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Introduction  
By voting in favor of the United Nations’ (UN) reunification plan on 24 April 2004, Turkish 
Cypriots caught many casual observers of the Cyprus conflict by surprise because in doing 
so they have made a huge U-turn from their half a century old policy of taksim (partition). 
Until very recently, the proponents of taksim had always been in power and their electoral 
support was on the rise even until few years earlier. However, first, their votes declined 
sharply in the December 2003 parliamentary election, which brought about the first ever 
government led by a pro-reunification prime minister. A year after the referendum, Rauf 
Denktaş (henceforth, Denktaş), who had led the Turkish Cypriot quest for partition for 
almost five decades, was replaced as president of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by a supporter of reunification, Mehmet Ali Talat. Few months 
later, Derviş Eroğlu (henceforth, Eroğlu), the leader of the National Unity Party (Ulusal 
Birlik Partisi, UBP), who had served some fifteen years as prime minister, stepped down as 
the party leader. Within only a matter of months, the symbols of old regime fell one after 
another, marking the end of an era in Turkish Cypriot political life -though, ironically, not 
the end of the TRNC itself, as Greek Cypriots who had rejected the UN plan by a huge 
margin maintained an intransigent position in the negotiations held afterwards.  
How can we explain the nationalists’ sudden and dramatic fall from grace? Given their past, 
uninterrupted electoral success despite their dismal record in the provision of public goods 
such as sustained economic growth, monetary stability, a well-established public health-
care and education system or at the very least, international recognition for the TRNC, it is 
highly unlikely that this was the price paid for failing to deliver on their promises. Has the 
Turkish Cypriot community become less nationalist all of a sudden, then? After all, as Vural 
and Peristianis (2008: 46) also highlight, one of the fundamental differences between the 
Turkish Cypriot political parties is their stance towards the Cyprus problem. The Turkish 
nationalists who favor the partition or status quo are considered right-wing, and parties 
favoring the reunification of the island on the basis of a federation are considered left-wing. 
Therefore, had we talked about an ideal case portrayed by “the responsible government 
model,” where “above all, programmatic linkages matter for democratic accountability and 
responsiveness,” (see Kitschelt 2000: 846) our answer could be “yes”.  
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As the comparative politics literature shows, however, there are strategies linking the 
electorate and political parties together other than program. Political clientelism, which 
“represents a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments 
or continuing access to employment, goods, and services,” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2, 
emphasis in original) is the most remarkable of these strategies. Where this strategy 
prevails, a government “party’s (or its program’s) popularity” cannot be inferred from its 
electoral successes (Stokes 2007: 607). In other words, the fact that Turkish Cypriot voters 
had kept the nationalists in power for almost 30 years does not necessarily prove that they 
had been bewitched by the nationalistic rhetoric of the pro-partition parties. Likewise, the 
fact that they have favored the Annan plan does not mean that the spell is gone, and they 
relinquished secessionism once and for all. We need to see both of these facts as 
consequences of certain historical and politico-economic dynamics. This study aims to 
explore these dynamics on the basis of the political clientelism literature. In doing so, as a 
subsidiary goal, it also aims to account for the underperformance of the Turkish Cypriot 
economy in the post-1974 period despite favorable initial conditions and billions of dollars 
of financial assistance funneled from Ankara. And thirdly, it can be seen as an attempt to 
outline the political history of Turkish Cypriots.   
The research agenda followed in this study seeks to contribute not just to our 
understanding of the politico-economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community, 
but is also meant to contribute to the study of the Cyprus conflict in general. For a long time, 
the students of the Cyprus conflict have generally followed roughly three analytical 
perspectives: The clash of Turkish and Greek ethno-nationalisms (Attalides 1979; 
Mavratsas 2000; Kızılyürek 2002), the maintenance of the balance of power between 
Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean (Theophanous 2001; Tayfur 2002) and 
the manipulation by external powers (Kitromilides and Couloumbis 1976; Pollis 1979a; 
Pollis 1998). The “Europeanization of the Cyprus problem” after the Republic of Cyprus’ 
(RoC) application for full membership, and the European Union’s (EU) decision to accept it 
as a candidate state, brought an additional dimension to these debates, and the possible 
effects of EU membership process attracted scholarly interest starting from the late 1990s 
(Axt and Brey 1998; Baier-Allen 1999; Diez 2002). Though all of these approaches possess 
valuable explanatory power, they provide only partial accounts of the changes outlined 
above. What is missing is, firstly, an account of the political competition within each 
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community in general, and within the Turkish Cypriot community in particular; the 
analysis of competing views over how to construct the Turkish Cypriot political community. 
Therefore, the research agenda pursued here seeks to complement, though not altogether 
displace, the existing focus on inter-ethnic conflict with a perspective that highlights the 
intra-ethnic sources of the ongoing state of affairs in Cyprus, and the mechanisms through 
which a particular vision of political community –which ruled out a unified Cyprus- was 
maintained. Secondly, I suggest that these mechanisms cannot be addressed in purely 
cultural terms, as much of the literature seeks to do, but need to be complemented by a 
politico-economic framework that addresses both the material aims of existing and 
contending elites, and the gains and costs incurred by different social groups.  
In this context, the political sea change outlined above will be explained on the basis of -
what turned out to be- a temporary crisis in the operation of the post-1974 politico-
economic order, which had increasingly relied on political distribution of economic 
resources for its survival. This is to say the Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the UN’s 
reunification plan was essentially an attempt to escape from the social, political and 
economic ills, which this order have led to, by jumping on the EU train. In this effort to 
explain this historic turning point, the literature of political clientelism is used as the 
theoretical framework because as it will be illustrated in the chapters to come, it provides 
us with more explanatory power than any other competing approach in the analysis of the 
post-1974 politico-economic order in general, and the decline of the pro-taksim right in the 
early 2000s, in particular.  
The dissertation is planned in accordance with this perspective. At the center of the 
research is a political party, the UBP. In the course of the study, it will be shown that (a) 
political clientelism was not a remnant of pre-democratic past or a cultural anomaly, but 
rather a strategy deliberately adopted by the UBP during its establishment phase to lock 
itself into power; (b) this was because the UBP has styled itself as the sole guardian of the 
state against the “enemy within”; (c) this attempt to exclude the opposition led to the 
emergence of a guided democracy or a democrazia bloccata1, and triggered widespread 
corruption; (d) this insistence to keep the UBP in power turned northern Cyprus into an 
                                                        
1 The term is used in the sense developed by Mouzelis. He used it to describe the post-civil war order in 
Greece (cited in Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002). In a similar vein, democrazia bloccata is the term used to 
denote the post-World War II Italy (see, for instance, Sassoon 1995).   
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aid junkie or an area assistita2, and finally (e) the system came in the brink of almost 
complete breakdown in the eve of the 2004 referendum mainly due to two consecutive 
economic crises whose adverse effects spun out of control because of an infighting within 
the nationalist camp, and hence the referendum result.   
Before focusing on the merits of political clientelism as a toolbox for research, I will briefly 
look at the relevant literature on Turkish Cypriot politics –which turned out to be 
surprisingly shallow (a) to see to what extent the approach adopted here was used before, 
and (b) to identify the gaps that can be plugged by this dissertation. I will start with three 
studies by Tayfur (2002), Kalodukas (2003) and Yaşın (1989), which aim to account for the 
emergence and perpetuation of the Cyprus conflict with a politico-economic approach.   
According to Tayfur, the Cyprus conflict is nothing but a battlefield in the broader historical 
Turco-Greek rivalry over the domination of the Eastern Mediterranean i.e. a race to become 
the Western capitalism’s agent in the region, which had started with the emergence of the 
Greek state in the 19th century and has escalated after the establishment of the modern 
Turkish state in 1923. Tayfur analyzes the rivalry between these two countries and its 
implications on the Cyprus problem in the framework of the world system theory. The 
downside of this work is that it completely overlooks the island level actors and interests.  
Like Tayfur, Kalodukas suggests that the Cyprus problem, especially after 1974, should be 
considered as a part of the general Turco-Greek competition (2003: 71), and that every 
phase of it has been determined by the balance of power between the Greek and Turkish 
“capitalists” at the given period (ibid.: 103). In addition, he identifies the conflicts between 
the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot capitalists on the one hand, and the conflicts 
between the Greek Cypriot and the Greek capitalists on the other, as the other reasons 
behind the perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. Yet, Kalodukas’ approach is one-sided and 
therefore incomplete, as he does not elaborate on the Turkish Cypriot actors’ interests. He 
tends to explain different historical developments in the Cyprus problem with the greed of 
the Greek Cypriot capitalists per se. For instance, incidents of the 1963-1974 period were 
consequences of “the apartheid regime” imposed by the Greek Cypriot “capitalists” on the 
Turkish Cypriots (ibid.: 75-9) and, the rigid rejectionist stance of the Greek Cypriot 
                                                        
2 The term is used in the sense developed by Chubb (1982).   
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administrations between 1978 and 1988 was shaped by the Greek Cypriot capitalists’ 
interests (ibid.: 95). In a similar vein, he argues that since Makarios-Denktaş High Level 
Agreement in 1977, the negotiation process has been in effect a struggle between the Greek 
Cypriot capitalists who has been trying to extend their influence over the north through a 
strong federal government and the Turkish Cypriot “side” who has been trying to prevent 
this by insisting on a weaker central government (ibid.: 91; 99).  
At the single point, where he refers to the Turkish Cypriot capitalists in concrete terms, his 
analysis is flawed because apparently, he sees this class as a monolithic entity. He suggests 
that the mass movement in the early 2000s against the establishment in the north, was in 
conflict with the preferences of the Turkish Cypriot capitalists (ibid.: 126; 130). However, 
this is to overlook the active role of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (Kıbrıs Türk 
Ticaret Odası, KTTO) and other smaller business associations, which obviously represent a 
significant segment if not the entire Turkish Cypriot “capitalist” class, in this process.   
Yaşın (1989) also sees the conflicting interests of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
“bourgeoisies” as the source of the problem. However, with a diametrically opposite view 
to Kalodukas’, who reduces everything to the greed of the Greek Cypriot capitalists, Yaşın 
goes as far as arguing that, the taksim policy stemmed from the dissatisfaction of the 
nascent Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie in the late 1940s, which found its channels of 
development blocked by the more developed Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie. According to 
Yaşın, “From Turk to Turk” campaign reveals that the main motive of the taksim camp was 
in essence to create a separate Turkish Cypriot market (1989: 42-6; 69-70). The problem 
with this argument is that it is devoid of strong empirical evidence. In other words, overall, 
their other merits aside, the three studies concerned do not sufficiently and accurately 
study the politico-economic dynamics within the Turkish Cypriot community in creating or 
sustaining the Cyprus problem.   
Unlike the three scholars mentioned before, Kızılyürek and Choisi do not put economic 
interests at the center of discussion in their efforts to account for the roots of the Cyprus 
conflict. Kızılyürek shows that the emergence of political/bureaucratic wing of the Turkish 
Cypriot upper class historically preceded the formation of an economic elite and therefore 
that the creation of a separate market/economy was only an ideological instrument and 
not a desire articulated by a class. According to Kızılyürek the Turkish nationalism in 
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Cyprus and its offspring taksim is devoid of any bourgeois class base, and is basically a 
counter-nationalist movement trying to cope with external factors including the Greek 
Cypriot chauvinism (1988: 17 and 104; 2003b: 17-18; see also Choisi 1993a: 19; 1997: 25). 
In other words, having a separate market/economy was a means and not the end for the 
Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite. In a somewhat similar vein, Choisi sees the Cyprus 
problem not as a conflict between the economic elites of the two sides but as an inter-elite 
conflict, in which nationalist ideologies were instrumentalized by the ruling elites in both 
sides “for mobilizing masses and for pursuing their interests” (1993b: 9-10; 13). It is 
important to note that both Choisi and Kızılyürek identify the unequal economic 
development process as an element, which served the deepening of the inter-elite conflict 
back in the 1950s (Choisi 1993b: 13; Kızılyürek 2003a: 253), but not as a reason for the 
conflict per se.  
When it comes to explaining the perpetuation of the conflict in the post-1974 period, again, 
Kızılyürek and Choisi have similar approaches. They both emphasize the role of ideology i.e. 
Turkish nationalism, while acknowledging the role of political distribution of economic 
resources in the reproduction of the existing power relations. According to Kızılyürek, for 
instance, until 1974, the Turkish Cypriot political/bureaucratic elite had to rely only on 
ideology -which was anti-Greek, anti-Communist and aspired for a separate economy and a 
separate state- and rough repression to retain control. After attainment of the latter two 
elements of the ideology in 1974, political and economic organization of the Turkish 
Cypriot elite was strengthened in the second half of the 1970s, and repression and ideology 
began to be coupled by the distribution of material benefits (Kızılyürek 1988: 105). Choisi 
also identifies political clientelism as a means for maintaining power for the ruling elite 
(1993b: 14). But still, her main emphasis is on the ideology.3  
This study complements the works of Kızılyürek and Choisi by focusing on the politico-
economic dimension of the issue without of course ignoring the interaction of the material 
and ideological means in the reproduction of the existing power relations maintaining 
division on the island. In this effort, political clientelism literature provides us with an 
important analytical tool. Yet, the literature review reveals that this tool has been 
                                                        
3 Based on the English summary of the study.  
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underutilized despite the abundance of anecdotal evidence showing that political 
clientelism has been a strong element of the Turkish Cypriot political life.      
Since the first multi-party elections held in 1976, there has not been even a single election, 
which was not tainted by the opposition’s claims about the selective and partisan use of the 
public resources by the ruling UBP, be it inter alia in the form of distribution of the Greek 
Cypriot movable/immovable properties, employment in the public sector, granting 
citizenship to Turkish citizens, granting taxi and rental car permits, and soft loans to fellow 
businessmen, or simply buying votes by offering cash. To take a random look at the local 
newspapers in any given election period suffices to have an idea about how extensively the 
UBP exploited its access to public resources to elicit electoral support. The media is full of 
anecdotes showing that from simple layman to the president, everyone has had something 
to complain about the irregularities in the election periods.  
Furthermore, there are reports and even testimony of politicians admitting vote buying. In 
his report on December 2003 parliamentary election for the Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights, for instance, Hylland states that ‘”there is no reasonable doubt that vote buying and 
undue influence on voters occurred in connection with the 2003 parliamentary elections” 
(2004: 42). “It is not just a question of isolated cases. Such practices were widespread, at 
least in some segments of the population,” the report concludes (ibid.).4 More recently, in 
the aftermath of the 2009 election, Serdar Denktaş, the leader of the Democratic Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP) and a former UBP deputy, apparently out of extreme exasperation, 
and with an expectation to pave the way for a system-wide catharsis admitted that his 
party bribed the voters. He was quoted as saying that all parties bought votes for cash: “We 
also bought votes … If there is any party that says it did not also do so … Iʼll put the proof in 
front of them”.5  The former head of the Turkish Cypriot Bar Association confirms that 
cash-for-vote is a ‘“well established’ practice,” and that “voters had ‘grown used to being 
able to get cash for their votes”’.6 What is more, there are two different reports, one 
prepared by a parliamentary enquiry committee, and the other by the attorney general’s 
office confirming the extensive use of public resources to gain votes in the eve of the 1990 
and 1993 elections respectively.  
                                                        
4 According to Hylland, reportedly “the price of a vote was, and had for a long time been, USD 100” (2004: 30).  
5 Cited in Simon Bahceli: “Votes for cash claim in north.” Cyprus Mail, 25.4.2009. 
6 Ibid. 
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Yet, the dearth of scholarly interest on politico-economic development of the Turkish 
Cypriot community equally applies to the study of political clientelism. To date, the role of 
political clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot politics have not been subject to a full-scale 
research though the abuse of the state’s resources by politicians has been referred to many 
times in the literature (see for instance Warner 1993; Olgun 1993; Lacher and Kaymak 
2005). Common point about all these studies is that neither of them is particularly 
interested in revealing the full extent and historical development of the clientelistic 
relations in a systematic way. All of them mention existence of such relations in passing, 
but do not elaborate on the issue. The only notable exception is the work of Egemen (2006), 
whose approach is fundamentally different from this dissertation. While Egemen sees the 
political clientelism in the post-1974 period only as the continuation of a process, whose 
roots can be traced back to the early 20th century, and therefore structural, this one seeks 
to show that its emergence was a result of a strategic choice made after 1974 to sustain the 
taksim project. The other differences between the two studies will be specified in the 
course of the dissertation.  
When it comes to the relationship between political clientelism and its adverse effects on 
economic development, again, there is not much at hand. It is true that the Turkish Cypriot 
economy has attracted more scholarly interest than its political economy or its politics. 
However, most of the time these studies don’t go further than enumerating the well-known 
pretexts for failure in economic development like “the unjust international isolation” and 
“structural disadvantages of being a small island economy”. Mismanagement of the 
economy and the pervasiveness of political distribution are hardly taken up. For instance, a 
bloated public sector, one of the symptoms of political clientelism, is pointed out as a major 
problem almost in every study on the Turkish Cypriot economy (Olgun 1993: 275-9 and 
289; Gumpel 1997: 71-2; TÜSİAD 1998; Türel 2002: 95; Balkır 2005; Seyidoğlu 2004: 228; 
İneci 2004: 203; Kalaycı 2004: 189). However, most of the time, the authors tend not to 
establish a causal relationship between political expediency and over-employment in the 
public sector. When they do so, generally they tend to attribute this to more benign 
political motives such as boosting up the psychology of the people (İneci 2004: 203) or 
concerns to avoid emigration and unemployment (Türel 2002: 99). And only in some 
exceptional cases, they attribute this to use of public employment “as political bribery 
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during election years” by the governments, which aimed to “monopolize power” (Olgun 
1993: 277; see also Balkır 2005).  
There are two notable studies, which diverge from this mainstream approach: Altan (2003: 
91-118) and Uğur (2003) explain economic problems of the TRNC with political 
distribution of the resources. Altan’s contribution is noteworthy as he establishes a causal 
relationship between economic crisis/decline of economic resources available for 
distribution, and political change/reorganization within community both in Turkey and 
Cyprus, though he does not relate this change directly with the Cyprus problem (2003: 93). 
His analysis is mainly on Turkey. But he likens the structure of the political distribution of 
economic resources, a structure devoid of economic rationality, in north Cyprus to the 
system in Turkey, and suggests that this structure is condemned to failure once economic 
resources dry up (ibid.: 103). The EU accession process or the negotiations with the IMF for 
stand-by agreements are seen as external dynamics to achieve, what is impossible with 
internal dynamics alone. That is why he sees the frequent crises of political distribution in 
general and the 2001 economic crisis in particular, as opportunities to transform and 
reorganize the entrenched system of political distribution (ibid.: 111). Altan highlights that 
the transformation starts when masses realize that the flow of money is in decline (ibid.: 
103). He also stresses that the mechanism, which is based on political distribution of 
money coming from external sources cannot last long (ibid.: 104). Overall, Altan sees 
economic irrationality embodied by the political distribution of economic resources as the 
reason of economic crises not only in Turkey but in Cyprus as well. The problem is political 
and so is its solution, he argues.  
Uğur (2003), who discusses the role of political clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot 
community within the context of accession to the EU, comes up with one of the most 
detailed analysis made so far on this issue. Basically, he argues that the widespread belief 
that the EU membership would facilitate economic growth in the north, alleviating the 
development gap between the two sides should not be taken for granted, given “the 
institutional/governance” inefficiencies in the north i.e. the clientelistic structure and 
dependence on the Turkish aid. Uğur suggests that these kinds of weaknesses may lead to 
widening of the gap between the two sides and subsequently threaten the sustainability of 
a prospective federal Cypriot state. Uğur’s contribution is important, as he clearly explains 
the sluggish economic performance of the north with political clientelism (2003: 61-2). 
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Going one step further, he establishes a causal relationship between this clientelistic 
structure and the Turkish Cypriot position in the inter-communal negotiations, and 
suggests that the legitimacy derived from this clientelist structure gave the ruling elite a 
free hand to pursue a hardliner policy vis-{-vis the Greek Cypriot administration.  
That said, no matter how sound their conclusions are, it should be noted that both studies 
have a limited scope. After all, Uğur’s study aims to examine the possible implications of EU 
membership for the north-south development gap in a federal Cyprus, and it is not an 
attempt to reveal the full-extent of political clientelism in the northern part of Cyprus. For 
instance, he concludes that a clientelistic structure was established in the north by 
analyzing only certain annual budget figures between 1977 and 1997. Altan’s analysis, on 
the other hand, is to a large extent an extrapolation of his research on Turkey and hence 
needs to be tested scientifically; something this dissertation aims to do.   
To sum up, the review of the literature on the politico-economic development of the 
Turkish Cypriot community shows that though the role of political clientelism in the 
Turkish Cypriot society have been taken up in passing in various contexts, a 
comprehensive study of political clientelism is still missing. This dissertation aims to plug 
this gap by offering a case study on the subject. In doing so, it also aims to contribute to the 
literature on Cyprus conflict, Turkish Cypriot economic development and political history 
of Turkish Cypriots.   
Chapter Plan 
The dissertation is organized around an overarching question: How can we explain the 
Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the UN’s reunification plan in 2004, given the fact that they 
had kept pro-partition leaders and parties in power for almost half a century? I will argue 
that the answer should be sought in the politico-economic dynamics, and particularly in the 
declining ability of the regime to dispense material resources to buy legitimacy, or to put it 
another way, simply in the crisis of the clientelistic system.  
If we are to account for this tectonic shift in Turkish Cypriot politics as an outcome of the 
crisis of the clientelistic system, then in the first place, we need to illustrate that there has 
been a clientelistic system sustaining this, what I call, pro-taksim consensus. With this in 
mind, the dissertation will start with a theoretical chapter on political clientelism. Here, I 
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will attempt to show the historical circumstances where clientelistic relations emerged and 
thrived elsewhere in the world, on the one hand, and the development of academic study of 
clientelism, on the other. After elaborating on the differences between “clientelism of 
notables” and “the party-based patronage,” and coming up with a working definition of 
political clientelism, I will review culturalist, developmentalist and institutionalist 
approaches, which try to account for the emergence of political clientelism in different 
contexts. 
In the light of the theoretical chapter, in Chapter Two, I will look into possible historical 
roots for political clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot community. Can we explain the 
dominant role of political clientelism in the post-1974 period with the prevalence of 
patron-client ties in the preceding period? Can we trace clientelism back to the periods 
under the Ottoman or British rule? Or did it emerge after independence in 1960 as it did in 
the Greek Cypriot community?7 My answer to all three questions will be “no”. By charting 
the evolution of electoral politics and intra-elite competition in the British and Republic 
periods, and illustrating that there was no ground for widespread clientelism then, I will 
show that neither the culturalist nor developmentalist approach, which seek the roots of 
clientelism in the pre-democratic past can explain the entrenchment of political clientelism 
in the contemporary Turkish Cypriot community. In this chapter, I will also briefly touch 
upon the roots of taksim policies; Ankara’s and Turkish nationalism’s influence on the 
Turkish Cypriot political elite and the evolution of separate Turkish Cypriot organizations 
in this period to prepare the ground for the subsequent analysis. 
If political clientelism has not been inherited or structural, then, how can we explain its 
emergence in the post-1974 period out of the blue? I will answer this question, in Chapter 
Three, where I will focus on the immediate post-1974 period with a view to accounting for 
the emergence of political clientelism with an institutionalist approach. I will start from the 
premise that political clientelism should be taken as a deliberate choice or a strategy, 
which was adopted by those already in power at the time of first multi-party elections to 
outmobilize the newly emerging opposition parties. I will dwell on the circumstances 
within which this strategy was adopted, and particularly, highlight the central role of the 
                                                        
7 For political clientelism in the Greek Cypriot community in general see Attalides 1977a; Loizos 1977; 
Faustmann 1998 and 2010. For this particular point see Faustmann 2010: 273-4.  
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taksim policy of the leadership and the ensuing legitimacy crisis it faced, in the making of 
this strategic choice. In the last section of Chapter Three, I will deal with the formation of 
the key institutions of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) with a view to 
exploring other possible institutional factors promoting political clientelism. Of particular 
importance here will be the electoral system and form of government.   
In Chapter Four, I will focus on the UBP’s establishment process and analyze its program, 
social composition, constitution and organization. First, I will show that it was essentially 
held together not by program or ideology but rather by clientelistic ties by illustrating the 
lack of cohesion in its program and fundamental conflicts of interest in its cadres, who for 
the most part made strange bedfellows given their social backgrounds. Then, I will turn my 
attention to the party organization. I will show that curiously for an “internally mobilized 
party,” whose founders were already in power, the UBP leadership opted for a bottom-up 
organization model, and attached great importance to the building up of an organization 
based on mass membership. Finally, I will illustrate how the UBP used public resources, 
first to recruit members, and then to mobilize voters in the run up to the first multi-party 
election.  
What were the effects of this organizational model on the balance of power between the 
old guard and the emerging new guard within the party? How did it affect the functioning 
of the government once the UBP had won the election and become the government party? 
How did mighty Denktaş gradually lose the control of the party he had established? At a 
broader level, what were the consequences of the institutional choices i.e. the semi-
presidential system and open list electoral system? Chapter Five will address these 
questions and chart the political developments at intra and inter-party level in the late 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. At the intra-party level, it will be shown that the underlying cause 
of the chaotic atmosphere and lack of discipline within the UBP was the power struggle 
within the party between the old and new guard. I will argue that the eventual purge of the 
old guard can be associated with the organizational choice. Although he was no longer the 
official leader of the UBP, Denktaş’s role as one of the protagonists in this process will be at 
the center of the discussion. In this context, the rise of Eroğlu, a member of the new guard, 
who gradually took over the party organization and became Denktaş’s archrival, will also 
be discussed. I will also point out how the clientelistic character of the party, which 
brought too many irreconcilable interests together, made it impossible to devise and 
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implement a program, to account for the dismal performance of the UBP as the governing 
party. At the inter-party level, I will touch upon the role of Ankara in forming a “guided 
democracy”.   
What were the accumulated effects of political clientelism on social, economic and political 
life? What did give the clientelistic system its strength? Which factors did eventually 
undermine it? Why did not the EU’s expected catalyst effect in the solution of the Cyprus 
problem initially kick in? In the closing chapter of the dissertation, I will address these 
questions, and explore the causes of the crisis of the clientelistic system, which culminated 
with the approval of the Annan plan. After evaluating the accumulated effects of three 
decades of political clientelism on the socio-economic structure of the community, and the 
effects of bureaucratic clientelism, a distinct form of political clientelism, on the public 
finances, I will conclude by showing how two economic crises and infighting within the 
nationalist camp coincided to expose all the weaknesses of the establishment, and turned 
the EU membership and reunification in the public mind into a panacea to all the ills the 
community has been suffering from.        
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework: What is Political Clientelism? 
Clientelism is a very broad concept “at the crossroads of politics and administration, 
economy and society” (Roniger 2004: 354). Reflecting this multifaceted nature, the study of 
clientelism has been the common domain of anthropologists, historians, sociologists and 
political scientists (Scott 1977c: 483). Given this variety, no wonder that the concept means 
“different things to different people” (Medina and Stokes 2002: 2), and this difference 
grows bigger when these people come from different disciplinary backgrounds. In 
particular, definitions attributed to the very same concept by anthropologists on the one 
hand, and political scientists on the other, proved to be so divergent that it has become 
indispensable to specify from the outset, which type of clientelism or patronage is being 
analyzed (Weingrod 1968: 380). Having emerged as a tool of analysis used by 
anthropologists to study the interpersonal relationships in small rural communities, 
needless to say, the meaning attached to the concept has changed substantially as it has 
come to be used as a tool for studying complex political systems at national level.  
Complicating things further, diverse terms such as patron-client relationships/ties, 
patronage, party-based patronage, clientelismo, mass clientelism, new clientelism, 
semiclientelism, bureaucratic clientelism, machine politics, clientelism of notables, pork-
barrelling, and political jobbery are used in different contexts to express variants of 
clientelism. At times, some of these terms are used to describe more or less the same 
practices, and yet, sometimes they are used to denote completely different phenomena, 
making any attempt to make a clear-cut definition all the more complicated.  
Bearing the contested nature of the concept in mind, this chapter aims to review the 
literature with a view to setting out a route map for the rest of the study, where the role of 
political clientelism in northern Cyprus in post-1974 period will be elaborated as a factor 
leading to the perpetuation of the Cyprus conflict on the one hand, and as a tool to explain 
its failure to keep up with its neighbor economically despite being considerably more 
advantageous at the outset, on the other. It will trace the historical evolution of the study of 
clientelism, and touch upon the major points of agreement and disagreement among 
scholars. Some of the questions that will be addressed in this chapter will be: How did the 
concept emerge in the first place? What are the main traits of patron-client ties as they are 
understood in anthropology? How was it introduced to the political science literature? 
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What are the main differences between clientelism in the anthropological and political 
science sense? In which contexts can it be used as a strong explanatory tool to elaborate 
complex political processes? How can we account for the emergence of political 
clientelism?  
1.1 Clientelism of Notables 
The concept originates from the social organization once prevailing in Mediterranean 
peasant societies. It was subsequently generalized to describe the relationship between 
peasant cultivators and landowners or local notables in general, in traditional societies at 
large (Clapham 1982: 2; see also Allum and Allum 2008: 341).  As the environment, a 
typical peasant destined to spend his life was characterized by extreme scarcities and 
threats, be it natural, like “disease, accident, death,” or man-made, like “violence, 
exploitation, and injustice at the hands of the powerful,” certain cooperative social 
arrangements emerged to cope with these difficulties of peasant life, patron-client 
relationship being one of the most important of them (Powell 1970: 411-2; see also 
Waterbury 1977: 337; cf. Lemarchand and Legg 1972). Under these adverse circumstances, 
“where subsistence needs are paramount and physical security uncertain,” the peasants 
saw that “a modicum of protection and insurance can often be gained only by depending on 
a superior who undertakes personally to provide for his own clients” (Scott 1977b: 133).  
In essence, the relationship was based on economic or military services offered by the 
client, typically a sharecropper, in exchange for security and protection provided by the 
patron, typically the client’s landlord, against the uncertainties of peasant life. The whole 
exchange was encapsulated “within a set of moral obligations, often symbolized, for 
instance, by godparenthood” (Clapham 1982: 2).8 Though in some occasional cases, the 
patron-client relationship was not based on “common participation in an agricultural 
enterprise,” it may be said that the bond still resembled, and “patterned after the landlord-
peasant relationship” (Silverman 1977: 297). From an anthropological point of view, the 
patron-client relationship can be illustrated with the following example from Central Italy: 
                                                        
8 It should be noted that, in Boissevain words, godparenthood “is a relationship that is not lightly entered into 
since it is a formal contract, solemnized in public and before God, and once concluded not to be broken” 
(1966: 21).   
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A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of money or 
help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his aid knowing of the 
problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further favors were likely to be 
asked or offered at some time later. The peasant would reciprocate –at a time and in 
a context different from that of the acceptance of the favor in order to de-emphasize 
the material self-interest of the reciprocative action- by bringing the landlord 
especially choice offerings from the farm produce, or by sending some member of 
the peasant family to perform services in the landlord’s home, by refraining from 
cheating the landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing 
devotion to him (Silverman cited in Powell 1970: 412).9 
This summary epitomizes the basic features attributed to the patron-client ties: they 
“involve dyadic bonds between individuals of unequal power and socioeconomic status; 
they exhibit a diffuse, particularistic, face-to-face quality … voluntarily entered into and 
derive their legitimacy from expectations of mutual benefits” (Lemarchand 1981: 15). 
Indeed, Pitt-Rivers’ “lopsided friendship” term summarizes the basic traits of the 
relationship in a rather succinct manner by emphasizing not only the personal and 
enduring character of the relationship, but also the asymmetry and reciprocity, it involves 
(cited in Weingrod 1968: 379).  
These basic features merit further elaboration. The asymmetric character of the 
relationship, for instance, is particularly significant, because it creates “a debt of 
obligation,” on the client’s side, which makes him bound to the patron (Scott 1977b: 125). 
The asymmetry has two dimensions. First dimension stems from “the disparity in their 
relative wealth, power, and status” (ibid., emphasis in original). Second dimension stems 
from the nature of the goods and services provided by the patron. The benefits provided by 
the patron were most of the time in material form (physical protection and economic 
assistance), while what the client provided for the patron required labor and effort, or 
simply demonstration of esteem (Lande 1977: xx; Powell 1970: 412; Wolf 1977: 174). 
Evidently, what the patron offered was what the client and his family needed for their 
survival and well being: “A locally dominant landlord … is frequently the major source of 
protection, of security, of employment, of access to arable land or to education, and of food 
in bad times. … [which] could hardly be more vital” (Scott 1977b: 125).  The benefits of the 
patron on the other hand, were though of importance to the patron himself, tend to be less 
                                                        
9 For a more coercive version of the clientelistic relationship, clientele mafiosa, see the case of 19th century 
Sicily (Graziano 1976: 361-4).  
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vital compared to what the client got in return: “Not only can a large landowner get along 
without the esteem or loyalty of an individual peasant and his family, but there are many 
more peasant families with needs than there are patrons with assets” (Powell 1970: 413). 
Therefore, ultimately, due to the asymmetric character of the relationship, the client was 
finding himself in an exchange in “which he is unable to reciprocate fully” (Scott 1977b: 
125), making him more submissive to the demands of the patron. Informing the patron 
regarding the activities of his enemies can be an example for this (Boissevain 1966: 23). In 
more extreme cases, the services asked from the client could also involve illegal or 
unpleasant activities “such as threatening or committing violence on the person or 
property of a personal enemy, or the enemy of some friend, or some friend-of-a friend” 
(ibid.). Overall, this state of affairs used to help the patron to build up his social credit, 
which he could rely on later, should the need for it arise. “The larger a patron’s clientele 
and the more dependent on him they are, the greater his latent capacity to organize group 
action” (Scott, 1977b: 125-6).   
Beyond this social credit aspect, the patron acquired some further benefits. At the very 
least, to have a client was of great convenience for him too.  
It provided a check against being taken advantage of, a check that was cheaper, 
more reliable, and in any case a useful supplement to supervision by fattori. It 
facilitated contacts with the peasant and contributed to the day-to-day efficiency of 
the enterprise. Finally, it was a means of controlling potentially disruptive 
influences from the outside. It is significant that the paternalism of the mezzadria 
landlords has often been pointed to as a factor in delaying the spread of labor 
agitation to the Central Italian hill region for several decades after its onset in many 
agricultural areas of the nation about 1870 (Silverman 1977: 296-7).  
Reciprocal character of the relationship is also a significant element worthy of further 
elaboration. “A favor or service granted creates an obligation which entails a reciprocal 
service that must be repaid on more or less a quid pro quo basis. If it is not repaid when 
requested or expected, the relationship is terminated” (Boissevain 1966: 22, emphasis in 
original). Powell points out the expectations of mutual benefits, or in other words, 
reciprocity, as a factor distinguishing the patron-client tie “from other ties which might bind 
parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space … such as relationships based on 
coercion, authority, manipulation, and so forth” (1970: 412, emphasis in original). He does 
not rule out the involvement of such elements in the patron-client pattern, but he suggests 
that if they come to play a dominant role, the tie is no longer a patron-client relationship 
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(ibid.). To rephrase Scott (1977a: 22), why should the patron cultivate a clientele in the 
first place, if he could simply issue commands? Obviously, although, the client is hardly on 
equal footing with his patron, he is not a pawn in a one-way relationship either (ibid.).    
In the light of these basic features of the patron-client ties, the following definition 
formulated by Scott puts together the main traits of the patron-client relationship as it is 
understood in the literature of anthropology: 
The patron-client relationship –an exchange relationship between roles- may be 
defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own 
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower 
status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and 
assistance, including personal services, to the patron (1977b: 124, emphasis in 
original).  
It is important to emphasize that the services offered by the client, and security or 
protection provided by the patron were beyond the obligations necessitated by the 
landowner-peasant cultivator relationship pure and simple. The relationship as such is 
institutionalized and guaranteed under a “contractual” arrangement. Basically, it involves 
exchange of land for a share of the harvest. There are certain practices beyond this limited 
institutional arrangement that make the relationship fall under the genre of patron-client 
relationship, however. There is no institutional arrangement, for instance, that obligates 
the landlord to provide economic assistance and physical protection in case of emergency, 
or permanent tenure for a particular sharecropper. If he does so, this constitutes a special 
favor. In a similar vein, the sharecropper is not institutionally obligated to defer the 
landlord in a special way or speak well of the landlord or show special respect. If he does so 
this also constitutes a favor. If there is such a special relationship beyond the 
“institutionalized” landlord-tenant relationship, this, as Landé aptly puts it, constitutes an 
“addendum” to the former (1977: xxi), and this addendum part is what we exactly are 
interested in when we are dealing with the patron-client relationships. As such, patron-
client addendum can be seen as a remedy for the “inadequacies of institutionalized 
relationships,” not only in agricultural tenancy but also in other sorts of institutionalized 
relationships (ibid.), which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
In this context, it should also be added that although there are many similarities, patron-
client ties are different from feudal relationship between the landlord and the 
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peasant/sharecropper (Gellner 1977: 2-3). In fact, “[a]lthough patron-client relations can 
be traced far back in history, it was only with the growth of feudalism in Western Europe 
and Japan that relationships of personal protection and subordination between lord and 
peasant came to form a basis for social, economic, and political organization” (Hall 1977: 
510). But this does not necessarily make them one and the same thing. Unlike in feudalism, 
in the patron-client bond, “[t]here was no oath of homage and no exchange of fiefs … choice 
of master was free; and services were not defined” (Kettering 1988: 420). As Tarrow put it 
“[i]n feudal society, social relations are formalized, hierarchical, and legally sanctioned. A 
logical pyramid of mutual obligations was built up which was congruent with the 
requirements of the society for defense and solidarity. … Clientelismo, however, is shifting 
and informal, and has no institutional recognition in concrete institutions” (cited in 
Kettering 1988: 420-1; cf. Boissevain 1966: 18).10 
In addition to providing physical and economic security, another important role attributed 
to the patrons, which is widely cited in the literature, is their function as a link between the 
client and the rest of the world (Silverman 1977: 297; Weingrod 1968: 382). The 
emergence of this role is more recent. In her study on Central Italy, Silverman argues that 
until the unification of Italy, this role of the patrons was of minor importance as “the 
sphere of social interaction extended no farther than the nearby market towns and a radius 
of neighboring communities within which there were cycles of fairs and religious festivals” 
(1977: 298). The interaction with the larger political unit was also at a minimal level, and 
hence there was not much to be mediated (ibid.). Mediators, Silverman suggests, “can be 
best understood as elements of particular form of part-whole relationship, one which exists 
at a particular level of development of complex societies” i.e. during the early nation-
building process, and thus, in a society at a pre-nation-state level of integration like pre-
unification Italian one, she argues, “there would be little necessity for mediators” (ibid.: 
294).  
When the peasant village began to be gradually penetrated by the state and the market, 
thanks to the unification of Italy, however, this picture also began to change. There were 
                                                        
10 It is also worth mentioning at this juncture that Kaufman criticizes Lemarchand and Legg (1972) of 
stretching the concept of patron-client relationship by treating “the highly legalistic, feudal contract as a sub-
type of the general patron-client exchange, rather than as a completely different type of vertical transaction” 
(1974: 290).  
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particularly two changes of major significance, which in turn led to the transformation of 
the patron-client relationship defined by the land-tenure system, outlined above. Firstly, 
due to economic and social development, those “from the commercial class of the towns 
and cities of the region,” bureaucrats and professionals like lawyers, physicians, 
pharmacists, and schoolteachers etc. joined the ranks of traditional patrons (ibid.: 299). 
Secondly, in addition to their earlier functions, this extended patron group came to play a 
different role than their predecessors. Namely, they began to function as “mediators” 
between the village community and the rest of the newly emerging nation-state.11 
Based on their empirical studies on Central Italy, and Sardinia, Sydel Silverman, and Alex 
Weingrod show that in the early phase of development of nation-state, for a particular 
period of time, this new group of patrons came to perform a major role in linking the local 
life of peasant communities with the rest of the nation (Weingrod 1968: 386-93; Silverman 
1977: 297-300). In other words, the twin processes of state and market penetration of the 
peasant village transformed the patrons into brokers, mediating the impact of the larger 
society on peasant society (Powell 1970: 413). 
When the state embarked on the task of bringing the isolated rural communities together, 
and the communication between the capital and the local increased steadily, the little 
world of the client began to expand. In the face of the challenge brought by this expanding 
world, the people of lower class turned to those who had always helped them: their 
patrons (Silverman 1977: 298). This does not necessarily mean that the patrons ceased to 
perform their traditional functions inherited from the past. However, in the post-
unification period, according to Silverman, what made the patron crucial for the client 
began to be his function as the mediator: “the most valuable patron was neither the 
wealthiest nor the most generous, but the one with the best connections” (ibid.: 298-9). 
More than for their traditional functions, now they were needed to -help to fill out the 
paperwork, and to- write letter of recommendation, which became a sine qua non for the 
client in all sorts of his extra-local dealings: 
If a client had to go out of the community for any purpose, the patron would 
recommend him to some acquaintance at the destination. In fact, all dealings with 
                                                        
11 In the case of Italy, this was “particularly true of lawyers, who have a key role in litigating the land disputes 
that persist to present day” (Tarrow 1967: 82). For more on this see Graziano 1977: 362-3.  
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institutions or persons outside the local system required personal 
recommendations from a mediator. When M.’s grandfather tried to get the local 
tobacco concession, when R. applied to a military specialists’ school, when F. took 
his deaf sister to a physician in Rome, when P. as a young man went periodically to 
the coastal plain to seek work, when T. took his bride to Perugia to choose a coral 
necklace –all would have considered it foolhardy to do so without a 
recommendation from a respected contact, and to get a recommendation a patron 
was needed. As jobs in the national institutions expanded, access to them was also a 
matter of recommendations, and this remained no less true even after adoption of 
the concorso system, an open competition for available jobs based on examinations 
(ibid.: 298).   
Silverman argues that this transformation can be generalized to many other industrializing 
nations, and that the mediators play an important but temporary role when these countries 
go through the early phase of nation-building process (ibid.: 304). As the process 
progresses however, she argues that patrons or mediators become redundant, and hence 
tend to disappear because they are basically replaced by public or private institutions 
(ibid.: 300-4). Weingrod does not agree with this argument. He does not see this as the 
demise of patronage in general, but rather as the end of a specific type of patronage i.e. 
“patronage in the anthropological sense” or the patronage of notables, which is in turn, 
replaced by “the new political party patronage system” (1968: 380-1, emphasis in original; 
see also Zuckerman 1977: 65). He underscores “the impact of universal suffrage, mass 
political parties, and more generally, mass society” as the main factors paving the way for 
the transformation of the political conditions of rural societies (Weingrod 1968: 381).   
Powell also points out this trend, and argues that this new form of patronage has political 
implications beyond the local level reaching to the national level, which merits further 
elaboration from the political scientists:  
The concept, I believe, helps to illuminate the political behaviour of low-status 
actors, particularly peasants, as they are incorporated, recruited, mobilized, or 
inducted into the national political process. Inasmuch as the induction of the 
peasantry into this process has in fact not yet occurred in many of the developing 
countries, an understanding of clientelist politics may be useful in a predictive sense. 
And while clientelist behaviour may be most visible in the political cultures of 
Mediterranean extraction, there is much –although scattered- evidence that it can 
be encountered in political cultures in many parts of the world. This is not a 
prediction that clientele systems of the type found in Italy or Venezuela are to be 
anticipated elsewhere, but that clientelist patterns of interpersonal behaviour may 
be a significant factor in the process of peasant politicization everywhere (1970: 
423). 
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Indeed, Weingrod and Powell can be seen as pioneers of a broader trend in the field of 
political science. From the 1960s on, the features of patron-client relationships began to 
draw the attention of political scientists working on political systems variously labeled as 
Third World, developing or modernizing countries. This was mainly due to the realization 
of these scholars of the fact that the tools that they were accustomed to use to explain 
politics in the West fell short of explaining politics in less developed parts of Europe, let 
alone in the newly independent countries (Lande 1977: xiii). As Legg writes of Greece, the 
style of politics was “unintelligible to many western observers” and “attempts to explain … 
political events in the language of political discourse familiar to westerners are bound to 
cause distortion, as well as surprise and dismay” (1973: 234). While some political 
scientists simply dismissed the patterns of political behavior and political structures 
prevailing in these countries as “either pathological, deviant, or of minor import” (Powell 
1970: 412), what they had observed prompted a group of scholars working on “the politics 
of developing countries to examine and learn from a body of anthropological literature 
dealing with interpersonal relationships” (Lande 1977: xiii). 
Based on his empirical studies on South Asian countries, Scott, for instance, suggests that 
class analysis, and primordial sentiments i.e. inter alia ethnicity, fall short of explaining the 
political activity in these countries as the political process was mainly dominated by “ad 
hoc groupings” such as “informal power groups, leadership-centered cliques and factions, 
and a whole panoply of more or less instrumental ties” (1977b: 124). Likewise, Schmidt 
points out that the approaches, which are widely used to understand politics in the West 
such as “the study of interest groups, political parties, voting patterns and ideology fails to 
account for political behavior” in the developing world (1977: 305). Both scholars suggest 
that the use of clientelism as a tool of analysis can overcome the difficulty of analyzing and 
describing these polities.   
Similarly, Lande observes that in these countries, during the process of organization of 
political activity, vertical inter-personal relationships play a more dominant role compared 
to horizontal relationships linking people of equal status along class or ideological lines 
(1977: xiii). As Tarrow observes, in Southern Italy, “[a]n individual is linked to the 
authority structure through personal ties of obligation and loyalty, rather than through 
merger of his interests with others of the same social group or ideological persuasion” 
(1967: 74). Even where horizontal organizations were observed to exist, it became evident 
23 
 
that they don’t often operate like disciplined collectivities, but rather “as clusters of 
personal relationships” (Lande 1977: xiii).    
Overall, “[w]hile class, ethnic, and religious cleavage may often explain a portion of the 
contest for power, clientelism often illuminates a vast range of political life which is not 
easily reducible to such categorical groupings” (Schmidt et. al. 1977: ix). Eventually, 
because of its usefulness in analyzing the empirical evidence from developing countries, 
the concept came to attract immense scholarly interest, and in the first decade of its 
introduction “in the lexicon of political scientists countless books and articles have been 
devoted to the exploration of clientelistic phenomena in settings as diverse as China and 
Columbia, Italy and Senegal, Venezuela and Lebanon” (Lemarchand 1981: 7). This interest 
did not last for long, however, and as Kitschelt and Wilkinson point out, “between 1978 and 
the late 1990s very little of theoretical consequence has been written about clientelism” 
(2007: 6).12 Since then, however, a remarkable revival in interest to the subject can be 
observed. 
1.2 Party-Based Patronage (Machine Politics) 
If traditional clientelism or clientelism of notables represents one end of the continuum, at 
the opposite end stands the modern clientelism of anonymous machine politics or party-
based patronage.13 As Weingrod (1968) was the first one to point out the distinction 
between patronage of the anthropologist and patronage of the political scientist, his study 
is a good starting point for the discussion on the party-based patronage, and its differences 
with the traditional one identified in the previous section.  
Weingrod defines patronage in the anthropological sense as a type of social relationship, 
and describes the study of patronage from this perspective as the “analysis of how persons 
of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their 
relationships in order to attain their ends” (1968: 379-80). Patronage from the political 
scientist’s perspective, on the other hand, takes the political party as the main unit of 
                                                        
12 Only exception to this general trend, they say, without getting into the details, is “a rather isolated 
literature on the effect of electoral laws on personalism and intra-party factionalism in party systems” 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 6).  
13 Machine and party-based patronage are mainly taken as more or less the same thing in the literature, and 
hence will be used interchangeably in this study. 
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analysis, and “refers to the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special 
favors in exchange for electoral support” (ibid.: 379). It is “largely the study of how political 
party leaders seek to turn public institutions and public resources to their own ends, and 
how favors of various kinds are exchanged for votes” (ibid.). 
Given this context, clientelism in the political science sense –and the working definition 
adopted in this study- is, in Piattoni’s words, “the trade of votes and other types of partisan 
support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits, which involves not only the 
distribution of jobs and goods but also the exploitation of the entire machinery of the state 
as ‘a token of exchange’” (2001a: 4, emphasis in original). “From a birth certificate to a 
building permit, from a disability pension to public housing, from a development project to 
a tax exemption” (ibid.: 6) almost everything under the control of the state can be subject to 
this exchange. As Kenny notes, “it is not a question here of considering that one may be 
entitled to these things by right, for between what is one’s right and what is possible lie a 
thousand different shrugs of the shoulder” (cited in Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 73). A 
patron seeking the vote of the client can make his client’s life much easier by ensuring “that 
the agents of the state either deal with the client honestly, or when required dishonestly … 
by ignoring tax regulations, building codes, anti-squatter legislation, proper procedures for 
charging water and electricity, or by giving favorable legal judgments” (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007: 11); in Chubb’s words these are “nonmonetary forms of patronage” 
(1982: 247; see also 211-6). Vice versa is also true. The life of an opposition supporter can 
be easily turned into nightmare by implementing laws selectively. In a former Peruvian 
president’s words, “for my friends anything. For my enemies the law”.14 
In its extreme form, the machine party is devoid of any ideology; it is politically indifferent 
(Banfield and Wilson 1966: 115), or totally deideoligized (Graziano 1976: 164; see also 
Scott 1969: 1143-4). Though, these attributes hardly applies to all contemporary 
patronage-based parties, because of its analytical utility15, it merits attention. Banfield and 
Wilson depict the machine like a business organization working in a “particular field of 
business –getting votes and winning elections. … [I]t is ‘just like any sales organization 
trying to sell its products’” (1966: 115). “The source of power and the cohesive force is the 
                                                        
14 Cited in “Politics in Argentina.” The Economist, 21.7.2012.  
15 As Banfield and Wilson aptly put it “[e]xtreme case of one kind … illumines the logic of the other kinds” 
(1966: 116).  
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desire for office and office as a means of gain” (Lord Bryce cited in ibid.). The political 
entrepreneur engaged in machine politics lives “entirely ‘off’ politics … is ‘pragmatic,’ 
without principles; he ‘buys’ votes by distributing office and other material rewards” 
(Graziano 1976: 164).  
The machine, therefore, is apolitical: it is interested only in making and distributing 
income –mainly money- to those who run it and work for it. Political principle is 
foreign to it, and represents a danger and a threat to it. As D. W. Brogan has 
remarked, “The true character of machine is its political indifferentism. … It exists 
for itself” (Banfield and Wilson 1966: 116). 
As long as the organizational structure of the machine is concerned, Lemarchand mentions 
two “ideal types,” which can be of help in studying the development of clientelistic 
tendencies within a party. These are “neo-traditional” and “orthodox machine”. First one 
comes into being when clientelistic solidarities of a traditional type characterized by ties of 
deference “are incorporated into a broader institutional framework, usually a party,”16 
while the second one is a typical example of the patronage-based party, which is held 
together “by expectations of concrete, short term benefits” (Lemarchand 1981: 20-1).        
Chubb comes up with a slightly different typology. Basically, she does not see the first type 
as a variant of machine but rather as a sort of transitional form between clientelism of 
notables and party-based patronage:      
In its early stages political clientelism takes the form of competing cliques of 
traditional notables, each with his own personal following and personal ties to those 
in positions of political power. The machine as a political institution comes into 
being only when the organizational superstructure of a modern mass-based political 
party is substituted for the personal influence networks of notables. At this point 
the party organization itself assumes the role of patron and the resources of the 
state take the place of the personal economic and social power of the notable (1982: 
4). 
In this process, the notables who had been “occasional” or “dilettante” politicians due to 
the deference they inspire among their followers thanks to their social background as 
landowners or professionals leave their places to “professional ones,” who lack this natural 
legitimacy (Graziano 1976: 163; see also Caciagli and Belloni 1981: 36-7). As a result, to 
make up for this deficiency, this new breed of politicians increasingly resorts to the 
                                                        
16 This is what Graziano calls “party of notables” (1976: 164).  
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distribution of material benefits. This is required not only to attract voters, but also to keep 
the party running:  
patronage is best thought of as an incentive system – a political currency with which 
to purchase political activity and political responses. The chief functions of 
patronage are: maintaining an active party organization … [p]romoting intra-party 
cohesion … [a]ttracting voters and supporters … [f]inancing the party and its 
candidates … [p]rocuring favorable government action … [c]reating party discipline 
in policy making (Sorauf cited in Weingrod 1968: 379).     
Remarkably, the account of a Sicilian practitioner of clientelism captures the differences 
between two variants of clientelism, as good, if not better than the subject’s students:  
‘Clientelism,’ the interviewed politician says, is by now an old word and needs to be 
replaced before long. It evokes, in fact, the letter of recommendation from the 
notable, a practice still in existence and still frequent in Sicily, though less and less 
so. For at least fifteen years clientelism has been changing in nature and instead of 
being a vertical tie as it was before, descending from the notable to postulant, it has 
become a horizontal one; it now concerns entire (social) categories, coalitions of 
interests, groups of (private) employees, employees of public office or regional 
enterprises. It is mass clientelism, organized and efficient, which consists of laws, 
leggine (laws made by parliament committees), extraordinary provisions, 
emergency measures, contributions and concessions granted no longer to the 
individual, but to favored groups.  
In order to put this powerful machine to work, through time the Christian 
Democrats have had to place party men at every level of power, in each key 
position… (Today clientelism) is a relationship between large groups and public 
power (Saladino cited in Graziano 1976: 149-50; also cited in Lemarchand 1981:21-
2; and in Caciagli and Belloni 1981: 35-6).  
These fundamental differences between two variants of clientelism made Graziano, among 
others, to ask to what extent it is meaningful to use the same term to denote these two 
different political phenomena: “What is there in common between the ‘vertical’ clientelism 
which used to link landlord and peasant, and the ‘horizontal’ mass clientelism practiced by 
a party in power?” (1976: 150; see also especially Kaufman 1974; Lemarchand 1981; 
Mavrogordatos 1997). The common ground for both variants, answers Graziano, is direct 
exchange: “Clientelism as an interpersonal relationship and clientelism as party-directed 
patronage are both based on the direct exchange of favors” (1976: 157). Therefore, the 
relationship between the patron and the client can be defined, in both of its manifestations, 
as a clientelistic association, which is structured dyadically, based on direct, asymmetrical 
exchange (ibid.: 149). This definition was formulated because basically previous definitions, 
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and particularly Scott’s definition quoted above, which he takes as a reference point, fall 
short of covering the impersonal character of mass clientelism today, where clients are no 
longer individuals but favored groups, and relationship is not face-to-face anymore. In this 
context, he also dismisses the typology adopted by Lande to distinguish between what is 
clientelistic and what is not; namely the “particularistic-categorical opposition,” as this fails 
to capture the collective particularism of mass clientelism; “new clienteles,” Graziano writes, 
are by their nature “categorical clienteles” (154-5; see also Kitschelt 2000: 852). 
Furthermore, though dyadic element was not abandoned by Graziano, it was later dropped 
from most of the definitions as proliferation of the studies on clientelism clearly showed 
that there were many other “organizational forms,” making it inappropriate to single one 
out among others as the core form (Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981: 1-2).   
Finally, one last point needs to be clarified for the sake of alleviating the conceptual 
cacophony prevailing in the literature; that is the distinction between patronage and 
clientelism. Some minor differences notwithstanding these are “largely the same 
phenomenon, with latter being more penetrating and all-encompassing than the former” 
(Piattoni 2001a: 7). Accordingly, they are used interchangeably in this study.       
Having made the distinction between traditional and modern variants of clientelism, what 
needs to be done next is to set a benchmark, which can be used as a basis for comparison 
because without specifying what clientelism is not, it is impossible to define what it is 
(Graziano 1977: 368). In the literature, this is mainly done by setting clientelism against 
“an ideal-type of ‘responsible party government’17 in which parties offer packages of 
policies justified in terms of a principled defense of the ‘public interest’” (Hopkin 2001: 
117). These packages will, no doubt, be formulated in a way that they will benefit certain 
groups within the electorate that the party sees as its electoral base, while making the 
others worse off. The benefits are therefore directed to very large groups to attract as 
much support as possible. Then, these policy packages or programs are implemented 
without verifying whether the beneficiaries have actually voted for the party or not. Given 
that, according to the responsible party government model, the linkage between the voter 
and the party is programmatic, and unlike clientelistic politics (where exchange is 
                                                        
17 For a brief account of responsible party government theory see Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 1-2).  
28 
 
contingent and direct), “the politicians enter a non-contingent, indirect political exchange” 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 10, emphasis in original). As Kitschelt puts it 
[i]n the analysis of programmatic and clientelist politics, we … have to separate 
definitional distinctions from empirical associations. In definitional terms, only the 
procedural nature of exchange relations counts to separate clientelist from 
programmatic linkage (direct versus indirect exchange). Empirically, party 
competition based on predominantly programmatic linkages may result in greater 
depersonalization of politics, more collective goods provision, and more 
institutionalization than clientelist politics. This is a contingent empirical 
association, however, diluted by democratic polities with predominantly clientelist 
linkages that are also highly institutionalized and routinized (2000: 853). 
Obviously, in its current modern form, which is characterized by the involvement of 
categorical groups -political parties as patrons and entire social groups as clients- engaged 
in impersonal, bureaucratic and institutionalized political exchange, political clientelism 
has come to be perceived as politics as usual; as Piattoni puts it, “a variant of particularistic 
politics,” and not as a “cultural pathology” or “developmental distortion” (2001a: 7). In 
Eisenstadt and Lemarchand words, “[t]he burgeoning literature on patron-client 
relationships has … recognized that such relationships can be found in many societies and 
civilizations, on different levels of economic development and social differentiation and in a 
great variety of cultural traditions” (1981: 1-2). In this respect, clientelism has come to be 
taken as a social exchange; a method of mobilizing political support (Chubb 1981 and 
1982); a strategy to maintain power (Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001); a method of electoral 
mobilization (Roniger 2004; Stokes 2007); or a linkage mechanism of democratic 
accountability (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007); rather than an anomaly 
dictated by socio-cultural or socio-economic context per se.  
Indeed, clientelism was depicted as a strategy as early as in 1977 by Waterbury: “Patron-
clientele networks may be seen as strategies for the maintenance or aggrandizement of 
power on the part of the patrons, and of coping and survival on the part of the clients. They 
are probably never the sole strategies available” (1977: 332). This was later refined and 
developed by Piattoni:  
clientelism and patronage are strategies for the acquisition, maintenance, and 
aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons, and strategies for the 
protection and promotion of their interests, on the part of the clients ... Although 
they more or less likely depend on the sets of circumstances –generally conceivable 
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as costs and benefits – in which patrons and clients happen to make their choices, 
their adoption is ultimately always a question of choice (2001a: 2, emphasis added). 
Choice is the key word here. But a clarification should be made. As I will explain in detail in 
the next section, this is not to say that the voters have a choice to make between political 
clientelism and responsible party government. Far from it; Banfield and Wilson describes 
the choice a typical voter faces most of the time in a rather vivid way as follows: 
Even though in the abstract one may prefer a government that gets its influence 
from reasonable discussion about the common good rather than from giving jobs, 
favors, and ‘friendship,’ even though in the abstract he may prefer government by 
middle-class to government by lower-class standards, and even though in the 
abstract he may prefer the rule of professional administrators to that of politicians, 
he may nevertheless favor the machine in some particular concrete situation. The 
choice is never between the machine and some ideal alternative. If there is any 
choice at all –and in some instances there may not be- it is between it and some real 
–therefore imperfect- alternative. It is at least conceivable that in some of the large 
central cities the political indifferentism of the machine may be preferable to any 
likely alternative (1966: 127).    
If it is a matter of choice, and it is not up to the voter to choose, then, the questions to be 
answered next are: whose choice, and in which context is this choice made? What does 
make political clientelism emerge as a more favorable strategy than other more legitimate 
choices? These are among the most fundamental questions the students of political 
clientelism have been seeking an answer for. The next section will present an overview of 
this endeavor.  
1.3 Accounting for the Emergence of Political Clientelism: Three Theoretical 
Approaches   
As Kitschelt puts it, the literature on political clientelism is case study-oriented and “there 
is no systematic comparative literature on the rise or decline of” political clientelism (2000: 
855). In other words, “[a]n approach … which is capable of accounting for the wide variety 
of clientelist and patronage systems while explaining their resilience under changing 
contextual circumstances,” is obviously lacking (Piattoni 2001a: 2). Basically, the attempts 
to explain the causes of alternative linkage mechanisms/strategies have not yielded an all-
encompassing theory which rules out any “empirical anomalies” (Kitschelt 2000: 866). To 
avoid these empirical anomalies as much as possible, more often than not, the students of 
clientelism come up with multiple, and often overlapping explanations, which are not 
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conducive for making broad categorizations. In what follows, an attempt is made to review 
these theories based mainly on categories used by Shefter (1994), Kitschelt (2000), and 
Piattoni (2001). 
To distinguish between different approaches, which aim to account for the emergence of 
political clientelism, Shefter (1994) borrows concepts from economics. On the one hand, 
according to Shefter, there is demand-driven “neoclassical” approach where demand 
represents the political behavior of voters, and on the other, we have a supply-driven 
approach, where supply represents the strategic behavior/choices of politicians and 
political parties. In essence, in both approaches, eventually politicians call the shots. 
However, according to the demand-driven approach, the choice is dictated by the 
orientations (or preferences) and social composition of the voters the party is appealing for 
support (Shefter 1994: 26-7), while according to the supply-driven one political 
entrepreneurs have the upper hand.  
According to the early students of clientelism, which can be called culturalists to use 
Piattoni’s (2001) term, the direction of the relationship is from demand to supply side. In 
other words, politicians offer particularistic benefits only to meet the demand from their 
voters, just like firms trying to respond to the demands of their customers. These scholars 
tried to understand and explain “the conditions under which citizens will demand 
individual favors or patronage in exchange for their votes” (Shefter 1994: xi-xii). Here, 
Shefter refers explicitly to Banfield and Wilson’s sociological approach. Banfield (1958) 
explains the clientelistic behavior of Southern Italian community of “Montegranesi” with 
“amoral familism,” an “ethos” prevailing within the community, which can be summarized 
as: “Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all 
others will do likewise” (1958: 85). In such a socio-cultural context, it is argued, 
cooperation and any kind of continuing association beyond the nuclear family, involvement 
in any public problem or activity in the interest of the community, achieving and 
maintaining formal organizations are simply not possible, and thus political clientelism 
inevitable (Banfield cited in Silverman 1968: 1). Banfield’s argument is not limited to 
Southern Italy. In the introductory chapter of his work, he states that Japanese one being 
an exception, “[t]here is some reason to doubt that the non-Western cultures of the world 
will prove capable of creating and maintaining the high degree of organization without 
which a modern economy and a democratic political order are impossible” (1958: 8).    
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In a similar but somewhat more sophisticated vein -thanks to the addition of social 
background of the voters to the analysis- Banfield and Wilson (1966) portray the urban 
machines in the US as an institutional form representing the “private-regarding” immigrant 
ethos of the lower-classes of Catholic European origin, “which emphasized family needs 
and personal loyalties and took no account of the larger community” as opposed to “public-
regarding” Anglo-Saxon ethos of middle and upper class voters (cited in Wilson and 
Banfield 1971: 1048-9).  
Boissevain, another representative of this current of thought, argues that “[p]atronage is, to 
a very large extent a self-perpetuating system of belief and action grounded in the society’s 
value system” (1966: 30). It plays an important social role because ties of dependency 
continue to provide something that neither state nor the family is able to provide: 
protection. Furthermore, he points out a link between religion and patronage: “Catholicism 
in particular, with its range of benevolent patron saints intermediate between God and 
favour-seeking, dependent human, provides an ideological world view which closely 
parallels a conception of society articulated by political and economic patron-client 
relations” (1977: 81).  
Another notable representative of this approach is Putnam, whose 1993 study can be seen 
as a return to culturalist lines. In his study on institutional performance of 20 different 
Italian regions, where he divides the Italian society into two groups as civic north and 
clientelistic south, Putnam concludes that more than anything else sociocultural context 
determines the level of success of regional governments (1993: 86 and 98-9). In other 
words, the government performance is not determined by the quality of its institutional 
set-up but rather by the level of “civic-ness of the citizens,” which has been shaped in the 
course of centuries, and thus unlikely to change in the short-run. According to this view, 
therefore, some polities are clientelistic and some are civic and there is no way to change 
this by political action. That is to say, demand is an exogenous given, at least in the short to 
medium-run. Therefore, trying to come up with an institutional design to break the vicious 
circle of clientelistic politics is nothing but a futile effort.  
To use Piattoni (2001) and Kitschelt’s (2000) term, developmentalists are the second group 
of students of political clientelism. This group associates clientelist politics with socio-
economic modernization, and suggest that the main cause behind political clientelism is 
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socio-economic backwardness. The group can be divided into two sub-groups within itself. 
First group tends to see political systems enmeshed in political clientelism, to be in a 
transitional stage of political development, which would eventually be replaced by a 
political system where programmatic politics will prevail (Scott 1969; Weingrod 1968; 
Powell 1970). Similar to the culturalist approach, this one is also demand-driven. According 
to Scott, “[s]uitable though it may be for the few groups in the modern sector organized 
along occupational lines, the modern legislative machinery of new nations cannot 
effectively cope with the host of special pleadings coming from outside the modern sector” 
(1969: 1142-3). Most of the political demands in these “transitional nations” are 
particularistic in character – for example a family’s request to have their son to be placed in 
a job in the public sector- and thus not suitable to be met by legislative action (ibid.). The 
only political form that can successfully meet these demands, and thrive on them, he argues, 
is urban machine (ibid.). What promote political clientelism in these countries, therefore, 
are their socioeconomic circumstances. Following the lines of modernization theory, the 
proponents of this approach predict “the prevalence of clientelist linkage mechanisms in 
poor countries and their transformation and eventual abolition with growing affluence, 
industrialization, and postindustrialization” (see Kitschelt 2000: 857). This transformation 
is only a matter of time.  As Huntington argues, “parties and party systems are clientelist, 
patronage oriented, and localist in early stages of modernization but become more 
programmatic and institutionalized with progressing development” (cited in Kitschelt 
2000: 856).  
The second group of developmentalists, on the other hand, is not that optimistic and, does 
not see this as a transitional stage. It rejects the idea of modernization theory, which 
foresees a “unilinear or inevitable progression toward some pre-determined goal” i.e 
“characteristics found in a Western political system” (Legg 1969: 2), in this case. Its 
standpoint is parallel to that of Dore’s, who rejects the tenets of modernization theory, 
which amounts to foreseeing a common path of change for postwar Nigeria like that of 
seventeenth century England (cited in Schneider et. al. 1972: 330).  
This group argues that once it is in place, political clientelism takes a self-reinforcing path. 
Based on her empirical study of the Christian Democratic (DC) rule in Palermo, Chubb 
argues that far from being an automatic process leading to dissolution of clientelism, 
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system is rather static, and hence, the “stimulation of change from within” is almost 
impossible (1981: 82): 
While the possibility for a clientelistic model of politics to take root at the end of the 
war was clearly closely related to a pre-existing state of underdevelopment, the 
situation since then can be described as one of a mutually reinforcing bond between 
the structure of political power and the economic base upon which it rests – i.e., 
through its political control the DC has succeeded in disaggregation upon which the 
survival of the system of power which it has created depends. Thus, far from being a 
transitional form of political organization, a mass-based clientelistic party, once 
having established control over key economic resources, can block precisely that 
process of economic development which is seen as bringing about its eventual 
demise, thereby perpetuating the structural base of its own power (ibid.: 85-6).  
Graziano has a similar approach. Firstly, he rejects the culturalist accounts of political 
clientelism by suggesting that culture cannot be the determining factor as culture itself is a 
dependent variable basically shaped by the economic and social structure of society 
(Graziano 1977: 361; see also Silverman 1968). He suggests that the process and the 
degree of capitalistic rationalization of an economy can account for the persistence of 
clientelistic relationships, and portrays clientelism in Southern Italy, as “the product of the 
incomplete capitalistic rationalization of the Southern economy” (ibid.: 361-2). Moreover, 
he rejects the idea that modernization will bring about the transformation and abolition of 
clientelism. Rather, he suggests that the modernizing forces of the state and the market, led 
to an “indigenous” model of political development characterized by clientelism’ (ibid.: 360), 
which inhibits “the emergence of conditions necessary for the development of less 
particularistic, more categorical groups” (ibid.).  
In a similar vein, Legg suggests that in Greece, “those occupying high status modern roles 
were able to utilize clientage relationships to maintain their existing positions, and 
consequently to inhibit further modernization” (1973: 234). Given that although there are 
“countless specific, non-aggregative demands for personal intercession in all spheres, 
social, economic or political,” coming from below, which gives the impression that the 
process is demand-driven, Legg argues that the impetus for perpetuation of clientelistic 
relations stemmed usually from above (ibid.), emphasizing the supply side of the 
interaction.    
Recently, with a volume edited by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), a return to 
developmentalist perspective with a broader and more sophisticated research agenda, was 
34 
 
proposed. In this study, once again the level of economic development gains precedence in 
the quest to account for the choices of linkage strategies (clientelistic vs. programmatic) 
across time and space. Kitschelt and Wilkinson argue that “[e]conomic development is the 
most commonly confirmed  predictor of differential modes of democratic accountability” 
(2007: 24). However, on its own it fails to account for all contexts18, and thus in this new 
version of developmentalism, or neo-developmentalism I am tempted to call it, in addition to 
the level of economic development, three more theoretical elements are introduced. These 
are the level of inter-party political competition19; economic resource endowments and 
politico-economic governance structures 20 ; and ethnocultural diversity. There is a 
relationship of contingency between these elements. Different mixes produce different 
results on demand and supply side, and hence lead to different decisions. “[W]hat is critical 
… is not to sort out the causal priority of any of these variables for economic development. 
It is important, however, to keep in mind that –as a bundle- they affect the politicians’ and 
voters’ preferences over democratic principal-agent relations” (ibid.: 40-1).     
The articles in the book analyze the contingent interaction of these elements in roughly 
four different levels of economic development -extreme poverty, i.e. sub-Saharan Africa; 
weak level; intermediate level, i.e. “roughly, per capita gross domestic product in the range 
of USD 5,000 to USD 10,000 purchasing parity corrected in 2000” (ibid.: 47); and 
postindustrial capitalist societies.  
Third group has a historical/institutionalist approach. According to Shefter, the pioneer of 
this approach, if we are to understand certain political phenomena, we need to focus less on 
the views of the masses, and more on the political institutions which shape and then in turn 
shaped by the strategic behaviour of leaders (1994: 3; emphasis added). Accordingly, 
                                                        
18 Among others, Kitschelt notes in an earlier study that “[d]evelopmentalist accounts have much empirical 
evidence on their side but cannot explain the persistence of clientelism in some advanced democracies (e.g., 
Japan, Italy, and Austria). Moreover, the theory cannot explain why clientelist politics appears to be much 
more prominent in some post-Communist polities, such as Russia or the Ukraine, than in others with equal or 
lesser affluence, such as the Baltic countries” (2000: 857). 
19 The party system is defined as competitive when there is “some programmatic distance between 
alternative party blocs competing for executive office (‘polarization’) and when governments have 
considerable institutional leverage to shift resources (e.g., among clients)” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 
28). 
20 Political-economic governance structures have something to do with the level of political influence over the 
economy via such mechanisms as the regulation agencies, public enterprises and public procurement 
contracts. To put it in a different way, we can say that the more “politicized” the economic governance 
structure, the more likely that we have a clientelistic linkage mechanism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 36). 
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Shefter rejects the idea that the behaviour of political parties is strictly determined by the 
composition of their electoral base, i.e. the demand side, which is largely determined by the 
social and cultural background of the voters:  
parties have managed to win the support of migrants and peasants in transitional 
societies both by working through “vertical” patron-client networks and by 
organizing them into “horizontal” associations; parties have been able to mobilize 
the middle and working classes in more modern social settings both by distributing 
patronage to individual members of those classes and by appealing to broader class 
and occupational loyalties among them (ibid.: 25).21  
Shefter’s approach reminds what is known in economic literature as Say’s law of market, 
which basically says, “supply creates its own demand”. He does not completely rule out the 
role of demand of voters in the process. He enumerates voter demands, along with the 
availability of resources for patronage, and the interests of party cadres and elites as the 
factors taken into consideration by the party leaders when they are trying to decide 
whether to adopt patronage as a party strategy or not (ibid.: 26). However, he points out 
that the political behaviour of the voters in modern as well as traditional settings, are not 
exogenous given, but “more variable and malleable,” in other words, susceptible to change 
by the deliberate action of political parties than, what he calls, neoclassical theorists 
assume, and thus, he puts more emphasis on the supply side of the process.  
His approach requires a macro-historical context. Particularly, he focuses on the historical 
development of certain institutions and highlights their enduring effects on the political 
system. The relative timing of bureaucratization and extension of universal suffrage, in his 
view, conditions the character of political parties. “Whether a party will or will not be 
crucially dependent upon the distribution of patronage to maintain its hold upon its 
supporters is a function … of how the leadership of that party initially established a linkage 
with a popular base” (ibid.: 29, emphasis added). In the establishment process, the party 
leaders considering resorting to patronage faces two constraints. First constraint is that its 
leaders need to occupy public office or be allied with elites who have access to the means 
required for patronage (ibid.: 27). If neither of these is the case, then they don’t have any 
other option than relying on “ideological and solidary incentives” (ibid.). This is the case for 
what he calls “externally mobilized parties;” for instance, “the major working class parties 
                                                        
21 For specific cases see Table 2.1 in Shefter 1994: 23.   
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of Europe”. Even if party leaders hold public office, they face a second constraint: “if 
governmental agencies are protected by civil service statutes and other general laws that 
specify how public benefits and burdens are to be distributed and that thereby prevent 
politicians from intervening in the administrative process on a case-by-case basis,” then 
they need to rely, again, on ideology and solidarity (ibid.). Here, it is important to note that 
statutes and laws on their own are not enough as they are not “self-enforcing”.  
Rather, if a civil service system (or any administrative arrangement providing for 
the allocation of public benefits and burdens according to general rules) is to resist 
the depredations of patronage-seeking politicians, the administrators or public 
officials who would defend it must be backed by a constituency that has a stake in 
the system and that is sufficiently powerful to prevail over competing forces. Only if 
it fears arousing the opposition of such a constituency will a governing party be 
constrained to forgo the immediate gains it would realize by directing bureaucrats 
to reward the party’s friends and to punish its enemies (ibid.: 28).  
If the bureaucracy itself is not well established or lack the support of “a constituency for 
bureaucratic autonomy” identified above, and therefore not in a position to protect the 
public resources, they become open to the raid from political leaders, and thus mobilizing 
public with patronage becomes an option for the party leaders.  
To summarize, today we are more likely to observe political clientelism in countries where 
an autonomous civil service capable of preventing the politicians from resorting to 
patronage, was absent at the time of extension of the universal suffrage because “the 
circumstances of a party’s origins ... can crucially influence the party’s subsequent 
behavior” (ibid.: 27).         
Second representative of historical/institutional approach is Piattoni.22 For Piattoni, whose 
conceptual context is strongly influenced by Shefter, clientelism is a strategy for both of the 
actors of the political game. It is a strategy to acquire, maintain, and aggrandize political 
power for the patrons, and a strategy to protect and promote their interests for the clients. 
As such, it is a matter of choice; a choice which is subject to dynamic “sets of 
circumstances” or “incentives and disincentives –generally conceivable as costs and 
benefits”. It is important to note that, these can be superseded and redefined by both 
                                                        
22 For practical reasons, only Piattoni’s name is used here because she was the one, who wrote the 
introductory chapter summarizing their theoretical approach. However, all contributors to the volume, she 
edited, are representatives of the same approach.    
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actors: politicians or voters (2001a: 18). Therefore, what we have is a complex system 
where demand and supply interact, and in principle may produce completely different 
outcomes across space and time even when objective circumstances seem to be similar 
(ibid.: 24-5). To give an example, in the immediate post-World War II period, 
the institutional room for clientelism was equally large (or small) in both France 
and Italy. The institutional setup of the French state left as much room to clientelist 
practices as that of the Italian state. The ideological commitment of the respective 
Christian Democratic parties was also (initially) equally strong. However, because 
the party leadership assessed the circumstances differently –with the French MRP 
leaders prioritizing the reformation of society according to Christian values and the 
Italian DC leaders the fight against communism– their strategies ended up differing 
(ibid.: 25). 
Accordingly, as the strategy to be adopted is a matter of choice, Piattoni deliberately shies 
away from establishing a strict causal relationship between strategies (i.e. patronage vs. 
program) and sets of incentives or sets of institutional and historical circumstances to 
explain the presence or absence of clientelist relationships. She talks about constellations 
of institutional and historical circumstances that make these strategies politically more or 
less viable and socially more or less acceptable. However, she also states that although 
there is a connection between them, their emergence, transformation, and demise do not 
necessarily determine the outcome, emphasizing the decisive role of the “strategic choices 
of individual actors” involved. If we are to understand the character of representation, 
Piattoni argues, we need to focus on “the reciprocal interaction” of demand and supply 
sides of clientelism. So, what do supply and demand sides involve? On the supply side we 
have:  
(1) The existence or lack of an independent bureaucracy resistant to partisan 
pressures, (2) the ideals or other objectives motivating politicians to run for office, 
and (3) the ideas and expectations about the source of legitimate power that 
historically developed along with the formation of state structures (ibid.: 17).  
On the demand side, on the other hand, we have: 
(1) The level of “empowerment” of the citizens, principally affected by their 
economic status; (2) their cognitive capabilities, especially influenced by the rate of 
literacy, access to information, availability of meeting places, and so on; and (3) 
their organizational capacity, that is, their capacity to form secondary associations 
or join independent organizations which may act as catalysts for collective action 
such as people’s churches and external political parties (ibid.)  
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The similarity especially, in demand side of Piattoni with the works of Banfield (1958), and 
Putnam (1993), whose works are largely influenced by Tocqueville, is obvious. Supply side 
on the other hand, is to a great extent influenced by Shefter (1994). 
In fact, the second group of developmentalists could have been classified in this category 
too, as their approach is also historical, and to a certain extent institutionalist, and, as 
shown above, they see the strategic political choices of the politicians as a decisive factor in 
the perpetuation of the clientelistic political structures (Chubb 1981 and 1982; Legg 1973; 
Graziano 1976; see also Tarrow 1967). Besides, along with socio-economic change, they 
hold the circumstances in which specific democratic institutions have emerged responsible 
for the state of affairs prevailing today. Legg, for instance, points out:  
In these systems, governmental structures borrowed from the outside have been 
superimposed upon clientelistic networks, and have in turn, nurtured them. … The 
timing and sequence of political development, in the sense of the introduction of 
specific democratic institutional forms as well as the pace of social and economic 
change, have contributed to the development of a society in which patron-client ties 
have permeated modern institutions (1973: 233). 
The reason they are categorized under the rubric of developmentalists is that it would be 
somewhat anachronistic to count them under the rubric of historical/institutional because 
this approach was not even formulated at the time of their writing. Secondly, and more 
importantly, they see the level of economic development at the time of initial political 
mobilization, as the primary factor to account for political clientelism.   
1.4 Research Strategy  
As the aim of the dissertation is to explain the politico-economic development of the 
Turkish Cypriot community in general and a historical turning point i.e. the result of the 
Annan plan referendum in the Turkish Cypriot side in particular, using political clientelism 
as an analytical tool, and not to come up with a new theory to account for the rise and fall 
of political clientelism, an eclectic approach is followed, which, I’m tempted to say, is the 
rule rather than exception in the literature. 
The study is predicated mainly on Shefter and Piattoni’s historical/institutional approach. 
This is to say, in the empirical part, contextual circumstances or interaction of demand and 
supply of political clientelism is studied to account for the emergence of political 
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clientelism. It should be noted that in some “clear-cut cases” like Greece and Sweden, 
Piattoni suggests that taking either demand or the supply side alone can suffice to explain 
the outcome. More complex cases on the other hand, like Spain and Italy where an “uneven 
geography of clientelism” exists, or “intermediate” cases like England, France and the 
Netherlands, require full account of both supply and demand side (2001: 21). In this 
typology, the case of northern Cyprus resembles more to Greece than, say the Italian case, 
as geographically there is uniformity in the distribution of clientelism, and hence the 
emphasis will be given to the supply side though the demand side is not completely 
overlooked.  
In line with the institutionalist approach, in the empirical part a special attention will be 
given to the immediate post-1974 period, as this was the time when the institutions of the 
new political entity, not least its political parties, have been shaped, and multi-party 
elections have been introduced where for the first time universal suffrage was 
implemented without the shadow of guns. Having said that, to set the political stage and 
better understand the wider background, putting the Turkish Cypriot quest to become a 
political community in a historical context is required. Therefore, the empirical part will 
start with a review of the major political developments in the pre-1974 period. This is also 
necessary to account for the origin of political clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Particularly, the question whether political clientelism was in the cultural 
genes of Turkish Cypriots or not, has to be addressed to justify the adoption of the 
institutionalist approach. By showing that the answer to this question is negative, I will 
highlight that when modern institutions were introduced there was no pre-existing 
clientelism that could inhibit their entrenchment, and in doing so, demonstrate that 
political clientelism was a more recent artifact, whose roots should be sought in the 
strategic choices of the ruling nationalist political elite in the post-1974 period.  
Yet, showing that political clientelism was a strategy adopted by the UBP in its 
establishment process is not sufficient. It should also be shown that this initial choice 
conditioned the party’s subsequent development up until the early 2000s, and that the 
party remained to be clientelistic.  As the period under consideration spreads over a long 
period of time, in this effort, the focus will be mainly on the election campaigns. This is not 
a big weakness though, because as Weingrod suggests manifestations of political 
clientelism become most obvious during the election periods (1968: 380). Having said that, 
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identifying where exactly to focus on in the empirical analysis of political clientelism 
beyond the election periods is a real challenge. How can we measure the level of 
clientelism in a given political system? Or how can we show that a party remains in power 
by patronage? To answer these questions, as Kitschelt points out, “we cannot simply ask 
politicians to explain their favorite linkage mechanisms. Educated, sophisticated citizens 
such as politicians, find clientelism morally objectionable, even if they practice it” (2000: 
869). It would be naïve, at best, to expect them to answer this question in honest manner. 
Mass surveys are also unlikely to bring up “true confessions” as the issue is quite sensitive 
(Mavrogordatos 1997: 3).  
In the face of these challenges, Kitschelt proposes three indirect methods to determine 
whether political clientelism is a widespread strategy in a polity or not. With some 
reservations, he suggests “the existence of programmatic incohesiveness and the lack of 
discipline in roll call voting may serve at least as an indirect indication that a party, as a 
coalition of politicians, is held together by nonprogrammatic or charismatic linkages” 
(2000: 870). Measuring the “levels of corruption in a polity” is the second indirect method 
brought up by Kitschelt (ibid.: 870-1). As Müller also points out, in the countries where 
political clientelism is highest in the Western democracies, i.e. Italy and Greece, corruption 
is also measured as highest (2007). As there is no direct way to measure the level of 
corruption, Kitschelt notes, it can be useful to use the reports and surveys conducted by 
financial risk assessment companies, businessmen, journalists and economists (2000: 871). 
Last indirect indicator of clientelism, Kitschelt comes up with, is reviewing the government 
budget to find out the proportion of funds “allocated to pork and special interest projects” 
(ibid.). Kitschelt concludes that “[t]he presence of clientelist linkages is particularly 
plausible when different indirect measures point in the same direction” (ibid.).         
The research strategy employed by Mavrogordatos for the empirical study of clientelism 
also presents a practical model. In his empirical analysis of political clientelism in Greece, 
he limits his focus to “employment and career opportunities” (1997: 3). The range of goods 
and services provided by clientelism is quite diverse and it is practically not possible to 
cover all of them. In that respect, picking one of them for the purpose of testing makes 
practical sense. Furthermore, providing employment is “not only specific, but also the 
single most vital item (of patronage), as reflected in public opinion” (1997: 3; for more on 
the role of public employment in maintaining clientelism see especially Chubb 1981 and 
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1982; and Lyrintzis 1984). He identifies “meritocracy, implying a system whereby 
appointments and career patterns are determined on the basis of merit alone, according to 
universalistic and objective criteria,” as the opposite of clientelism (ibid.: 4), and compares 
the number of employments made through party channels, and general competition.  
This study has been guided by an approach, which combined methods suggested by 
Kitschelt and Mavrogordatos. Particularly, in the Chapters Four and Five, the aim will be to 
expose the UBP’s “programmatic incohesiveness and lack of discipline,” as an indicator of 
its clientelistic character. However, to do this, rather than focusing on the “roll call voting,” 
I mainly relied on the statements of the UBP politicians published in the media; most of the 
time those who had resigned, but at times also of those who were still party members. This 
was made possible by the very nature of the party: Throughout the party history, intra-
party rivalries and frequent resignations have prepared the ground for high-level party 
functionaries to air their criticisms against their fellow party members, which found wide 
coverage in the local media.     
As for the corruption, in the absence of reports like the Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index, I will touch upon the issue only in an unsystematic way, as a 
full-scale analysis of corruption would make a dissertation on its own. I will rely on 
anecdotal evidence to show that, as in the case of Italy, political clientelism and lack of 
alternation in power have led to widespread corruption.      
Investigation of the government budget figures pointed the direction towards the biggest 
constituency of patronage: the beneficiaries of tens of thousands of paychecks issued 
monthly by the ministry of finance to pay the public sector employees, pensioners and 
those on welfare benefits. This issue will be elaborated in detail in Chapter Six, where, after 
showing that the public sector has been even more over-bloated than it is usually assumed, 
I will show that the reason behind this was what Lyrintzis calls bureaucratic clientelism. To 
do this I will basically use the method employed by Mavrogordatos outlined above.    
Throughout the research process, I extensively used newspaper and magazine archives as 
well as unstructured interviews with former politicians and bureaucrats. The minutes of 
the parliamentary debates on certain relevant issues were also occasionally used. Another 
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major source of information used in the study were the statistics provided by the 
government organizations.  
Finally, although, this is not a comparative study in its strict sense, in the rest of the 
dissertation, occasional references will be made to political parties from different parts of 
the world cited in the literature. Among these parties, one stands out. This is Democrazia 
Cristiana (Christian Democracy, DC), which had dominated the political life of Italy for 
almost five decades after the World War II. The review of the literature and the empirical 
field research on the Turkish Cypriot politics revealed that there is a striking resemblance 
between the UBP and DC whose organization in Mezzogiorno is probably the most 
extensively studied case in the literature of political clientelism. In this respect, various 
similarities between the two parties will be given special attention in the rest of the study. 
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Chapter 2: The Turkish Cypriot Political Community in the Making: 
History of Electoral Politics and Roots of Taksim Policy  
The hegemonic role of Turkish nationalism in Turkish Cypriot politics cannot be 
understood in the absence of a historical analysis going back to the British rule. Nor is it 
possible to account for the emergence and development of political clientelism without 
looking into the nature of political competition in this period. With this in mind, in Chapter 
Two, the aim will be compressing the major developments of the pre-1974 period into a 
chapter, with a view to giving essential background for the subsequent analysis of the post-
1974 Turkish Cypriot politics.  
In this framework, the chapter will present a brief history of electoral politics in the 
Turkish Cypriot community. In parallel, the emergence of the idea of taksim, the blueprint 
upon, which the Turkish Cypriot political community construction took place; its effect on 
the emergence of the political right; the political right’s ideological underpinnings and its 
leader Denktaş’s relations with different actors in Ankara; the way the alternative vision of 
political community i.e. coexistence with the Greek Cypriot community, was annihilated; 
and other intra-communal rivalries will be briefly touched upon in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the gradual progress of the separate Turkish Cypriot administrative 
structure after the inter-communal clashes in 1963, in other words, the building blocks on 
the way to partition, will also be taken up.   
In the light of the contours of electoral politics during the British and post-independence 
period, in the concluding section of this chapter, I will turn my attention to tracing back the 
roots of patron-client relations in the Turkish Cypriot community. The major question to be 
answered here is: Can we explain the existence of political clientelism in the post-1974 
period with the prevalence of pre-existing patron-client ties? My answer will be “no”.    
2.1 A Brief Overview of Politics among Turkish Cypriots in the British Period  
Contrary to the general assumption, electoral politics in Cyprus was introduced by the 
Ottomans after the Tanzimat reforms although the powers of the representative 
institutions were limited, and elections were rudimentary and “even corrupted” (Nevzat 
2005: 112; see also Purcell 1969: 221). In the Central Administrative Council, there were 
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elected representatives of the two communities (Nevzat 2005: 113).23 At the village level 
too, mukhtars (village headmen) were elected annually “in free assembly” (Dixon 
Hepworth cited in Katsiaounis 1996: 62; see also Dixon cited in Loizos 1977: 121).24 Not 
surprisingly, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, popular participation in this period was 
very limited because (a) the minimum tax payment excluded a considerable number of the 
population from the franchise, and (b) those who were franchised would be expected to 
vote “within a deferential and familial concept of politics” (Katsiaounis 1996: 62).   
When the British took over the administration of the island, they were initially reluctant to 
give a say to the Cypriots in the island’s affairs (Nevzat 2005: 112). When they instituted 
the Legislative Council in December 1878, all of its members were nominated rather than 
elected.25 Only after the adoption of the 1882 constitution, the representatives of the two 
communities started to be elected (Leventis 2002: 30-1), on a proportional basis (Attalides 
1979: 41).26 The new Legislative Council was “composed on the principle that the official 
members plus the Turkish exactly equalled the number of the Greek members” (Storrs 
1945: 472). Accordingly, the Legislative Council contained 12 elected members, of whom 
nine were Greek Cypriots and three were Turkish Cypriots, along with six nominated 
officials including the High Commissioner (Lyssiotis 1990: 56).27 There were “three 
electoral Districts, each returning four Members, one Moslem and three non-Moslem” (Hill 
1972: 421). The representatives were elected for a five-year term, in a separate communal 
vote, where suffrage was limited to the tax-paying male population over the age of 21, who 
resided in the island not less than five years (Hill 1972: 421; Kitromilides in Nevzat 2005: 
112; Lyssiotis 1990: 56; Leventis 2002: 31).  
                                                        
23 “[I]n ostensible imitation of the constitutional practices prevailing in Europe, membership of the electorate 
was conditional upon the property qualification. The franchise was extended to Ottoman subjects who were 
older than 18 and paid a minimum of 50 piastres in vergi (property tax). Candidates for office had to be at 
least 30 years old and pay a minimum of 100 piastres” (Katsiaounis 1996: 62).  
24 The British abolished elections for this post in 1891 (Nevzat 2005: 113). 
25 “Mustafa Fuad Efendi, of an old Cyprus family,” who was nominated as a member by the High 
Commissioner Wolseley, represented the Turkish Cypriot community in this council (Cavendish 1991: 155). 
The other two native members were, “a merchant named George Glykis, and the Italian farmer Richard Mattei. 
It was remarked at the time that none of the unofficial members spoke or understood English” (Cavendish 
1991: 155; see also Hill 1972: 416-7).      
26 Until then, representation was equal. “The Muslim leaders protested against this and asked for equal 
representation,” to no avail (Attalides 1979: 41).  
27 “The Council was enlarged on the same basis in 1925, so that with nine officials and three Turks the 
Governor’s casting vote could carry any measure against the united opposition of the twelve Greeks” (Storrs 
1945: 472).  
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Writing in 1891, Williams likens the Legislative Council to a “toy parliament”:  
The Cyprus constitution was a sham gift. The giver gave nothing. The recipient 
received that which he did not want, and was unable to put any good use. And the 
gift has had the fate of all shams. It has made the giver contemptible and the 
receiver ungrateful (cited in Hill 1972: 419).  
Especially, in the early years of the British rule, participation in elections was low. 
According to a British official, in the 1886 election, from 63 villages, which had 1556 
registered voters combined, “not a single voter went to the poll and … 40 villages with an 
electorate number of 1025 sent one voter apiece, and he, in the majority of cases, was the 
village representative whose presence is compulsory!” (cited in Katsiaounis 1996: 89). In 
another election in the early 1920s, the turnout was as low as 4 percent largely reflecting 
the frustration in the face of the British government’s rejection to introduce full self-
government (cited in Hill 1972: 426).  
This “liberal-constitutional phase” of the British rule, to use Georghallides’ terms, came to 
an abrupt end with the October uprising in 1931 (cited in Leventis 2002: 71).28 In the more 
authoritarian phase of the British rule following the uprising, the Legislative Council was 
abolished, “[p]ower to legislate was given to the Governor,” and the constitution and all 
other elective institutions were suspended (Hill 1972: 432).29 There was little room left for 
political activities (McHenry 1997: 139). “Meetings of more than five -later fifteen persons- 
without permission of the local District Commissioner were banned” (Purcell 1969: 225). 
In 1933, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Edward Stubbs, the governor, 
wrote “I would not propose anything which would give an opening for political meetings or 
discussions by including any form of election” (cited in Leventis 2002: 72-3). 
This heavy-handed rule continued until the early 1940s. Though the island “was ruled by 
decree,” and no election was held for representative bodies other than municipalities up 
until independence (Richter 2006: 138), a relative liberalization could be observed during 
                                                        
28 Regarding the end of the liberal phase, Choisi wrote: “The threat of a common ‘national cooperation’ of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots had to be avoided at all costs, if the ‘colonial peace’ in Cyprus was to be retained. 
It was this fear, and not the October 1931 tumults – as it is usually held in the literature on Cyprus – that led 
the British put aside the constitution and rule the island via emergency laws until the end of their domination. 
The October tumults were solely the suitable occasion which the British waited for long, in order to abolish 
the controversial constitution” (1993: 20).   
29 The elections for the post of mukhtar were also abolished, and the authority to nominate them was given to 
the governor (Richter 2006: 136). 
46 
 
the governorship of Battershill (1939-1941). In 1941, political parties, and political 
meetings were legalized (Richter 2006: 143; Purcell 1969: 226), and in 194330, the 
municipal elections were reintroduced (Leventis 2002: 93; Protopapas 2006: 276-9; 
Christophorou 2006: 298).31 In the absence of any other representative bodies, “municipal 
elections provided the only platform for the expression of rivalries and competitive 
political representation” (Protopapas 2006: 269).32 
This relatively liberal political environment paved the way for the emergence of modern 
politics in the Greek Cypriot community (Christophoru 2006: 296). The first political party 
to be established was Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), a strong left-wing 
organization. It was established in 1941, and began to gain ground by largely capitalizing 
on the success of the trade union movement as well as its precursor, the Cyprus 
Communist Party (KKK), which had been outlawed in 1933 (Protopapas 2006: 271-2; 
Peristianis 2006: 249-50). The emergence of a strong, organized opponent or “ungodly 
internal enemies,” as they perceived it, triggered the formal organization of the right 
(Protopapas 2006: 275; emphasis in original). Consequently, it can be observed that in this 
period, right and left in the Greek Cypriot community came into being with their “full array 
of mass organizations (political parties, trade unions, peasant unions, cultural and athletic 
clubs – and so on)”33, and competed in the municipal elections along ideological lines 
(Peristianis 2006: 251; Loizos 1977: 129). 
As in many other respects, the Turkish Cypriots lagged behind the Greek Cypriots in the 
setting up of modern political institutions. In the 1943 election, for instance, although Dr 
Fazıl34 Küçük (henceforth, Dr Küçük), the rising star of the Kemalist movement, and his 
friends ran for the Municipal Council in Nicosia as the candidates of the People’s Party35, 
there was no sign that the party was organized in other electoral districts of the island. 
Moreover, it was only a party in name, which was formed just to contest the election; its 
                                                        
30 The election was held on 21 March 1943 (An 1996: 2-3).  
31 Indeed, the municipal elections were scheduled for June 1941. However, because of the German occupation 
of Greece in April 1941 the elections were postponed (Christophorou 2006: 298; Leventis 2002: 93).  
32 Universal male suffrage was implemented; men over the age of twenty-one “who had resided in the 
municipal boundaries for the past twelve months” were entitled to vote (Protopapas 2006: 277; 
Christophorou 2006: 296).  
33 “Use of the terms Right/Left by the social actors, referring to political formations with a respective 
ideological content, actually began in the 1940s” (Peristianis 2006: 251). 
34 Sometimes also written as Fadıl.  
35 A clear reference to the Republican People’s Party in Turkey (An 1997: 268).  
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name was never heard afterwards. The same applies to the grouping, which competed 
against the People’s Party in Nicosia. It did not have a name beyond the leader’s, let alone 
an organizational structure. It was called “Avukat Fadıl Partisi” (the party of Fadıl the 
lawyer) (Gürkan cited in An 1997: 268) or “Necati Partisi” (the party of Necati).36 Indeed, in 
the last election for the Legislative Assembly in 1930, at least there was a tint of an 
ideological element in the power struggle between the Kemalist candidate, Necati Özkan 
and the representative of the traditional elite, Mehmet Münir. Choisi depicts this political 
competition in a broader context as follows: 
The Kemalist movement in Cyprus embodied above all the idea of opposing the 
influence of the ruling notabilities and their British protectors. It was therefore, not 
an emancipatory movement in the conventional sense. Its objective was not to 
overcome colonial domination in order to set up an independent national state. 
Rather, it was simply a movement by part of the Turkish Cypriot elite, to thrust 
aside the moslem oriented notabilities, and obtain influential posts. Because the 
Kemalist opposition faced difficulties in its social and political development, due to 
the close network of cliental dependencies created among the traditional Turkish 
Cypriot elite, it tried through an ideological binding to the new Turkish national 
state, to limit the influence and power of the ruling traditionalists (1993: 19; cf 
Nevzat 2005: 377). 
From what governor Storrs wrote, we understand that beyond the “ideological” binding, 
Kemalists secured the active support of the Turkish government in their quest to replace 
the traditional elite. Assaf Bey, the Turkish Consul, played an active role in the success of 
Özkan who managed to defeat the incumbent Münir, the representative of the old guard 
(1945: 501).37 I will come back to this in the last section of this chapter. Suffice it here to 
say that the defeat of the old guard showed that after all, “the close network of cliental 
dependencies,” mentioned by Choisi was not so strong. 
The political situation in the 1940s was more or less the same. Only difference was, when 
we look at the political debates in the 1940s, we see that it was no longer between the 
traditionalists and Kemalists but rather among the proponents of Kemalist ideology, and 
hence devoid of any ideological distinction even on surface.38 
                                                        
36 Ak. Pınar (obviously a pseudonym): “Cemaat İşlerinde Doğruluk Lazımdır [Righteousness is required in 
communal affairs].” Halkın Sesi, 13.1.1944.  
37 Necati defeated Münir by 1993 to 1553 votes (Nevzat 2005: 376).  
38 See for instance, Dr. Fadıl Küçük: “Çarpışan İki Fikir [Two clashing ideas].” Halkın Sesi, 16.12.1943; Dr. Fadıl 
Küçük: “Yeni Edebiyat Numuneleri [New literature samples].” Halkın Sesi, 18.12.1943.  
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The political debates going on in Halkın Sesi in the 1943-44 period corroborate the 
diagnosis of various British officials on the Turkish Cypriot community who wrote that “the 
lack of initiative and organizing power … is generally a characteristic of this community” 
(cited in Choisi 1993: 13) or talked about “the spirit of hopeless resignation” in the face of 
an “economic decline over a long period” prevailing among the Turkish Cypriots (cited in 
Choisi 1993: 17). The political elite of the time seems to be caught in a stalemate, failing to 
surmount personal rivalries and effectively tackling on socio-economic backwardness of 
the community. 
One of the first attempts to break this vicious cycle and to work together as a united front 
to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community proved to be rather short-lived, 
although a promising start had been made. In the formation process of Kıbrıs Adası Türk 
Azınlıklar Kurumu (Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island of Cyprus, KATAK), old 
personal political rivalries seemed to be pushed aside. Among others, Münir, a 
representative of the traditional elite, Özkan, his Kemalist successor in the Legislative 
Council, and Dr Küçük whose party competed against Özkan’s few weeks earlier in the 
municipal election, managed to come together, along with many other members 
representing different segments of the society.39 However, the KATAK experiment did not 
last long, and even before the first anniversary of its establishment, Dr Küçük resigned.40 
The association apparently failed to mobilize a mass support, and in the face of popular 
indifference, the prospect of success for KATAK would have been quite low even if Dr 
Küçük had not withdrawn his support. Two months before Dr Küçük’s resignation, a 
frustrated Denktaş, who was then just 18 years old, wrote an article entitled “I accuse 
people!” where he criticized the Turkish Cypriot community’s indifference towards this 
                                                        
39 “Türk Azınlığının Haklarını Koruyacak Yeni Bir Cemiyet Kuruldu [A new association has been founded to 
protect the Turkish minority’s rights].” Halkın Sesi, 21.4.1943.   
40 Apparently, once again, personal rivalries overshadowed communal motives. His resignation came a month 
after an election where the representatives of Nicosia federation in the broader confederation of KATAK were 
elected (“Bir İstifa [A resignation].” Halkın Sesi, 13.1.1944). The election was held on 9 December 1943 
(“KATAK Sekreterliği’nden: Lefkoşa Federasyonu [From the KATAK secretariat: the Nicosia federation].” 
Halkın Sesi, 14.12.1943). From what Dr Küçük wrote in his newspaper, it is understood that Necati Özkan had 
attempted to prevent Dr Küçük’s election with a political manoeuvre (Dr Fadıl Küçük: “Seçim Böyle mi Olur 
[Is this how one holds an election]?” Halkın Sesi, 16.12.1943). 
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“unique, precious association,” when less than 10 people turned up in the first 6-monthly 
general meeting of KATAK.41  
2.2 Taksim: The Birth of a Vision for a Turkish Cypriot Political Community  
The Turkish Cypriot community had to wait until the latter part of the 1950s for a full-
fledged political mobilization (Patrick cited in Attalides 1977: 80 and 1979: 46-7). Until 
then the political activism of the Turkish Cypriot community was to a great extent limited 
to expressing their loyalty to the British government and voicing their concerns regarding 
the prospect of enosis (Markides 1977: 22-3). 1955 marks the beginning of the armed 
struggle of EOKA, which aimed to achieve enosis by force. Even in the face of such an 
existential threat, the Turkish Cypriot’s political mobilization was not entirely home-
grown: “Within the next 3 years, a community political structure was developed as a result 
not only of efforts of Turkish Cypriot leaders to oppose enosis, but also of encouragement 
from British and Turkish officials who were seeking to safeguard their countries’ strategic 
interests” (Patrick cited in Attalides 1977: 80 and 1979: 46-7).42 As Choisi puts it, the 
Turkish Cypriot “national ‘awakening’ occurred not as a reaction to British colonialism, but 
as an anti-Greek opposition encouraged by the British” (1993: 25). In the center stage of 
this national awakening has stood the ideal of taksim. Yet, even this ideal, according to 
some accounts, was strategically introduced by the British to dissuade Greek Cypriots from 
their demands for enosis, and it took the Turkish government a while to fully embrace it 
(Markides 1977: 24-5).43  
Once it became involved in the Cyprus problem, the Turkish government threw its weight 
behind Dr Küçük in his campaign to become the communal leader44 (Karagil cited in An 
2006: 659), so that the Turkish Cypriots could speak with one voice. A Turkish citizen, 
                                                        
41 Halkın Sesi, 2.11.1943.  
42 Patrick wrote this based on his interview with Dr Küçük (1976: 42).  
43 Charles Foley, a British journalist based in Cyprus in 1955, quotes Hikmet Bil, saying “[i]f, and only if, 
Britain decides to abdicate in Cyprus, then we shall put forward our claim to regain the island for Turkey … If 
necessary, we shall fight” (1964: 29). 
44 His newspaper, Halkın Sesi should also be considered as a factor further boosting his political power. In a 
letter to a friend in Istanbul dated 11 September 1954, Özker Yaşın, a contemporary journalist, wrote “Dr 
Küçük’s Halkın Sesi has been a force, a scourge haunting everyone in this island for years. … I have to admit 
that no other newspaper has the same effect on the community as Halkın Sesi. Halkın Sesi has been the 
strongest, and the most influential weapon providing Dr Küçük with credit and leadership (Cited in An 2006: 
509-10).       
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Hikmet Bil was sent to Cyprus to help Dr Küçük to reorganize his party (Foley 1964: 29).45 
The party secured its dominance when it managed to take over the control of Evkaf, “the 
most important Turkish communal institution46,” when the British finally decided that the 
time was ripe to surrender the administration of this influential institution to the Turkish 
Cypriots.47  
The new party fully endorsed the idea of taksim and managed to mobilize the community 
on this basis. The following excerpt from an interview given by Dr Küçük summarizes very 
well the justification for taksim policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership then, and in the 
decades to come:   
Cyprus is not a ‘country’ in any ethnic sense; it is just a small island which does not 
have a ‘nation’ of its own, being populated as it is by two separate communities 
which are mere extensions of Greek and Turkish nations proper. The Turks 
comprise one fifth of the population and own no less than 30 percent of all arable 
land on the island, as well as being shareholders in the sovereignty of Cyprus.48 
Therefore, actual ownership of land by virtue of title deeds alone can be a criterion 
of ownership for Cyprus, let alone the fact that Cyprus before it was leased to Britain 
in 1878 was a Turkish province for about 300 years. Consequently if the Greeks 
acquire the right to unite with Greece, the Turks should have the same right and 
unite with Turkey.49 
Dr Küçük was considered as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community because the 
political unity among Turkish Cypriots was achieved around his Cyprus is Turkish Party 
                                                        
45 Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği Partisi decided to re-name itself as the “Cyprus is Turkish Party” after the visit of 
Hikmet Bil, the chairman of the Cyprus is Turkish Association, which had 83 branches in Turkey. The decision 
was made unanimously in an extraordinary congress of the party held on 24 July 1955 (An 2006: 522).    
46 Georghallides explains the importance of Evkaf as follows: “after the withdrawal of the Ottoman state, the 
Evcaf became the most important Turkish communal institution. It had a leading voice in Turkish education 
and it oversaw and contributed to the expenses of schools and mosques throughout the island. Since to a 
large extent the Evcaf drew its strength from the Government, it became a means for the exercise of British 
influence over the Moslem community. This was most clearly exemplified by the career of Mussa Irfan bey, 
Turkish Delegate from 1904 to 1925. Irfan posed as the staunch defender of the rights and privileges of the 
Turkish community and simultaneously (since he was the director of a semi-Government department) as an 
apologist of British policies” (1979: 79).   
47 This was recommended earlier by the Committee on Turkish Affairs in its report. The report, which was 
expected to be “instrumental in securing a higher standard of living for the Turkish community and pave the 
way for greater responsibility” (Lord Winster cited in Crawshaw 1978: 44), among other things 
recommended “that the Muftiship would be restored; that Evkaf should be managed by an elected all-Turkish 
Committee”. The Committee was convened in April 1948 (Crawshaw 1978: 44). For the full report in Turkish, 
see Fedai 2002. 
48 In fact, the interview was conducted in 1964. However, the last part of the sentence regarding sovereignty, 
which became relevant after the establishment of the Republic aside, the position was not different in the 
mid-1950s.  
49 “Constitutional Position Today.” Special News Bulletin, 11.10.1964. From the interview given to the 
Encounter magazine on 5.10.1964.  
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(Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi). However, the spearhead of the taksim movement was Denktaş 
thanks to his active role in the initiation and conduct of the armed resistance. After his 
resignation from the government of Cyprus, where he had worked for nine years in 
different capacities50, he became the president of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot 
Associations (Nesim 1999: 9) -“a voluntary organization activating social and economic life 
of Turkish people in Cyprus and organizing their resistance to” enosis.51 The federation was 
the second most influential organization at the time after the Cyprus is Turkish Party.    
Few weeks after he had become the president of the Federation, Denktaş took part in the 
establishment of the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT). 
The other two founders were, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, a medical doctor and the secretary 
general of the Federation, and Kemal Tanrısevdi of the Turkish Embassy. The TMT was not 
the first counter-enosis armed organization. What made it distinct from the others was: 
Firstly, it was organized island-wide, and secondly and more importantly, upon Denktaş’s 
insistence it was directly attached to the Special Warfare Department in Turkey (Kızılyürek 
2003: 247).52 Although the other two co-founders’ approach was to keep the TMT as “a 
Cypriot organization,” and not to ask for anything from Ankara, Denktaş recounts, he 
insisted on Turkey’s involvement, and said “[u]nless this is going to be Turkey’s 
organization, we are not going to manage anything; we’ll end up killing each other like 
EOKA” (2006: 47-8).   
After meeting both leaders, the Department’s head decided to have Denktaş rather than Dr 
Küçük as its liaison in the island (Tansu cited in Kızılyürek 2003: 247-8).53 As Kızılyürek 
suggests, this decision turned out to be “a turning point in Denktaş’s political life … as soon 
as he entered into organized politics, he had become the ‘strongest man’ of the Turkish 
Cypriot community” (Kızılyürek 2003: 247-8).  
The TMT quickly made its name known by issuing leaflets ordering the people to get 
prepared for the day “when you will be called upon to sacrifice your life and blood in the 
                                                        
50 From 1949 until 1957, Denktaş had worked for the Cyprus government as “Junior Crown Counsel, Crown 
Counsel, and Ag. Solicitor General” respectively (Public Information Office (n.d.): 3). He also took part in the 
Consultative Assembly (1948), and the Committee for Turkish Affairs (1948-9) (ibid.). 
51 Ibid.  
52 The organization’s name has been changed several times (see Söyler 2012: 7).   
53 Denktaş, Mayes observes, “is a shrewder, tougher man than Kucuk” (1960: 103).  
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‘PARTITION’ struggle” (Crawshaw 1978: 287-8, emphasis in original). The means, it had 
used to mobilize the Turkish Cypriot community around the ideal of taksim was not always 
peaceful: “Where ethnic consensus failed to be reached through nationalistic formations, 
the militant cadres of the TMT came into play to secure a forced-ethnic consensus through 
pressure and violence” (Kızılyürek 2003: 264; see also Attalides 1977a: 81; Crawshaw 
1978: 287). The methods used by the nationalists were sometimes found “extremely 
oppressive” by the Turkish government. Kıbrıs Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı (Cyprus Turkish 
Youth Organization), which had close ties with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, for instance, 
was identified as a “fascist” formation by the Turkish premier Menderes and its president, 
Celal Hordan, a Turkish citizen was called back to Ankara (Kızılyürek 2003: 251).  
It is important to note at this point that the formative years of Turkish nationalism as an 
ideology of mass mobilization in Cyprus, coincides with the rise of a more conservative and 
less tolerant version of Turkish nationalism with Pan-Turkist and Islamist elements in 
Turkey, in the late 1940s and 1950s (Kitromilides 1979: 25-7). The Turkish Cypriot 
version of Turkish nationalism was heavily influenced by these currents, which basically 
amounted to “an exclusive political and cultural dogma, which blocked a tolerant outlook 
from developing” (ibid.). Furthermore, as Kitromilides suggests the secret organization in 
Ankara, which had taken the responsibility of the TMT operation in Cyprus had been 
“directly linked … to the most reactionary and militant elements in the conservative revival 
in Turkey" (ibid.: 27). The organization Kitromilides referred to was the Special Warfare 
Department, which was the official title given to the Turkish Gladio. As Söyler puts it, the 
organization, which had been established as a counter-communist organization under 
NATO, in time “deviated from its ofﬁcial purpose and was authorized not only to destroy 
political dissidence, but also to subvert governments if necessary” (2012: 7). This 
organization was nothing other than what would come to be known as the “deep state” or 
“state within a state” in the 1990s (see Gunter 1998). As it will be briefly touched upon in 
Chapter Five, the organization would use this extended authority i.e. destroying dissidence 
and subverting governments, in northern Cyprus too. This connection also goes a long way 
to explain the level of respect Denktaş would command with the Turkish establishment, 
and how he would be able to resist the pressure from various political leaders including 
charismatic Özal and Erdoğan in the more recent past. Obviously the ties he had cultivated 
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with the deep state over decades shielded him against political actors, who were 
themselves held under tutelage by this mighty organization.        
Furthermore, unlike EOKA, and the Greek Cypriot right in general which had to take on 
AKEL, the TMT did not have to compete with a well-entrenched political ideology/rival. 
The newly fledgling trade union movement was far from constituting a formidable 
challenge for TMT, and therefore it did not take it long to suppress the movement. Similar 
to the Greek Cypriot case, neither existed a liberal challenger (for the Greek Cypriot case 
see Peristianis 2006). Therefore, the TMT, and Turkish Cypriot right single-handedly 
shaped the political landscape during the period of political modernization, and emerged as 
a political monopoly, effectively and sometimes violently crowding out any contender in 
the decades to come.   
2.3 The 1960 Republic and the First Elections 
By February 1959, the vicious feud between the proponents of enosis and taksim appeared 
to come to an abrupt end, when it was declared that Turkey and Greece came to an 
agreement in Zurich about the future of the island: independence. “It is something like a 
miracle,” Sir Hugh Foot, the British governor, was quoted saying in Time, and “too good to 
be true” said the London Daily Mail.54 Yet, the news caused less enthusiasm in the island.  
Both communities regarded the new Republic very much as a ‘second best’ 
arrangement. … Greek-Cypriot leaders viewed the treaties and constitution as an 
‘imposed’ solution which had to be temporarily accepted to prevent taksim. Turk-
Cypriot leaders would have preferred partition and union with Turkey. Since that 
was not forthcoming, they demanded the strictest adherence to the provisions of the 
treaties and constitution which granted their community very generous entrenched 
rights (Patrick 1976: 35; emphasis added).  
Ironically, independence brought its most determined opponents, the proponents of 
extreme nationalism in both communities, to power. The former EOKA and TMT members 
were recruited at all levels of the new government and the civil service (Attalides 1979: 55), 
in a way sowing the seeds of its own destruction.   
Given these circumstances, the establishment of the RoC did not bring about normalization 
in the inter-communal affairs. Indiscriminate murders were still rampant despite joint 
                                                        
54 “Cyprus: Something Like a Miracle.” Time, 23.2.1959.  
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appeals by Makarios and Dr Küçük to their respective communities to avoid clashes 
(Pantelis 1984: 331-2), and the media in both sides were full of statements declaring that 
the struggle was not over yet. Using this tension as a pretext, the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership refused to loosen its grip in its internal affairs. The elections for various offices 
in the new republic came against this backdrop.  
Dr Küçük was elected by acclamation and proclaimed vice-president on 3 December 1959 
(An 2006: 641-2; Pantelis 1984: 331) without much controversy, at least on the surface.55 
Indeed, Nalbantoğlu who had an immense influence on the TMT fighters was at 
loggerheads with Dr Küçük, and wanted to replace him with Denktaş as early as in 1959 
(Denktaş cited in Gazioğlu: 64). Denktaş did not agree. As he had a different strategy, he did 
not seek a ministerial post in the central government or a seat in the House of 
Representatives either.56 Rather, he opted for the chairmanship of the Communal Chamber 
as he thought the chamber “is more important because it deals directly with the people”.57 
He was right; the Communal Chamber was the most important institution of the Turkish 
Cypriot community as it had far-reaching executive powers unlike alternative posts. It had 
authority “in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of 
personal status” (Mayes 1960: 223).58 In this capacity, it controlled the Turkish and 
international aid received for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as the influential 
institutions like the Cooperative Central Bank and Evkaf.59 “To me the biggest challenge is 
to set up this new Communal Government and win the confidence of our people,” Denktaş 
                                                        
55 This was not the case in the Greek Cypriot community. The people of Cyprus were not consulted about the 
agreements founding the Republic. However, the presidential election can be seen as a quasi-referendum in 
the Greek Cypriot community because of the positions of the two contenders: Makarios and John Clerides. 
Eventually, Makarios who was in favor of the Zurich-London Agreements won the 65% of the votes against 
John Clerides who represented joint opposition camp of the extreme Right and Communists, who were 
against the agreements (Kitromolides 1980: 189; Markides 1977: 80-1).   
56  The 1960 Constitution envisaged the sharing of the legislative power between the House of 
Representatives, and the two Communal Chambers.  
57 “Our candidates are above party politics says Denktash.” Cyprus Mail, 21.7.1960. According to Mayes “he 
was deliberately keeping himself uninvolved, ready to see Küçük founder with the agreements” (1960: 103). 
“Certainly Rauf Denktaş is the man to watch, if there is a breakdown in Cyprus,” Mayes adds with remarkable 
foresight.   
58 The Communal Chambers would also “supervise the working of the separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
municipalities that were to be created in the five largest towns for a trial period of up to four years” (Mayes 
1960: 223).  
59 Aydın Samioğlu interviewed by author; The British Government, for instance, agreed to pay one million 
pounds to the Turkish Cypriot Community for its own use, independent from financial aid being given to the 
RoC. The first instalment, 500 thousand pounds, were paid into the Turkish Bank in Nicosia on 29th July 1960 
(“Ankara Pledge of Economic Aid to Turks in Cyprus.” Cyprus Mail, 30.7.1960).  
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said.60 This was what he did rather successfully in the next few years to come. He built up 
the foundations of the formidable electoral base that he would rely on in his long political 
life, in this period. When asked what made Denktaş such a political heavyweight, Fuat 
Veziroğlu, one of his aides in the late 1950s and early 1960s, gave the following answer:  
Denktaş was a great organizer; by establishing organizations, he was securing mass 
participation. …  Sometimes, all of a sudden he was jumping out of his office, driving 
to the remote villages of Karpasia or Tylliria, stopping by at coffee shops, chatting 
with the villagers, listening to them, and if possible satisfying their needs.  … He was 
always in touch with people; always trying to solve their problems. Whenever, he 
was in the eve of making an important decision, he started with convincing the 
notables at the village level: mukhtars, imams, and the company secretaries (elected 
representative of the village cooperatives). This way, he had made a popular base.  
Along with his charisma and skill as an orator, his modest personality made him 
likeable to the masses. He was making ordinary folk feel important by greeting the 
crowd gathered in the coffee shops one by one, eating and drinking with them, and 
telling them what was going on in Nicosia. … It is worth adding that Denktaş had 
also made a name for himself as a staunch advocate of Turkish rights in his capacity 
as a counsel during the British rule.61      
As for the parliamentary elections, it can be said that what was supposed to be the first 
democratic experiment of the Turkish Cypriots in the post-colonial Cyprus62 turned out to 
be not so democratic because of the authoritarian tendencies of the leadership (see for 
instance Gürkan 2001). The elections for the House of Representatives and the Communal 
Chambers were set for 31 July and 7 August 1960 respectively. Three organizations, which 
had come to dominate all aspects of life in the Turkish Cypriot community, the Party63, the 
Federation64 and the Youth Organization65 joined their forces in a common ticket and 
called themselves the National Front.66 The candidate list, “a national organ above party 
                                                        
60 Public Information Office (n.d.): 5. 
61 Interviewed by author.  
62 Universal suffrage was introduced in this election (Pantelis 1984: 331-2). According to the Article 63 of the 
Constitution: “every citizen of the Republic who has attained the age of twenty-one years and has such 
residential qualifications as may be prescribed by the Electoral Law shall have the right to be registered as an 
elector in either the Greek or the Turkish electoral list”. 
63 Cyprus National Turkish Union (Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği); sometimes also referred to as National Unity (Milli 
Birlik) led by Dr Küçük.  
64 The Federation of the Cyprus Turkish Associations led by Denktaş.  
65 The Cyprus Turkish Youth Organization led by Necdet Güvener.  
66 “Parti, Federasyon ve Gençlik Teşkilatının Mebus Adayları Açıklandı [The parliamentary candidates of the 
party, the federation and the youth organization have been revealed].” Halkın Sesi, 20.7.1960.  
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politics,” as Denktaş put it67 was to a great extent determined by Denktaş, and was made up 
of “yes men” (Gürkan 2001: 72).   
As nobody else contested, all thirty National Front candidates for the Turkish Communal 
Chamber were elected by acclamation. Eight candidates for the House of Representatives, 
who were not opposed in their constituencies, were also declared elected.68 However, to 
the dismay of the leadership, there were other candidates for the remaining seven House of 
Representatives seats for the districts of Famagusta, Limassol and Paphos, and therefore 
elections had to be held.69  
Few weeks before the election, Dr İhsan Ali, a notable from Paphos district, had announced 
in a press conference that he was going to establish an opposition party.70 However, the 
party could not be set up as the Turkish government was against this: The Turkish 
president, Cemal Gürsel was quoted in the Turkish Cypriot daily Bozkurt as saying “we 
never support the splitting of the Turks, who constitute a numerical minority into few 
parties and strata” (An 2006: 659).71 Under the circumstances, rather than forming a party, 
the opposition candidates opted for running as independents. Though he did not stand for 
election himself, Dr İhsan Ali was considered as the leader of the opposition movement.72 
Opposition in any form was seen as a source of weakness by the leadership however, and 
whoever attempted to run as an independent was stigmatized as “subversive” (ibid.: 667-
8).73 “The ones who foment and abuse the opposition only serve the Greek Cypriots,” 
Denktaş thundered in an election rally in Famagusta (ibid.: 669).74  
Consequently, all seven contested seats went to the National Front.75 Yet, it is worth adding 
that the independent candidates in Limassol, Paphos and Famagusta managed to garner 
                                                        
67 “Our candidates are above party politics says Denktash.” Cyprus Mail. 21.7.1960.  
68 “12 Representatives Returned Unopposed.” Cyprus Mail. 23.7.1960.  
69 The situation in the Greek Cypriot community was not much different: For the 35 seats in the House of 
Representatives, there were 45 candidates (“No Nomination Day Shocks: 67 Candidates for 50 Seats.” Cyprus 
Mail, 22.7.1960). According to Cyprus Mail dated 23 July 1960, “all the Greek local papers agreed yesterday 
that it would be preferable for an election to be avoided”. Of the 10 independents 2 withdrew by 27 July (“Yet 
Another Candidate Leaves the Elections.” Cyprus Mail, 28.7.1960).    
70 “Kıbrıs’ta Türkler Yeni Parti Kuracak [Turks in Cyprus will set up a new party].” Milliyet, 6.6.1960. 
71 Originally published in Bozkurt (24.6.1960).  
72 “Patriotic Front Names its Communal Candidates.” Cyprus Mail, 28.7.1960.  
73 Originally published in Bozkurt and Halkın Sesi on 22.7.1960.  
74 Originally published in Halkın Sesi on 26.7.1960.  
75 “Patriotic Front Sweep the Board.” Cyprus Mail, 2.8.1960.  
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more votes than the National Front candidates in the town centers but lost due to the votes 
coming from the villages.76 The result in Limassol was particularly contested. Supporters of 
independent candidates in Limassol held demonstrations for two consecutive nights to 
protest the election result, which they believed was rigged.77 The demonstrators demanded 
a new poll to no avail.78 The fact that ballot boxes were transferred to the district centers 
for vote counting making it possible to change the ballot papers en route lends credibility 
to the allegations.79 Furthermore, there were also reports in the local press that the 
independent candidates were harassed by the TMT members during the election campaign. 
Osman Örek, the interim minister of defence of the Republic, for instance, admitted that 
Faiz Kaymak, an independent candidate from Famagusta, was followed by the TMT on his 
way to canvassing, however denied any wrongdoing: “This is something normal. This is not 
pressure. No harm was done to him or to his property,” (ibid.: 671) he was quoted as 
saying.80 
Within less than two months, a necessity arose to hold a by-election to fill the three seats 
vacated by the members of the House who had been appointed as cabinet ministers.81 
Kemal Deniz82, who ran as an independent, managed to defeat the candidate of the National 
Front in Nicosia, though other two seats went to the National Front again.83 Faiz Kaymak 
was dissuaded from running in the by-election, apparently under duress.84 In the 
                                                        
76 “Kıbrıs [Cyprus].”Kim (Turkey), 31.8.1960 (Reprinted in the pro-Republic Turkish Cypriot daily Cumhuriyet 
on 19.9.1960).   
77 “Kıbrıs’ta Seçimleri Kaybeden Adayların Taraftarları Dün Nümayiş Yaptılar [The supporters of the defeated 
candidates in Cyprus held a demonstration yesterday].” Milliyet, 4.8.1960; see also “Leymosun’da 
Bozgunculuk Tezahürleri: Seçimlerde Yolsuzluk Yapılmış [Manifestations of Subversion in Limassol: Electoral 
fraud allegations]!” Halkin Sesi, 3.8.1960.  
78 “Election Protest by Limassol Turks.” Cyprus Mail, 3.8.1960. 
79 See “Rey Sayımı [Counting of votes].” Halkın Sesi, 30.7.1960.  
80 Originally published in Bozkurt (30.7.1960). 
81 “Ara Seçimleri İçin Hazırlıklara Başlandı [By-election preparations have started].” Halkın Sesi, 3.9.1960.  
82 Kemal Deniz was probably not considered as a major threat by the leadership as he was a loyal nationalist 
himself. Few weeks after his election, in a press conference in Turkey, he asked the Turkish government 
among other things to consider Cyprus always as a part of the motherland (“Kıbrıslıların İsteği [The Cypriots’ 
request].” Milliyet, 7.10.1960).  
83 “Ara Seçimlerinin Neticeleri Bu Sabah İkide Belli Oldu: Seçimleri Banka Müdürü Orhan Bey ile Tüccar 
Kemal Deniz Bey Kazandılar [The result of by-election disclosed at 2 am: The bank manager Mr Orhan and 
tradesman Kemal Deniz won].” Halkın Sesi, 26.9.1960.  
84 “Kıbrıs [Cyprus].” Cumhuriyet, 19.9.1960.  
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meantime, though the establishment of a new party had been announced in early August85, 
it did not take part in the by-election.  
Indeed, the necessity to hold a by-election on its own merits more attention than its 
outcome. It was obvious that these three interim ministers would be appointed as the 
ministers in the first cabinet. Then, given the fact that the consitution did not allow them to 
hold these two positions at the same time, why did they stand for election in the first place? 
This was, in Denktaş’s words, basically to “prove to certain elements in Turkey that they 
were in office by the will of the people”86 because some “malicious rumours in Turkey” 
held that they lacked the approval of the Turkish Cypriot community.87 Indeed, this was 
nothing but a manifestation of a wider rift between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the 
Committee of National Unity (Milli Birlik Komitesi) in Turkey, which came to power after 
the military coup d’état of 27 May 1960.  
The junta was suspicious about the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s loyalty. Some notable 
Turkish Cypriots apparently fomented these suspicions.88 The initial intention of the 
government was to replace Dr Küçük, as he was considered too close to Menderes, the 
toppled Turkish premier. One of Dr Küçük’s articles in his daily, where he basically had said, 
it was wrong to criticize the deposed leaders mercilessly before they were tried and found 
guilty, was considered pro-Menderes and counter-revolutionary.89 This triggered anti-Dr 
Küçük demonstrations in major cities of Turkey, which were organized by the Turkish 
Cypriot university students.90 Given that a military rule was prevailing at the time in 
Turkey, these demonstrations were obviously endorsed if not directly organized by the 
junta. Ironically, other international actors involved, Britain and Greece, were reluctant to 
accept a change of leadership in the Turkish Cypriot side fretting that this might stir a 
backlash within the community, and in turn, jeopardize the implementation of the 
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86 “Kranidiotis Rejects Foreign Affairs Ministry.” Cyprus Mail, 16.8.1960.  
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Yürüyüş Yapıldı [A silent march held in Ankara for Cyprus].” Milliyet, 26.6.1960.   
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agreements.91 It turned out that eventually the new military-backed government, which 
had earlier expressed its commitment to the agreements signed by the Menderes 
government92, took this concern into consideration, and did not push for a leadership 
change in the island.  
To cut the ties with the previous regime however, the Turkish government withdrew the 
appointment of İsmail Soysal, chief spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(TMFA) during Menderes administration93, and appointed a retired lieutenant colonel, 
Emin Dirvana as its first ambassador to the RoC94 - who would prove to be a staunch 
proponent of the Republic to the dismay of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Apparently, the 
junta had some second thoughts about the TMT as well. They recalled its commander, 
colonel Rıza Vuruşkan, and the responsible officer in Ankara, İsmail Tansu was forced to 
retire.95 As the dominant tendency within the government was to attach the TMT directly 
to the Turkish contingent in the island96, they did not appoint a commander to replace 
Vuruşkan.97  
The junta’s commitment to the London and Zurich Agreements was so firm that despite the 
TMT’s insistence “after the coup not a single gun had been run to the island until the 
clashes broke out in 1963”.98 The TMT was re-organized, and in a way pacified, as part of 
this operation. As a result, former commanders became in effect inferior to sergeants sent 
from Ankara, which caused a deep disappointment among the ranks of the TMT (Halluma 
2007: 344).99 A replacement to the commander was appointed only after a civilian 
government took over in 1962 in Ankara.100 This appointment coincided with a change of 
heart on the Turkish position regarding the future of the Republic. The turning point seems 
                                                        
91 Aydın Samioğlu interviewed by author.   
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95 Aydın Samioğlu interviewed by author.  
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97 Aydın Samioğlu interviewed by author. 
98 Fuat Veziroğlu interviewed by author.  
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to be Makarios’ visit to Ankara in November 1962.101 In this visit, İnonü, the Turkish 
premier, reiterated the Turkish position regarding the agreements establishing the 
Republic, and asked Makarios not to push for any changes in the constitution but did not 
receive a positive answer. “Makarios’ attitude in the official meetings cannot be seen as an 
indication of a solution to the problems in Cyprus any time soon,” wrote Mehmet Ali Kışlalı 
of Milliyet, referring to the sources close to the TMFA.102   
Having studied the period running up to the inter-communal clashes, Patrick concludes, 
“there is no doubt that both Cypriot communities expected the 1960 constitution to prove 
unworkable, and that they anticipated and planned for an armed clash” (1976: 37). Before 
long, the anticipated armed conflict broke out when Makarios, despite the clear opposition 
from Turkey, proposed to amend the constitution in December 1963. 
2.4 The Evolution of Separate Turkish Cypriot Administrations  
The inter-communal clashes of 1963 paved the way for the first administrative division in 
the island. The Turkish Cypriots evacuated more than hundred villages and retreated into 
the areas where Turkish Cypriots constituted majority. One fourth of the Turkish Cypriot 
population was displaced.103 These areas were basically disconnected enclaves, dispersed 
all around the island. Overall, there were, some large and some very small, no less than 73 
different administrative units.104 Eventually, more than half of the Turkish Cypriot 
population of 116 thousand started living in the areas under Turkish Cypriot control 
(Borowiec 2000: 65). As Denktaş put it, “the Turkish community was forced into an 
economic and administrative vacuum” (1982: 34; for an alternative account see Nicolet 
2002: 61-8; for an account from the Greek Cypriot perspective, see Spyridakis 1974: 183-
192). To fill that vacuum, and to administer the Turkish Cypriot affairs, a General 
Committee was established. This first step in the direction of a separate administrative 
structure was justified, in a rather vivid way, in the Special News Bulletin, the mouthpiece of 
the Turkish Communal Chamber as follows:  
                                                        
101 Fuat Veziroğlu interviewed by author.  
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103 State Planning Organization (1979: 4). 
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The structure and mechanisms of bodies be they of a group of people or of a state 
are organic. Just as a living matter which is rejected by an organic body looks for a 
place to strike its roots as a separate organism, the Turkish Cypriots, whose 
existence in the Republic of Cyprus is ignored, are inclined to look for their own 
sources in order to secure their separate existence. Naturally this leads to actual 
separation and paves the way for TAKSIM. In the administrative field we possess the 
status of a separate community.105 
The General Committee, which consisted of 13 members106, was only one of the foci of 
political power within the community107. Even before the inter-communal clashes began, 
there had been a power struggle between these forces. “The commander of the TMT, the 
Turkish ambassador, and the commander of the Turkish contingent had wanted to use 
certain authorities, which belonged to the politicians, and this caused some quarrels,” Nejat 
Konuk, the then secretary general of the Communal Chamber, recounts (cited in Besim 
2011: 132).  
The inter-communal conflict not only brought the ongoing internal power struggle waged 
behind closed doors into limelight but also tilted the balance in favour of the TMT, the most 
organized group within the community. Accordingly, its commander, so-called Bayraktar108, 
a colonel from Turkey, therefore accountable to the Turkish Joint Chief of Staff, became the 
holder of “absolute power,” not only in military but also in political matters (ibid.: 133; Cf. 
Salih 1978: 181). Dr Küçük, on the other hand, though on top of the political hierarchy as 
the vice-president of the Republic had in effect no executive power. The Communal 
Chamber had retained its political and economic influence thanks to its control over the 
Turkish financial assistance as well as the Evkaf and Cooperative Central Bank. However, 
Şemsi Kazım, who was in charge of the Communal Chamber in the absence of Denktaş109, 
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position in the Turkish Embassy.     
109 He was banished by the Makarios administration after he had left for Ankara in early 1964.  
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sided with the Bayraktar rather than Dr Küçük.110 This was, in fact, what Dr Küçük had 
been concerned about from the outset. Although, he was its leader, at least on paper, he 
was concerned that the existence of an armed organization would eventually “weaken his 
political influence” (Gazioğlu 2000: 21). His concerns were obviously proven well founded.  
Although the balance of power between the actors changed from time to time, this three-
headed structure prevailed until 1974 (cf. Salih 1978: 181), and came to be known as the 
Rule of BEY: Bayraktar, Elçi (the Turkish ambassador), Yönetim (the Turkish Cypriot 
administration), and hence the acronym BEY, which can be roughly translated as master.  
Against this backdrop, Dr Küçük continued to play his role as the community leader, and 
did his utmost to avoid any public show of disunity. In answering a foreign journalist’s 
question regarding the opposition within the Turkish Cypriot community, he wrote, 
“[t]here are no clashing trends of opinion among the Turks of Cyprus. We are all engaged in 
a struggle for survival and we are solidly united in this cause. In fact our solidarity 
constitutes our strength in this life-or-death struggle”.111 This was indeed hardly the case 
not only due to the internal power struggle within the formal leadership but also because 
of the existence of different voices in the public at large. Few months before the interview 
concerned, in a cable dated 16 March 1964, addressed to İnönü, “on behalf of the citizens 
who cannot raise their voice owing to the prevailing threats and terrorism,” wrote Dr İhsan 
Ali, “I am sure your foresight will bring about the failure of those who are trying to mislead 
you and your Government into a difficult position by leading Turkey to a war, and to turn 
this island into hell by putting forward to world opinion the nonsensical allegation that the 
two communities cannot live together in Cyprus”.112  
How representative of the Turkish Cypriot public opinion Dr İhsan Ali’s views were, 
remains a moot point, as the popularity of his ideas had never been put to test in a real 
election. What is known for a fact is that he was a strong critic of the leadership, and that he 
supported at least initially, the short-lived opposition party established by Ahmet Gürkan 
and Ayhan Hikmet, who also published the pro-republic Cumhuriyet newspaper, which 
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came to an abrupt end in April 1962, when its founders were assassinated, allegedly, by the 
TMT.     
The Turkish establishment was firmly against the idea of military intervention. Much to the 
disappointment of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, Cemal Tural, the chairman of the joint 
chiefs of staff, publicly ridiculed the calls for intervention repeatedly: “The Turkish army 
cannot be sent whenever someone gets thrust a needle on his foot in Cyprus,” he was 
reported as saying.113 About the same time, he made the following statement: 
There is no such thing as the Cyprus problem today. The Cyprus problem is made up 
of balloons flown by some who are after their selfish interests. There is a fight 
between Ali and Aleco [the characters of a popular story about two fishermen] in 
Cyprus but there is no need for sending the army for the fight between two persons. 
… Should an event occur, we will defend our just cause, but at the moment, there is 
no incident in Cyprus. The ones who are after their selfish interests have 
exaggerated what had happened.114 
This stance of the Turkish military notwithstanding, Turkey and Greece came to the brink 
of war when clashes broke out in the villages of Kophinou (Köfünye) and Ayios Theodoros 
(Geçitkale) in November 1967.115 Ankara threatened to invade unless twenty thousand 
Greek troops in the island were withdrawn, and their commander Grivas recalled.116 A deal 
was eventually brokered thanks to the US president Lyndon Johnson’s special envoy Cyrus 
Vance’s intensive shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia, and shortly the 
Greek troops began to withdraw from the island.117 The Greek Cypriot press denounced the 
agreement as “a sell-out”.118  
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Emboldened by this success, and further encouraged by the turmoil in Athens (the military 
government was internationally unpopular and internally unstable)119 Ankara took one 
more step, and on 28 December 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leaders declared the 
establishment of the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration.120 The decision was made 
the previous night in a meeting at the vice-presidenc’s office where two Turkish officials, 
Zeki Kuneralp, the secretary general of the TMFA, and Suat Bilge, the TMFA’s chief legal 
adviser, also participated.121 According to the Turkish Cypriot leadership this was merely 
“an attempt to put their house in order by re-organizing their existing administrative 
system”.122   
Not surprisingly, the declaration stirred an international controversy. It was perceived as 
an act of secessionism by the Greek Cypriot leadership. The Makarios government declared 
the administration “unlawful,” and lodged a protest at the UN.123 The involvement of 
Kuneralp in the process was considered as interference in the internal affairs of the RoC, 
and the Greek Cypriot administration declared him persona non grata.124 Furthermore, 
Makarios issued an “ultimatum to all heads of foreign missions in Cyprus, warning them 
that any contact by them with the members of the Turkish Cypriot provisional 
administration would be regarded … as an act of ‘recognition’ of the Turkish administration, 
and as such, a violation of the terms of their accreditation”.125 U Thant, the UN Secretary 
General did not welcome the declaration either, and in his Report to the Security Council, 
he wrote, inter alia  “I cannot conceal my misgivings as to the decision itself, its timing, the 
way in which it was announced and the publicity given to it by the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership”.126 
                                                        
119 The military government had been in power since the coup in April 1967. However, it should be noted that 
the king tried to stage a counter-coup, and when failed, was sent into exile in mid-December (“Restoration 
Bid Fails: King Constantine flees into exile.” Cyprus Mail. 15.12.1967). 
120 “Kıbrıs’ta Geçici Türk Yönetimi Kuruldu [Provisional Turkish administration established in Cyprus].” 
Milliyet, 30.12.1967. 
121 “Re-Organization of the Turkish Cypriot Administrative System.” Special News Bulletin, 30.12.1967. 
122 “Setting the Record Right About Turkish Cypriot Re-Organization.” Special News Bulletin, 4.1.1968.  
123 “Makarios: ‘Hareket Kanunsuzdur’ [Makarios: ‘The Act is Unlawful’].” Milliyet, 30.12.1967. 
124 “Makarios Türk Hükümetini Protesto Etti: Kuneralp İstenmeyen Adam İlan Edildi [Makarios protested the 
Turkish government: Kuneralp declared persona non grata].” Milliyet, 31.12.1967.  
125 “Makarios Still Adamant in his Attempt to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of Diplomats.” Special News 
Bulletin, 10.1.1968.  
126 Secretary Generals Report to the Security Council cited in “U Thant Concerned Over Turkish Move.” Cyprus 
Mail, 5.1.1968.  
65 
 
Kuneralp assured that the intention was “to facilitate administration and not to promote 
partition or the creation of a separate state” (Crawshaw 1978: 78). This was reaffirmed by 
Dr Küçük, in a telegram addressed to the UN Secretary General, dated 30 December 1967: 
“the reorganization is entirely within the framework of the Constitution and has no scope 
of a political nature. Nor has it any connection with the final solution of the problem of 
Cyprus”.127 The leadership repeatedly reiterated the constitutionality of the move, and 
denied the allegations that it was meant to set up a separate government in the island:  
The Turkish Cypriot Administration is not a new institution. It is basically, an 
integral part of the constitutional government of the Republic, which, having been 
pushed out its original legal setting, by armed force and violence, came to exist and 
function separately to cater for the needs of Turkish Cypriots. … The measures 
announced on 28 December 1967 by the Turkish Cypriot Community were, 
therefore, no more than a reformulation of a system which has been in existence 
before the eyes of the world since 1963. There is nothing sinister or subversive in 
Turkish Cypriots’ attempt to run their affairs more efficiently. … Nor does it tend to 
violate the Constitution of the Republic; if anything, it is, a reaffirmation of the 
Turkish community’s determination to uphold the Constitution and secure respect 
for its provisions.128  
The Basic Provisions of the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration dated 29 December 
1967, which was envisaged to remain in force “until all provisions of the 16 August 1960 
Constitution of the RoC are applied,” gave the executive power to the executive council 
(cited in Salih 1978: 153; see also Denktaş 1982: 35). The president of the executive 
council was the vice-president of the RoC, Dr Küçük, and the vice-president was the 
president of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Denktaş (cited in Salih 1978: 153). Judicial 
power was given to “independent Turkish Courts”. The authority to appoint the Turkish 
judges as well as the members of the executive council were given to the president on the 
recommendation of the vice-president (Basic Provisions cited in Salih 1978: 154). In the 
new structure, the members of the Communal Chamber and the House of Representatives, 
who had been elected in 1960, continued performing their legislative roles in a single body 
called the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly (Salih 1978: 76).  
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Of course, this was just on paper. The real power was still concentrated at the Bayraktar’s 
office. When in an effort to reassert themselves, few Nicosian members of the Communal 
Chamber called a general meeting to discuss a road map, they were bluntly told by the 
Bayraktar that basically there was not much to discuss and that the “Chamber was put into 
the freezer”.129     
Denktaş was appointed in absentia as he was forced to stay in Ankara after the Makarios 
administration banned his entry to Cyprus. He was seen as a “rebel leader,”130 who 
committed “offences against the state”.131 His time in exile in Ankara was probably one of 
the worst periods of Denktaş’s life.132 The Turkish government was seeing him as an 
extremist. Denktaş, for his part, was openly critical of the Turkish government: “The 
culprits of the current deadlock in Cyprus are the Turkish governments, which had ignored 
warnings and insisted on their (mistaken) policies. … The problem can be solved only by 
the intervention of Turkey, which had been authorized by the Treaty of Guarantee,” he was 
quoted as saying in a public meeting in Ankara.133  
Particularly, it is known that he fell out with İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the Turkish foreign 
minister.134 Their relationship turned from bad to worse, when Denktaş had provided the 
opposition leader Bölükbaşı with documents, which led to the grilling of Çağlayangil in a 
parliamentary debate on Cyprus.135 This led to his isolation at the TMFA, where he had an 
office (Adalı 1999: 54). There was a growing criticism against him in Cyprus as well. Dr 
Küçük who came to perceive him as a political rival, published articles criticizing him, and 
allegedly wrote letters asking Ankara to keep him away from Cyprus to avoid disunity in 
                                                        
129 Ahmet Mutallip, a member of the Communal Chamber (cited in Adalı 1999: 88-92). The meeting was 
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the community his return may cause. At some point, the General Committee even reduced 
his salary (ibid.). Not only the Makarios administration, but also Ankara, and even his 
closest friends were trying to eliminate Denktaş (ibid.: 55). He was so frustrated and 
depressed that he decided to come back to the island secretly. When he was caught after 
landing on the coast of Larnaca, and put into custody, he said to his interrogators, he came 
to show his critics that he was not a “deserter”.136 
The Greek Cypriot public opinion was split about what to do with Denktaş. According to 
one view, he should be tried and punished. One of the proponents of this view was Patris, a 
Greek Cypriot daily, which likened Denktaş’s botched attempt to land in Cyprus to Rudolf 
Hess’ attempt to land in Britain in 1941, and argued “[l]ike Rudolf Hess, who was detained, 
and later tried at Nuremberg and sentenced to life imprisonment the Denktaş mission 
should similarly fail”.137 According to the second view, “for reasons of expedience he should 
be deported to Turkey”.138 Eventually, the second view prevailed, and after some ten days 
in custody, he was sent back to Turkey on the condition that he would not seek to enter the 
island illegally again.139 His return to the island was finally allowed in April 1968140, and as 
soon as he came back, he assumed his post as the negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot 
community in the inter-communal talks - a post he was to retain for more than 35 years.       
2.5 Elections in the Post-1968 Period  
The rift between the TMT fighters and Dr Küçük took a different turn when the 
administration called the long overdue vice-presidential election for 25 February 1968. 
This was because the Greek Cypriot administration decided to do so. This election marked 
one of the rare instances, when the view of the different actors from Ankara in Cyprus so 
obviously diverged. When the election was called, determined to get rid of Dr Küçük once 
and for all, his critics approached to probably the most respected member of the Turkish 
Cypriot community of the time, Chief Justice Zeka Mehmet (henceforth, Zeka Bey).141 Zeka 
Bey was the former president of the Cyprus Supreme Court and a serving judge at the 
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European Court of Human Rights, where he represented the RoC. He had also served as a 
member of the Legislative Council and chaired the Committee for Turkish Affairs during 
the British rule.  
Initially, Zeka Bey was not willing to accept the offer, as “he had not intended to mix in 
politics”.142 However, upon strong request and pledges of support by a number of Turkish 
Cypriot organizations and notables including some members of the Communal Chamber 
and the House of Representatives, and the Commander of the Turkish contingent (Adalı 
199: 95-6)143, he decided to stand for election against Dr Küçük “for the sake of the national 
interest”.144 “If it is a national duty, I will carry it out,” he said in an interview.145  
Zeka Bey’s candidacy was welcomed by “the men on the street,” according to the Turkish 
Cypriot weekly Zafer.146 His distance from politics was highlighted as an advantage. “What 
the Turkish Cypriot Community needs today is an administrator who is expert in legal 
matters and who has no political ambition,” wrote one O. Toprak in Zafer, urging the voters 
to vote for Zeka Bey.147 Given the fact that he was not associated with any organization, he 
was seen as someone who could promote “unity in the Turkish community”.148 Zeka Bey’s 
candidacy was welcomed also in the Greek Cypriot community. Cyprus Mail reported that 
Zeka Bey "has a long record of good cooperation with the Greek Cypriots … [and if] he wins, 
the road may be open for constructive negotiations between the two sides".149  
After just few days of election fever, and at a time when he was expected to fly to Ankara to 
confer with the Turkish officials about his candidacy, Zeka Bey surprisingly withdrew from 
the race with the short statement cited below: 
With the object of preserving unity in our Community, which is needed more than 
ever before at this critical stage in which our national cause stands and in view of 
                                                        
142 “Mr Justice Zekia as Turkish Candidate.” Cyprus Mail, 23.1.1968. 
143 Although, he was a member of the General Committee, Zeka Bey was not a political figure. His son in law, 
Dr Şemsi Kazım was the acting president of the Turkish Communal Chamber. His other son in law, Oktay 
Feridun was the deputy solicitor general. 
144 “Mr Justice Zekia as Turkish Candidate.” Cyprus Mail, 23.1.1968. 
145 Interview with Zafer cited in “Turkish Nominee Calls for Communal Effort.” Cyprus Mail, 25.1.1968. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Cited in “Yesterday’s Turkish Press.” Special News Bulletin, 27.1.1968. 
148 Interview with Zafer. 
149 “Turkish Cypriots to go to the polls.” Cyprus Mail, 21.1.1968. 
69 
 
the comforting assurance given by H.E. the Vice-President Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, I shall 
not put my nomination for the election of a Vice-President in the 25th February.150  
Indeed, Zeka Bey changed his mind under duress, and even his withdrawal statement was 
formulated by Ankara (Yavuzalp 1993: 142). Oktay Feridun, who was present at the 
meeting between Zeka Bey, and the two top Turkish officials in the island, Yavuzalp, charge 
d’affaires, and the Bayraktar, where Zeka Bey was forced to withdraw his candidacy, 
recounts that their attitude towards Zeka Bey was not diplomatic to say the least.151 He 
also recounts how the third representative of Ankara, the commander of the Turkish 
contingent, Fazıl Polat who was in favour of Zeka Bey’s candidacy, said “he should not have 
gone to that meeting” in protest (cited in Fedai 2002: 70-1).  
Zeka Bey was preparing to run on a platform that would outline what to do to make 
progress in the field of economic development. He had the chance to talk about his plans at 
length in an interview published in Zafer, which is very illustrative of the socio-economic 
ills in the enclaves:  
Our grievances are not only political. … This thing cannot be carried out by one or 
two persons. Everybody has to do his best. Our existence on this island depends on 
the development of all 120,000 persons. The development of one or two groups 
does not mean the development of the community as a whole. … We need a 
programme, a plan. We must provide a future for the youth. To say “you must stay 
here” cannot prevent emigration. Our youth must have a future here. … The first 
condition is to become productive, not consuming. There should be no more salaries 
for idlers. Everyone should deserve pay for the work he offers. He must earn it. We 
cannot live on aid forever. … We must give a place to our experts. Every job must be 
entrusted to the right man. Everybody must work. Everybody must take part in the 
community’s cause for existence and development.152 
As far as the policy to be pursued regarding the Cyprus conflict was concerned, Zeka Bey’s 
stand was indeed not different from the incumbent Dr Küçük. When he was asked a 
question on that, his response was revealing: “as you know this is worked out by Ankara … 
all our efforts must be exerted jointly with Turkey”.153 It is also worth noting in this 
juncture that among other things, the TMT fighter’s role in the candidacy of Zeka Bey 
reveals that the rift between the TMT fighters and Dr Küçük was largely a power struggle 
                                                        
150 “Statement by Mr. Mehmet Zekia.” Special News Bulletin, 30.1.1968.  
151 Oktay Feridun interviewed by author.  
152 Cited in “Turkish Nominee Calls for Communal Effort.” Cyprus Mail, 25.1.1968. 
153 Interview with Zafer. 
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devoid of any disagreements in policy. Otherwise, Zeka Bey, a well-known moderate, would 
probably be the last person in the community the TMT would turn to as a candidate to 
replace Dr Küçük. At any rate, the rift came to a temporary if not a definitive end when 
Denktaş came back from exile and reassumed his position as the vice-president of the 
executive council and the speaker of the Communal Chamber.     
Two years later, when the Greek Cypriots decided to hold parliamentary election after ten 
years154, the Turkish Cypriot administration felt the pressure to follow suit155, and 
announced that an election for the Turkish Cypriot members would be held parallel to the 
Greek Cypriot election on 5 July 1970 (Yavuzalp 1993: 144-7). This prompted Ahmet M. 
Berberoğlu, a member of the House of Representatives, who had also served as a member 
of the General Committee (see Fevzioğlu 1998: 39 and 47), and his friends to start an 
initiative to establish a political party (Yavuzalp 1993: 147-8). They prepared the statute 
and program of the party, which they named the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi 
Türk Partisi, CTP)156, and submitted it to the Turkish Embassy to get “the green light” from 
Ankara (ibid.). However, the attempt was vetoed on the grounds that the establishment of a 
party would trigger the establishment of others, which would in turn give an image of 
disunity within the community in this critical period of the national cause (ibid.: 149; see 
also Adalı 1999: 75-8).157  
“After various consultations with Ankara, and the community,” writes Ercüment Yavuzalp, 
the then charge d’affaires at the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, in his memoirs, “the 
framework in which the elections would be conducted was decided” (1993: 148-9). 
Accordingly, “[t]he Turkish community has worked out a ‘National Solidarity Programme,’ 
which has been accepted by all the candidates as a common denominator”. “The 
programme” according to the administration “caters for all the views and convictions 
which obtain within the Turkish community with regard to domestic and political 
                                                        
154 The representatives were elected for five years in 1960. However, due to the internal situation after 1963, 
in the mean time no election was held, and their term was extended yearly.  
155 According to Şemsi Kazım, majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly were indeed, against 
holding an election (interviewed by author).   
156 According to Adalı the name of the party would be the Republican Party (1999: 75).  
157 In the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, 1970 election was contested on an organized party 
basis – first time ever (“No Fuss Election Goes Off Quietly.” Cyprus Mail, 6.7.1970). 
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issues”.158 “On the Turkish side, unlike the Greek side, there is no party strife and, therefore, 
no conflicting policy platforms,” claimed the Special News Bulletin boastfully.159 All 
candidates, 59 for the 15 seats in the Chamber and 43 for the 15 seats in the House160, ran 
on the National Solidarity Programme, which had been prepared by Denktaş, and 
campaigned only to show that they were the most capable ones to implement the national 
program.   
The Bulletin’s claim was only partly justified. Although there was no formal party, the 
candidates close to Denktaş came together under the National Solidarity Team (Ulusal 
Dayanışma Ekibi), and ran as a group in all six districts. There was no group contending 
them island-wide. However, judging from the local press coverage, it can be said that there 
were candidates acting together at local level against the National Solidarity. In Famagusta, 
for instance, there were candidates who called themselves the Green Island Team (Yeşilada 
Ekibi).161  
For the most part, the candidates of the National Solidarity won the seats, although in 
Nicosia three out of ten seats went to the independent candidates.162 Denktaş, who ran as a 
candidate above groups163 won the biggest victory of his political life by obtaining 
according to one account, over 95 percent of the votes.164 This overwhelming support 
strengthened his hand and gave him an aura of invincibility in the years to come. 
Furthermore, it confirmed that the days of Dr Küçük as the vice-president were numbered.   
                                                        
158 “Election Revelations.” Special News Bulletin, 4.7.1970. 
159 Ibid. 
160 “Nominations.” Special News Bulletin, 26.6.1970.  
161 Osman Arif, Ayhan Çiftçioğlu, Taner Erginel in Famagusta ran under “Yeşilada” team (see for instance 
“Adayları Tanıtıyoruz [We are presenting the candidates].” Bozkurt, 1.7.1970). According to Cyprus Mail, A. M. 
Berberoğlu formed a group in Limassol to compete with the National Solidarity Team led by Ziya Rızkı 
(“Cyprus voters still in the dark.” 19.6.1970).    
162 Kemal Deniz who had won as an independent in the by-election, managed to retain his seat in the House. 
Özker Yaşın and Nevzat Uzunoğlu managed to defeat the candidates of the National Solidarity Team, Ayer 
Kaşif and Ümit Asım Özdil, to win seats in the Chamber (Bozkurt, 5.7.1970 and 7.7.1970; see also Akay Cemal: 
“Kıbrıs’da AKEL karlı çıktı [AKEL made gains in Cyprus].” Milliyet, 8.7.1970).    
163 Denktaş’s name did not feature on the ballot paper along with the candidates of the National Solidarity 
Team to emphasize his status above all groups. However, the Team decided to leave his place blank, and only 
four names featured on the left hand side of the ballot paper for Nicosia, where the National Solidarity Team’s 
candidates were. Denktaş’s name was on the right along with the independents (Bozkurt, 5.7.1970).  
164 “A Warm ‘Thank You’ by Denktash.” Special News Bulletin, 8.7.1970.  
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Before his return from exile Denktaş was asked by the Turkish government to maintain a 
good relationship with Dr Küçük for the sake of unity.165 Denktaş heeded this request and 
silently waited for his day. In the meantime, the two leaders continued to work together. 
Upon the request of Ankara, even Denktaş’s office was moved next to the vice-president’s 
office (Adalı 1999). However, the bitterness between the two leaders was obvious. The 
gradual transition of power from Dr Küçük to Denktaş, which had started in 1958, was 
finally completed in 1973 when Dr Küçük’s term as the vice-president expired. After he 
returned empty-handed from his last-ditch visit to seek support in Ankara, Dr Küçük 
declared that he would not seek a re-election as “he felt an election campaign now might 
have negative repercussions within the community”.166  
Berberoğlu, who had earlier declared his candidacy as the representative of the CTP167, was 
also forced to withdraw few days before the election. In what has become a “tradition,” 
Berberoğlu was invited to the Embassy, and asked to withdraw from the election. When he 
refused, he was reminded by the Bayraktar, “who abruptly stepped in from the next room,” 
that he had to take into consideration that “a stray bullet” or a “car accident” might find 
him on his way back home, if he insists on running (Berberoğlu cited in Özuslu 2011: 37). 
When he defied and wanted to fly to Ankara, he was put to house arrest (ibid.: 38). The next 
day, on 16 February 1973, Denktaş was declared the vice-president of the Republic168 and 
became the formal leader of the Turkish community.  
2.6 The Role of Political Clientelism in the Pre-1974 Period  
Having briefly reviewed the pre-1974 political developments, now, the role of patron-client 
ties in this period can be addressed. As discussed in the previous chapter, to account for 
political clientelism in a given society, culturalist, and to a certain extent developmentalist 
approaches tend to focus on the earlier existence of deep-rooted patron-client ties within 
the society concerned. To oversimplify somewhat, in certain societies, the argument goes, 
voters demand particularistic benefits in exchange for their votes because the traditional 
patron-client ties, which had emerged in the pre-modern/pre-democratic period and had 
prevailed for centuries, are still resilient and continue to haunt them. The form of 
                                                        
165 Veziroğlu interviewed by author.  
166 “Dr Küçük not to seek re-election.” Special News Bulletin, 3.1.1973.  
167 The Republican Turkish Party was established on 27 December 1970.  
168 “Denktash the new Vice-President.” Special News Bulletin, 17.2.1973.  
73 
 
incorporation into electoral politics explains this continuity: In the time of initial political 
mobilization, political parties did/could not reach these rural communities with ideological 
or programmatic appeals but rather penetrated via existing channels of patronage. In other 
words, electoral mobilization took place via the “politicisation of clientelistic networks 
between leaders and followers” (Sayari 1977: 108). This clientelism of notables, then 
evolved into a party-directed patronage. In other words, for reasons, which can be simply 
identified as path dependence, where strong patron-client ties prevailed in the past, we 
have political clientelism today.  
The Turkish Cypriot case, however, does not fit into this pattern and therefore these 
approaches fall short of explaining the pervasiveness of political clientelism in 
contemporary Turkish Cypriot politics. To start with, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
after the emergence of the idea of taksim in the mid-1950s, the newly established Turkish 
Cypriot leadership penetreated the rest of the community, rural and urban alike, with this 
strong idea in a rather authoritarian fashion. The electoral incorporation in the post-1960 
period took place in the same manner. This is to say there was neither a competitive 
election nor a coherent political opposition to be outmobilized, which could have 
necessitated resorting to clientelism, as their development had been effectively arrested by 
the TMT earlier. Secondly and probably more importantly, even if such a need had arisen, it 
would be difficult to find “existing channels of patronage” because it is not possible to talk 
about a long history of patron-client ties in the island. For one thing, Cyprus did not have a 
feudal past (Lanitis 1992: 3), which is often associated with the diffusion of political 
clientelism. Unlike the rest of the Ottoman Empire169 or the wider Mediterranean basin, a 
big majority of farmers of Cyprus have been peasant proprietors. By 1944, of the sixty six 
thousand adult male peasants, 48,600 (73,7 percent) were peasant proprietors (Lanitis 
1992: 6; see also Nevzat 2005: 373). As Meyer notes,  
A bright spot in the Cyprus land picture is the virtual absence of really exploitative –
on Egyptian or Iranian standards- feudal and absentee ownership of holdings. Only 
some 7 per cent of the island’s farmland is estimated to be in the hands of town-
dwellers, and sharecropping is rare. The Cypriote farmer at least is still his own 
master (1962: 31).   
                                                        
169 Katsiaounis suggests “inequality of landownership was not as pronounced as in other regions of the 
Empire,” and most villagers still tilled their own land (cited in Nevzat 2005: 373).  
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Furthermore, to give a specific example, Loizos notes that in the Kalo village where he 
conducted his research in the 1970s, “in 1931 only 21 out of 169 families – roughly 12 
percent- were landless while a handful of families were moneylenders and regular 
employers of labour” (1977: 129). He goes on: 
At the extremes then, a class structure existed. But between these extremes 
something akin to a ranking system operated, since virtually everyone owned land 
and worked with his hands. There was no landlord or latifundist class, no leisured 
aristocrats, no literate elite. The land-rich peasant was prepared to take a man with 
little land as son-in-law.   
It is important to note that there is not enough data to reach a definitive conclusion on this 
matter. However, based on the findings at hand, it is possible to argue that the land 
distribution in the Cypriot society in the pre-modern period displayed a different character 
than say, the Italian, Spanish or Turkish one, and that it was less conducive to the 
development of rigid vertical linkages –such as the ones between patrons and their clients- 
that would condition the political development in the modern period (see also Egemen 
2006: 97).170  
Having said that, it should be added that after the introduction of the Legislative Council in 
the British period, as Loizos suggests, “the potential was available for enduring patron-
client relationships to emerge” (1977: 117, emphasis in original). There are two notable 
studies, which analyze to what extent this potential was realized until the abolition of the 
Legislative Council in 1931. However, it should be mentioned at the outset that both Loizos 
(admittedly), and Egemen’s analysis on the role of patronage in the elections for Legislative 
Council are conjectural.   
When we analyze the practice of political clientelism in the Greek Cypriot community in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, we see the major role played by moneylenders. As the 
farmers were constantly in need of credits in this period (Lanitis 1994: 34), a money-
lending class had emerged, which subsequently managed to translate their economic 
                                                        
170 Egemen also comes to the conclusion that traditional patron-client relations did not emerge in the Turkish 
Cypriot community (2006: 89 and 97). The basis of his argument, however, is different (2006: 89-101). He 
stresses the role of the vakifs as the owners of land, where here the peasant ownership is considered as the 
decisive factor. Is it so important? It is important because overstating the role of vakifs, and Evkaf as an 
umbrella organization of vakifs, leads one to overestimate the power of Evkaf.  
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power into political influence in the elections.171 Governor Storrs’ (1926 to 1932) memoirs 
provides a good summary of the situation on the ground: 
three-quarters of the population are engaged in agriculture. Most of these were 
illiterate; seventy per cent were chronically indebted to usurer and merchants 
whose actions for recovery (more than half the cases in the District Courts) afforded 
employment to the numerous advocates, who derived the greater part of their 
professional income from that source. I found on the Council eight advocates, three 
of whom were money-lenders; one landowner who was also a money-lender; one 
bishop of the Cyprus Orthodox Church; one merchant and one farmer (1945: 
473).172  
Storrs talks exclusively about the twelve Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council. 
However, it is known that in the Turkish Cypriot community too, peasant indebtedness was 
a major problem (see for instance Gürkan 2008). However, its political ramifications 
turned out to be different. The political influence of the moneylenders was virtually nil. 
Instead, as Nevzat points out, a “more institutionalised patronage” tool was available for 
“those Turks with access to Evkaf173 resources” (2005: 213). The following excerpt offers 
us a glimpse of how the Turkish Cypriot delegate in charge of Evkaf, İrfan Bey, made use of 
his status to win a seat in the Legislative Council in the early 20th century:  
Korkut gives a vivid account of the use, or rather abuse of such power for 
electioneering purposes, stating that when his brother Osman Cemal ran as a 
candidate against İrfan Bey for the Legislative Council, a villager who approached 
him revealed to him that though his campaign speech and rendition of verses of the 
Koran were impressive enough, he should not expect the people of the village to 
vote for him, and insinuated that this was because they were financially indebted to 
the Evkaf. Even the High Commissioner was to divulge, in a confidential despatch to 
the Secretary of State Andrew Bonar Law concerning the elections of 1916 that, 
“Among the Moslems, who are nearly always rent by party feeling, the supporters of 
İrfan Bey, the able Moslem Delegate of Evkaf, probably derived considerable 
advantage from the influence he exercises in that capacity” (ibid.).174  
                                                        
171 As Nevzat points out, it should be highlighted that being peasant proprietors was likely to alleviate the 
sway of the moneylenders, and other local notables on the villagers (2005: 373).   
172 Storrs talks exclusively about the twelve Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council.  
173 Evkaf is “the pious foundation, that was in Cyprus the greatest source of accumulated communal wealth, 
having control of vast resources of land and property charitably donated over the years by members of the 
Moslem community” (Nevzat 2005: 104). Writing in the early 1960s, Meyer writes “The Moslem religious 
foundation, Evcaf, controls … 1 to 2 per cent of the island’s farmland” (1962: 32).  The Greek Cypriot Church, 
on the other hand, controlled “an estimated 8 to 10 per cent of the island’s farmland” (ibid.).   
174 Nevzat notes that “the British were frequently referring to the undue power of Greek Cypriot money-
lenders in determining the outcome of elections,” but did not mention anything about the situation in the 
Turkish Cypriot community (2005: 213).  
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Egemen points out that the British made use of the Evkaf’s power to protect the loyal 
Turkish Cypriot elites vis-{-vis the contending Turkish nationalists or Kemalists. He argues 
that using the resources of the Evkaf, the British Colonial administration constructed “a 
patronage network reaching to the smallest units of the Turkish society,” to stem the rising 
tide of Kemalist movement (2006: 95). Although the role of Evkaf cannot be easily 
dismissed, it is equally important, not to overestimate its power -as Egemen does. For one 
thing, it should be remembered that Münir Bey, who had replaced İrfan Bey after the 
latter’s death, as the delegate of Evkaf and the member of the Legislative assembly, was 
eventually voted out in the 1930 election and a Kemalist was elected.175 It is important to 
note that this election was not an ordinary one. It took place at the height of the ideological 
struggle between the Kemalists and traditionalists. In Korkut’s words, this “was not like a 
simple election where one candidate wins a membership against another candidate. With 
this election our community showed that it did not like the 30 years of the Evkaf-
Government politics” (cited in Nevzat 2005: 377). Given that the stakes were so high for 
the British, it is only normal to expect a full-scale mobilization of the Evkaf’s capabilities as 
a patron in this election. The fact that the patronage power of the Evkaf did not suffice to 
win this critical election, therefore, can be taken to reveal the limits of the power of this 
institution and the electorate’s relative immunity against the Evkaf’s influence.  
The conjectural character of the analyses of Loizos and Egemen regarding the potential for 
the emergence of patron-client ties in the so called “liberal-constitutional phase” of the 
British rule aside, one can also see that whatever “potential” there had been for clientelism, 
was later strongly undermined by the British administration, and the entrenchment of 
patron-client ties in the years to come was blocked. The studies by Loizos (1977), Attalides 
(1977) and Faustmann (1998), who worked on the patterns of clientelism in the Greek 
Cypriot community, demonstrate that the British policy to weaken the moneylending class 
-which was considered to be the standard bearers of the anti-British enosis movement- 
bore fruit by the 1940s. It can be seen that with the introduction of the cooperatives, and 
the foundation of an Agricultural Bank in 1925 (Loizos 1977: 117), and the Agricultural 
                                                        
175 Münir was defeated by Necati by 1993 to 1553 votes (Nevzat 2005: 376).   
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Debtors Relief Law introduced in 1940  (Gürkan 2008: 210), the monopoly of 
moneylenders was effectively broken.176 As Hill notes  
the lawyer class, from whom were drawn the money-lenders; the richest men in the 
island were nearly all men who had made their fortunes in this way. But the 
foundation of Co-operative Societies and of an Agricultural Bank, and other 
legislation, freed the peasants from the usurer; litigation declined and the lawyers 
saw the bread being taken out of their mouths (1972: 495).     
Moreover, the dissolution of the Legislative Council after the October Revolt of 1931 had 
left little room for political competition, and hence for political clientelism. As discussed in 
the previous sections, even when municipal elections were reintroduced in the early 1940s, 
while the Greek Cypriots embarked on ideological mobilization, the competition in the 
Turkish Cypriot community did not go beyond personal rivalries; and in that race we 
cannot observe any indication of patronage politics. As I discussed earlier in this chapter, 
eventually mass political mobilization of the Turkish Cypriot community was realized 
around the ideal of taksim or Turkish nationalism, and with the help of an armed 
organization. After independence, the anticipation of inter-communal conflict did not allow 
normalization, and a military rule was maintained until 1974. In other words, even after 
independence, obviously there was no need for mass political clientelism as a strategy to 
mobilize political support against opposition because the crude force of the TMT was there 
to do the same thing with much less material resources.    
To sum up, this is to say that in the pre-democratic period, there is no sign showing that a 
culture of patronage developed in the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore, presenting 
political clientelism in the post-1974 period, as a legacy inherited from ancestors is 
apologetic, and devoid of empirical substance. If we are to account for the emergence of 
political clientelism, I argue, we need to turn our attention to more recent history; the 
period of state-building and initial mass electoral mobilization. This is what I will do in 
Chapter Three.   
 
 
                                                        
176 Therefore, even if we assume that the Evkaf had had a monopolistic role similar to the moneylenders in 
the early 20th century, it can be said that it broke down towards the middle of the century.   
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Chapter 3: Why Political Clientelism? Priorities of the Political Elite 
and their Choice of Mass Political Mobilization Strategy 
As discussed earlier in Chapter One, in the literature, political clientelism has come 
increasingly to be taken as a strategy to mobilize mass political support rather than a 
political anomaly or an anachronistic remnant from pre-modern times dictated by 
structural factors. As such, its adoption is a matter of choice; a choice made by the 
leadership of a political party at the time of establishment between alternative paths of 
mass political mobilization: basically, a choice between program and patronage. This 
choice is naturally not made in a political vacuum. Rather, it is heavily influenced by 
different parameters, which can be broadly categorized as demand and supply side of 
political clientelism.  
Which of these forces is more decisive in the choice made and therefore merit further 
elaboration? According to Shefter, the pioneer of the demand-supply approach, emphasis 
should be on the supply side, and the way “the strategic behavior of leaders is shaped by 
and in turn shapes political institutions,” should be analyzed (1994: 3).177 This, in his 
opinion, is the key to explain not only the reasons behind the adoption of political 
clientelism but also many other political phenomena of significance (ibid.). Piattoni, who is 
influenced by Shefter, builds on this and argues that the supply side should be “integrated 
with the analysis of the demand for clientelism,” if we are to explain its prevalence -or its 
decline- in a wider cross-country context (2001a: 24).  
Having said that, she adds that in some clear-cut cases looking only at one side may be 
sufficient. For the case of Greece, for instance, looking only at the supply side may reveal 
how the choice was made. This is to say, essentially the nuance between the approaches of 
these two scholars is not so big. Besides, Shefter does not deny the role of demand side 
altogether. He considers “the orientations of the voters to whom the party is appealing for 
support” as one of the three factors, party leaders have to take into consideration when 
deciding whether to adopt a clientelist strategy or not (1994: 26). What he suggests is that 
the voter demand can be altered/manipulated by the political actors. In other words, it 
                                                        
177 It should be underlined that in the final analysis, other major theoretical works (Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007; see also, for instance Chubb 1982: 8-9) emphasize the importance of the strategic 
considerations of the party elites in the decision to adopt political clientelism as a strategy.  
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should not be treated as an exogenous given or an independent variable but rather as a 
dependent variable.  
In this framework, Shefter argues that a party is likely to adopt clientelism as a strategy if:  
[t]he voters whose support it is seeking…value the particularistic beneﬁts it 
distributes; the party…enjoy access to a pool of resources from which such beneﬁts 
can be generated; and the party leadership…calculate that, considering the reactions 
of elites as well as voters, the gains to be realized exceed the losses the party might 
incur, including the opportunities it forgoes, if it uses these resources in this way 
(1994: 26). 
To have access to a pool of resources, the party should be in government.178 In other words, 
it has to be an “internally mobilized party”. However, though necessary, being in 
government is not sufficient for a party to have access to public resources. It should also be 
in a position to dictate its terms to the bureaucracy. It should be able to bend public 
decision-making in such a way to promote individual, particularistic considerations as 
opposed to collective ones (Piattoni 2001a: 17). To put it in a different way, the emergence 
of systemic political clientelism “depends on whether the structures of public decision-
making –elected government and nonelected bureaucracy– are, respectively, interested in 
and available for this kind of exchange” (2001b: 194-5). This makes it imperative to focus 
on “the process through which such structures were formed, that is, state-building and the 
creation of autonomous structures of routinized decision-making, in particular, the 
administration” (Piattoni 2001a: 17). Therefore, explaining the supply side requires 
focusing on the twin processes of state-building and mass political mobilization.  
It should also be highlighted in this juncture that the role played by the strategic choices of 
individual actors in the whole process is a decisive one. As pointed out by Piattoni, as the 
development of post-World War II Christian Democratic parties in France and Italy shows, 
even in cases where identical institutional circumstances prevail, the mobilization 
strategies may diverge because of the way political leaders assess their priorities (2001a: 
25). In this particular case, these parties became quite different from each other as the 
party leaderships had different calculations and priorities (ibid.; see also Warner 2001).  
                                                        
178 Alternatively, it should be allied with elites with access to patronage (Shefter 1994: 27).  
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In this theoretical context, following Shefter and Piattoni’s approach, in this chapter I aim 
to explore the emergence of political clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot politics by 
analyzing the interaction of supply and demand sides with a special attention on the 
strategic choices of political actors. I will mainly focus on the state-building process in the 
transitional period, which starts with the Turkish intervention/invasion in July 1974 and 
comes to an end with the first multi party elections held in June 1976. In the first section, 
the socio-economic state of the Turkish Cypriot society will be taken up as an indicator for 
potential demand for political clientelism. The second section will investigate availability of 
resources to satisfy this demand, and the presence or absence of constraints that could 
hinder politicians’ access to these resources. The effect of broader contextual 
circumstances, or Cyprus conflict to be more precise, on the strategic calculations of the 
political elite who made the eventual choice will be analyzed in the third section. Finally, 
the last section will dwell on the wider domestic political context, and deal with the 
formation of other key political institutions, which would condition the politico-economic 
developments in the decades to come.   
3.1 Demand Side: Socio-Economic Structure of the Population 
Socially and economically disempowered social groups, not least immigrants, displaced 
peasants, and poor are considered to be more prone to exchange their votes for 
particularistic benefits (see Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). 
Considering the turbulent recent history of the island and in the light of the analysis 
provided by the previous chapter, then, even intuitively one can conclude that the 
circumstances in the immediate post-1974 period provided a perfect breeding ground for a 
strong demand for political clientelism. This section seeks to verify the validity of this 
intuition. The socio-economic state of the Turkish Cypriot community in the immediate 
post-1974 period will be examined with a view to assessing how receptive the electorate 
was to clientelistic appeals by focusing on the social composition and the economic welfare 
of the population in the eve of first full-scale electoral mobilization.  
Demographic data on the post-1974 Turkish Cypriot community are not easy to come by 
because for a long time the authorities treated the population issue as a highly sensitive 
political matter. The overall population figures were inflated to justify controlling some 36 
percent of the island, and hence to avoid territorial concession, while its composition was 
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distorted to fend off the colonization allegations of the Greek Cypriot administration. 
Accordingly, there are big discrepancies between figures provided by different sources. 
While the Greek Cypriot sources estimated the Turkish Cypriot population at 116,400 in 
1973 (Symeonides 1977: 257)179, the first official Turkish Cypriot figure, published in 1979, 
put the 1978 population at 145 thousand.180 Yet, according to Aydın Samioğlu181, the 
highest-ranking Turkish Cypriot officer at the Bayraktar’s Office in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the “de facto census,” conducted in January 1975182, revealed that the figure was only 85 
thousand.183  
These complications aside, the post-1974 population in the northern part of Cyprus can be 
divided into five broad categories. In the first group, there were some 23 thousand people 
who moved to the north individually or as small groups when the exchange of prisoners of 
war took place, following the ceasefire.184 In the second group, there were some nine 
thousand185 people who sought refuge in the British bases when the war had broken out. 
They were transferred to the north after the Anglo-Turkish arrangement agreed in January 
1975.186 The third group was comprised of those who had been cut off in the south. They 
came to the north after the Third Vienna Agreement signed in August 1975, and their 
number was in the vicinity of 8 thousand.187 Overall, the number of Turkish Cypriots who 
moved to the north in the 1974-5 period was somewhere between 36 thousand and 45 
thousand.188 In the fourth group, there were some 30 thousand Turkish “settlers” who 
                                                        
179 Of whom 71,170 lived in what would become the Turkish controlled area after 1974.  
180 Devlet Planlama Örgütü (1979: 9). 
181 Interviewed by author. Nazif Borman, then the Commissioner of Cooperatives gives a similar figure 
(Interviewed by author).   
182 The “de-facto census” did not cover, those who were cut off in the south, and therefore was “not counted 
valid” (and its result was not disclosed). However, according to the State Planning Organization, it was later 
used to estimate the population in 1978 (Devlet Planlama Örgütü 1979: 8).   
183 Given the turmoil in the preceding decades, the sharp decline in population is hardly surprising. Olgun 
provides two sets of statistics about the number of Turkish Cypriots emigrating from Cyprus in the pre-1974 
period. According to the first set, from 1959 to 1967, 10,330 people, and according to the second set, from 
1955 to 1974, 17,106 people had left the island (1993: 270-1).     
184 ECHR 1976: Paragraph 102. 
185 According to Ziya Rızkı, a Limassol MP, who oversaw the whole process, the exact figure was 9400 (“Ziya 
Rızkı: Göçmen Mücadelesi Başarıyla Sonuçlandı [The struggle for displaced successfully completed].” Zaman, 
13.02.1975.  
186 ECHR 1976: Paragraph 102. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Statistics compiled by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and International Committee of the Red 
Cross (as of September 15, 1974) put the total number of Turkish Cypriots displaced, and cut-off at 42 
thousand (Crisis on Cyprus 1975: 18). According to a revised set of statistics compiled by the Government of 
Cyprus, UNFICYP, the UNHCR and ICRC, the number Turkish Cypriot displaced and cut-off  (as of November 1, 
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were relocated from Anatolia starting in late 1974 (Atun 2007: 387), under the disguise of 
“agricultural labour force”.189 Stavrinides notes that reportedly by July 1975, “the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities had already moved eight thousand mainland Turks into the north of the 
island” (1999: 99). According to İsmet Kotak, the then minister responsible for 
resettlement, the number reached slightly above 22 thousand by July 1976.190 In many 
respects, this was the most disempowered of the five groups, and therefore easiest to be 
manipulated because firstly, they were transferred from a different country following a 
war, which made their existence in the island, legally and politically precarious at best. 
Secondly, as the name given to them i.e. “agricultural labour force” suggests, they were 
most of the time uneducated peasants, mainly from most conservative parts of Anatolia.191 
In the last category were those who used to live in the north prior to the Turkish 
intervention/invasion, and hence not being displaced in 1974.192 However, it should be 
noted that this group included some of those who had been already uprooted earlier in 
1963.193 Furthermore, though they were not displaced in 1974, it should be noted that they 
had been living in a state of deprivation like the rest of the community for more than a 
decade in the enclaves they had retreated after the inter-communal clashes of 1963.  
Mention of the enclaves brings the state of the economy in general into the foreground. 
After a decade in isolation, in the eve of the Turkish intervention/invasion, the Turkish 
Cypriot community was economically almost completely demobilized and impoverished. 
The “enclaves had little in the way of productive economic activity, which could provide 
employment opportunities other than some village agriculture” (Pollis 1977: 62). Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1974) was 39 thousand including some of the Turkish Cypriots, who had moved after the inter-communal 
clashes of 1963-4 (Crisis on Cyprus 1975: 19). According to Mustafa Çağatay, the Turkish Cypriot Premier, it 
was over 45 thousand (Cited in Kasımoğlu 1980: 18). According to Osman Örek, the vice president of the 
Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, it was around 36 thousand (“Örek Makarios’un Konuşmasını 
Cevaplandırdı [Örek answered the speech of Makarios].” Zaman. 12.12.1974).  
189 This figure gradually climbed up to 45 thousand towards the end of the decade (Çağatay cited in 
Kasımoğlu 1980: 18). 
190 “Until my last day in the Ministry, I resettled some 82,500 people, of whom some 60 thousand were from 
the south, and the rest immigrants from Turkey” (interviewed by author). Mehmet Ali Birand notes that 
reportedly their number already reached to 30 thousand in June 1976 (“Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two 
sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (5).” Milliyet, 27.6.1976).   
191 Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (4).” Milliyet, 
26.6.1976.   
192 The total number of people living in the north prior to 1974 is also contested.  
193 As discussed before some 20-25 thousand Turkish Cypriots were displaced after the inter-communal 
clashes of 1963-4. There are statements from the Turkish Cypriot authorities saying the number of displaced 
Turkish Cypriots resettled was 60 thousand. This figure obviously includes a considerable number of these 
people, if not all of them.  
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agricultural production capacity was also severely curtailed because, by retreating into the 
enclaves, the Turkish Cypriots left thirty to forty percent of their land behind (Nötel cited 
in Stavrinides 1999: 82). When we add the civil servants, who were cut off from the payroll 
of the Republic and became dependent on “the maximum allowance of £30 per month 
irrespective of their rank or station in life,”194 a more complete picture of the economic 
situation emerges.  
In Kadritzke and Wagner’s words, “[t]his was the logical end of separatism because the 
small Turkish community was only viable either as integral part of an economically 
homogenous Cypriot society or as a Turkish enclave totally dependent on the mainland” 
(1977: 101). Obviously, the Turkish Cypriot administration opted for the second option. As 
a result, in the 1964-74 period, “total budget expenditure of the Turkish Community 
amounted to 2,690 million Turkish Liras of which 2,417 million was met by aid from” 
Turkey.195 In other words, in average, annually 90 percent of the budget was funded by 
Ankara. In fact, starting from early 1968, the Greek Cypriot administration’s economic 
blockade was eased. Yet, this did not help to improve the public finances. Towards the end 
of the period, the share of domestic revenues stood at a mere seven percent in 1973.196   
The extent of economic stagnation suffered by the Turkish Cypriot community, becomes 
more striking when the development trends of per capita income levels of the two 
communities are compared: 
Average per capita income of the Turkish Cypriot population in 1961 … was 
assumed to have been 20 percent lower, i.e. £130–135 as compared with the Greek 
Cypriot population’s £160–165. Ten years later (in 1971) it was … 50 percent lower, 
i.e. about £150 as compared with £300 for the Greek Cypriot population (Nötel cited 
in Kedourie 2005: 653).197  
In the immediate aftermath of the 1974 war, inevitably, the economic situation got even 
worse as this meant the whole economy or whatever was left of it grinding to a complete 
halt. Rampant inflation, scarcity of certain commodities and hard currency, and black-
                                                        
194 State Planning Organization (1979: 3). 
195 State Planning Organization (1979: 4). See also Salih 1978. According to Salih, “[f]rom the time the Turkish 
Cypriot civil servants lost their jobs in the Makarios administration, they have depended heavily in the $20 
million they receive annually from Turkey” (1978: 75).  
196 Maliye ve İktisadi İşler Üyeliği (1973: 1).   
197 “All calculations at constant 1970 prices”.  
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marketing were major problems reported almost daily in the local newspapers. 
Furthermore, though, for those who were already on the payroll of the administration, not 
much had changed at least in terms of income, for some 10 thousand people who used to 
work for the Greek Cypriot employers (Stavrinides 1999: 83; see also Attalides 1977b: 86), 
this meant instantly joining the ranks of the thousands of unemployed and underemployed.  
At any rate, a big majority of the population was made up of displaced/migrants of one sort 
or another198, and unemployed who had no option but to turn to the state for their 
livelihood. Given this context, no wonder a big chunk of the community was dependent on 
the benefits from the administration. According to the official statistics, in 1975, in total 
24,034 people were given social welfare benefits of whom, 20,574 have received displaced 
person benefit.199 A different set of official statistics, show that rather than going down, the 
number of welfare paychecks issued monthly by the Social Welfare Department steadily 
climbed up from 2,094 in 1974 to 11,150 in 1977200, showing that the economic 
circumstances did not improve for a long time.  
The reasons behind the sluggishness of the normalization process are discussed at length 
in the latter sections. Suffice it here to say that it stemmed largely from disorganization or 
lack of planning and coordination because as mentioned above, flow of people to the north 
stretched over time buying the administration considerable time for preparation -unlike 
the situation faced by the Greek Cypriot leadership who had to deal with a flood of refugees 
instantly. The consequence of this mismanagement was further disempowerment of the 
society vis-{-vis the state. In many cases people from the same town or village were 
dispersed and not settled as communities.201 Hakkı Atun, the then undersecretary of the 
ministry responsible for resettlement, admits that this was one of the biggest mistakes 
                                                        
198 According to the official statistics, from 1974 to 1982, 91,225 persons were (re-)settled (Kuzey Kıbrıs 
Haber Ajansı 1983: 28). 
199 KTFD 1976 Geçiş Yılı Programı, p. 98. 
200 Devlet Planlama Örgütü (1978: 63). 
201 Orhan Kahya, the chairman of the Aggrieved Southerners Association (Zarar Görmüş Güneyliler Derneği), 
cited in “Muhtıra [Memorandum].” Yeni Devir, 25.10.1978; see also Ekrem Avcıoğlu’s (Limassol) 
Parliamentary speech (Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi Meclisi Zabıtları [Minutes of the Parliament of 
Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration], 28.1.1975, p.19). Here Avcıoğlu says “with a view to putting an 
end to the mentality of regionalism, and reasoning that ‘now we have all become northerners,’ towns and 
villages have been dismembered. Furthermore, curiously there are even many cases where parents and 
children, and siblings were settled in different places without any reasonable justification”.    
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made in the whole process.202 This mistake delayed the rehabilitation process by 
disrupting the social and economic fabric of certain towns and villages, and hence made it 
more difficult for the displaced to attain economic independence.203  
In a similar vein, some could not become productive because their professional 
backgrounds were not taken into consideration when they were resettled. Some farmers 
were resettled in urban areas and some city dwellers were resettled in villages.204 To cite 
two specific cases, “I’m a fisherman but they had me settled in a village where they 
cultivate land. I don’t know how to do that,” protested a Limassollian to Denktaş in 
campaign trail. “They gave 66 tractors to the neighboring village, while they gave only one 
to us. How can I till the land?” complained another.205  
Overall, it can be argued that the population’s socio-economic structure, the divisible 
nature of their immediate needs (shelter, job, land, credit), and the general circumstances 
prevailing at the time were conducive for a clientelistic mobilization strategy. In the next 
section, I will turn my attention to the supply side and investigate (a) whether there was 
enough resources to satisfy the needs of the populace, and (b) whether these resources 
were protected by a constituency of bureaucratic autonomy or not.    
3.2 Supply Side: The Resource Base and the State of Bureaucracy  
If a political party is to adopt a clientelistic strategy it has to have access to a “pool of 
resources” out of which it can dole out particularistic benefits to its clients (Shefter 1994: 
27). To have that, first, the party needs to be in the government, and second, there should 
not be a strong “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy,” which can restrict its control 
over the use of public resources (ibid.). In this section, the aim is to show that due to the 
special circumstances of the island, at the time of mass mobilization, in addition to 
resources available to any party in government anywhere in the world there was an 
extraordinary amount of resources available for distribution under the disposal of the 
                                                        
202 Hakkı Atun interviewed by author.  
203 Ekrem Ural interviewed by author.  
204 Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (4).” Milliyet, 
26.6.1976. See also Orhan Kahya, the chairman of the Aggrieved Southerners Association, cited in “Muhtıra 
[Memorandum].” Yeni Devir, 25.10.1978. 
205 Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (4).” 
Milliyet, 26.6.1976. 
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Turkish Cypriot administration. Of particular importance for this study is the divisible 
nature of these resources i.e. their suitability for particularistic distribution. The second 
condition, whether the politicians had access to this huge pool or not; in other words, to 
what extent these resources were protected by an autonomous bureaucracy will be 
addressed later in this section, and it will be shown that let alone its strength, it was 
difficult even to talk about the presence of bureaucracy at the time.   
In the weeks following the Turkish intervention/invasion, there was a striking optimism 
about the future of the Turkish Cypriot economy.206 When asked about the prospects of, 
what was then called the Turkish Cypriot Autonomous Region, gaining its economic self-
sufficiency, Ziya Müezzinoğlu (henceforth, Müezzinoğlu), the chairman of the Cyprus 
Coordination Committee responded  
both its natural resources and established facilities indicate that this region will be 
self-sufficient in a very short period of time. … That is why we envisage providing 
economic development assistance i.e. project credits, rather than grants at this stage 
of our relationship with Cyprus.207  
Accordingly, T.C. Yardım Heyeti (T.R. Board of Financial Assistance), an organization 
“similar to the American A.I.D.” was established to monitor the implementation of 
infrastructure projects financed by Turkey.208 In line with Müezzinoğlu’s statements, in the 
budget for 1975, domestic revenues were envisaged to finance current expenditures.209 
The source of this optimism was the massive amount of assets abandoned by the Greek 
Cypriots. From the beginning both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities never hesitated 
to declare that they would make full use of these resources to boost economic growth. As 
                                                        
206 See for instance the statements of Korkut Özal, the Turkish Minister of Agriculture, during his visit to 
Cyprus cited in “Askeri Harekat Bitti, Ekonomik ve Sosyal Harekat Başlıyor [The military operation came to 
an end, economic and soical operation is starting].” Zaman, 26.08.1974. 
207 Interviewed by Abdi İpekçi, Milliyet, 14.10.1974; “Yılbaşından Sonra 5 Yıllık Bir Kalkınma Planı 
Uygulanacak [From the January 1st on, a 5-year economic development plan will be implemented].” Bozkurt, 
26.10.1974. See also the statements made by Bülent Ecevit during his visit to Cyprus: “Ecevit: ‘Kıbrıs Türk 
Halkı Kısa Zamanda Kendine Yeter Bir Hale Gelecektir’ [Ecevit: ‘The Turkish Cypriot people will be self-
sufficient soon].” Zaman, 6.1.1975.     
208 Nilüfer Yalçın: “Türkiye Kıbrıs’ta Bir Yardım Heyeti Kurdu [Turkey establised a board of financial 
assistance in Cyprus].” Milliyet, 23.3.1975. Yardım Heyeti was established as an extension of the Cyprus 
Coordination Committee based in Ankara. 
209 “Müezzinoğlu: ‘Bazı Dar Boğazlar Mevcuttur’ [Müezzinoğlu: There are some bottlenecks].” Kurtuluş and 
Zaman, 3.4.1975. Even the budget was prepared in Ankara by the Cyprus Coordination Committee (İnhan: 
“Makarios’u Ne Bir Devlet Ne de Hükümet Olarak Tanımıyoruz [İnhan: We do not recognize Makarios in any 
capacity].” Zaman, 22.03.1975).  
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the Time magazine reported at the time “on every second building, signs proclaim: ‘What 
we have gained by blood we shall build by sweat’".210   
If we put the immorality of building an economy on stolen property aside, it can be argued 
that the Turkish Cypriot community was sitting on a huge potential for development. 
According to Symeonides, the area, which came under the Turkish Cypriot rule, was “by far 
the richest part of the island which in 1975 [sic]211 produced nearly 70 percent of the Gross 
Output, accounted for 50 percent of exports and attracted 70 percent of the tourists” 
(1977: 255). The Economist gives similar figures: the source of 70 percent of the GNP, 46 
percent of the agricultural and 26 percent of the industrial production, as well as 65 
percent of the hotel beds were now in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot authorities.212 
Likewise, Time reports, “Turkish-held territory contains something like 70 percent of the 
island's wealth-producing farms, factories and tourist facilities”.213  
There is also countless anecdotal evidence confirming these sources. To mention but few, 
in the words of a Turkish Cypriot observer, “under our disposal, we have gifts, ‘elements of 
economic development,’ no other community enjoys. Industrial facilities that will work 
once we press a button; groves where we can pick the produce once we water; enough 
animals to set up farms”.214 “Now all the Greeks have left is their grapes,” the Turkish 
Cypriots were telling the foreigners visiting the north boastfully, a foreign journalist 
reports in December 1974.215 Finally, in Dr Küçük’s words, “the Turkish Cypriots were up 
to their chins in wealth; wealth that has never been bestowed upon any other community 
throughout history”.216  
Quantifying the amount of movable property left behind is probably impossible217, and for 
the purposes of this study not vital. However, given the fact that “[p]eople moved the 
                                                        
210 “Separation: A Sense of Betrayal.” Time, 24.12.1975. 
211 It must be 1973. 
212 27 August 1977 edition cited in Yeni Kıbrıs, October 1977.  
213 “Looking for Paradise Lost.” Time, 2.9.1974. 
214 Eşref Nidai: “Belirlenecek Ekonomik Yöntem [The economic method that will be determined].” Bozkurt, 
4.11.1974.  
215 Paul Martin: “Now the Turks Must Decide What to Do With the Part of Cyprus They Won.” The Times 
(London), 31.12.1974. Reprinted in Crisis on Cyprus (1975: 57-8).  
216 Dr Küçük: “Sayın Demirel’in Nasihatı [Mr Demirel’s advice].” Halkın Sesi, 2.8.1980.  
217 The parliamentary committee dealing with the Greek Cypriot properties had asked the ministry concerned 
the amount of moveable property left behind by the Greek Cypriots but the question was simply not 
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instant they saw or thought the Turkish army was advancing towards their town or village” 
and that “they moved instantly –dropping everything, taking very little with them,” as the 
Subcommittee Report of the US Senate put it218, it will not be a wild guess to assume that 
tens of thousands of houses (see below) left behind were intact with furniture, kitchen 
appliances and other personal belongings when their owners left. In a similar vein, it is 
widely known that the fleeing Greek Cypriots did not have time or means to evacuate their 
shops, warehouses and factories. Many cars, other motor vehicles 219 , agricultural 
implements, spare parts and raw materials were also left behind providing the Turkish 
Cypriot administration with a plethora of moveable property at hand, even after those lost 
due to looting and vandalism were factored out.  
As for the amount of immovable properties, more tangible figures are available provided 
by different sources from both sides of the divide. One of the most important and most 
valuable considering the profile of the post-1974 Turkish Cypriot population items that can 
be investigated under the rubric of immovable properties is housing. Although the exact 
number of displaced persons is open to debate, there is no room for discussion that the 
number of Greek Cypriots crossing to the south was at least triple the number of Turkish 
Cypriots moving to the north. This translates into the number of housing units left behind. 
The Greek Cypriot sources put the number of housing units Turkish Cypriots evacuated in 
the south at around 15 thousand, while the number of housing units left behind by Greek 
Cypriots was around 45 thousand (Symeonides 1977: 260).220 The number provided by the 
Turkish Cypriot officials regarding the latter figure, on the other hand, was 36,400.221 The 
number of houses available for distribution initially, which is more important for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
answered by the ministry without any explanation (İsmail Bozkurt’s (TKP, Famagusta) parliamentary speech, 
Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Zabıtları [Minutes of the TFSC Parliament], 30.6.1977, p. 67).  
218 Crisis on Cyprus (1975: 27). “Most refugees,” according to the Time magazine, “both Greek and Turk, had 
left their homes with little more than the clothes on their backs…” (“Looking for Paradise Lost.” 2.9.1974).  
219 According to one account the number of motor vehicles left behind by the fleeing Greek Cypriots was 
around thirty thousand (Öztunç: “Gerçekleri Görelim [Let’s see the realities].” Halkın Sesi, 10.6.1976).  
220 According to the Chairman of the Cyprus Land and Property Owners Association, the number of Greek 
Cypriot housing units was 48,611 (See the report of the European Commission of Human Rights: Paragraph 
438).  
221 Memorandum submitted to the Minister of Interior and Settlement (The copy of the memo from the 
personal archive of an anonymous interviewee) (n.d.).  
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purposes of this study, stood at approximately 22 thousand222, obviously more than 
enough to accommodate the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons.223   
A considerable amount of agricultural land also came under the disposal of the Turkish 
Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot authorities estimated that the total agricultural area in 
the north at 1,279,099 donums224 of which 280,093 was under the Turkish Cypriot 
ownership, and 29,252 owned by the Greek Cypriots who stayed in the north after 1974, 
leaving the total area under the control of the state at 872,778 donums.225 As for the 
business facilities, it can be seen that the Greek Cypriots left behind 3463 businesses 
according to the official Turkish Cypriot sources.226 The number of industrial facilities left 
behind by Greek Cypriots was 230, of which 138 employed more than 5 employees (Çelik 
1990: 66). The number of hotel beds was around 15 thousand.227 Overall, it can be seen 
that there were a considerable amount of resources at hand.  
So far I established that there was indeed a huge pool of economic resources available 
under the disposal of the Turkish Cypriot administration. Next step is to establish whether 
politicians’ access to these resources was restricted or not. To answer this question, two 
dimensions have to be separately taken up. The first has something to do with the 
resettlement and rehabilitation of the families. The second involves the handling of the 
bigger assets like industrial and tourism facilities, and hence broader economic 
policymaking.  
To start with the resettlement and rehabilitation dimension, it can be observed that the 
ministry responsible for resettlement distributed most of the houses, small businesses and 
some of the agricultural land in a rather hasty manner as the displaced persons and settlers 
arrived. The immobile properties such as household goods required to furnish the houses 
                                                        
222 Upon the written request of the parliamentary committee, the ministry concerned provided the figures 
(İsmail Bozkurt’s (TKP, Famagusta) parliamentary speech, Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Zabıtları [Minutes of the 
TFSC Parliament], 30.6.1977, p. 67). 
223 The discrepancy between the figures can be explained by the fact that some villages and towns such as 
Varosha were not opened to settlement at all, and some of them were used as military bases.   
224 For the figures provided by the Greek Cypriot authorities see Symeonides (1977: 259).  
225 Bozkurt’s speech, p. 66.  
226 Başbakanlık Basın Bürosu (1981: 98).  
227 KTFD 1976 Yılı Geçiş Programı Taslağı, p. 69. It is important to note that the most of the tourism capacity 
was in the Varosha region, which was not opened to settlement. According to the Statistical Yearbook 1979, 
the total number of beds available in the north in 1976 stood at 3526 (State Planning Organization 1980: 
148).  
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and the agricultural implements required to cultivate the land, on the other hand, were 
stored in the warehouses, which were under the control of the ministry of finance. As it will 
be shown in Chapter Four, the distribution of a large amount of immobile property was 
delayed until the beginning of the 1976 election campaign. But a certain amount was also 
distributed in this period parallel to the resettlement process.  
On what legal basis did this distribution take place? The first attempt of the Turkish 
Cypriot administration to put the distribution of the Greek Cypriot immovable properties 
in order was the directive published in the Official Gazette on 22 November 1974. 
Apparently, the directive was prepared by a group of experts from Ankara.228 Yet, it should 
be noted that the resettlement of the displaced Turkish Cypriots in the areas vacated by the 
fleeing Greek Cypriots had started earlier under the initiative of both the military and 
civilian authorities at the district level (Atun 2007: 387-8), and by the mid-November, 20 
thousand people had been already resettled229, in the absence of any legal basis 
whatsoever.  
Eventually, the first legislation regulating the distribution process, the so-called İTEM 
(İskan Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası [Settlement, Land Distribution and Equivalent 
Property Law]) would be passed in the parliament as late as in August 1977. As Gürel puts 
it, “this is a very elaborate and important piece of legislation that lays down the rules 
regarding allocation of use … of property which Greek Cypriots left behind in the north to 
Turkish Cypriot citizens residing in that area” (2012: 23). The problem was that it was 
passed too late. In the meantime, with the Law for Allocation and Investment in Properties 
of Foreigners, dated 15 September 1975, the Constituent Assembly of the TFSC, put the 
foreigners’ immovable properties i.e. “in effect of Greek Cypriot property left in the 
northern part of Cyprus” (Gürel 2012: 22) “in the control, management and allocation of 
the Council of Ministers” (Atun 2007: 388), which used this authority extensively.230 
Therefore, by the time it was finally passed, the İTEM became nothing but a blanket 
                                                        
228 “Toprak Dağıtımı ve Göçmenlerin Yerleştirilmesi Kurala Bağlanacak [The distrubition of land and the 
settlement of the displaced will be tied to rules].” Zaman, 7.11.1974. See also “Yeni Yönetmelik Birçok 
Problemleri Halledecek [The new directive will solve many problems].” Zaman, 14.11.1974. 
229 “20 bin göçmen Soydaşımız İskan Edildiler [20 thousand of our displaced kinsmen have been resettled].” 
Zaman, 20.11.1974. 
230 For a brief summary of the Turkish Cypriot legal framework regarding the immovable property issue see 
Gürel (2012). 
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legislation legalizing the allocations that have been already made in the preceding three 
years.  
It should be added that although legally the allocation was made on temporary basis and 
initially no title deed was granted (until 1995), by and large, the political message given to 
the new “owners” was that these allocations would be permanent. This was so because 
since February 1976, the official Turkish Cypriot position regarding the settlement of the 
property issue was the so-called “global exchange and collective compensation formula” 
(see Gürel 2012: 15) 231, which to a large extent, was in line with Denktaş’s broader policy 
that ruled out any major dislocation of the Turkish Cypriots in case of a political settlement. 
As Atun puts it, İTEM was a major “watershed,” and with its passage in the parliament 
“Turkish Cypriot people made a definitive decision to renounce their properties in the 
south and to live under the roof of the state they established in the northern Cyprus. The 
state policy was based on this” (2007: 390). 
In this juncture, also the strength and autonomy of the bureaucracy, which could have 
potentially excluded the politicians’ clientelistic meddling in the process, come into play.  
When we look at the legal dimension, we see that the Public Service Commission, which 
was established in line with the Article 123 of the Constitution of the RoC was still in place. 
As in the other institutions of the Republic, three Turkish Cypriot members of the 
Commission continued to perform their tasks under the Turkish Cypriot administration 
after the inter-communal clashes of 1963.232 The members of the commission were 
appointed jointly by the president and the vice-president of the new administration, for a 
period of six years and could not be “removed from office except on the like grounds and in 
the like manner as a judge of the High Court” (Article 124). The commission was entrusted 
with the duty “to appoint, confirm, emplace on the permanent or pensionable 
establishment, promote, transfer, retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including 
                                                        
231 In Gürel’s words, this formula “translates as a kind of ‘lump-sum agreement’ between the two Cypriot 
administrations, entailing an exchange of all Turkish Cypriot properties in the south for all Greek Cypriot 
properties in the north, with compensation to be paid, if necessary, for any difference in the value of 
properties, taking into account the Turkish Cypriot losses before 1974” (2012: 15). 
232 The Section 15 of the Basic Provisions of the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration dated 29 
December 1967 was as follows: “the functions of the Public Service Commission as envisaged in the 16 
August 1960 Constitution shall be exercised in respect of all pubic officers of the Provisional Turkish 
Administration by a commission composed of three members. The members of the Turkish Public Service 
Commission shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Vice-President of the 
Executive Council” (Cited in Salih 1978: 154). 
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dismissal or removal from office of, public officers” (Article 125). Therefore, on paper, 
hiring, firing, and advancement of the civil servants were regulated by impersonal rules.  
Yet, as Shefter points out, such rules “are not self-enforcing” therefore their presence per se 
does not give the bureaucracy any autonomy vis-{-vis the politicians in power unless there 
is a wider constituency for bureaucratic autonomy (1994: 28). But beyond that, it is 
important to note that in order to be able to talk about a constituency for bureaucratic 
autonomy, we need to be in a position to talk about a coherent bureaucracy in the first 
place. Judging by the problems identified in the Draft Transition Program for 1976, one can 
conclude that the public service as a whole was in a complete disarray.233 According to this 
draft, inter alia, the statutes regulating the internal structures of the ministries were not 
made; the duties, authorities and responsibilities of the ministries were not determined; 
division of labour between the ministries were not regulated to ensure efficient and 
productive provision of services. Most significantly, it was pointed out that the Turkish 
Cypriot public service was deprived of an effective auditing mechanism.  
This is small wonder because in the immediate post-1974 period, in the words of 
Müezzinoğlu “the Turkish Cypriot administration was not more advanced than an 
association”.234 The civil service inherited from the pre-1974 period was primitive. Among 
other things, it lacked the ability to act independently (a) because the personnel were in 
effect in a chain of command, as a military rule had been in force since 1963, and (b) 
because it was staffed by personnel who just finished their university studies, and had been 
employed in the public service just to make sure that they did not emigrate. Furthermore, 
there were 73 different administrative units scattered around the island before 1974.235 
After division of the island, the scene was completely different as some of these units were 
now in the south while their personnel were in the north.   
Indeed, the problem was not limited to the civil service. The whole administration 
including the political executive was in a shambles. As pointed out by Ecevit at the time, 
though the circumstances fundamentally have changed after 1974, the administrative 
                                                        
233 KTFD 1976 Yılı Geçiş Programı Taslağı, p. 110. See also Turhan Feyzioğlu cited in Mehmet Ali Birand: 
“Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (7).” Milliyet, 29.6.1976. 
234 Müezzinoğlu cited in Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in 
Cyprus] (7).” Milliyet, 29.6.1976. 
235 State Planning Organization (1979: 4). 
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structure, which had been established in the pre-1974 period just to ensure the survival of 
the community, was not reformed. This resulted in an administrative cacophony. “The 
clearing of the administration from the remnants of the past administration model is an 
urgency. Unless the coherence, functionality and efficiency of the administration is secured, 
the Turkish Cypriot economy cannot be kick-started,” Ecevit concluded.236 This is to say let 
alone protecting the public resources, it is safe to say that, the civil service was not capable 
of performing its basic functions in this period.  
Given these circumstances, it can be concluded that the resettlement and rehabilitation 
dimension was conducted without any major bureaucratic “obstacle,” at least, from the 
local actors. There was an alternative authority, however, which could exercise influence 
on the executive. This was the Cyprus Coordination Committee. The Committee was set up 
as a sub unit of Cyprus Coordination Board in Ankara, which was tasked to deal with the 
normalization of day-to-day affairs. 237  Its chairman was a veteran ambassador, 
Müezzinoğlu238, who had earlier served as the undersecretary of the State Planning 
Organization –the institutional home of indicative planning in Turkey.  
The Committee’s priority was stabilizing the economy and revitalizing the socio-economic 
life. In line with the broader Cyprus policy of the Turkish government, the aim was to lift 
the Turkish Cypriot community’s per capita income to the level of the Greek Cypriots as 
soon as possible. The main target of the Turkish Cypriot community, according to 
Müezzinoğlu was “to gain strength in the field of economy, to become an independent 
economic community and to establish the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, as 
a fully-fledged structure within a state based on geographic federation”.239 In other words, 
the Committee had a political aim and a vision to achieve it. In this context, as Müezzinoğlu 
later admitted, the Committee had concentrated its efforts on macro projects and left the 
                                                        
236 “Ecevit: ‘Kıbrıs Sorununu Askıda Bırakmak, Çözümü Gitgide Zorlaştıracaktır’ [Delaying the solution of the 
Cyprus problem will make it more intractable].” Milliyet, 21.7.1975. 
237 The Board was comprised of five cabinet ministers headed by a state minister (see “İnhan: Makarios’u Ne 
Bir Devlet Ne de Hükümet Olarak Tanımıyoruz [İnhan: We do not recognize Makarios in any capacity].” 
Zaman, 22.03.1975). 
238 Considering his power on the Turkish Cypriot administration, it wouldn’t be exaggeration to call 
Müezzinoğlu a viceroy, at least as long as economic affairs were concerned.   
239 “Müezzinoğlu: Türkiye OKT Yönetimine Uluslararası Nitelikte Yardımlar Yapmaktadır [Turkey’s assistance 
to the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration is like international aid].” Zaman, 28.12.1974. 
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resettlement and rehabilitation issue to the Turkish Cypriot administration.240 So, in this 
regard, the politicians were given a free hand.   
It is not possible to say the same thing about the wider economic policymaking, and 
handling of the factories and tourism facilities. Although the tendency in the council of 
ministers was in favour of privatizing the economic enterprises left behind by the Greek 
Cypriots241, the Committee introduced a mixed-economic model, in line with the economic 
development policy pursued by Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) 
in Turkey. Accordingly, for the running of industrial and tourism facilities several state 
economic enterprises (SEEs) were established as joint ventures with the Turkish SEEs.242 
In a similar vein, some of the agricultural land and production facilities were transferred to 
the newly established state farms. In other words, the Committee effectively intervened 
and prevented the distribution of these facilities to the cronies and political allies.  
Furthermore, Alper Orhon, a Turkish Cypriot professor of economics, who was also 
working for the Committee243, was sent to Cyprus to establish the ministry of planning and 
coordination and to head it. Simultaneously, a ministry of tourism was also established.244 
Obviously, Ankara was serious about planning and devising a state-led economic 
development model. Having secured the full backing of Müezzinoğlu, Orhon was like a 
                                                        
240 “In that period the process could not be stopped to avoid individual grievances,” he said in June 1976,  
adding that now that the transition period was completed “the time was due for addressing individual 
grievances, and redressing injustices” (Interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü 
[Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (7).” Milliyet, 29.6.1976). 
241 Kotak interviewed by author. In our interview, Mr Kotak said that the chamber of commerce and some of 
his fellow ministers targeted him in the 1976 elections and its aftermath because he opposed privatization 
when he had served as the minister of resettlement. See also Alper Orhon’s interview with Abdi İpekçi cited 
below.      
242 The decision was made as early as in September 1974, in a meeting attended by Müezzinoğlu, and the 
Turkish Cypriot high-level economic bureaucrats (Hilmi Refik interviewed by author). By the end of 1975, 40 
of the industrial facilities were allocated to a state enterprise (K.T. Sanayi Holding İşletmeleri); 18 of them to 
the cooperative bank (K.T. Kooperatif Merkez Bankası) and village cooperatives; and 12 of them to another 
public enterprise (Cypfruvex) (KTFD 1976 Yılı Geçiş Programı Taslağı, p. 51). It is worth noting that the 
Turkish partners had the majority (51 percent) of stakes in the joint ventures.  
243 “Prof. Alper Orhon Çok Yakında Görev Alıyor [Prof. Alper Orhon will be in office very soon].” Zaman, 
29.9.1974; “Prof. Orhon Bakanlığı İçin Dinamik Bir Şama Hazırlıyor [Prof. Orhon is preparing a dynamic 
scheme for his ministry].” Bozkurt, 21.10.1974. 
244 Çağlar Yasal, a Turkish Cypriot who until then had been working for the Turkish ministry of tourism was 
sent to the island to take over the newly established ministry of tourism and promotion (“Çağlar Yasal Turizm 
ve Tanıtma Bakanlığı Görevine Getirildi [Çağlar Yasal appointed as the minister of tourism].” Zaman, 
2.10.1974). 
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prime minister.245 As a proponent of state-led economic development and an expert of 
economic planning, Orhon started with conducting economic censuses to make the 
inventory of resources, and drew up a one-year transitional plan, which was to be followed 
by a five-year economic development plan.246 Yet, Orhon’s stint as the minister would not 
last long enough to see to the implementation of these plans. As soon as a right-wing 
government with more liberal tendencies in economy came to power in Turkey and it 
became apparent that Müezzinoğlu would be replaced, Denktaş sacked Orhon247, and 
shelved his development plan –until the CHP came to power again in 1978.   
What Orhon said about his short stint in the council of ministers in an interview few 
months later, reflects the fundamental disagreements between the Committee, and Turkish 
Cypriot administration over the handling of the public resources. Just as importantly it 
shows why the SEEs were condemned to failure.     
I had difficulty to have certain bills passed in the cabinet. Even when I managed to 
pass them, they never made it to the parliament to become law.  … To give an 
example … seven-eight SEEs have been established. However, there is no law to 
manage and audit them. Though the council of ministers had approved the bill 
eight-nine months ago, it has not been passed in the parliament yet. Because of this, 
public companies holding the biggest employment potential cannot be audited or 
forced to meet the economic expectations of the administration … They support the 
idea that state cannot play an effective role in running the industrial facilities. 
Accordingly, their approach is ‘let’s transfer these facilities to individuals’. They 
justify this by saying ‘it’s been one year and a half but the state still has not been 
able to run them’.248 …  Although there is a five-year plan available, the current 
government has blocked its implementation. They don’t believe in a planned 
economy … The findings of the censuses conducted have not been evaluated. A 
statistic department, which was supposed to be set up to provide data required in 
the decision-making process, has not been established so far. It is not known on 
what basis the state mechanism is making decisions. Even a price index is not 
available.249    
                                                        
245 Indeed, it was believed by many that he had been sent to take over domestic affairs from Denktaş  (Alpay 
Durduran interviewed by author; Hakkı Atun interviewed by author; see also Konuk cited in Besim 2011: 
107). 
246 Alper Orhon interviewed by Abdi İpekçi, Milliyet, 5.1.1976. 
247 “Alper Orhon Bakanlıktan Affedildi [Alper Orhon dismissed].” Zaman, 11.4.1975. 
248Müezzinoğlu was also quoted saying, “those who blame our approach as socialist were in favor of a 
practical approach i.e. distributing the industrial facilities to individuals” (Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand: 
“Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (7).” Milliyet, 29.6.1976. 
249 Interviewed by Abdi İpekçi, Milliyet, 5.1.1976. 
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In the period following the dismissal of Orhon, the government’s policy can be summarized 
as kicking the can down the road, which would prove extremely costly in socio-economic 
terms in the long run. What made things even worse was the fact that in the six-year period 
following the 1974 war, Turkey saw seven different governments. With every government 
change in Ankara, also changed the economic policies pursued in Nicosia. Furthermore, the 
executive boards of the SEEs became patronage posts to be filled by the Turkish parties 
taking part in the coalitions.250 As a result, the huge potential for economic development 
inherited from the Greek Cypriots was not utilized effectively to establish a self-sufficient 
and sustainable economy that would lessen the dependence (a) of its citizens on state for 
sources of livelihood, and (b) of its treasury on funds from Ankara.  
But how can we explain the government’s lack of concern for economy? The answer lies in 
the strategic priorities of the political elites, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Suffice it here to say that unlike the Coordination Committee, the ruling nationalist elite 
never envisaged the Turkish Cypriots as a political community independent from Turkey, 
and did not consider a self-sufficient economy as a priority. Neither it occurred to them 
that this state of limbo would last almost four decades.      
3.3 The Taksim Policy and Legitimacy Crisis of the Ruling Political Elite 
Based on the analysis made in the first two sections, it can be argued that the balance was 
heavily tilted towards a patronage strategy: The socio-economic situation of the people 
made them receptive to clientelistic offers; there were huge resources under the control of 
the administration; bureaucracy was extremely weak and only institution, which could and 
did initially constrain the politicians had lost its capacity to do so when the government 
changed in Ankara. The analysis is still incomplete, however, unless the priorities of the 
ruling nationalist elite are introduced into the equation. As Piattoni notes, sometimes the 
broader political context at the time of mass political mobilization, such as the advent of 
the Cold War in the case of post-World War II Italy, may completely change the calculations 
of the ruling political elite and make political clientelism “a more appealing strategy” 
(2001: 24-6). This section aims to locate the strategic priorities of the Turkish Cypriot 
                                                        
250 See for instance “Anavatan Başbakanına Açık Mektup [Open letter to the motherland’s prime minister].” 
Yeni Kıbrıs, June-July 1977; see also Dr Küçük: “Sayın Demirel’in Nasihati [Mr Demirel’s advice].” Halkın Sesi, 
2.8.1980.  
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leadership regarding the Cyprus conflict into the equation of the demand and supply of 
political clientelism to account for their opting for a clientelistic strategy to mobilize mass 
support.  
Basically, I will argue that, what made the ruling elite adopt a full-scale clientelistic strategy 
when the time to mass political mobilization came was more than anything else, the 
legitimacy crisis it faced. The reason behind this crisis was its vision for the solution of the 
Cyprus problem: taksim. The taksim policy of Denktaş was accepted neither by the 
international community, nor by the Turkish government nor by the Turkish Cypriot 
opposition. In the face of this external and internal legitimacy crisis, the easiest possible 
way out was securing a mass following in the domestic political arena and in doing so 
delegitimizing the pro-reunification policies internally and externally. Just like the Cold 
War conditions in Italy in the time of political mobilization after the World War II 
“pressured the anti-Communist parties into gaining and keeping power almost by all 
means, clientelism included” (Piattoni 2001b: 199), it can be said that their approach to the 
solution of the Cyprus problem or simply their ideology, pressured the founders of the UBP 
to do the same thing. In the following two sub-sections, I will elaborate on the external and 
internal dimension of this legitimacy crisis.  
3.3.1 External Dimension      
In his long political career, Denktaş’s position on the solution of the Cyprus problem did 
not move an inch from what had been declared in the late 1950s, which was simply taksim. 
On the way to reaching this ultimate goal, the ethnic/geographic segregation, which was 
practically achieved after the Turkish military intervention/invasion and the ensuing Third 
Vienna Agreement251, was a major milestone. Having tackled the most formidable challenge 
on the way to permanent partition, next step for Denktaş was to capitalize on these new 
                                                        
251 The Third Vienna Agreement, signed on 2 August 1975, envisaged, inter alia, “the Turkish Cypriots at 
present in the South of the Island will be allowed, if they want to do so, to proceed North with their 
belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP” and in a similar vein, “the 
Greek Cypriots at present in the North who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any 
kind of pressure, wish to move to the South will be permitted to do so”. The population exchange took place 
within a month from 14 August to 14 September 1975 (İsmet Kotak interviewed by author). Around 10 
thousand Turkish Cypriots who sought refuge in the British Base in Episcopi hade been flown to Turkey 
earlier when Britain finally allowed them to leave in January 1975 (Steven F. Roberts: “Cyprus Split Seems 
Closer as Turks Plan to Evacuate Refugees.” The New York Times, 17 January 1975). Reprinted in Crisis on 
Cyprus (1975: 56).   
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facts on the ground to make the status quo irreversible in the political arena (see also 
Kızılyürek 2003). All political manoeuvres in this period, domestic and international alike 
were guided by this overarching political ideal. This dogmatic approach, which ruled out 
even the slightest deviation as treason, in the long run inevitably created contradictions. 
And almost all the ills from which Turkish Cypriot community suffers today, from social 
tension between the “original” Turkish Cypriots and “settlers” to the bankruptcy of public 
finances, from a huge, inefficient public sector to international isolation, have all their 
origins in these contradictions.  
Ironically, the biggest hurdle for Denktaş in his quest for permanent partition was the 
Turkish government’s Cyprus policy. As in the 1960s, once again Denktaş was at 
loggerheads with the Turkish mainstream establishment. Ecevit, the Turkish premier 
clearly ruled out “taksim or annexation” in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish 
intervention/invasion.252 In a similar vein, Turan Güneş, the Turkish foreign minister, 
stated that the government’s policy was in line with the rest of the international 
community, and envisaged the “territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of 
Cyprus”.253 Consequently, the official Turkish position in the inter-communal negotiations 
for the settlement of the Cyprus problem was forming an independent, geographic 
federation comprised of Turkish and Greek Cypriot federated states. Given his ideological 
disposition, it is not difficult to see that a common state was an anathema to Denktaş. Even 
when he was discussing the formation of a federation on the negotiation table and touting 
geographical federation as the “only untested system” to the international press254, 
obviously at the behest of Ankara, he was asking “the Turkish government to establish the 
                                                        
252 “Ecevit ‘Kıbrıs için Taksim veya İlhakı Düşümüyoruz’ dedi [‘We do not contemplate partition or 
annexation in Cyprus,’ Ecevit said]”. Zaman, 24.08.1974.  
253 “Güneş ‘Adadaki Durumumuzun Değeri ve Gücü Vardır’ dedi [‘Our position in the island is valuable and 
powerful’ Güneş said].” Bozkurt, 27.10.1974. See also his interview with Robert Kroon: “Blunt Voice from 
Turkey.” Time, 26.08.1974, where he says “in its new federative form, Cyprus can remain independent. We 
don't want double enosis [union with Greece and Turkey]”. 
254 “Rauf Denktaş Fransız Haber Ajansına Demeç Verdi: ‘Denenmemiş Tek Sistem Coğrafi Federasyondur’ 
[Rauf Denktaş gave a statement to the French News Agency: ‘Only untested system is geographical 
federation’].” Zaman, 3.2.1975. See also “Federal Sistem Kaçınılmazdır [Federal system is inevitable].” Zaman, 
28.08.1974. 
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Turkish wing of Confederal Cyprus State,” and preparing the Turkish Cypriot public 
opinion for a confederation.255  
Furthermore, whenever he deemed circumstances favourable, Denktaş floated the idea of 
declaring a separate, independent state256, only to be dissuaded by Ankara.257 These moves 
were not welcomed by the Turkish public opinion. “Turkey cannot drift behind Denktaş’s 
fait accompli decisions,” stated a declaration issued by the CHP, as a reaction to Denktaş’s 
statements about proclaiming an independent state.258 Reportedly, Ecevit also found his 
endeavours “untimely”.259 The other major party in Turkey, Demirel’s Justice Party (Adalet 
Partisi), was also against a unilateral declaration of independence.260 The National Front 
government headed by Demirel was criticized for being too soft on Denktaş. Ahmet Şükrü 
Esmer261, for instance, lambasted the government over its silence in the face of Denktaş’s 
“intemperance” and identified Denktaş’s attitude as “irresponsible”:   
Turkey intervened in Cyprus based on the rights provided by the Zurich and London 
agreements. If Denktaş thinks that he can drag the Turkish army to an adventure 
                                                        
255 “Türkiye Hükümeti’ne Önemli Bir Mesaj Gönderen Denktaş: Konfedere Kıbrıs Devleti’nin Türk Kanadının 
Kurulması İsteğinde Bulundu [Denktaş sent an important message to the Turkish government and asked the 
formation of the Turkish wing of the Confederal Republic of Cyprus].” Zaman, 6.2.1975; In an editorial in his 
son’s newspaper Zaman, titled “Why Confederation?” it was argued that the confederation was the only way 
to slam the borders closed to persons like Nicos Sampson (“Niye Konfederasyon [Why confederation]?” 
Zaman, 9.2.1975).  
256 In our interview, he said his biggest regret was to heed to the then Turkish minister of foreign affairs 
Esenbel’s advice not to declare independence in 1975 when the international conditions were more 
favourable. 
257 See for instance, Denktaş’s article titled “Why a separate state?” in Zaman, 19.12.1975. See also “Denktaş: 
Ayrı Bir Devlet İlan Edilecek [Denktaş: A separate state will be declared].” Halkın Sesi, 8.5.1976; “Denktaş: 
Kolombo’dan Çıkacak Karar Makarios’un Konuşması Paralelinde ise Ayrı Bağımsızlık İlanı İçin Fazla 
Beklememize Lüzum Kalmaz [Denktaş: If the decision in Colombo will be parallel to what Makarios said in his 
speech, then there will be no need to wait for a long time for the declaration of independence].” Zaman, 
19.08.1976; Upon his arrival in Istanbul from New York, where he had attended meetings on the Cyprus 
problem, Denktaş was quoted as saying “Declaring independence is one of the ways out. It’s futile to still 
expect good will from Greek Cypriots. The final decision needs to be made boldly. The issue of greatest 
priority is independence” (“Denktaş: ‘Artık Rumlar’dan İyi Niyet Beklemek Fuzulidir’ [Denktaş: It’s futile to 
expect good will from Greek Cypriots].” Milliyet, 01.12.1978). A day later he announced that the Turkish 
premier did not agree with him (“Denktaş: ‘Sayın Ecevit, Kıbrıs’ta Bağımsızlık İlanını Şimdilik Uygun 
Bulmuyorlar’ [Denktaş: For the moment Mr Ecevit does not see it fit to declare independence in Cyprus].” 
Milliyet, 2.12.1978).      
258 Cited in Halkın Sesi, 2.12.1975.  
259 Kasım Yargıcı: “Kıbrıs ve Türk-ABD İlişkileri [Cyprus and the Turco-American Relations].” Milliyet, 
30.9.1975.  
260 Ali Sirmen: “Denktaş Ne İstiyor [What does Denktaş want]?” Cumhuriyet cited in Halkın Sesi, 2.12.1975. 
261 Mr Esmer was a veteran academic and foreign policy columnist. According to Mümtaz Soysal, Professor 
Esmer was “one of the most experienced foreign policy commentators with the youngest mindset” (Mümtaz 
Soysal: “Devlet Olmak [To be a state].” Milliyet, 10.12.1975).  
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with a fait accompli, he is mistaken. If he is bluffing, then the Turkish army cannot 
be used as a tool in his bluff.262  
In a similar vein, according to Mümtaz Soysal, a respected professor of constitutional law 
and a columnist in the left-leaning Milliyet, with his statements about independence 
Denktaş was undermining the credibility of the official Turkish position in the eyes of the 
international community and in doing so he was providing the Greek side with diplomatic 
ammunition to say, “Turks have never intended to form a common, independent, federal, 
Cyprus state”.263 
Yet, Denktaş was undeterred. Although it was obvious that the deal would involve 
returning a considerable amount of land to the Greek Cypriot side, he constantly reiterated 
his determination “not to give away at the negotiation table what was obtained on the 
battlefield” with a strong nationalistic rhetoric. The following excerpt form a speech he 
delivered during the celebrations of a national holiday is a good illustration of his way of 
thinking and what he made of inter-communal negotiations:  
Turkish Cypriots have not attained the status they enjoy today through negotiation. 
Current situation is a reasonable one, where historical rights have been secured. We 
are going to stay loyal to this status, which has not been attained through 
negotiation. Because what has formed the borders, the existence of the current 
situation as a foundation stone is not land but blood; not land but fatherland; not 
land but liberty, freedom, which was acquired at the expense of life and blood, and 
hundreds of martyrs.264  
In a different speech, while criticizing an opposition leader, who had earlier talked about 
making territorial concessions, he was indeed expressing his resolve to maintain the status 
quo forever: “he has no right to do so. … Only those who had conquered the land can make 
concessions on land, [and] those who had conquered the land are now lying under the 
ground”.265 He was not only speaking against territorial concession but also taking 
concrete steps to avoid it. In the remainder of this sub-section, I will attempt to show how 
he managed not to make any territorial concession and at what cost. To do this, I will bring 
                                                        
262 A. Ş. Esmer cited in Soysal, Milliyet, 10.12.1975.  
263 Soysal, 10.12.1975. 
264 “Denktaş: ‘Kıbrıs Türkü Bugünkü Duruma Pazarlıkla Gelmemiştir’ [Denktaş: ‘Turkish Cypriots have not 
attained the status they enjoy today through negotiation’].” Zaman, 24.04.1975; see also for instance his 
statement in Zaman, 22.3.1977. 
265 “Denktaş: ‘Toprak Tavizini Ancak Toprağı Alanlar Verir’ [Denktaş: ‘Only those who had conquered the land 
can make concessions on land’].” Milliyet, 19.6.1976.  
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the handling of the resources left by the fleeing Greek Cypriots once again in the center of 
the discussion and illustrate how this fit into his taksim policy.  
To start with, when we look at the general domestic situation at the time, we see that 
Denktaş administration was constantly under fire for lack of planning and coordination, 
arbitrariness and favouritism in its efforts in resettling the displaced. An orderly 
resettlement process and avoiding the squandering what was left from the Greek Cypriots, 
which came to be seen as “national wealth” however, seemed not to be a priority for the 
administration even though many members of the parliament repeatedly expressed their 
uneasiness about the process266 and the newspapers were full of complaints. How can we 
explain this chaotic situation, especially given the availability of vast amount of resources 
and sufficient time to deal with the issue in a more orderly manner?   
Certainly, part of the explanation for setbacks lies with the weakness of the state apparatus. 
Yet for a larger part of the explanation, the attention has to be turned once again to the 
strategic calculations. The disorder in the resettlement process was indeed serving a 
purpose: creating new facts on the ground to avoid territorial concessions in the 
negotiations.267 The international pressure on the Turkish side to make concessions was 
mounting by the day.268 As pointed out by Alpay Durduran, there were thousands of vacant 
houses in the north, while their owners were suffering in the south in tent camps.269 
Looking from this perspective, no matter how frustrating this was for the community at 
large, hasty distribution of Greek Cypriot houses and businesses made political sense. The 
clumsy population transfer from Turkey270 should also be considered in this context. 
                                                        
266 See for instance minutes of the general parliamentary debate on the resettlement and rehabilitation of the 
displaced persons dated 28.1.1975.  
267 The following excerpt from the Time magazine, which was published in the wake of the proclamation of 
TFSC gives a rough idea about the Greek Cypriot position in the negotiations.  “Makarios … had approved a 
plan that would have created a ‘substantial’ Turkish zone in northern Cyprus —a major concession— and 
would have allowed permanent settlement of Turkish refugees in the north. Glafkos Clerides, negotiator for 
the Greek Cypriots, insisted that major areas now under Turkish occupation must be restored to Greek 
control in order that some of the Greek refugees might be resettled” (“Separation: A Sense of Betrayal.” Time, 
24.2.1975).  
268 The U.S. Congress, for instance, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, which aimed “to pressure Ankara 
into withdrawing its troops from Cyprus and allowing the resettlement of the 200 thousand refugees (mostly 
Greek Cypriots) who were left homeless by the war”  (“Strains in an Old Alliance.” Time, 17.2.1975).  
269 Interviewed by author.  
270 Regarding the settlement of Turkish “agricultural labour brought from Turkey,” İnal Batu, a former 
Turkish ambassador notes, “We couldn’t manage to do what the Ottomans successfully did five centuries ago; 
in a sense, we messed it up” (cited in İnanç 2007: 96).   
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Nothing would serve better and quicker to this political aim than filling the vacant houses 
as quickly as possible, and turning a blind eye to looting of the Greek Cypriot properties. 
This would not only complicate things to the point of no return but also send a simple 
political message to the Greek Cypriot side: Forget about coming back to your homes 
because there is no home left! The following statement made by Denktaş is a telling 
example of how his taksim and hasty distribution strategies went hand in hand in practice:   
We have disclosed our criteria about land. One of them is that we are not going to 
re-evacuate areas where we have already settled. During the Second Vienna 
negotiations the area we had already opened to settlement was smaller than today. 
Therefore, when territorial/border adjustment was discussed, the line could have 
been drawn differently. There used to be more flexibility. As months passed by, and 
homeless people came and settled, [flexibility] has diminished … Between the 
Second Vienna Negotiations and today, the territorial/border adjustment became 
more rigid to the detriment of Greek Cypriots. We have not created this. Time and 
events have.271 
The urgency in the international front tramped the domestic concerns. The stakes for 
Denktaş were high enough to justify taking all the criticisms posed against him in the 
domestic front regarding injustices in the resettlement process. To rephrase what Sidney 
Tarrow said of the Italian peasants in the 1950s after the Agrarian Reform (1967: 355), 
without any property the Turkish Cypriot population, which had suffered from economic 
deprivation in the enclaves for years, would have become volatile and rebellious, and 
probably would favour a solution, which would prompt their going back to the south. But 
as “property owners” they simply became conservatives and proponents of the new status 
quo. In this way, indeed Denktaş created a natural constituency for partition, which would 
support him in the decades to come.  
Beyond its direct involvement in the distribution of immobile properties, the 
administration played a subtler role by triggering a “ganimet (spoils of war) rush” by 
simply condoning looting. In a minister’s words, “after the war the country was in a looting 
frenzy” (Konuk cited in Besim 2011: 108).272 Kyrenia, for instance, was “looted beyond 
                                                        
271 “Başkan Denktaş Rum İddialarını Cevaplandırdı ve Hudut Düzeltmesi ile İlgili Elastikiyet Azalmıştır dedi 
[President Denktaş answered the Greek Cypriot allegations and said that flexibility regarding border 
adjustment had decreased].” Zaman, 3.7.1976. 
272 When he was asked to quit his ministerial portfolio to represent the cabinet in the constituent assembly, 
Konuk accepted the offer instantly as this would keep him away from “the looting frenzy”. Denktaş was so 
surprised to hear that Konuk was willing to leave the cabinet, he had the urge to ask a colleague of Konuk’s if 
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description”.273 It is remarkable that Bedreddin Demirel, the commander of the Turkish 
forces in the island held Denktaş personally responsible for this: “You! All these robberies 
are going on with your orders and condoning," said Demirel in a reception pointing his 
finger at Denktaş.274 It is true that all these created vested interests that would prove useful 
in the elections. Yet, it is important to note that everything covered so far was random in 
the sense that all these would have been done even if there had been no elections. Certainly, 
some politicians had taken advantage of their status to cultivate personal clientela in this 
period. However, nothing was done at this stage to particularly mobilize mass political 
support.  
Basically, this is to say, the nature of the ruling elite’s strategic calculations outlined here 
tilted the balance further in favor of a clientelistic strategy. Yet, still there was a chance to 
opt for a programmatic mobilization strategy, only if the political elite as a whole had 
played along and supported the taksim policy of the administration. Then the pressure on 
Denktaş to resort to clientelism would have been much less. But this was not the case; 
there were politicians who were opposed to taksim, whose stance was legitimized by 
Ankara’s official policy on this matter. Therefore, there was a polarization at the elite level, 
and as Kitschelt and Wilkinson put it, polarization, or the presence of “programmatic 
distance between alternative party blocs competing for executive office is a strong 
incentive for the party in power to opt for a clientelist strategy” (2007: 28). Accordingly, as 
it will be illustrated in the next chapter, come the establishment phase of the UBP and time 
to go to the polls, a new round of distribution started, this time exclusively to mobilize 
mass political support for the party. I will discuss the political polarization issue in the 
following sub-section.  
Before coming to this, two brief points about the socio-economic consequences of the 
process outlined above should be made. For Denktaş, avoiding loss of land was a huge 
success, which could not be measured in economic terms. Yet, what might look politically 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
he had understood that representing the cabinet in the constituent assembly would mean he had to quit as a 
minister (cited in Besim 2011: 108).  
273 Crisis on Cyprus (1975: 30). The report continues like this: “in driving across the island to Famagusta, 
there is wide-spread evidence of looting of Greek Cypriot villages along the road. In fact, the Study Mission 
observed two military trucks and a lorry loaded with miscellaneous pieces of furniture heading for some 
unknown destination down the road from Famagusta”. 
274 Anonymous interviewee who was present at the reception.  
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expedient does not necessarily make economic sense. The adverse effects of distribution 
without regard for long-term prospects of economic growth became evident as early as 
some five months after the Turkish intervention/invasion. Evaluating the economic 
situation, Paul Martin of the Times comments “anyone asked to draw a comparison 
between the two areas at this stage would come to the conclusion that the Greeks were the 
victors and the Turks the vanquished”.275 Martin continues as follows: 
Though the Turks boast that they will resurrect the now dead hotel trade in the 
north, officially condoned looting of deserted hotels continues. And, so bad has the 
Turkish record been on this score, Turkish families from the south find themselves 
inheriting vacated Greek houses stripped bare. This has sparked off another cycle of 
looting.276    
It took a little bit more before the negative effect of unrestrained looting on the social fabric 
became visible. By condoning looting, as well as other illicit activities like smuggling and 
black-marketing, the administration paved the way for the emergence of a culture of 
impunity, which would build up in the years to come. If what Banfield coined “amoral 
familism,”277  or a private-regarding or individualist political ethos prevails in the 
contemporary Turkish Cypriot community, as some former Turkish ambassadors to 
Nicosia seem to imply (see İnanç 2007: 9; 44), its seeds were definitely sown in this period. 
Alper Orhon’s statements made few years later in a roundtable discussion is worth citing in 
this context: “By a policy of condoning, not controlling, and letting the thieves to get away 
with what they steal, the UBP paved the way for the emergence of millionaires of looting, 
and in doing so it pushed the society into a moral depression” (cited in Kasımoğlu 1980: 
17).  
3.3.2 Internal Dimension  
The dichotomy between Denktaş and the Turkish Cypriot opposition should be discussed 
in the context of statehood and political identity because diverging views on this issue is 
the line dividing what has come to be called left and right in the Turkish Cypriot politics (Cf. 
Egemen 2006: 159-61). 
                                                        
275 “Now the Turks Must Decide What to Do with the Part of Cyprus They Won.” 31.12.1974. Reprinted in 
Crisis on Cyprus: 57-8.  
276 31 December 1974. Reprinted in Crisis on Cyprus: 57-8.  
277 A mentality of maximizing “the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others 
will do likewise” (Banfield 1958: 85).  
105 
 
Denktaş’s insistence on statehood derived from his belief that having a state was 
“necessary for the survival of the Turkish ethnic community and identity” (Çolak 2004: 3), 
and on that, indeed both sides agreed. Accordingly, when the TFSC was proclaimed in 
February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot opposition welcomed the decision278, and eagerly 
accepted to take part in the constituent assembly. The ratification of the TFSC constitution 
with over 99 percent of the vote in the referendum (Dodd 1993: 108) was an obvious 
manifestation of this unanimity. However, while establishing the federated wing of a 
federal state was an end in itself sufficient to guarantee political survival of the Turkish 
Cypriot community on the island for the opposition; for Denktaş, setting up a federated 
state, or even a confederated state was nothing but a stepping stone to reach the ultimate 
goal of full integration/unification with Turkey.   
In line with this political vision, Denktaş embarked on a “Turkification” process to 
completely “nationalize” the northern part of the island (Kızılyürek 2003: 291-2). The 
Turkish identity needed to be consolidated to justify unification with Turkey. By the same 
token, Cypriotness or Cypriot identity should be downplayed.279 In the perception of the 
leadership, Cypriotness was something dangerous; as Denktaş once stated, “if we are 
deceived into thinking we are Cypriots we shall boil in the Greek Cypriot pot” (cited in 
Dodd 1993: 149). As highlighted by Kızılyürek, “[t]his approach, which went as far as 
denying the Turkish Cypriot community, derived from a search for legitimacy for taksim-
oriented political preferences, rather than ‘an intellectual illusion’” (Kızılyürek 2003: 293). 
By denying the element of Cypriotness in the identity of “Turks in Cyprus280,” the Turkish 
Cypriot nationalists tried to demonstrate the impossibility of a future common state with 
Greek Cypriots because of “identity differentiations between the two communities” (Vural 
and Rüstemli 2006: 332).  
                                                        
278 Berberoğlu, the leader of CTP, for instance, said that this was the “right step on the way to a Federal 
Republic of Cyprus,” (“Berberoğlu Bir Mesaj Yayınladı: Karar, Federal Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetine Doğru Önemli Bir 
Aşamadır [Berberoğlu issued a message: the decision is an important step on the way to the Federal Republic 
of Cyprus].” Halkın Sesi, 14.2.1975).  
279 Historically, “Cypriotness has been the territorial-civic component of collective identity, which was used 
by members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to separate their identity from mainland 
Greece and mainland Turkey respectively” (Vural and Rüstemli 2006: 332). 
280 According to the official discourse espoused by the nationalists, there are Turks in Cyprus, not Turkish 
Cypriots.  
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The opposition, which initially rejected the taksim idea, arguably just because Ecevit did so, 
on the other hand, in time gradually developed a “stance of identity” emphasizing 
“Cypriotness,” and resisted the variant of Turkish nationalism imposed by Denktaş 
(Kızılyürek 2005: 249). It should be underlined that one particular element of the 
Turkification process backfired heavily and facilitated the development of Cypriot identity. 
This was the population transfer from Turkey, which was orchestrated by Denktaş.281 
When the Turkish Cypriots began to live side by side with the Turkish settlers, and 
discovered the cultural differences between Turkish Cypriots and the mainlanders 
(Kızılyürek 2003: 292), they felt the urge to distinguish themselves, subsequently opting 
for a prioritization of the “Cypriot dimension of their identity” (Özejder cited in Kızılyürek 
2005: 250; see also Pollis 1979b: 99). To quote Kızılyürek once again, “Cypriots who had 
been once Turkified in the face of Hellenic nationalism, were being re-Cypriotified” in the 
face of Turkish nationalism (Kızılyürek 2005: 259). “Against the ‘everyone is Turk’ 
discourse of the administration, different segments of the community, though in different 
tones,” developed an understanding that can be best captured by the words “‘I am a 
Turkish Cypriot and on this land, which belongs to me, it’s my right to live with my distinct 
identity’” (Özejder cited in Kızılyürek 2005: 251). The left opposition came to represent 
this identity movement and have become the vanguard of reunification.   
To delegitimize the opposition, Denktaş did not hesitate to resort to his time-and-battle-
tested strategy of monopolizing Turkish (ultra-)nationalism, which worked perfectly in the 
1950s, 1960s and early 1970s in pacifying the opposition, and anything to do with Turkey. 
In line with that, he created an “imaginary enemy within282,” which was not only pro-Greek 
but also communist. Whoever criticized Denktaş or his government was either Rumcu (Pro-
Greek/Phil-Hellene)283 or communist284, or at best playing to the hands of the Greek 
                                                        
281 “It is not true that Turkey sent them. Denktaş passed a resolution in the council of ministers.  As the 
majority of the population was cut off in the south, we required labor force. That is why they were brought” 
(Kotak interviewed by author). According to Atun, a protocol was signed between the Turkish government 
and the TFSC (Atun 2007: 387). 
282 In an editorial in his newspaper, Dr Küçük, argued that “an artificial class of traitors” was fabricated just to 
divert attention from the failure in domestic politics (“Dış ve İç İşlerimiz [Our external and internal affairs].” 
Halkın Sesi, 30.6.1976). 
283 It is worth mentioning that politicians whose nationalistic credentials cannot be disputed were all tarred 
with the same brush. Among them, the former community leader Dr Küçük; one of the 3 co-founders of the 
TMT, Dr Nalbantoğlu; and the serdar of Limassol, Zıya Rızkı’s names can be counted to demonstrate the 
extent of this smear campaign. “For a long time, those politicians who were disliked or seen as competitors 
were smeared with reports sent to Ankara” (“CTP ve Denktaş [CTP and Denktaş].” Olay, 8.5.1978, p.9).  
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Cypriots. As an opposition leader highlighted in an interview, Denktaş “links his 
independence initiative to nationalism. Those who oppose this are said to be sheltered 
under Makarios’ gown and blamed as traitors”.285 Significantly, because Denktaş was seen 
in Turkey as the embodiment of the Turkish Cypriot cause, whatever he said was taken 
seriously in the Turkish public opinion. In the rare chances they found to reach the Turkish 
public opinion, the opposition figures who lacked such stature were forced to answer 
Denktaş’s allegations, and hence had to take a defensive position. When Berberoğlu, the 
leader of CTP, for instance, was asked about Denktaş’s accusations286, “we are in favour of 
an independent, sovereign, non-aligned Cyprus based on a bi-zonal federation. Is that 
collaboration?” he exclaimed.287 It is ironic that those who were only advocating the 
Turkish government’s official Cyprus policy were accused in the Turkish public opinion of 
treason.  
This also served as a smokescreen blocking the bread-and-butter issues. To quote Orhon, 
once again: 
In our speeches, we talk about the daily problems of the people. Our opponents say, 
‘we brought you freedom. Isn’t that enough? Communists will trick you and bring 
Greek Cypriots back’ they respond. They are trying to deceive people … No 
opposition party has a view of solution, which will bring the Greek Cypriots back. 
But this is what they spread.288  
To come back to where I started, given these circumstances, it was only normal for Denktaş 
to resort to political clientelism as a means to outmobilize and choke the fledgling 
opposition. The UBP founders had to show Ankara and the rest of the world that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
284 For instance see “Denktaş Solcu Muhalefete Çattı [Denktaş lambasted the leftist opposition].” Milliyet, 
6.6.1976 or “CTP Mensuplarının Londra’da Rumlarla İşbirliği Yaptıkları Belgeleriyle Kanıtlandı [The CTP 
members’ cooperation with the Greek Cypriots in London proven by documents].” Zaman, 28.6.1976. The 
dove in the TKP emblem, according to Denktaş, was the dove of Makarios (cited in “Cumhurbaşkanı Ağzı [The 
presidential discourse].” Kurtuluş, 7.6.1976); Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides 
of the medallion in Cyprus] (5).” Milliyet, 27.6.1976.     
285 Alper Orhon interviewed by Abdi İpekçi, Milliyet, 5.1.1976. 
286 As part of the same special report on Cyprus published in Milliyet, for instance, Denktaş was quoted as 
saying “Opposition says ‘the fascist Turkish army out of Cyprus. Socialist Makarios is better than fascist 
Denktaş,’ they say. They want to bring Greek Cypriots back” cited in Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta 
Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus](5).” Milliyet, 27.6.1976. 
287 Interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand (ibid.). 
288 Interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand (ibid.).   
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Turkish Cypriot society was firmly behind Denktaş in his pro-taksim policies.289 As 
Kuomintang (KMT), which faced a similar problem, did in Taiwan, it can be said that 
Denktaş instrumentalized political distribution “as a vital mechanism, maintaining the 
legitimacy of the political system through creation of an image of mass support” (for the 
case of the KMT, see Wang 1994: 181). I will elaborate on this in Chapter Four. Before this, 
in the last section of this chapter, I will briefly look into the wider political context and the 
institution/state-building process.   
3.4 Setting the Stage: The Wider Political and Institutional Context 
As discussed in the previous chapter, until the emergence of the taksim movement, the 
Turkish Cypriot community was in a state of political paralysis. The development of 
embryonic trade union and cooperative movements, which could have laid the foundations 
of ideological organizations (horizontal linkages) as they did in the Greek Cypriot 
community, was arrested by the emergence of the TMT, which took the control of these 
movements. As Kadritzke and Wagner put it, dependence on Turkey “in economic, military 
and political terms” made it possible for the Turkish Cypriot leadership to “build up their 
own puppet dictatorship over its community, an aim which its EOKA B colleagues never 
managed to achieve” (1977: 101). Therefore, although dissidence against the political 
leadership was growing within the community even in the 1960s and early 1970s, there 
was no organized opposition. True, the CTP was established in December 1970. However, 
the political circumstances of the time i.e. military rule, did not allow it to function as a real 
opposition party, and it took another four years before the first organized opposition 
emerged in the parliament.  
On 1 November 1974, eight deputies formed the “Freedom Group”.290 This was an initiative, 
which emerged as a reaction to the rumours over the administration’s preparation to form 
                                                        
289 When asked about the benefits of his electoral success, Denktaş’s response was “When I say my public 
opinion want this or that, my words will have greater weight” (Interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta 
Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (8).” Milliyet, 30.6.1976.  
290 Mahide Ergün: “Türk Toplumunun Siyasi Hayatında Yeni ve Önemli Bir Aşama: Meclis’te Özgürlük Grubu 
Oluştu [A new era in the political life of the Turkish community: The freedom group has been set up in the 
parliament].” Halkın Sesi, 2.11.1974. The group was made up of the following members: Fuat Veziroğlu 
(Famagusta), Dr Burhan Nalbantoğlu (Famagusta), İsmail Bozkurt (Larnaca), Mehmet Küçük (Nicosia), Dr 
Şemsi Kazım (Paphos), Özker Yaşın (Nicosia), Dr Haluk  Avni (Larnaca), Dr Hasan Güvener (Famagusta) 
(Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Meclisi Zabıtları [Minutes of the Parliament of Autonomous Turkish Cypriot 
Administration], 1.11.1974, pp. 3-4).    
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a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution.291 What brought these deputies 
together was not their ideological affinity but their concern about losing their seats in the 
parliament because of their opposition to Denktaş.292 The group was in favour of a new 
constitution but against the establishment of a constituent assembly fretting that this 
would mean the dissolution of the current parliament.293  
The group was strongly critical of Denktaş. In his column in Halkın Sesi, Fuat Veziroğlu, an 
ally turned dissident and one of the most influential members of the parliamentary 
opposition, argued that dissolving the parliament, which was made up of elected members 
and forming a constituent assembly by appointment would be an undemocratic move and a 
manifestation of Denktaş’s “dictatorial tendencies”.294 He argued that such an assembly 
would be nothing but a puppet in the hands of the executive. Criticizing the Denktaş 
administration of absolute failure in domestic affairs, he called for not only parliamentary 
but also presidential election. Few days later, in an open letter to Ecevit, he reminded that 
Denktaş was not elected to the presidency, and that it would be disappointing for the 
public to leave him in his position especially considering that some of his statements about 
the Cyprus problem put even Ankara diplomatically in a difficult position.295  
Although the idea of drafting a new constitution and setting up of a constituent assembly 
was being floated since early November296, it did not take off until Denktaş seized the right 
moment to declare the TFSC.297  Whether Denktaş had bowed because of the reaction of the 
Freedom Group or he had not intended to dissolve the parliament anyway, remains to be a 
moot point. What is known for a fact is that he settled for forming a constituent assembly 
                                                        
291 Fuat Veziroğlu: “Kurucu Meclis [Constituent assembly].” Halkın Sesi, 2.11.1974. 
292 Veziroglu interviewed by author.  
293 “Bir Bildiri Yayınlayan Özgürlük Grubu Kurucu Meclis Fikrine Karşı Çıktı: ‘Özgürlük Grubu Yeni Bir 
Anayasaya Taraftar’ [The freedom group issued a statement and opposed the idea to form a constituent 
assembly: The freedom group in favor of a new constitution].” Halkın Sesi 5.11.1974. 
294 Fuat Veziroğlu: “Kurucu Meclis [Constituent assembly].” Halkın Sesi, 2.11.1974 
295 Fuat Veziroğlu: “Sayın Ecevit’e Açık Mektup [Open letter to Mr Ecevit].” Halkın Sesi, 4.11.1974. It is worth 
mentioning that the letter covered the upper half of the front page of Halkın Sesi. 
296 “R. Denktaş Gazetemize Özel Bir Demeç Verdi: ‘Toplumumuz Yeni Bir Oluşum İçerisindedir.’ [R. Denktaş 
gave a special statement to our newspaper: ‘our community is in a new formation process].” Zaman, 
3.11.1974.  
297 The declaration coincided with the American Congress’ decision to suspend arms assistance and sales to 
Turkey. The suspension was based on an earlier decision of the Senate, which set 5 February 1975 as a 
deadline for Turkey to withdraw a major number of troops or to allow a major number of the Greek Cypriot 
displaced people to return their homes. In the eve of the decision, Time reports, Denktaş “warned that the aid 
cutoff might provoke the proclamation of an independent Turkish-Cypriot state” (“Strains in an Old Alliance.” 
Time, 17.2.1975). 
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by adding 25 new seats, representing different professional organizations to the existing 
25-strong parliament.298 
Few days after the declaration, on 18 February 1975, an extraordinary, joint meeting of the 
Executive Council and the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot 
Administration was convened to decide on the composition of the constituent assembly, 
which would draw up the constitution and function as the legislative body until the first 
multi-party election. Curiously, the president and deputy president of the assembly were 
elected in this first meeting; before almost half of its members even joined.299 Now, 
Denktaş was not only the president of the executive but also the president of the legislature. 
The composition of the assembly also showed who would be calling the shots. Evidently, it 
was designed to secure a handsome majority for Denktaş loyalists.300  
Decisively outnumbered, though now a bigger group after the participation of the 
representatives of certain professional organizations, the opposition’s strategy was to do 
their utmost to strengthen the parliament vis-{-vis the president as much as possible in the 
new constitution.301 They had serious concerns that Denktaş would continue acting like a 
dictator should he be allowed to continue with a presidential system.302 Similar to the case 
of the post World War II Italy, where the constituent assembly “established a 
parliamentary form of government that jealously guarded against the possibility of a 
powerful executive branch” (Gilbert and Nilsson 2007: 17), the opposition pushed for a 
parliamentary system.  
                                                        
298 The “corporatist” approach espoused in the formation of the constituent assembly reminds the Turkish 
experience in the drafting of the 1961 constitution (Mümtaz Soysal: “Kuruluşun Başlangıcı [The beginning of 
establishment].” Milliyet, 22.3.1975).     
299 Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi Yürütme Kurulu ve Meclisinin Olağanüstü Müşterek Birleşim Zabıtları 
[Minutes of the extraordinary joint session of the Executive Council and Parliament of the Autonomus 
Turkish Cypriot Administration], 18.2.1975, p. 5.    
300 Denktaş, who was a member himself, had a personal quota of 4. There was a quota for the Executive 
Council, which was the handpicked cabinet of Denktaş. Another Denktaş appointee, the head of Evkaf was 
also a member. Farmers Union, and Türksen, which were known to be very close to Denktaş had 5 among 
themselves. Artisans, for instance, were not represented at all. The displaced people, who constituted a big 
chunk of the population, were also excluded. 
301 Veziroğlu interviewed by author. See also, for instance, Akay Cemal: “Kıbrıs Anayasası Taslağı Anti 
Demokratik Olarak Niteleniyor [The draft constitution in Cyprus found anti-democratic].” Milliyet, 6.4.1975.  
302 At the apex of his popularity at that time, Denktaş, in the words of a member of his wider entourage, “was 
like a mythological figure”(Erdal Andız interviewed by author).  
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Denktaş’s protégés, on the other hand, were in favour of a presidential system. In their 
view, the state of the national cause made such a system imperative. Denktaş was 
attributed almost a God-like status; the one and only person, who would never stray from 
the course, while all others could go off the track:    
The prime minister and his ministers may stray from the path of our national cause, 
and as they rely on the majority in the parliament, the majority in the parliament 
may stray too. Let’s give the head of state power to bring them back into line should 
they do so.303 
The model they had in mind was similar to that of the French Fifth Republic, where a 
“belief in the need for charismatic leaders who are capable of being ‘above politics’ and 
expressing the will of the nation,” had given rise to “a highly personalistic system of 
presidential rule” (Webb and White 2007: 352). This would mean to a large extent, 
continuation of the de facto situation adopted after 1968. Although he had started as the 
deputy president of the executive council -in effect, the prime minister- under Dr Küçük’s 
presidency, it was known that Denktaş was the one pulling the strings behind the scenes 
both in domestic politics and in the inter-communal negotiations. When he became the 
president himself in 1973, he continued to control the executive council by abolishing the 
post of deputy president (Şemsi (n.d.): 313; see also Egemen 2006: 150-1).304    
When the committee, which was tasked to draw up the constitution305, submitted its draft 
on 4 April 1975306, it was seen that to the disappointment of the opposition, the draft 
envisaged a semi-presidential system, where the executive power was vested in the 
president. The draft was disappointing for the opposition because an earlier report 
prepared by the legislative assembly to be submitted to Ecevit upon his request concluded, 
“[i]n the light of the experiences acquired during the implementation of the presidential 
                                                        
303 This was the justification given by the members of the constitution committee who were close to Denktaş 
for their insistence on a presidential system (Cited in İsmail Bozkurt’s parliamentary speech, KTFD Kurucu 
Meclis Zabıtları [Minutes of the TFSC Constituent Assembly], 10.4.1975, p. 117). 
304 Later, in October 1974, Denktaş restored the post, and appointed Osman Örek as his deputy (“Osman Örek 
Denktaş’ın Yardımclığına Atandı [Örek appointed as Denktaş’s deputy].” Bozkurt, 6.10.1974).  
305 The committee was comprised of 7 people: Two experts from Turkey, Professor Suat Bilge and Professor 
Şeref Gözübüyük; the President of the High Court (as a consultant), Necati Munir and, four members of the 
constituent assembly, Mustafa Cağatay, Nejat Konuk, Zaim Necati, Mehmet Zeka (Zeka Bey) (“KTFD Kurucu 
Meclisi Anayasa Komitesinin, KTFD Anayasası Taslağı’na İlişkin Raporu [The report of the constitution 
committee on the draft TFSC constitution].” KTFD Kurucu Meclis Zabıtları [Minutes of the TFSC Constituent 
Assembly], 3.4.1975, p. 4).  
306 To the dismay of many members of the assembly, before it was submitted to the members of the 
Constituent Assembly, the draft was published by Zaman, the pro-Denktaş newspaper of Raif Denktaş.   
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system, we believe the parliamentary regime suits the community better”.307 Given that, 
when released, no wonder, the draft, and particularly the part on the executive, stirred a 
big controversy. The opposition sent a delegation to Ankara to seek Ecevit’s and Turkish 
public opinion’s support to change the draft.308 Although initially Denktaş reacted by 
dismissing the opposition by saying, “the air created by the opponents of the constitution is 
not conducive to our common national cause,”309 at the end of a process, which turned out 
be an exercise in brinkmanship310, he accepted to make amendments which would limit the 
powers of the president. Other major concessions he made, which turned out to be crucial 
with the passage of time, were accepting the Article 79(1) of the constitution, which limits 
the presidency to two consecutive terms, and the article 81, which stipulates “[t]he same 
person cannot be both the President and the Chairman of a party”.  
Why did Denktaş eventually bow to the demands of the opposition on the form of 
government although he had the majority required to push for anything he wanted? To 
answer this question, one needs to take different calculations over domestic and 
international politics into consideration. First, according to Vedat Çelik, one of Denktaş’s 
closest aides at the time, he did not want to be involved in an open conflict with Ankara, 
which seemed to favour a parliamentary system.311 Second, he could not afford a show of 
disunity. He was keen on sitting on the table with a broad public support behind him. If the 
opposition had walked out and campaigned against the constitution, this would have been 
taken as a manifestation of a chasm within the Turkish Cypriot community, and would have 
further undermined his external legitimacy in the eve of the new round of inter-communal 
                                                        
307 Cited in the parliamentary speech of Özker Yaşın, Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti Kurucu Meclis Zabıtları 
[Minutes of the TFSC Constituent Assembly], 9.4.1975, p. 42; see also the speeches of Fuat Veziroğlu (ibid.: 7) 
and Ümit Süleyman (ibid.: 25-6). It is important to note that the report was prepared by a non-partisan 
committee.  
308 Although Ecevit was no longer the prime minister, his prestige in Cyprus as the liberator was unshakeable.  
309 Cited in Akay Cemal: “Kıbrıs Anayasası Taslağı Anti Demokratik Olarak Niteleniyor [The draft constitution 
in Cyprus found anti-democratic]”. Milliyet, 6.4.1975.  
310 Denktaş backed down, when the Freedom Group (Fuat Veziroğlu, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, İsmail Bozkurt, 
Mehmet Küçük and Özker Yaşın) stood up to walk out of the parliament (KTFD Kurucu Meclis Zabıtları 
[Minutes of the TFSC Constituent Assembly], 10.4.1975, p. 124-5); “this article is totally anti-democratic. … 
We cannot assume the responsibility of the adoption of this clause. We cannot even assume the responsibility 
of having voted against it. We are walking out of this assembly,” said Veziroğlu.   
311 Interviewed by author. Veziroğlu also said, “Denktaş is not kind of person who swims against the tide.” 
When he realized that Ankara was against a presidential system, he took a more conciliatory stance 
(Interviewed by author).  
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negotiations.312 Third, the constitution gave him what he wanted anyway; a prime minister, 
which would act as a lightning rod for the public fury over domestic problems. It is 
important to note that, unlike his protégés, he did not want to have a presidential system. 
“It was we, Nejat Konuk and I, who pushed for a presidential system,” recounts İsmet 
Kotak; “Denktaş did not want it, ‘I don’t have time to deal with trivial issues like 
determining egg prices,’ he used to say”.313 In a similar vein, “I personally visited and told 
him ‘please sir, the issue of powers of the president is very important, do not make any 
concessions,’” Nejat Konuk says in an interview (cited in Besim 2011: 100).  
Obviously, at least to a certain extent, Denktaş wanted to distance himself from the daily, 
petty squabbles of domestic politics.314 Being at the apex of his power, this would not mean 
giving away too much power anyway. After all, he would enjoy the legitimacy of being 
directly elected by the people, the right to appoint the prime minister, and under certain 
circumstances, to dissolve the parliament. Having a similar, “unique historical legitimacy,” 
and being elected by popular vote, something de Gaulle himself lacked when he had been 
elected for the first time in 1958, it would not be difficult for Denktaş to establish a 
presidential primacy like de Gaulle did (For the French case see Knapp and Wright 2006: 
55). As long as Denktaş continued to hold the reins of the party, in effect, the system would 
work quite similar to the operation of the Fifth Republic, where “presidents like to get their 
prime ministers to take the blame when things go wrong”.315 As it will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four, this would prove to be the case in north Cyprus too, and in his first 
term in office as the president of the TFSC, he would work with three different prime 
ministers.  
The effect of this shift on the political arena would be felt only gradually. The whole system 
was designed in anticipation of cohabitation; a possible power struggle between Denktaş 
and a prime minister from the opposing camp. The opposition tried to reduce the 
                                                        
312 “Anayasanın Halk Oyuna Sunulmasının Viyana Toplantısından Önce Bitmesi Bekleniyor [The constitution 
expected to be put to a referendum before the Vienna meeting].” Zaman, 12.4.1975. See also the 
parliamentary speech of Fuat Veziroğlu (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti Kurucu Meclis Zabıtları [Minutes of the 
TFSC Constituent Assembly], 9.4.1975, p. 7-8).  
313 Interviewed by author.  
314 Furthermore, Denktaş said, he never regretted this decision as this system helped him to gain time during 
the inter-communal negotiations. “I have to consult with the government and parliament, I used to say, when 
they put pressure on me” (interviewed by author).  
315 “The nobody who became somebody: The secret of an unknown prime minister’s survival.” The Economist, 
18.11.2010.   
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president’s power, while his loyalists tried to fortify it. However, eventually, the challenge 
to the power of Denktaş would not come from a prime minister from the opposition but 
from his own party. With the ascendance of Eroğlu first as the party chairman and then as 
the premier, a situation arose where a president and the prime minister from the same 
camp found themselves on a collision course; not a typical but a possible consequence of 
semi-presidential systems.316 The causes and effects of this power struggle, which is of 
great significance in the multi party political life, will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five 
and Six.  
In this context, it is also important to note that, in the new system, the cabinet became 
accountable to the parliament and prime minister who appoints them rather than the 
president. Furthermore, unlike in the French system, where “parliamentarians’ appetites 
for governmental oﬃce” was limited by making ministerial posts “incompatible with oﬃce 
as Deputy or Senator,” (Knapp and Wright 2006: 54), the TFSC constitution allowed the 
ministers to be selected from amongst the deputies. This would have two consequences. 
The first has something to do with the cases where a power struggle between the president 
and prime minister erupt. It makes the ministers more likely to switch their allegiance to 
the prime minister, who appoints and sacks them. The second is directly related to political 
clientelism as it makes the ministers more receptive to particularistic demands from the 
voters because as members of the parliament they have to seek re-election.  
As for the electoral system, we see that after having to make a big concession in the 
government system by settling for a relatively weak president, the UBP group tried to make 
up for the initial loss by formulating an electoral law, which would help to form strong, 
single-party governments. Despite the protests of the opposition as well as independents, 
they pushed through an electoral system, which would eventually give them 75 percent of 
the seats with only 53 percent of the votes.317 The majoritarian character of the system 
stemmed from the “seat bonus,” which gave the party extra seats for each candidate 
receiving more than 50 percent of the votes. Another important element of the electoral 
                                                        
316 As Knapp and Wright put it “A president and prime minister from the same camp may be extremely close, 
like Chirac and Alain Juppé, or endure execrable personal and political relations, as Mitterrand did with 
Michel Rocard” (2006: 59).  
317 It is interesting to note that the DC passed a similar electoral law in the mid-1950s, but suffered when it 
backfired (Chubb 1982: 62).  
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law was its provision, which made voting for individual candidates possible. It envisaged a 
multimember system with an open party list, which allowed the voter to use personal 
preference votes across party lists.318  
Both of these elements of the electoral law turned out to play an important role in the 
institutionalization of political clientelism. The seat bonus turned the first multi-party 
election into an all-out-war.319 As it will be illustrated in the next chapter, to secure a clear 
majority in the first multi-party election, the UBP used the might of the state to its limits. 
The article on intraparty preference voting, on the other hand, paved the way for 
personalization of electoral competition and acted as an incentive for politicians to pursue 
clientelism (see Kitschelt 2000: 861; Müller 2007: 271).320 According to Müller, this system 
is the one in which the incentive for a politician to pursue a clientelist strategy is the 
greatest (2007: 271). Furthermore, this has an adverse effect on the party unity. As Katz 
put it “[w]hether or not cohesion is the ‘natural’ state of a political party, effective 
intraparty preference voting creates a powerful incentive to disunity” (2003: 101). These 
effects are elaborated in detail in Chapter Four.   
Finally, another important element of the 1975 constitution, was the Article 93(6) on 
“provisions in connection with the public officers,” which stipulates: “Public officers 
carrying out the duties of an administrator at high level shall be appointed by decree 
carrying the signatures of the Minister concerned, the Prime Minister and the Head of 
State”. This provision would pave the way for the complete politicization of the high level 
bureaucracy. In this way, the high level bureaucrats would lose their autonomy and 
become subject to the will of the ruling party. This would also break the link between merit 
and promotion and trigger the deterioration in the quality of public services.  
                                                        
318 Ranking made by the party becomes relevant only when the voter votes for a single party without 
indicating any preference for individual candidates.   
319 This was a brainchild of Nejat Konuk (Kotak interviewed by author). Though it was implemented in the 
first two elections, its effect was felt only in the first one, as in the second election in 1981, no candidate 
managed to pass the 50 percent threshold.  
320 Italy was a perfect case in point until the electoral system was changed in 1992. The research on the 
geographical distribution of preference votes showed that the use of preference vote is relatively higher in 
the “clientelistic” south than “civic” north (Putnam 1993: 94). This does not necessarily mean that the 
electoral system alone determines the level of clientelism. Countries like Austria and Venezuela, for instance, 
which are considered as countries where political clientelism is widespread, have closed-list multimember 
district system (Kitschelt 2000: 859).  
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Chapter 4: UBP: The Anatomy of a Machine 
The previous chapter explored the interplay between demand and supply for political 
clientelism, which shaped the UBP founders’ choice over the initial mobilization strategy 
during the formative years of the new political entity. This chapter will elaborate on the 
anatomy of the party, which have emerged when this decision was put into practice. The 
chapter will start with a brief analysis of the wider political context and dividing lines 
between political forces, which for the first time came to be represented by political parties. 
Then, it will be shown that curiously for an internally mobilized party, the UBP founders 
adopted a bottom-up organization model, and attached great importance to the building up 
of an organization based on mass membership. The details of this process will be studied in 
Sections Two and Three, where the program, constitution and social composition of the 
party, as well as the nature of the party organization will be elaborated in detail. In Section 
Four, I will look into the role of clientelism, first, in the recruitment and then, in the election 
process, which will be discussed both at inter- and intra-party level.  
Overall, in this chapter, I aim to show that although its founders presented it as a mass 
party, the UBP has always been a clientelistic catch-all party, which relied on a clientele 
rather than active participation of members bound together by ideology and programme. 
In doing so, I will also lay the foundations necessary to explain the intensity of intra-party 
power struggle, which will be discussed in the following two chapters.     
4.1 Dividing Lines Between Parties and Denktaş’s Catch 22 
As discussed in the previous chapters, Denktaş was not particularly keen on multi-party 
politics321, and he did everything to fend off a real electoral competition in the pre-1974 
period. Needless to say, he achieved this by securing the backing of the Turkish authorities, 
who shared his conviction that electoral competition could be detrimental to the unity of 
the community. After 1974, however, conditions were less conducive to outright 
                                                        
321 In their study on the political parties in new democracies, Webb and White refer to cases where parties 
are considered pathological elements of political system as they are “regarded as embodiments of partial 
group interests, and sources of national disunity” (2007: 352). Tellingly, few years later, in the wake of the 
coup d’etat in Turkey, Denktaş likened the multi-party politics (particilik) to a disease in a statement 
published in Turkish daily Günaydın (cited in Kurtuluş, 12.12.1980).  
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repression of the opposition.322 Ankara, especially when the Ecevit-led governments were 
in power, was willing to give the image to the world that Turkey was in Cyprus to liberate 
the Turkish Cypriots and to institutionalize democracy.323 
The first attempt of the opposition deputies, who called themselves the Freedom Group, to 
set up a party had been interrupted earlier when Denktaş suddenly decided to proclaim the 
federated state. Once the political parties law passed in May 1975 at the constituent 
assembly and the constitution was ratified in the referendum the following month, the 
stage was finally set for the establishment of parties. All four parties, namely the CTP, 
Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP), UBP and Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş 
Partisi, TKP), which emerged in this period managed to gain representation in the first 
parliament. However, only three of them maintained their public support, and became 
constant players in the Turkish Cypriot body politic: the UBP, TKP and CTP. Before turning 
the attention to the UBP, in the rest of this section, the origins of other parties will be 
briefly discussed.  
As mentioned before, the CTP was established in December 1970 and Berberoğlu, its 
chairman stood against Denktaş in 1973 as a presidential candidate. However, in the 
absence of a law regulating the parties at the time, it had been registered as an association 
and officially it became a political party only in 1975. In the meantime, it went through a 
transformation and became very different from what the founders had envisaged at the 
outset, when more radical elements joined and eventually captured the party (see 
Kızılyürek 2005: 253). These were the university graduates who espoused leftist values 
during their studies in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, a period when ideological 
polarization between the left and right, and student activism reached its apex in this 
country. The CTP came to have two members in the constituent assembly when Özker 
                                                        
322 In a similar vein, the conservative parties of Italy, Germany, and Japan in the late 1940s, had to compete 
with the working class parties in elections rather than simply repressing them because the US would not have 
tolerated such an action (Shefter 1994: 10).  
323 Mümtaz Soysal, for instance, urged the government to show the international community that they did not 
“export despotism/tyranny” to Cyprus (Milliyet, 16.4.1975). See also “Anavatan Basını Ne Diyor [What does 
the motherland’s press say]?” Halkın Sesi, 1.6.1976 (Originally published in Cumhuriyet (Istanbul) and 
“Ecevit: ‘Kıbrıs Sorununu Askıda Bırakmak, Çözümü Gitgide Zorlaştıracaktır [Ecevit: Delaying the solution of 
the Cyprus problem will make it more intractable].’ Milliyet, 21.7.1975. According to Kotak, Müezzinoğlu was 
constantly pressuring the administration into holding multi-party elections as soon as possible (interviewed 
by author).  
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Özgür, the representative of the High School Teachers’ Union, joined its ranks.324 In few 
years time, the party would complete its transformation by replacing its founding chairman 
Berberoğlu with Özgür, and positioning itself on the far left of the political spectrum. The 
party adopted a Marxist-Leninist, anti-West and anti-NATO position.325 
The second party came into being when an initial attempt to unite under the banner of the 
CTP failed, and six members of the parliamentary opposition326 joined their forces to 
establish the HP.327 Soon, four other deputies joined them.328 According to the party’s 
secretary general, their grassroots membership reached 3,372 when its first conference 
was held in October 1975.329 This promising start notwithstanding, the party would fail to 
maintain its integrity. In fact, the party was stillborn as it was split into two factions right 
from the beginning.330 The first faction comprised of the parliamentary party, whose 
backbone was the Freedom Group, as well as the representatives of civil society 
organizations, who came to be known as the Group of Six.331 These two groups came to 
realize that they had many things in common during the constituent assembly and decided 
to set up a party. The second faction was made up of the members close to the party 
chairman, Alper Orhon, the former minister of planning. The first group had decided to 
invite Orhon to the party and nominate him as their chairman (a) to avoid any competition 
among themselves for the leadership, which could divide the party, and (b) to capitalize on 
Orhon’s popularity.332 Since his appointment as the minister of planning by Denktaş, Orhon 
had been portrayed as an alternative/successor to Denktaş.333 He was also perceived as 
                                                        
324 The party was represented at the constituent assembly by its secretary general, Naci Talat.  
325 See for instance the party’s 1976 election manifesto (“Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi [The 
CTP’s Election Manifesto].” Yenidüzen, 29.5.1976). 
326 In addition to the seasoned members of the parliament, like Nalbantoğlu, Bozkurt, Veziroğlu, Mehmet 
Küçük and Özker Yaşın, a freshman Durduran (Representative of Architects and Engineers), was among the 
founding members.   
327 “Siyasi Parti Kuruldu [A political party established].” Zaman, 5.8.1975; “Alper Orhon ‘Berberoğlu’nun 
CTP’siyle Yoldaşlığımız var’ dedi [‘We have comradeship with Berberoğlu’s CTP,’ Orhon said].” Zaman, 
6.8.1975.   
328 Fatma Sezer (Representative of Pharmacists), Turgut Mustafa (Representative of the Primary School 
Teachers), Mustafa Akıncı (Representative of the University Graduates), and Ziya Rızkı (Limassol).  
329 İsmail Bozkurt cited in “Birçok Delege HP Kurultayına Katılmadı [Many delegates did not attend the HP 
congress].” Zaman, 13.10.1975.  
330 Ekrem Ural, the representative of the civil servants in the constituent assembly (and a member of the 
Group of Six), did not join the party exactly because of this reason (Interviewed by author). 
331 Özker Özgür, who was also a part of the Group of Six, did not join the party.  
332 Durduran interviewed by author. 
333 Ural interviewed by author; “I and Raif [Denktaş] used to present Alper as the next leader after Denktaş 
(Erdal Andız interviewed by author).    
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someone close to Ecevit, who was a hero among the Turkish Cypriots at the time. Ecevit’s 
prestige was so high that even the party’s name was chosen to imply a connection with his 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi.334  
Things did not work out as expected, however. Soon, a rift appeared between the two 
factions, and this led to the hasty establishment of a third party on the left by the 
parliamentary party, only few weeks before the elections when a second attempt to join the 
CTP had collapsed: the TKP. 335 What made the TKP a strong contender for power was the 
profile of its deputies: The party managed to bring together members with the TMT 
background, whose popularity had been proven by an earlier electoral success like 
Nalbantoğlu and Bozkurt, with the young and dynamic civil society representatives. Of 
particular importance was the involvement of the Primary School Teachers Union (Kıbrıs 
Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası, KTÖS) – probably the most cohesive and best organized of all. 
The party also secured the former community leader, Dr Küçük’s endorsement, who was at 
the time publishing one of the three dailies, Halkın Sesi. Like the HP, the TKP identified 
itself as “democratic left”.  
Crucially, besides their disapproval of the handling of the domestic affairs, common 
denominator of these three parties was their opposition to Denktaş’s taksim policy. When 
Denktaş asked the constituent assembly to grant him authorization to declare 
independence whenever he deems necessary/appropriate, the opposition did not hesitate 
to boycott the vote336, and in doing so showed that they would never give Denktaş a free 
hand to pursue a line, which would lead to a unilateral declaration of independence. Later, 
they confirmed this position in their election manifestos too. According to the CTP, taksim 
was in conflict with the interests of both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The party was in 
favour of a geographical federation that would grant full autonomy to the component units 
in their domestic affairs.337 In a similar vein, the TKP was in favour of a bi-zonal 
                                                        
334 In his speech in the first party conference, Özker Yaşın, one of the founders said “the programme of our 
party is inspired by the programme of CHP, and our party is on the CHP’s path” (“Alper Orhon Başkan Seçildi 
[Orhon elected as chairman].” Halkın Sesi, 1.9.1975).  
335 İsmail Bozkurt interviewed by author.  
336 “Bağımsızlık Konusunda Dün Bütün Gün ve Gece Geç Vakte Kadar Süren Görüşmelerden Sonra: Muhalefet 
Meclisi Terketti [After deliberations over independence, which lasted whole day and until the late hours of 
the night: The opposition walked out of the parliament].” Halkın Sesi, 23.9.1975.  
337 See the foreign policy section in their 1976 election manifesto (Yenidüzen).  
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geographical federation.338 It should be noted again that the opposition was following the 
official line adopted by the Turkish government and mainstream political parties like CHP 
and AP, and it was Denktaş who opposed the Ankara’s official position.    
This programmatic distance or polarization on the Cyprus issue was indeed what drove 
Denktaş to setting up his own party, and pursuing a vigorously negative campaign against 
the opposition. As the Turkish Cypriot on top of the civilian administration, who had also 
organized the resistance and delivered redemption, he commanded natural deference of all 
segments of the society. Furthermore, he was in control of all influential organizations. The 
support of former TMT commanders and veteran organizations; Türk-Sen, the biggest 
trade union; Farmers Union, as well as the KTTO were all secured. Furthermore, his 
appointees held all the key posts. This is to say, Denktaş could have got himself elected 
without a party, and remain above politics339, if he was interested in being the president for 
the sake of status. This would have distanced him from the challenges of daily politics and 
helped him to protect his popularity.  
If he was to achieve his mission, taksim, however, he had to wield power. The presidency 
was symbolic as the president’s power was largely crippled by the constitution. In other 
words, he could not afford loosening his grip in domestic affairs in order not to risk his 
position as the community leader and negotiator. He had to control the majority in the 
parliament because he was conducting the negotiations on its behalf. Therefore, to avoid a 
probable change of course in the direction of taksim, he had to control the parliament, and 
hence the establishment of a party loyal to him was an absolute necessity.  
Why was this so? David Hannay has the best answer. In the excerpt cited below, he 
provides an analysis of Denktaş’s perspective on the solution of the Cyprus problem, and 
strategic thinking behind his manoeuvres throughout his long political life including his 
dealings with Turkish governments:      
It often seemed to me that Denktaş's own preferred solution was that north Cyprus 
should become part of Turkey. He clearly did not trust his successors, whoever they 
                                                        
338 See their 1976 election manifesto (“TKP Seçim Bildirgesinin Özetini Basına Dağıttı [The TKP distributed 
the summary of its election manifesto to the press].” Bozkurt, 18.6.1976).  
339 According to Shefter this is one of the conditions necessary for incumbent political leaders to remain in 
power without building a broad based party (1994: 9).  
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might be, to hold to the firm line he had established, and he certainly did not trust 
Turkish governments, either present or future, to do so either. So the only way to lock 
the door and throw away the key was through annexation. Unfortunately for him this 
was the one solution that no Turkish government with a concern for its 
international standing and aspirations to join the European Union could 
contemplate. So he was forced to make do with what he regarded as second best, 
although that did not stop him hankering after his ideal solution or trying to edge 
his way towards it (2005: 18-9, emphasis added). 
This analysis explains not only one of the reasons behind the failure of inter-communal 
negotiations but also sheds light on the development of Turkish Cypriot domestic politics 
by showing the motives guiding the UBP’s establishment and political evolution. Denktaş’s 
vision entailed a simple division of labour between the UBP and himself: The party would 
provide him unwavering support in his handling of the negotiations, while he would shield 
it against the opposition in domestic politics. As the party was meant to be more than 
anything else, an instrument to support Denktaş, its strength should be carefully calibrated. 
A strong party would mean a potential contender for his power, and hence not desirable. 
The party and its leader should be strong enough to fend off opposition but not too strong 
to challenge Denktaş. This search for a delicate balance, as it would soon be found out, was 
a perfect recipe for a party robust enough to win elections but at the same time so 
internally divided that could not do anything beyond muddling through when it comes to 
governing; hence spectacularly failing in delivering public goods, particularly economic 
development.  
4.2 A Brief Overview of the UBP’s Establishment Process, Program, and Social 
Composition 
After some foot-dragging Denktaş eventually announced the setting up of his party, the 
UBP, on 12 August 1975.340 The party officially came into being on 11 October 1975, when 
it was registered at the ministry of interior. Chronologically, it may appear to be the third 
party established, however it should be noted that it had the longest roots of all because 
given the personalities involved in, and common aims defined i.e. taksim, in effect it was the 
reincarnation or natural successor of the Cyprus is Turkish Party, which was established in 
the mid-1950s and became defunct after the first elections of the Republic. This is to say, 
the UBP is an “internally mobilized party,” to use Shefter’s terminology; a type of party 
                                                        
340 “Halkımızın Siyasal Örgütlenmesi Gerçekleşiyor: Ulusal Birlik Partisi [The political organization of our 
people is materializing: the National Unity Party].” Zaman, 12.8.1975. 
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“founded by politicians who do occupy leadership positions in the prevailing regime … 
[who] seek to secure their hold over the government in the face of a challenge by an 
externally mobilized party” (1994: 5).  
It would not be wrong to say that the party was established only half-heartedly. Its leaders’ 
initial resistance to the idea of multi-party politics was so fierce that, during the early 
stages of the party’s establishment, the leadership felt the need to express their reluctance 
to do so in every occasion.341 In their view, multi-party politics was not something 
desirable, yet they were forced to follow suit when others started setting up political 
parties. This can be clearly sensed in the following statement made by the founding 
committee: “we set up the party to shoulder the cause (dava) in accordance with the 
national interests after seeing those eager to divide the community by splitting into 
political parties”.342 As tacitly acknowledged in this statement, the party was established 
around what Katz and Mair call “single national interest that cut across sectional 
boundaries” (1995: 12), the single national interest in this case being the national cause 
(milli dava) as it had been formulated in the 1950s.  
My aim in this section is to show that the UBP as an internally mobilized party capitalized 
on this position in its recruitment and mobilization process, and that it was essentially held 
together not by program or ideology but rather with clientelistic linkages by illustrating 
the incohesiveness of its program, and fundamental conflicts of interest in its cadres, who 
for the most part made strange bedfellows given their social backgrounds. To do that I will 
analyze the nature of the UBP by referring to the public speeches made by its founders, 
press statements it issued, its constitution and program, as well as its social composition. 
The party’s position was that the national struggle was not over, and would continue “until 
integration with Turkey” was achieved.343 The first article of the party program, entitled 
“Commitment to the Motherland” concludes: "The Turkish community's elimination of the 
current national threats; claiming of its integrity and enjoying of all its rights; 
                                                        
341 See for instance Denktaş’s speech cited in “Rauf Denktaş: UBP Güçlüdür Çünkü Gücünü Halktan Alır [Rauf 
Denktaş: The UBP is powerful because it derives its power from the people].” Zaman, 10.6.1976).   
342 “Ulusal Birlik Partisi Kuruluş Çalışmaları Devam Ediyor [The UBP’s organization process underway].” 
15.8.1975. 
343 “Ulusal Birlik Partisi Mesaj Yayınladı: Ulusal Kavga Türkiye’yle Bütünleşinceye dek Sürecek [The UBP 
issued a message: national fight will last until the integration with Turkey].” Bozkurt, 31.8.1975. 
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successful development in the political, national security, social and economic fields, 
depend solely on its development as an inseparable and indivisible part of the Turkish 
nation".344 As this required the maintaining of the “national unity” -hence the party’s name- 
and therefore the collaboration of different segments of the society, the party was to 
embrace people from all walks of life.  
When we look at the backgrounds of the founders, we see that this was exactly the 
impression Denktaş wanted to give in his selection of the 51 names among thousands of 
founding members to sign the founding document to be submitted to the ministry of 
interior: According to Zaman, which published the founders’ names along with their 
occupations, there were eight lawyers, eight tradesmen, seven medical doctors/dentists, 
five farmers, four trade unionists, three teachers, three engineers, one artisan, one 
mechanic, and one housewife, among founders.345  
In line with its social composition, another striking feature of the party was its pragmatic, 
non-ideological character, which was also manifested by the founders’ overt hostility to 
ideologies in their speeches. In one of the first statements made during the early phases of 
the establishment process “rigid ideologies” were declared “useless and unrealistic in 
Cyprus”.346 Elsewhere, Denktaş likened “foreign ideologies” to poison.347 In a similar vein, 
in a speech in the same period Denktaş said “ideological approaches” were dangerous as 
they could lead to defeat in the national cause; avoiding this would be one of the aims of the 
party. "In the principles of Atatürk, there is social justice and equality; everything required 
for social progress," Denktaş continued; and concluded that "we do not need to be inspired 
by foreign ideologies whose roots are abroad". 348  Accordingly, the party program 
emphasized Ataturkism -whose tenets could be seen as “policy goals rather than ideology” 
(McLaren 2008:7)-, which make room for interpretation in various ways, providing a 
middle ground.   
                                                        
344 The UBP’s Program (Published in Zaman, 14-21 October 1975).  
345 “Denktaş: UBP Halkın Partisidir [Denktaş: The UBP is the party of people].” Zaman, 12.10.1975.  
346 “Halkımızın Siyasal Örgütlenmesi Gerçekleşiyor: Ulusal Birlik Partisi [The political organization of our 
people is materializing: the National Unity Party].” Zaman, 12.8.1975. 
347 “Rauf Raif Denktaş Ulusal Birlik Partisi Genel Başkanı Oldu [Denktaş elected as the president of the UBP].” 
Zaman, 26.4.1976. 
348 “Denktaş: ‘Daha Büyük Hedeflere Doğru Gönül Gönüle Yürüyeceğiz’ [Denktaş: we will walk hand in hand 
towards bigger targets].” Zaman, 5.10.1975.  
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Before elaborating on the program in detail, the groupings within the party should be 
briefly discussed. Regardless of the anti-ideological discourse, the existence of different 
ideological tendencies within the party was obvious. Similar to the DC of Italy349, the UBP 
was a big club: While one wing of the party was espousing the social democratic values of 
Ecevit’s CHP, the other was flirting with Türkeş’s ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP)350, and yet another group was trying to promote laissez 
faire policies. Although it is difficult to make a clear categorization, the first group can be 
roughly labelled as the old guard, and the latter two as the new guard. One of the most 
important points that should be taken into consideration here is the fact that Denktaş did 
not actively take part in the writing of the program but rather delegated it to a committee 
presided over by Nejat Konuk.351 Konuk was a social democrat, who had been an active 
CHP member in the 1950s when he was practicing law in Bursa (Turkey) (cited in Besim 
2011: 92). So were İsmet Kotak, Çağlar Yasal, and Özel Tahsin, the other three members of 
the committee.352 Therefore, in the drawing up of the program, it was the old guard 
members who were inspired by CHP, who had the upper hand.353  
It does not take an exhaustive analysis of the program to confirm the influence of CHP on it. 
A quick overview, however, also shows that certain modifications were made in order to 
accommodate the new guard. The program adopted the four of the so-called six arrows of 
the CHP, namely nationalism, laicism, populism, revolutionism/reformism.354 The fifth and 
sixth arrows, republicanism and statism were dropped, however. The former would not 
make any sense at all in the Turkish Cypriot context anyway, as this was adopted in Turkey 
after the abolition of sultanate. The latter, on the other hand, was obviously crossed out as 
a concession to the new guard. Nevertheless, the program was essentially social 
democratic with repeated emphasis on social justice, fair income distribution, social 
security, promotion of cooperatives and people’s entrepreneurship.  
                                                        
349 See for instance Tarrow, who talks about the “coexistence of its left-wing trade unionists with 
conservative local notables” to point out the non-ideological character of the DC (1967: 341). 
350 Mehmet Ali Birand: “Kıbrıs’ta Madalyonun İki Yüzü [Two sides of the medallion in Cyprus] (5).” Milliyet, 
27.6.1976).  
351 See for instance “Toplumumuzda Siyasal Örgütlenme Hızlanıyor: Denktaş’ın Kadro Yenilemesi UBP İçinde 
Gerçekleşecek [Political organization within our community is gaining momentum: Denktaş will renew his 
team within the UBP].” Bozkurt, 26.8.1975. 
352İsmet Kotak interviewed by author. See also Özel Tahsin’s resignation statement (Olay, 17.7.1978, p.6).  
353 Later, both Konuk and Kotak confirmed that the program of the CHP inspired them, when they were 
preparing the UBP’s (Kotak interviewed by author; Konuk cited in Besim 2011: 113). 
354 The UBP’s Program (Published in Zaman, 14-21 October 1975).   
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Still, all these do not necessarily make the party social democratic or an ideological party in 
disguise. When we look at the profile of the party’s organizers, we see that its left-leaning 
program did not drive away the newly thriving business community. To the contrary, 
scratching the surface and looking into the cadres of the party and KTTO reveal the overlap 
between the two. Of the 18-strong executive assembly of the KTTO elected in January 1976, 
twelve were (already or would be) also directly involved in the UBP: Three of them as the 
members of the UBP’s party assembly (Ergün Şevket, Mehmet Can and Enver Emin); six as 
delegates at the local UBP congresses (Önder Atai, Mustafa Yıldırım, İsmail Sadıkoğlu, 
Adem Kader, Ali Babaliki, Rehavi Piskobulu); two as founding members (Memduh Erdal 
and Ömer Kale); and one as a candidate in the primary election for the parliamentary 
elections (Şinasi Başaran).355 It should be also added that the representative of the KTTO 
(Ahmet Raşit Mustafa) as well as the representative of the Employers Association (Mustafa 
Toros) in the constituent assembly, joined the parliamentary group of the UBP.356 
Obviously, if not by its program, by its business-friendly policies, the party managed to lure 
this important group to its ranks.   
The business community’s interest in taking part in the UBP’s establishment process was 
hardly surprising. Commerce was the only vibrant sector of the economy in this period. 
The number of members of the KTTO boomed after July 1974: In the first four-five months 
to January 1975, 210 new businesses were set up.357 As the chairman of the chamber stated, 
their membership more than tripled from “some 300 to over 1000” in the 18 months 
following the division.358 The Turkish Cypriot business community, which accounted for 
only two percent of the imports and exports before 1974359, came to control not only the 
whole Turkish Cypriot market but also gained an indirect access to the vast Turkish market, 
                                                        
355 For the executive assembly of the chamber see “KT Ticaret Odası 16. Genel Kurulu Yapıldı [The Chamber 
of Commerce’s 16th general meeting held].” Zaman, 19.1.1976; for the party assembly of the UBP see “UBP 
Parti Meclisine Seçilenler [The list of those who got elected to the UBP party assembly].” Zaman, 26.4.1976; 
for the delegates of the UBP see “UBP Girne Mahalli Kongresi Yapıldı [The UBP Kyrenia local congress held].” 
Zaman, 8.3.1976, “Mağusa Kurultay Delegeleri [The congress delegates of Famagusta].” Zaman, and “Lefkoşa 
UBP Yerel Kuruluş Kongresi Muhteşem Oldu [The UBP Nicosia local congress was magnificent].” Zaman, 
8.4.1976; for the candidates in the primary election see “UBP’nin Lefkoşa Aday Adayları Belli oldu [The UBP’s 
candidates for Nicosia primary election disclosed].” Zaman, 2.5.1976.  
356 See “K.M. Temsilcileri Seçimine Başlandı [Elections for the C.A. representatives have started].” Zaman, 
21.2.1975, and “UBP Meclis Grubu Listesi Dün Meclis Başkanlığına Verildi [The list of the UBP parliamentary 
group submitted to the presidency of the parliament].” Zaman, 29.10.1975.  
357 “Ticaret Odası’na 20 Temmuz’dan Sonra 210 Üye Kaydoldu [After July 20th, 210 new members have 
joined the chamber of commerce].” Zaman, 29.1.1975. 
358 Mehmet Can interviewed by the reporter of TAK cited in Zaman, 20.1.1976. 
359 Ziya Müezzinoğlu interviewed by Abdi İpekçi, Milliyet, 14.10.1974. 
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which was otherwise strictly protected against foreign luxury goods, via luggage tourism 
and a smuggling network between the southern Cyprus, northern Cyprus and Turkey.360 
Their economic power did not initially translate into political influence, however, 
especially when Müezzinoğlu was in charge. They felt to be left out in the cold when the 
economic structure of the new political entity was being designed. Earlier, they expressed 
their resentment with a report submitted to Ecevit, where basically they argued that the 
extent of statism had gone too far.361 Now, with the establishment of political parties, they 
found a channel to gain political influence too. Naturally, the UBP was the only address for 
them. Not only the other three opposition parties promised more statist policies but also 
they advocated a federal solution, which was an anathema to this group, as this would 
jeopardize their newly acquired privileges and market share. Under these circumstances, a 
symbiotic relationship between the UBP and the KTTO became inevitable. In the decades to 
come, the chamber would be one of the staunchest advocates of Denktaş’s pro-taksim 
policies.   
4.3 The Party Organization 
Looking at their social composition and program is not sufficient to understand political 
parties. In Duverger’s words, “Hume … made the shrewd observation that the programme 
plays an essential part in the initial phase, when it serves to bring together scattered 
individuals, but later on organization comes to the fore, the ‘platform’ becoming 
subordinate. Nothing could be truer” (1978: xvi-xvii). Following this line, this section 
focuses on the UBP’s organizational structure. Here, first, I will attempt to show that 
looking from a broad perspective, by opting for a mass party format, the UBP leadership 
made a puzzling choice. Then, I will seek to come up with possible explanations for this 
choice to shed further light on the context in which this decision was made, which in turn 
help to understand the dynamics of the intra-party struggle to come.     
Given the party’s characteristics discussed in the preceding section, one would expect the 
organizers to opt for a model akin to Kirchheimer’s catch-all party, whose primary 
distinguishing characteristics are its “shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, 
                                                        
360 See, for instance Mümtaz Soysal: “Nea Sintesis [New formula (in Greek)].” Milliyet, 2.1.1976.  
361 “Kıbrıs Türk İşadamlarının Sorunları [The problems of Turkish Cypriot businessmen].” Cited in Halkın Sesi, 
10.01.1975.  
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and overwhelmingly electoral orientation, as well as … the prominent leadership and 
electoral roles of the party’s top-ranked national candidates” (see Gunther 2005: 259; see 
also Katz and Mair 1995; Allum and Allum 2008). Especially, the mass party model should 
not have been an option, as this model is known to be something for “externally mobilized 
parties,” which are “established by leaders who do not occupy positions of power in the 
prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their way into the political system by 
mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency” (Shefter 1994: 5). Furthermore, contrary 
to the UBP’s approach, such parties, “explicitly claimed to represent the interests of only 
one segment of society” (Katz and Mair 1995: 10). Having said that we see that the UBP 
officially adopted a mass party model. But to what extent did it stick to this model in 
practice? Before answering this question, first the model has to be properly defined.  
Duverger explains the basic characteristics of mass parties by referring to the case of the 
French Socialist Party:  
in its eyes the recruiting of members is a fundamental activity, both from the 
political and the financial standpoints. In the first place, the party aims at the 
political education of the working class, at picking out from it an elite capable of 
taking over the government and the administration of the country: the members are 
therefore the very substance of the party, the stuff of its activity. Without members, 
the party would be like a teacher without pupils. Secondly, from the financial point 
of view, the party is essentially based upon the subscriptions paid by its members: 
the first duty of branch is to ensure that they are regularly collected. In this way, the 
party gathers the funds required for its work of political education and for its day-
to-day activity; in the same way it is enabled to finance electioneering: the financial 
and political are here at one (1978: 63). 
The UBP constitution stipulated the members to sign an undertaking to the party (Article 
5)362, to pay an annual subscription (Article 10.3), and the branches to hold a system of 
registration (Article 5), which are all indispensable features of mass parties (see Duverger 
1978: 64; 71). However, “[c]onstitutions and rules never give more than a partial idea of 
what happens, if indeed they describe reality at all, for they are rarely strictly applied” 
(ibid.: xviii). The UBP constitution was no exception. In practice, it can be seen that the UBP 
had never collected subscription363; nor it ever had a system of registration of its members 
(Christophorou 2006: 534). As Duverger puts it, “the absence of any system of registration 
                                                        
362 The TKP did not have such an article for instance.  
363 Hakkı Atun, who also served as the secretary general of the party, for instance, does not remember ever 
paying membership fee (interviewed by author).  
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of members or of any regular collection of subscriptions is a fairly reliable criterion,” to 
decide whether a party is a mass party or not: “no true membership is conceivable in their 
absence” (1978: 64-5). From “the financial point of view,” therefore, it was not a necessity 
for the UBP to organize as a mass party.364 Obviously, it did not need mass membership for 
financial reasons.  
When we look from the political standpoint, we see that although Denktaş portrayed the 
party organization as a mechanism for recruitment of the new members and leaders, 
where they would also be educated and work even more intensively after the election 
period365, we see that the education aspect was also clearly missing in practice.  
If these aspects are missing, then, can we say that the UBP was simply a mass party only on 
paper? Not exactly. Given the mass party model’s success, indeed, seeing a cadre/internally 
mobilized party imitating the mass party model should not come as a surprise (Duverger 
1978: 64-6; see also Katz and Mair 1995: 11-2). Indeed, this was what, the DC went 
through under Fanfani in the mid-1950s (Allum and Allum 2008: 343; Chubb 1982; Tarrow 
1967) – due to different reasons but with almost identical consequences. From a 
theoretical standpoint, what drew the UBP closer to the mass party model was the active 
involvement of the grassroots in the selection of the candidates as well as the other party 
cadres. To quote Duverger once again, “activity connected with the nomination of 
candidates presented at elections by a party constitutes one of the activities typical of party 
membership,” and such parties, like the “American parties in States which operate the 
system of ‘closed primaries’ with registration of electors … resemble mass parties from the 
political point of view … [and] should be classified as semi-mass parties” (1978: 65). 
In this respect, it can be said that the UBP founders, in a way, went too far in their imitation. 
During the establishment process, the extent of participation of the grassroots in decision-
                                                        
364 In addition to its easy access to other sources of financing, like public resources it firmly controlled, or the 
donations from the business circles, it should be noted that the availability of financial assistance to the 
political parties provided by the state reduces the need for collecting subscriptions. According to the Article 
45 of the Political Parties Law, every year the 0.3 percent of the budget is earmarked for political parties. The 
parties, represented in the parliament, which took part in the previous parliamentary election, share this 
money on the basis of number of seats they have in the parliament (For more on the financing of the political 
parties see Dodd 1993c: 187-8).    
365 “Denktaş Halkımıza Bir Çağrıda Bulunarak Mahalli UBP Örgütlerinin Kurulmasını İstedi: ‘Partiyi Siz 
Kurdunuz ve Siz Yaşatacaksınız’ [Denktaş urged our people to establish the local organizations of the UBP: 
‘You established the party and you will make it survive’].” Zaman, 13.10.1976.  
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making and selecting the party officials is striking. Oddly enough for an internally 
mobilized party, mass participation was strongly encouraged, and great importance was 
attached to internal democracy. Unlike the other parties, “the party’s leadership cadres will 
not be occupied in advance,” it was said during the early phases of the organization 
process.366 In his statement launching the party, Denktaş was quoted as saying “the UBP is 
people’s party,” and that the signatories of the founding document were only fulfilling a 
legal requirement. They would not set up the party with a top-down approach but rather 
the party would be formed from bottom-up: “The party will be formed in the villages. Their 
representatives will join the ones from towns and neighbourhoods to establish the party 
organization,” he said.367 Before departing for a long trip in the wake of the party’s 
establishment, he exhorted the people to establish their local party organizations:  
Push aside petty and sterile feuds and jealousies; be aware that you are all brothers; 
and unite in every village and neighbourhood! Select a committee of minimum 
seven, maximum nine people. Help them to recruit new members, and hold a 
general meeting as soon as possible to select an executive committee and the 
delegates to be sent to the first party conference. … In our first party conference, 
you are going to elect the chairman, the members of the party assembly and 
disciplinary board, and ratify the program and constitution of the party.368 
Unlike the ones on party financing and political education, what Denktaş said, and the 
articles of the constitution, which empowered the rank and file party members, were 
followed to the letter. As a result of an aggressive organization and recruitment strategy, 
the number of members reached to 20 thousand by the end of December 1975.369 By the 
time the organization process was completed in April 1976, the party boasted 40,200 
members. 370  This figure was obviously overblown. 371  However, it would not be 
                                                        
366 “Ulusal Birlik Partisi Kuruluş Çalışmaları Devam Ediyor [The UBP’s organization process underway].” 
Zaman, 15.8.1975.  
367 “Denktaş: UBP Halkın Partisidir [The UBP is the party of people].” Zaman, 12.10.1975; See also “Halkımızın 
Siyasal Örgütlenmesi Gerçekleşiyor: Ulusal Birlik Partisi [The political organization of our people is 
materializing: the National Unity Party].” Zaman, 12.08.1976. 
368 “Denktaş Halkımıza Bir Çağrıda Bulunarak Mahalli UBP Örgütlerinin Kurulmasını İstedi: ‘Partiyi Siz 
Kurdunuz ve Siz Yaşatacaksınız’ [Denktaş urged our people to establish the local organizations of the UBP: 
‘You established the party and you will make it survive’].” Zaman, 13.10.1976. 
369 Ülkü Cem (the penname of Raif Denktaş): “Utanma Olmayınca [When there is no shame].” 23.12.1975.  
370 “UBP Belediye Başkan Adayları Denktaş’ı Ziyaret Ettiler [The UBP’s mayoral candidates visited Denktaş].” 
Zaman, 28.4.1976; see also the statements of Nejat Konuk, the secretary general of the party in “UBP 
Demokratik Siyasal Hayatımızın En Güçlü Partisidir [The UBP is the strongest party of our democratic 
political life].” Ulus, 20.4.1976.  
371 The total number of eligible voters at the time was 75,824, of whom only 56,346 went to the polls in the 
1976 elections (Aydoğdu 2005: 93). 
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exaggeration to say that the UBP was established in a rather participatory manner. At the 
village and neighbourhood level some 1,600372 branch delegates (şube delegesi) were 
selected to participate at the three branch conferences to be held in Nicosia, Famagusta and 
Kyrenia. At the branch conferences, the branch delegates selected the executive board of 
their branches as well as the 404 conference delegates (kurultay delegesi)373, who would 
represent the branch at the party conference. The conference delegates, along with the ex 
officio members of the conference i.e. the party chairman, the parliamentary group, 
ministers etc.374, selected 40-member party assembly as well as the party chairman. Then, 
the party assembly elected the secretary general and the central executive board made up 
of nine members.  
Going back to Duverger’s point about the candidate selection process, it can be seen that 
the task of selecting their district’s candidates in the parliamentary election was also given 
to the branch delegates by the candidate selection regulation.375 The effects of this method 
of candidate selection on the intra-party balance of power in practice will be elaborated in 
the following sections. Suffice it here to say that by removing the discretion of party leaders 
on the selection of candidates, this system had detrimental effects on the old guard’s 
prospects of maintaining their position, and paved the way for the ascendance of a 
different breed of politicians who would before long capture the party administration. In 
other words, in a way, the old guard UBP founders went too far in their endeavour to 
encourage mass participation, and in doing so undermined the privileged position 
normally the party leadership enjoys. This paved the way for the renewal of the party 
cadres in a rapid fashion; so rapid that even Denktaş would lose control of the party in a 
relatively short period of time. Furthermore, when coupled together with the open list 
electoral system discussed in the previous chapter, this method of candidate selection is 
known to encourage cultivation of a personal vote (see Carey and Shugart 1995: 427-8), 
which is closely associated with political clientelism. 
                                                        
372 Calculated by author based on the list of delegates published in the party’s publication Ulus, 20.4.1976.  
373 Ibid. 
374 For the full list see the article 25 of the constitution.  
375 The regulation was published by Zaman on 30.4.1976; see also Raif Denktaş: “Demokrasi ve Politik Gücün 
Yaygınlığı [Democracy and the pervasiveness of political power].” Zaman, 3.4.1976.  
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Why did the party leadership deem mass membership so important if it would not rely on 
them to raise funds? In other words, why did they organize themselves as a semi-mass 
party? Political ideology of those responsible for the drawing up of the party constitution 
was one factor. Apart from that, I suggest, this served to three main purposes: Firstly, it 
was an attempt to outdo the HP, which adopted a similar model and reached over three 
thousand members by the time its first conference was held in October 1975.376  
Second purpose had to do with what has been said in the previous chapter when the 
factors making a clientelist mobilization strategy more favourable were analyzed. Denktaş 
wanted to legitimize his leadership by pointing to a large and empowered membership. He 
was aware that his pro-taksim position was pushing him into isolation not only 
internationally but also in the eyes of mainstream political actors in Ankara.377 After being 
cold-shouldered by the Turkish government in his quest to declare an independent state in 
late September 1975, he made the following statement: “If from time to time we get into 
rough terrain and become isolated/marginalized and solitary, this is because it is 
imperative for the cause we are trying to rescue. We become solitary not because we are 
dimwitted. We have a purpose. We want to show, prove what you long for [i.e. taksim] 
because we believe the time has come”.378 A mass flow into his party would show that he 
was speaking on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community. To quote him once again, “when 
the international community wants to know what the Turks of Cyprus want, they will look 
at the National Unity Party, and take their answer from the program of the party where the 
big majority of the Turkish community have united”.379 The advantages of the numerical 
strength that would come with mass membership, therefore, should be considered in this 
context rather than its financial advantages as it would be in a real mass party.   
                                                        
376 The HP Secretary General, İsmail Bozkurt cited in “Birçok Delege HP Kurultayına Katılmadı [Many 
delegates did not attend the HP congress].” Zaman, 13.10.1975. 
377 The Turkish premier Demirel was in an awkward position. On the one hand, he was willing to mend the 
fences with the international community, particularly with the US. On the other, he did not want to be 
portrayed as a weak prime minister in domestic politics by taking steps that could be exploited in domestic 
politics as “concessions,” lest everyone saying “Demirel gave away, what had been taken by Ecevit”. 
Furthermore, his coalition partner, in the so-called Nationalist Front, MSP, held a very tough position, and 
made “no territorial concession in Cyprus” a pre-condition for the continuation of the coalition (“MSP 
Koalisyonun Devamı için AP’ye Bildirilecek Şartları Saptadı [The MSP ascertained the conditions for 
maintaining the coalition with the AP].” Milliyet, 20.10.1975).  
378 “Denktaş: Bir Milletin, Bir Toplumun Davasını Omuzlayıp Yürümek Yalnızlık Değildir [Denktaş: It is not a 
solitary predicament to shoulder a nation’s, a community’s cause and walk on].” Zaman, 5.12.1975.  
379 Denktaş cited in “Dünya Kıbrıs Türkünün Parçalanmaz Bir Bütün Olduğunu Görecektir [The world will see 
the indivisible integrity of the Cyprus’ Turks]” and “Davamızdan Tek Bir Adım Geriye Dönüş Olmayacak 
[There will not be even a single step back from our cause].” Zaman, 8.12.1975. 
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Finally, though the way he was conducting the Cyprus negotiations was widely praised, 
Denktaş’s cabinet was criticized heavily even by independent observers like Eşref Nidai 
and Ahmet Tolgay of daily Bozkurt. He was said to be out of touch with what’s going on 
internally.380 What makes these columnists’ views more notable is the fact that both of 
them worked at the same time for the Bayraktar’s office, and therefore what they say could 
not be easily dismissed by the administration as communist or subversive propaganda. But 
Denktaş did not want to alienate anyone in his cabinet by sacking those who had been 
heavily criticized. Therefore, he presented the party mechanism or internal democracy 
within the party as a method of democratic selection, which would help the renewal of the 
cadres. As Bozkurt reported quoting “the circles close to the party,” nobody would be 
imposed as party functionaries and “renewal of Denktaş’s cadres would be realized in the 
form of a people’s movement within the UBP”.381  
4.4 The First Wave of Mass Political Mobilization and the Setting Up of the 
Machine 
No matter how it tried to portray itself, the party was initially, to a large extent, a party of 
notables. It should be noted, however, that the majority of these notables, unlike in the case 
of Italy, for instance, did not earn their status because of their role as patrons or 
intermediaries in a traditional society, which was in the eve of transition to mass politics as 
it was identified in the theoretical chapter. Rather, very few, like Mustafa Hacıahmetoğlu or 
Osman Civisilli aside, they owed their status to their role in the administration. As they did 
not require a solid base to get elected in the past, they were disconnected from the voters. 
Such was this detachment that one of the heavyweights, Osman Örek, on his way to 
stumping could not find his way to a village only 12 miles from Nicosia and asked passers 
by for directions, and hence ridiculed by the opposition.382 
 The politics acquired its clientelistic character when the UBP embarked on an aggressive 
recruitment strategy to create a following for the party, which was based on the use of the 
                                                        
380 Eşref Nidai: “Başkanın İşlevi ve Yeni Danışman [The function of the president and the new advisor].” 
Bozkurt, 23.8.1975.  
381 See for instance “Toplumumuzda Siyasal Örgütlenme Hızlanıyor: Denktaş’ın Kadro Yenilemesi UBP İçinde 
Gerçekleşecek [Political organization within our community is gaining momentum: Denktaş will renew his 
team within the UBP].” Bozkurt, 26.8.1975; see also Denktaş: “Daha Büyük Hedeflere Doğru Gönül Gönüle 
Yürüyeceğiz [Denktaş: we will walk hand in hand towards bigger targets].” Zaman, 5.10.1975.   
382 “Sarılacak Dal Arayanlar [Those who are seeking a branch to hold on to].” Halkın Sesi, 17.12.1975.  
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public resources including the public personnel. This was the first time politicians resorted 
to the public resources to lure masses. This is, of course, not to say that the party owed its 
success in recruiting members solely to providing/promising of material benefits or the 
threat of exclusion from them. Denktaş’s charisma, his historical personality, and the way 
he monopolized the roles of being the champion of the national cause and Turkish 
nationalism would attract a considerable chunk of the electorate to his party anyway. 
However, the role of political clientelism cannot be denied either. What started as random 
nepotism in the chaotic atmosphere of the immediate post-war period, was now, with the 
establishment of the party, put into the service of a full-scale political machine.  
In a statement talking about the recruitment process, the spokesperson of the party said 
that people were “in a race with each other to become a founding member” of the UBP.383 
Closer scrutiny reveals that this race was rigged to say the least. The UBP relied heavily on 
the utilization of the power and resources of the state in this process. The strategy was 
based partly on intimidation and partly on promises, and involved, as an early indication of 
the conflation of party and state, active participation of civil servants in the recruitment 
process.384  
The following observation captures the atmosphere very well:  
On behalf of the UBP, some civil servants have been going around house-by-house, 
door-by-door to recruit new members for the party. The first question they ask to 
the household members opening the door is: “Do you have any complaints about 
Denktaş?” Before the respondent recovers from the shock of the first question, the 
second question comes: “Do you approve of Denktaş?” It takes real courage to say 
no. This is not easy. Your, and your children’s livelihoods are at stake. And the UBP 
member civil servant continues: “As you have no complaints about Denktaş, and you 
approve of him, then please sign this paper”. Presto! You have become a UBP 
member. 385 
                                                        
383 “Ulusal Birlik Partisi Kuruluş Çalışmaları Devam Ediyor [The National Unity Party establishment process 
underway].” Zaman,15.8.1975.   
384 See particularly İsmail Bozkurt cited in “Halkçı Parti Partizanlık Yapan Görevlilerden Hesap Soracak [The 
Populist Party will hold accountable the officials involved in clientelism].” Halkın Sesi, 13.10.1975; Fuat 
Veziroğlu: “Halka Telgraf [Telegram to people].” Halkın Sesi, 13.10.1975.   
385 Sabahattin İsmail: “Bu Ne Biçim Demokrasi? Bu Ne Biçim Particilik [What kind of democracy is this? What 
kind of party politics is this]?” Halkın Sesi, 2.9.1975; see also “Türkiye’de Ecevit Partizanlık Yapan Memurların 
Cezalandırılacağını Söylerken Kıbrıs’ta Bazı Memurlar İktidar Partisine Üye Yazmak İçin Halka Baskı Yapıyor 
[While Ecevit is saying that the civil servants involved in clientelism would be punished in Turkey, some civil 
servants in Cyprus are pressuring people to join the government party].” Halkın Sesi, 15.9.1975; Fuat 
Veziroğlu: “Muhalif Halka Mektup [Letter to the dissident people].” Halkın Sesi, 17.12.1975.   
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Some of the civil servants who did not accept to take part were intimidated or banished.386 
Specifically, the employees working at the SEEs like Cypfruvex, and Salamis Bay Hotel as 
well as the employees of certain directorates attached to the ministry of finance were 
forced to join the party by their superiors.387 In an observer’s words, “in the villages too, 
diverse forms of shenanigans are employed to recruit members”.388 “Those who did not 
join the party of Denktaş would not be given credits or chemical fertilizers, and their 
produces would not be bought” it was said 389, while those who accepted to join were 
promised credit, land and welfare benefits.390  
In one particular case, civil servants from the department of social benefits (sosyal yardım 
dairesi) toured the village, and forced the mukhtar to give the names of those who had 
earlier joined the HP. Later, reportedly, a villager who called at the Kyrenia branch of the 
department was told the village would suffer because of their support for the HP.391 In 
another case, those who attended the meeting of the HP were held subject to 
investigation.392  
Ultimately, the anatomy of UBP was identical to what Allum and Allum say of the DC: 
“formally like that of the mass party, but, in fact, based on a following or clientele and not of 
an active participant membership” (Allum and Allum 2008: 343; see also Chubb 1982: 72-
3). This anatomy would become more palpable in the election period when a larger 
segment of the society had to be mobilized.  
The constitution stipulated the holding of elections within six months upon its entry into 
force. In other words, the elections were supposed to be held in December 1975. However, 
                                                        
386 İsmail Bozkurt cited in “Halkçı Parti Partizanlık Yapan Görevlilerden Hesap Soracak [The Populist Party 
will hold accountable the officials involved in clientelism].” Halkın Sesi, 13.10.1975.  
387 “UBP’nin Örgütlenmesi Baskı ve Vaade Dayanıyor [The UBP’s organization is based on pressure and 
promises].” Yenidüzen, 12.12.1975 and, Sabahattin İsmail: “Bu Ne Biçim Demokrasi? Bu Ne Biçim Particilik? 
[What kind of democracy is this? What kind of party politics is this]?” Halkın Sesi, 2.9.1975 
388 Sabahattin İsmail: “Bu Ne Biçim Demokrasi? Bu Ne Biçim Particilik? [What kind of democracy is this? What 
kind of party politics is this]?” Halkın Sesi, 2.9.1975 
389 “Türkiye’de Ecevit Partizanlık Yapan Memurların Cezalandırılacağını Söylerken Kıbrıs’ta Bazı Memurlar 
İktidar Partisine Üye Yazmak İçin Halka Baskı Yapıyor [While Ecevit is saying that the civil servants involved 
in clientelism would be punished in Turkey, some civil servants in Cyprus are pressuring people to join the 
government party].” Halkın Sesi, 15.9.1975; Vefa Fırtına: “Gerçek Hikayeler [True stories].” Halkın Sesi, 
1.10.1975. 
390 See for instance “Köyden Sesler [Voices from village].” Halkın Sesi, 9.12.1975;  
391 See the letter from a resident of Çamlıbel village: “Bu da Benden [And this is from me].” Halkın Sesi, 
21.11.1975. 
392 The village concerned was Değirmenlik, see “Köyden Sesler [Voices from village].” Halkın Sesi, 9.12.1975; 
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the UBP postponed them, first to February 1976393, and then until the summer of 1976 by 
delaying the passage of the election and referendum law until March 1976. The aim was to 
buy time so that Denktaş could be actively involved in the campaign after completing a 
period of intensive international contacts.394 The presence of the leader was central to the 
campaign because as the election results would show, his personal popularity was much 
higher than of the other leading figures and the party itself. Eventually, both presidential 
and general elections were scheduled for the same day: 20 June 1976.  
As Denktaş’s election was a foregone conclusion, the strongest opposition party, the TKP, 
did not even field a presidential candidate. Therefore the real competition was for the 
parliamentary election, whose analysis should be done at two levels: Inter-party and intra-
party. At the inter-party level, given the weak showing of the UBP in the local elections held 
a month earlier than the parliamentary election395, and in the absence of a real threat at the 
presidential election against himself, Denktaş’s campaign aimed at reversing the rising tide 
of the opposition and ensuring a majority for the UBP in the parliament to avoid 
cohabitation. He conducted a negative campaign based on defaming the opposition.396 His 
message was simple: The community was threatened by a communist takeover and a 
victory by the opposition would undermine the national cause. To give but two examples, 
“if the UBP does not come to power with at least 25 [of the 40] seats, the communists will 
take over,” he said in a meeting where he had summoned the mukhtars, who had been 
elected as independent or from the opposition parties.397 As for the national cause, “other 
parties are unnational and unserious” and “they are perverting the national cause,” he was 
                                                        
393 “Seçimler Ertelendi [Elections postponed].” Zaman, 9.12.1975; “Seçimler Şubat Sonu [Elections to be held 
at the end of February].” Zaman, 10.12.1975.  
394 He was abroad between 12 October and 28 November 1975, visiting certain Islamic countries, New York, 
and Ankara (see Numan Ali Levent: “Başkanın Dönüşü [The return of the president].” Zaman, 30.11.1975). 
395 In the municipal elections, the UBP collected 38.2% of the votes against TKP’s 17.2%, HP’s 14.3%, CTP’s 
12.7% and independents’ 17.6% (Aydoğdu 2005: 148). Remarkably, the opposition candidates won Nicosia 
and Kyrenia.  
396 For some of his allegations see for instance Naci Talat: “Sözümüz Sizedir Denktaş Bey [Our word is to you 
Mr Denktaş].” Yenidüzen, 5.6.1976; “İktidar Partisi UBP’nin Karalama ve Korkutma Politikası Sürüyor [The 
UBP’s smear and terror campaign is continuing].” Yenidüzen, 12.6.1976; Eşref Çetinel: “Kimmiş Komünist 
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397 In the same meeting, he claimed that the HP leader was an “international communist according to an 
intelligence report from” the Turkish national intelligence organization (see “HP Seçimlerde Denktaş’ı 
Desteklemeyeceğini Açıkladı [HP disclosed that it would not support Denktaş in the election].” Halkın Sesi, 
2.6.1976; “Halkçı Parti Başkanlık Seçiminde Bağımsız Kalacak [Populist party will remain neutral in the 
presidential election].” Bozkurt, 2.6.1976).  
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quoted as saying, also portraying the opposition as “anti-[Turkish] army” in the Turkish 
media.398 In fact, by exaggerating the power of communists and accusing the opposition of 
treason, Denktaş’s intention was to address the public opinion and particularly the 
nationalist circles, both civilian and military, in Turkey to engage them against the 
opposition.    
Normally, the most significant violations of the electoral law, the use of public resources to 
forward the incumbent party’s political campaign, are the hardest to prove. Not in this 
particular case. Reportedly, the UBP distributed truckfulls of household goods until the last 
day of the election campaign and did nothing to hide it.399 In the words of Dr Küçük, the 
former community leader and the editor of the daily Halkın Sesi: 
The doors of the warehouses have been opened wide. There is no lunch break or 
any keepers. 24 hours a day, ten or 15-tonne trucks full of goods are leaving. There 
is neither salesman nor registration. Don't ask where they are heading to! They are 
heading to unknown directions. Hundreds of villages... Those who have been 
neglected for two years … are now told “to take as much as you want”.400  
These warehouses (ambarlar) were used to store the Greek Cypriot moveable properties 
after 1974, and were attached to the State Estate and Supplies Directorate (Devlet Emlak ve 
Malzeme Dairesi), which was under the ministry of finance. It was not a secret that these 
goods were sold to the cronies of the government at giveaway prices401, and indeed as 
Mehmet Hasgüler puts it, this directorate was known to be the center of distribution of 
                                                        
398 “Anavatan Basını Ne Diyor [What does the motherland’s press say]?” Halkın Sesi, 1.6.1976 (Originally 
published in Cumhuriyet (Istanbul); see also “Türkiye Basınında Denktaş [Denktaş in the Turkish press].” 
Yenidüzen, 12.6.1976.  
399 Dr Fazıl Küçük: “Toplum Balık Değildir [The community does not suffer from amnesia] (2).” Halkın Sesi, 
9.6.1976; “Yağma Hasan’ın Böreği [Corruption and abuse].” Halkın Sesi, 10.6.1976; “Ve UBP Oyların Ancak 
Yüzde 53.7’sini Alabildi [And the UBP managed to garner only 53.7 percent of the votes].” Kurtuluş, 
28.6.1976; Erten: “Dikmenlilerin Haykırışı: ‘Şimdi Vaad Ettikleri Eşyaları Bir Buçuk Yıl Önce Niye 
Vermediler?’ [The scream of people of Dikmen: ‘Why did not they give those houselhold goods that they 
promise now, a year and a half ago?’]” Halkın Sesi, 16.6.1976; Fuat Veziroğlu: “Suçluların Telaşı [The panic of 
the guilty].” Halkın Sesi, 6.6.1976; Erten: “Kimin Hakkı [Whose right]...” Halkın Sesi, 8.6.1976; Berberoğlu’s 
speech cited in Halkın Sesi, 16.6.1976; Fuat Veziroğlu: “UBP Nasıl Seçim Kazandı [How did the UBP win the 
election]?” Halkın Sesi, 26.6.1976. In some cases, the goods were given away right away, and in some cases 
promises were made. In the village of Engomi (Tuzla) for instance, distribution took place after the election 
(see Eşref Çetinel: “Ortada Kalan Sorular [Those unanswered questions].” Bozkurt, 2.7.1976).  
400 Dr Fazıl Küçük: “Uçuyor...Uçuyor [Flying...Flying].” Halkın Sesi, 16.6.1976. 
401 See for instance Kemal Deniz’s (Independent, Nicosia) speech in the parliament cited in “İktidar Şiddetle 
Eleştirildi [The government fiercly criticized].” Halkın Sesi, 4.11.1975.  
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ganimet.402 Such was the abuses of the politicians here that its director asked to be 
transferred to another directorate, even if this would mean a demotion, saying in his 
resignation “he would not be able to work with thieves”.403 To cite one of the UBP’s 
founders, “it was a time when the greedy made fortunes. The UBP became the protector of 
those who profited from the new, chaotic, economic order, and the party relied on 
distribution of the ganimet to gain support”.404 Those who already benefited from or 
expecting to benefit from a lax administration, which subsequently came to form a big 
“constituency for patronage,” to use Shefter’s term, clustered around the UBP, which 
became the guarantor of this system. This constituency was so big that Durduran, the 
chairman of the main opposition party, recalls being half-jokingly warned by an aide that if 
he kept on saying that the TKP would hold the culprits accountable, no one would vote for 
them as almost everyone was involved in the ganimet frenzy.405 
One of the novelties of this distribution process or “vote hunting,” as the opposition dubbed 
it, was the involvement of women in canvassing. The wives of the candidates, particularly 
ministers, were touring their husband’s constituencies house-by-house, and asking what 
the voters needed.406 Their “wishes” were later delivered from the state warehouses.407 In 
some instances, the known opposition sympathizers were targeted and offered “favours”; 
some of them were invited to the ministry of resettlement “orally or in writing” to claim the 
household goods they wished.408 Halkın Sesi, which openly had sided with the opposition, 
ran a mock ad where after informing the public that the warehouses were opened to satisfy 
the cronies, it urged the displaced people or those in need to go and ask for their shares 
                                                        
402 Mehmet Hasgüler: “Umarsız Hayatlar: Kıbrıs Tu rklerinin Yok Olan I nsan Sermayesi [Desperate Lives: The 
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407 “UBP Devlet Ambarlarını Yağma Ediyor [The UBP is pillaging the state warehouses].” Kurtuluş, 7.6.1976; 
see also Dr. Fazıl Küçük: “Tabiat Kanunları [Laws of nature] (2).” Halkın Sesi, 4.6.1976; Erten: “Kimin Hakkı 
[Whose right]...” Halkın Sesi, 8.6.1976.   
408 “Lefkoşa Halkı UBP Mitingini Boykot Etti [The people of Nicosia boycotted the UBP rally].” Halkın Sesi, 
8.6.1976.  
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before everything ran out.409 Land, credit, jobs and title deeds for the houses they occupy 
were also promised to the voters.410 As the most organized, and best financed party, the 
UBP also hired all taxis and transported the voters to the polling stations on the ballot 
day.411 
In the face of widespread abuse of the state resources412, the TKP appealed for help from 
the government and opposition parties in Ankara413, to no avail. In the words of a TKP 
spokesperson:  
We, as the Communal Liberation Party, do not intend to turn a blind eye to the UBP 
government’s frenetic behavior, and pillaging of the budget along with the state 
warehouses to gain votes for the UBP. We, as a party, who hold the national interest 
above everything and operates within the boundaries of law, make the due warning, 
and urge the Motherland’s government to duty and intervention. The constitution 
envisages elections to be conducted at equal conditions. However, there is no 
equality now. By abusing the state’s resources, the UBP is carrying out a privileged 
election campaign. … We also invite the press of motherland to send reporters and 
observers to follow what’s going on from a close range because unless this frenetic 
behavior is brought to an end, we have strong doubts about the security and 
peacefulness of the election. Even the presence of these doubts alone will cause 
negative effects in the international arena, and in turn damage the national cause. 
The responsibility of this damage will be on the shoulders of the sinful UBP.414  
Certainly, the election campaign was not all about carrots; there were sticks as well. Some 
of the voters were told that they would be evicted from the houses allocated to them; that 
their displaced person benefit would be cut or that they would lose their jobs in the public 
service, should they support the opposition.415 Denktaş’s strong negative campaign also led 
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Fazıl Küçük: “Köylüye Yalan Söylüyorlar [They are lying to villagers].” Halkın Sesi, 12.6.1976; Fuat Veziroğlu: 
“Yurttaş Dikkat [Citizen, pay attention]...” Halkın Sesi, 11.6.1976; “Kıbrıs Türk Demokrasi Derneği Halka 
Çağrıda Bulundu [The Turkish Cypriot Democracy Assocation called on the people].” Halkın Sesi,  11.6.1976.   
411Fuat Veziroğlu: “Yurttaş Dikkat [Citizen, pay attention]...” Halkın Sesi,  11.6.1976; “Oylar Yeniden Sayılıyor 
[Votes to be recounted]” Halkın Sesi, 25.6.1976; Aytekin Musa: “Son Hazırlık  [The final preparations]!” 
Yenidüzen, 29.6.1976. 
412 Fuat Veziroğlu: “Ne Bu Şiddet, Bu Celal [What is the reason of this fury]?” Halkın Sesi, 2.6.1976; Fuat 
Veziroğlu: “Suçluların Telaşı [The panic of the guilty].” Halkın Sesi, 6.6.1976; Naci Talat: “Seçim Sonuçları 
Halkın Gerçek İradesini Temsil Etmiyor [The election results do not reflect the real popular will].” Yenidüzen, 
29.6.1976.   
413 “UBP Devlet Ambarlarını Yağma Ediyor [The UBP is pillaging the state warehouses].” Kurtuluş, 7.6.1976. 
414 Ibid. 
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to polarization especially in the rural areas.416 In some villages, the opposition candidates 
and sympathizers were intimidated and harassed417, and at times beaten by thugs.418 In 
one particular case, a shopkeeper, who had posted a campaign poster of the TKP on his 
shop window, was beaten by the local police chief.419 Such was the atmosphere that on the 
last day of the campaign, in his article, Dr Küçük likened the administration to the 
government of Mussolini, and urged the voters to cast their votes for the opposition.420  
To summarize, while Denktaş’s strategy was to shift the focus away from the intractable 
difficulties of governing towards the Cyprus problem by insisting on the slogan “the 
national struggle is not over yet,”421 and pointing out the imaginary looming communist 
takeover, the opposition’s election campaign rested on disclosing the partisan treatment of 
the displaced, squandering of the “national wealth” (i.e. the Greek Cypriot properties)422, 
and the distribution frenzy in the last 10-15 days of the election campaign. “I used to finish 
my speeches with the same line,” recalls Alpay Durduran, the leader of the TKP: “we will 
hold them accountable”.423 The way Denktaş conducted the Cyprus problem, especially his 
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422 See for instance, “Milyarlık Servet Nereye Gitti [Where has the fortune of billions gone]?” Kurtuluş, 
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statements about unilateral declaration of independence, was also occasionally 
criticized.424 
In the mean time, a parallel competition was going on at the intra-party level. This should 
also be taken up at two stages. First round was fought in the primaries, and the second in 
the general elections. Indeed, the division had emerged even earlier. During the 
establishment of the party a group of self-styled reformers emerged, and declared war 
against the old guard, particularly the cabinet members. The so-called Reformist wing did 
not hide its discontent with the incumbent government, and declared that they would 
support reform-minded candidates in the party conference and primaries. The most 
prominent member of this group was Raif Denktaş, the president’s elder son. In his words 
“this wing is obviously not content with the current council of ministers and advocate the 
forming of a better one”.425 In their first press statement, “the UBP is not in power today,” 
and “the UBP is not equal to the government,” they claimed, and talked about those party 
members who attempted “to conceal their failure and effeteness by hiding below the UBP 
umbrella”.426 The wing was there to clean up the party from “the influence-peddlers, 
thieves, smugglers and profiteers”.427  
Indeed, an implicit campaign against the old guard had started before. The inner circle 
around Denktaş was said to fend off criticism from the people by saying “Denktaş is good, 
but his circle is not” or “don’t vote for these ministers if you are not satisfied”.428 The 
Reformist wing came on top of this, and embodied these efforts. As also pointed out by the 
opposition at the time, in the final analysis, this renewal movement can be seen as an effort 
by Denktaş to distance himself from the effete members of his cabinet in the eve of the 
elections429 and to deny responsibility for the failure of the cabinet he had appointed as the 
                                                        
424 See for instance Özker Özgür: “Tutarsız Dış Politika [The inconsistent foreign policy].” Halkın Sesi, 
1.6.1976; Berberoğlu cited in “Akşam Güneşi [The evening sun].” Yenidüzen, 18.6.1976.   
425 Raif Denktaş: “Reformcu Kanadın Düşündürdükleri [Thoughts on the reformist wing].” Zaman, 10.3.1976 
426 “Reformcu Ulusal Birlik Kanadı Doğdu [The reformist National Unity wing has been born].” Zaman, 
4.3.1976. 
427 Erdal Andız cited in “UBP Gerçeği [The UBP reality].” Kurtuluş, 17.5.1976.    
428 See Tezel Asena: “Mahvedeceğiz [We will ruin].” Halkın Sesi, 23.11.1975; Naci Talat: “Reforumcu 
Denktaşçılar [The Reformist Denktashists].” Yenidüzen, 12.3.1976; Aytekin Musa: “Göster Bana Arkadaşını 
[Tell me who your friends are].” Yenidüzen, 12.3.1976; Tözüm İsmail: “UBP’lilerin Seçim Propagandası [The 
UBP members’ election propaganda].” Halkın Sesi, 27.11.1975.  
429 See Fuat Veziroğlu: “Çıkmaz Sokakta Bir İktidar [A government in a dead end].” Halkın Sesi, 20.12.1975, 
and Tezel Asena: “Mahvedeceğiz [We will ruin].” Halkın Sesi, 23.11.1975. 
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president.430 It was not a coincidence that the leader of the wing was his son, who was also 
the owner-editor of the party’s mouthpiece Zaman. Of course, Denktaş never formally 
endorsed the wing. However, he did not denounce them either. The wing enjoyed his 
blessing if not his open support: “He enjoyed it when I was grilling his cabinet members 
because I was telling things he agreed but could not utter himself,” recounted Erdal Andız, 
one of the influential reformers.431 
The reformist wing initially made some inroads. They won one of their first battles when 
they managed to get Orhan Zihni elected by acclamation to the chairmanship of the 
Famagusta branch against one of the most influential cabinet ministers, İsmet Kotak.432 
However, they were less successful in eliminating the old guard in the primaries.433 At the 
end, only one of the ministers, Rüstem Tatar lost the primary and this was largely because 
he could not campaign well as he was recovering after a medical operation. Patronage was 
effectively used, at least by some: banquets were thrown, and ganimet was distributed.434 
Overall, it can be said that the old guard capitalized on advantages of incumbency to defeat 
the new guard. But this was not a total defeat because many new faces made it to the party 
ticket including, Raif Denktaş, İrsen Küçük, Enver Emin, Recep Ali Gürler from Nicosia, and 
Derviş Eroğlu and Mehmet Bayram from Famagusta. As will be shown in Chapter Five, 
gradually, these members of the new guard would take the control of the delegates, and 
establish an unshakeable power base, which would encourage them to take on, first the old 
guard party leadership, and then even Denktaş. I will turn to this in the next chapter.  
In the primaries, individual candidates had to team up and campaign together against other 
candidates. One particular way of doing this was distributing shortlists featuring only the 
names or numbers indicating the team members’ position on the ballot paper to the branch 
delegates. To bolster their chances of winning the candidacy, groups started spreading 
news that their lists were endorsed by Denktaş, by the secretary general Konuk, or by the 
central executive board of the party. At some point, the secretary general felt the need to 
                                                        
430 A.M. Berberoğlu: “İktidar ve Sorumluluk [Power and responsibility].” Yenidüzen, 12.3.1976; Aytekin Musa: 
“Göster Bana Arkadaşını [Tell me who your friends are].” Yenidüzen, 12.3.1976.  
431 Interviewed by author.  
432 Andız interviewed by author.  
433 “UBP’de Kazan Kaynıyor [The cauldron is simmering in the UBP].” Yenidüzen, 8.5.1976; “UBP Gerçeği [The 
UBP reality].” Kurtuluş, 17.5.1976.   
434 See for instance Aytekin Musa: “Değneğin İki Ucu da [A rock and a hard place].” Yenidüzen, 15.5.1976.  
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deny the presence of any lists endorsed by the party administration, and declared that the 
party leadership was at equal distance from all candidates.435 The competition was so 
fierce that in a different statement, released on the same day, it was announced that 
disciplinary action was started against certain candidates whose campaign violated the 
relevant party bylaw and the candidates were informed that such behaviour might lead to 
losing of the candidate status.436    
The intra-party competition did not come to an end once the candidate selection process 
was completed. This marked only the start of the next round. As discussed before, by 
allowing the voters to make preference votes among the candidates, open list electoral 
system played a key role in the fragmentation within the party. As a party founder put it 
“because of the election system, the candidates soon realized that to get elected they had to 
eliminate each other”.437 This forced candidates to campaign individually or as small 
groups against fellow candidates.438 Two specific examples may be of help to show the 
importance of the personal campaigns: First, although other parties’ ads in the newspapers 
featured all candidates of the party, some UBP candidates gave individual ads too to bolster 
their chances vis-{-vis other UBP candidates.439 Second, in a UN Security Council meeting, 
the Turkish Cypriot side was represented by the minister of finance because the state 
minister responsible for foreign affairs, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not 
want to leave the country as the UN meeting coincided with the last week of the election 
campaign.440 Instead, the Turkish Cypriot side was represented by Rüstem Tatar, the 
minister of finance, who was the only member of the cabinet who was not running for a 
seat.  
Furthermore, although the allegations in this direction were formally denied at the time, 
later many UBP members admitted how they sabotaged each other’s campaign. Konuk, for 
instance, recounts how he and another veteran, Erol Kazım found out that they were 
                                                        
435 “UBP Basın Bildirisi Yayınladı [The UBP issued a press statement].” Bozkurt, 8.5.1976.   
436“UBP Aday Yoklaması [The UBP primaries].” Zaman, 8.5.1976.  
437 Andız interviewed by author.  
438 See for instance “Bayılsınlar Böyle Birliğe [What a unity].” Kurtuluş, 14.6.1976; “Denktaş Adına Listeler 
Dağılıyor [Lists distributed on Denktaş’s behalf].” Kurtuluş, 19.6.1976.   
439 See the individual ads of Osman Örek, Kenan Atakol, Tansel Fikri, Şemsi Kazim in Halkın Sesi (19.6.1976); 
see also “Denktaş Adına Listeler Dağılıyor [Lists distributed on Denktaş’s behalf].” Kurtuluş, 19.6.1976.  
440 The Greek Cypriot side was represented by the minister of foreign affairs. “Niye New York’a Tatar’ı 
Gönderdi [Why did he send Tatar to New York]?” Halkın Sesi, 13.6.1976.  
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undermined by İrsen Küçük and also admits that they reciprocated (cited in Besim 2011: 
114). In the Famagusta district, competition between the groups of Orhan Zihni and İsmet 
Kotak was also obvious, and it was not a secret that the sides explicitly campaigned against 
each other.441 Denktaş himself was said to be involved by covertly circulating the list of 
UBP candidates he favored.442  
As all these suggest, by the time it finished its establishment process the UBP clearly 
showed major symptoms of clientelistic parties. The passive role given to the members; its 
non-ideological character; and the method of recruitment and electioneering are typical of 
machine parties. Having outlined the anatomy of the party in this chapter, in the next 
chapter I will analyze how these characteristics of the party affected its performance in 
government, and look at the development of the intra-party relations in the two-decade 
period until the late 1990s. I will show how choices made in the establishment process 
conditioned the UBP’s future organizational development and made it susceptible to 
endless factional feuding. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
441 Ergün Tamer: “Şimdi de Başbakanlık Savaşı [And now the battle over premiership].” Halkın Sesi, 
24.6.1976; “‘Kanun Adamı’ Bilgehan Seçim Günü Kanunu Çiğnedi [Bilgehan, ‘the man of law,’ broke the law on 
the ballot day].” Yenidüzen, 29.6.1976. 
442 One of Denktaş’s targets was Osman Örek, one of the most respected leaders of the pre-1974 period along 
with Dr Küçük and Denktaş; in other words, a potential rival. See “Denktaş Adına Listeler Dağılıyor [Lists 
distributed on Denktaş’s behalf].” Kurtuluş, 19.6.1976; see also “Denktaş: Artık Yabani Güvercin Demem 
[Denktaş: I will not say wild dove again].” Halkın Sesi, 15.6.1976.  
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Chapter 5: A Ruling Party at Odds with Itself  
The UBP won the first multi-party election by a landslide. By reaping the benefits of the 
electoral system, the party managed to gain thirty of the forty seats with some 53 percent 
of the votes. With a three-fourths majority in the parliament, now there was nothing that 
could stop the UBP from taking the much-delayed decisions that would bring about 
stability and prosperity. Nothing, it turned out, but itself. Like other clientelistic catch-all 
parties such as the DC, throughout its long stints in power, the UBP showed immobilism 
and failed to deliver public goods, not least economic development, largely due to endless 
power struggles within the party, which made devising and implementing a coherent 
program impossible. There were simply too many rivals and irreconcilable interests 
represented within the party.        
The intra-party feuding, which had started in the establishment period did not come to an 
end after the election. If anything, it intensified. During the first parliament (1976-1981), 
many founding members resigned from the party. Those who left were not ordinary 
members. In the period concerned, at different points, 12 deputies including the first two 
prime ministers of the TFSC resigned with serious accusations, and the disaffected deputies 
gave countless memorandums to the party leader. Notably, from the statements of those 
who resigned, it is understood that the disputes did not arise from disagreement over 
policy but rather over the distribution of cabinet seats and petty conflicts of interest. At the 
end of an extremely turbulent period, by the next election in 1981, the old guard was 
almost completely eliminated and the new guard came to control the party. This did not 
mark the beginning of a period of stability, however. Ironically, towards the end of the 
period, a crack was opened, this time, between the new guard and Denktaş who had 
initially encouraged them in their quest to eliminate the old guard.  
It is true that catch-all parties are riven with such infighting and factionalism. Yet, to fully 
explain the level of tension experienced in the UBP, the role of Denktaş should be opened to 
discussion. Illustrating this is one of the aims of this chapter. It will be shown that to a large 
extent Denktaş managed to manipulate the political agenda with backroom deals until the 
early 1990s. He was so successful in pulling the strings behind the scenes that the only 
major study in English language on the Turkish Cypriot politics in the post-1974 period 
concludes that he did not play a role in domestic politics at all. According to Dodd (1993: 
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111), Denktaş withdrew himself completely out of domestic politics. The fact that he was 
directly elected by people, Dodd argues, “helped distance him from everyday politics –
unlike Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in Turkey in the aftermath of the War of Liberation when 
in order to retain influence he had to control the Grand National Assembly – and the 
Republican People’s Party” (ibid.). Remarkably, a more recent study in Turkish language by 
Egemen arrives at a diametrically opposite conclusion about the role he played in this 
period. According to Egemen, there was not much going on in the inter-communal 
negotiations, therefore, Denktaş had enough time to singlehandedly shape domestic 
politics, and hence emerged as the sole “patron” in the period concerned (2006: 216-20).  
Neither account does accurately reflect the situation on the ground as they both overlook 
the inextricably intertwined nature of domestic politics and Cyprus negotiations on the one 
hand, and the ongoing intra-party power struggle to take over the control of the machine, 
on the other. By focusing on this tug of war, I aim to show that Denktaş was not above 
parties or politics but rather he was right in the middle of it, not as the sole patron though, 
but as one of the protagonists whose power ebbed and flowed over time. This was mainly 
due to the semi-presidential character of the system of government. It led to the 
strengthening of the prime minister vis-{-vis the president, and forced Denktaş to keep an 
eye on the developments within the UBP to avoid the rise of a potential or actual contender 
for power. Though in the early years of the TFSC, he had managed to fend off such a 
nuisance by playing different groups off each other, his tricks eventually ran out, and a 
crack opened within the party. After Eroğlu’s ascendance to premiership in 1985443, 
probably more than anything else, the power struggle between these two most prominent 
figures of the Turkish Cypriot political life in general, and the right-wing politics in 
particular, began to shape the political arena. Ironically, it was the chasm between these 
two leaders of the nationalist camp, which would pave the way for the collapse of the old 
regime in the run up to the Annan plan referendum. In this respect, the sometime open, 
sometime latent political struggle between these figures will be an underlying element of 
this and the following chapter.  
                                                        
443 Eroğlu became the leader of the party in the extraordinary party congress in December 1983, and took 
over the premiership after the 1985 parliamentary election. In the meantime, there was a transition 
government in power, which took over when the last elected-parliament of the TFSC was turned into a 
constituent assembly with the addition of appointed deputies after the unilateral declaration of independence 
on 15 November 1983.   
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Against this backdrop, in the rest of Chapter Five, I will chart the political developments at 
intra and inter-party level in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Among other things, by 
showing the intensity of personal power struggles and the lack of discipline within the 
UBP444, I will illustrate that rather than ideology or programme, the party continued to be 
held together by clientelism or to use Schattschneider’s terms, by the “cohesive power of 
public plunder” (cited in Sartori: 52-3). This character of the party goes a long way to 
account for the failure in economic development efforts as well. Additionally, I will touch 
upon the political competition at the inter-party level and the significant role played by 
Ankara in keeping the UBP in power, and hence forming a “guided democracy”.     
5.1 The Rise of the Junta     
The party’s internal divisions, already evident in the campaign trail, burst out once the 
election was won. The first civil war within the party broke out immediately after the 
election in the form of a succession crisis.445 Who would be the prime minister and leader 
of the party after Denktaş who was by constitution forbidden to hold the party 
chairmanship? There were at least four hopefuls. Those being talked about included Osman 
Örek and Vedat Çelik. However, Orhan Zihni Bilgehan and Nejat Konuk were mentioned 
most. After consultations with various political actors for two weeks, Denktaş decided to 
appoint Konuk as his prime minister -though he was not his first choice.446 In accordance 
with Denktaş’s election pledge to renew his team, in the first Konuk cabinet, five of the ten 
seats went to the new members of the parliament: Eroğlu, Hakkı Atun, Mehmet Altınay, Ali 
Atun, İrsen Küçük, and the sixth seat went to a former bureaucrat from outside the 
parliament, Nail Asaf. Indeed, Nejat Konuk and Erol Kazım aside, none of the members of 
the new cabinet had ever taken part in a government before 1973.447 Experienced names 
like Örek, Kotak, Tatar, Manyera, and Korhan were all out. Of particular importance was the 
                                                        
444 As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, this is an indirect indicator of political clientelism.  
445 See for instance Ergün Tamer: “Şimdi de Başbakanlık Savaşı [And now the battle over premiership].” 
Halkın Sesi, 24.6.1976; “UBP’de Başbakanlık Bunalımı Var [Crisis over premiership in the UBP].” Halkın Sesi, 
28.6.1976.  
446 According to Kotak, Denktaş and the Turkish ambassador Asaf İnhan’s choice was Vedat Çelik (“Tekerleme 
ile İktidara Yeniden Adaylık Koyan Parti [The party which wants to come to power again by regurgitating the 
same things].” Olay, 26.1.1981); see also İsmet Kotak: “UBP Gitsin de Kim Gelirse Gelsin Demiyoruz [We do 
not say that it does not matter whoever replaces the UBP as long as it is replaced].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 
11.6.1981.  
447 Only two out of eleven, Erol Kazım and Nejat Konuk had ever served in a cabinet before 1973. For the 
cabinets see Fevzioğlu 1998: 55, 62.  
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elimination of Kotak, probably the most influential social democrat within the party. 
Though the premiership was in the old guard’s hands, the new round of the intra-party 
rivalry was obviously won by the new-guard.  
The new cabinet not only failed to impress independent observers448 but also sowed the 
first seeds of division, as some of the party members’ expectations were not met. 
Particularly, Kotak, who found himself out in the cold, was resentful. He organized other 
backbenchers close to him and waged a war in the parliamentary committees against the 
cabinet, blocking the passing of bills, and effectively paralyzing the operation of the 
government.449 Furthermore, even before its first year in office came to an end, two groups 
of deputies gave the prime minister memoranda urging him to make changes in his 
cabinet.450 The secretary general of the party, Raif Denktaş, also talked about “a fresh 
start”.451 When their memorandum went unheeded, six of them resigned as members of the 
parliamentary committees in protest.452 Two of them who were in the executive committee, 
and four of them who were also in the party assembly resigned from those posts as well.453 
Few months later Kotak left the party. Soon, another deputy, Özel Tahsin454 who was 
known to be close to Kotak followed him.455   
Discontent was not limited to the backbenchers. When it came to governing, it was seen 
that the conflict between contending interest groups was so big that working in harmony in 
the cabinet was impossible. In the then minister of interior, Orhan Zihni’s words, “every 
minister had his own kingdom; all of them were more concerned with satisfying their 
                                                        
448 Eşref Çetinel: “Ve Bakanlar Kurulu [And the council of ministers].” Bozkurt, 7.7.1976.  
449 Kotak interviewed by author. See also Eşref Çetinel: “UBP’de Neler Oluyor [What is going on in the UBP]?” 
Bozkurt, 21.12.1976.  
450 See “İsmet Kotak Ulusal Birlik Partisi’nden İstifa Etti [Kotak resigned from the UBP].” Bozkurt, 2.9.1977; 
See also “Dokuz UBP’li Milletvekili Hükümetin İstifasını İstedi [9 deputies have demanded the resignation of 
the government].” Halkın Sesi, 5.6.1977; Fuat Veziroğlu: “Parça Parça [Broken into pieces].” Halkın Sesi, 
18.6.1977.      
451 “Raif Denktaş: ‘Yeni Bir Başlangıç Gerekecektir’ [Raif Denktaş: A fresh start will be needed].” Zaman, 
9.6.1977.  
452 İsmet Kotak, Özel Tahsin, Hüseyin Curcioğlu, Feridun Adahan, Hasan Murat, Mustafa Hacı Ahmet (“Altı 
UBP Milletvekili Meclis Komitelerinden İstifa Etti [6 UBP deputies have resigned from the parliamentary 
committees].” Halkın Sesi, 15.7.1977). 
453 “UBP’li Dört Milletvekili Parti Meclisinden İstifa Etti [4 UBP deputies have resigned from the party 
assembly].” Halkın Sesi, 17.7.1977; “Hasan Murat ve Özel Tahsin UBP Merkez Yönetim Kurulundan İstifa 
Ettiler [Murat and Tahsin have resigned from the UBP’s executive committee].” Zaman, 16.7.1977. 
454 See Olay, 17.7.1978.  
455 Later, he returned to the party (According to İsmet Kotak, they (Özel Tahsin and Hüseyin Curcioğlu) were 
forced by the Türk-Sen leader, Necati Taşkın to do so, and they were promised a seat in the cabinet in return 
(interviewed by author).    
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bunch of followers than working for the common good of the society”.456 Given this, no 
wonder that three ministers resigned even before the first year of the government was 
over. Altınay, the minister of finance who was the first to resign showed “the lack of 
harmony within the party” as the cause of his resignation.457 In his resignation statement 
he pointed out “the conflict of different philosophies and views” and “a competition to 
protect different interest groups” within the party.458 The statement continued as follows: 
While a number of urgent economic and financial problems were piling up, the 
factions within the party turned their attention to a battle for seats in the cabinet, 
and the intra-party conflict reached to a level damaging the public’s interests.  
He left the party as well, and after few months joined the TKP.459 In the statement, he 
issued upon joining the TKP, he said “[i]n the UBP government, the constitution has been 
disregarded, and the state lost its functionality due to an administrative chaos … internal 
and external problems have been addressed with arbitrary, particularistic, short-term and 
superficial approaches”.460 Although, the resignations of the ministers of education, and 
commerce were also mooted at the time, Konuk said this was “out of the question”.461 
However, he was confounded few months later, when the minister of education, Eroğlu 
tendered his resignation. His reasons were not so different from Altınay’s: “Unrest within 
the party due to different views, lack of discipline, and disharmony”.462 Unlike Altınay, he 
did not leave the party, but rather focused on strengthening his base in the Famagusta 
district.   
Nail Asaf, who was the minister of commerce with no political background, quit silently.463 
At a time when imports were subject to controls, his position was of immense significance. 
He was under the pressure of commercial interest groups within the party. Tired of this, 
when he went to Denktaş to ask for his help, the answer he received from the president 
                                                        
456 Interviewed by author.  
457 “Yeni Bakan Bugün Açıklanacak [The new minister to be announced today].” Zaman, 16.12.1976. 
458 “Mehmet Altınay İstifa Nedenini Açıkladı: UBP’de Toplum Çıkarlarına Zararlı Çalışmalar Var [Altınay 
revealed why he resigned: The UBP is working against the interests of the people].” Bozkurt, 18.12.1976. 
459 “Altınay TKP’ye Geçti [Altınay joined the TKP].” Halkın Sesi, 28.6.1977. 
460 Altınay’s Statements cited in “Altınay TKP’ye Geçti [Altınay joined the TKP].” Halkın Sesi, 28.6.1977. 
461 “Konuk: Yeni Bir İstifa Soz Konusu Değil [Konuk: A new resignation is out of question].” Bozkurt, 
18.12.1976.  
462 “Dr Derviş Eroğlu Bakanlıktan Ayrıldı [Dr Derviş Eroğlu resigned as minister].” Bozkurt, 7.5.1977. 
463 See “UBP İçinde Listelerin Dolaştığına İlişkin Haber Spekülasyondan İbarettir [The newspaper reports 
alleging that lists are circulated within the UBP ranks are speculation].” Zaman, 23.6.1977.  
149 
 
was quite telling: “You took this ministry business too seriously!” with further remarks 
implicitly, advising him not to bite the hand, which feeds him.464 Obviously, Denktaş did not 
want to trouble the KTTO and sacrificed Asaf. It is remarkable that two of the ministers to 
resign had key policy-making portfolios. 
Konuk himself lasted only a little bit more. Although he had weathered the first storm in 
May 1977 by making a small-scale cabinet reshuffle, in March 1978, he finally succumbed 
and tendered his resignation as prime minister, party leader, and party member. Though 
he was convinced to form the government once again by Ankara465, few days later he 
withdrew on the grounds of ill health.466 To understand this resignation, we have to look at 
the balance of power within the party, as well as the broader political context, where 
Denktaş and Ankara were involved as protagonists. 
When we look at the intra-party situation, we see that the new guard, who waged a war 
against the old guard before the elections, played a major role in this resignation. Unlike 
those in the DC, it is difficult to call this group a faction as it had a fluid structure with 
transient alliances and it is equally difficult to say the competition was fuelled by 
ideological differences though this was not completely absent. Main figures of the new 
guard were Raif Denktaş, İrsen Küçük and Enver Emin, the Nicosia clique, who 
ideologically represented the right wing of the party. Particularly, Raif Denktaş was said to 
have close relations with the MHP.467 Those they opposed to, Kotak and Konuk, on the 
other hand represented the social democratic wing.468 Still, in the final analysis, it should 
be noted that personal power struggle aspect outweighed the role of ideology as the cause 
of the conflict.   
                                                        
464 Anonymous interviewee  who was present at the meeting.  
465 See İsmet Kotak: “CHP ve Bürokratlar [The CHP and bureaucrats].” Olay, 1.5.1978; see also Konuk cited in 
Besim (2011: 122). Here Konuk says, he was asked by the Turkish ambassador and the foreign minister to 
withdraw his resignation. 
466 “Konuk Başbakanlık Görevinden Affını İstedi [Konuk resigned as prime minister].” Zaman, 12.4.1978. 
467 See for instance Refik Erduran: “1979 Kıbrıs’ta Dönüm Yılı [1979: The turning point in Cyprus] (7).” 
Milliyet, 14.1.1979. 
468 According to Milliyet, Konuk was under pressure from the MHP wing of the Turkish government (Akay 
Cemal: “Rumlar Ecevit’in Açıklamasını İhtiyatla Karşıladı [Greek Cypriots cautiuos about the statements of 
Ecevit].” Milliyet, 11.1.1978). 
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The key person of the Nicosia clique was İrsen Küçük, a wealthy landowner469. Similar to 
Raif Denktaş, his power largely derived from his surname. He was the nephew of the 
former community leader Dr Küçük, and indeed he was admitted to the party to weaken 
his uncle’s strong opposition against the UBP: “We toured the villages together. Everyone 
saw that our biggest critic’s nephew had joined us,” Konuk recounts (cited in Besim 2011: 
113-4). Unlike Raif Denktaş, however, thanks to his position in the cabinet as the minister 
of agriculture, he managed to build a political base of his own in a short time470 (see also 
Egemen 2006: 229). By establishing a patronage network around the ministry and 
affiliated institutions, and capitalizing on his uncle’s surname, İrsen Küçük soon became a 
heavyweight within the party, and before long set his eyes on the premiership.  
What finally triggered Konuk’s resignation was a demonstration organized by the Farmers 
Association to protest the government’s decision to raise the price of diesel fuel (see also 
Dodd 1993: 114), and the active role played by the Nicosia clique in this demonstration.471 
It should be noted that, earlier, six other professional associations, including the KTTO, 
protested the decision, and called a strike, which brought the commercial life to a halt. The 
price hike was indeed part of a larger package of austerity measures, which were 
introduced after “consultations” with Ankara. In other words, the prime minister Konuk 
was between a rock and a hard place.  
Halkın Sesi reported the Association’s demonstration with a piece entitled, “The UBP 
members strongly protested the UBP government,” commenting that such things could 
happen only in the TFSC.472 Two UBP deputies, Civisilli and Hacıahmetoğlu played a leading 
role in the organization of the demonstration.473 Raif Denktaş, who was the deputy 
secretary general of the party at the time, gave his support openly by sending a telegram, 
which was read aloud at the demonstration. In the face of this revolt within the party, 
                                                        
469 Örsan Öymen: “Kıbrıs’ta Battaniyenin Ekonomi Politiği [The political economy of blanket in Cyprus].” 
Milliyet, 2.4.1978. 
470 Refik Erduran: “1979 Kıbrıs’ta Dönüm Yılı [1979: The turning point in Cyprus] (7).” Milliyet, 14.1.1979; 
“Hayvan Yetiştiricileri ve Besleyicileri Birliği Yeksan Bakay Açıklama Yaptı [The chairman of the association 
of animal husbandry issued a statement].” Yeni Devir, 10.1.1979; “UBP’nin Partizanlığı Büyüyor: TKP Hesap 
Soracak [The UBP’s clientelism is growing: The TKP will hold accountable].” Kurtuluş, 9.1.1980.  
471 Enver Emin interviewed by author; for a detailed analysis see “Hükümet Buhranının Hikayesi [The story of 
the government crisis].” Olay, 17.4.1978; see also Örsan Öymen: “Girne’de Bir Buluşma [A meeting in 
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472 24.3.1978.  
473 Ibid. 
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Konuk decided to resign: “I could have started a disciplinary action and dismissed them 
from the party, but this would have created tension with the president who shared the 
same surname with the deputy secretary general,” he said.474     
In fact, Konuk was initilly convinced to withdraw his resignation and to form a new 
government, when his two conditions were acccepted: Raif Denktaş’s resignation as the 
deputy secretary general, and the exclusion of İrsen Küçük from the cabinet.475 “Whatever 
it takes, the UBP should become an internally coherent and disciplined party with 
members who fully believe in its program,”476 he was quoted as saying after accepting to 
form a government upon the guarantee given by the parliamentary party to support him 
unconditionally. “I resigned earlier, when I came to realize that I had difficulty in 
implementing the program of the party due to lack of discipline and support from the party 
administration, and because I faced resistance in dispensing the public benefits in a socially 
just manner,” he continued.477 His intention was to form a government with the 
participation of technocrats.478 Though Raif Denktaş accepted to resign479, İrsen Küçük 
responded by flexing his political muscle. In the blink of an eye, he mobilized the chairmen 
of 120 out of 136 party sections along with 161 mukhtars behind himself.480 Obviously, he 
was firmly in control of the party’s grassroots organizations thanks to his patronage power.  
Having failed to elicit Denktaş’s support against İrsen Küçük and realizing that he stood no 
chance of winning a probable race for leadership against him in the upcoming party 
conference, Konuk surrendered.481 His statements after the second resignation shed 
further light on the nature of Turkish Cypriot politics: As for the intra-party power struggle, 
                                                        
474 “Konuk İstifa Nedenlerini Olay’a Açıkladı [Konuk revealed the reasons behind his resignation to Olay].” 
Olay, 24.4.1978.  
475 “Hükümet Buhranının Hikayesi [The story of the government crisis].” Olay, 17.4.1978, p. 16. 
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secretary general of the UBP].” Zaman, 14.4.1978. 
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481 He decided to resign after meeting Denktaş. See “Başbakan Nejat Konuk Devlet Başkanı Denktaş’a 
Temasları Hakkında Bilgi Verdi.” Zaman, 11.4.1978, and “Konuk Başbakanlık Görevinde Affını İstedi [Konuk 
has resigned as prime minister].” Zaman, 12.4.1978.  
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“I have always been against clientelism (partizanlik). Working only for the benefit of the 
party would serve nothing but to degenerating democracy,” he said. According to Konuk, 
the developments paving the way for his resignation, particularly the efforts to keep İrsen 
Küçük in his place, put the party in a ludicrous position in the public opinion; "the party is 
no longer an institution, which commands people’s respect … it was degraded to a level 
where a battle could be waged for a cabinet seat; interests”. Regarding the role of Denktaş 
within the party, “it is true that on paper I have power, but I was held under tutelage,” 
Konuk said.482 He concluded his statements as follows:  
I hope the next prime minister will not be someone who works only for the benefit 
of the party. I hope he will not allow the others to withhold his constitutional 
authorities, and find ways to prevent such attempts in a definitive way because no 
prime minister should be held under tutelage. I hope the new prime minister will 
not suffer the torment I have gone through.483    
What did Konuk mean when he said he was held under tutelage? To answer this question, a 
parenthesis should be opened and the relationship between Denktaş, the prime minister 
and party should be elaborated. First, it should be pointed out that in this period, the UBP 
leaders and prime ministers were not elected by the party but rather appointed after the 
selection was made behind closed doors by the so-called Coordination Council -an extra-
constitutional body -which involved the president, the Turkish ambassador and the 
commanders of the Turkish armed forces in the island.484 The party conference to elect the 
chairman of the party was held afterwards to rubberstamp this selection. Nor was he 
independent in running the daily affairs. Firstly, his power was constrained by the 
president. As Ahmet Atamsoy, a party member close to Konuk, put it, Konuk heard the 
composition of his cabinet on radio on his way to the president’s office485, although the 
constitution vested the power to choose the ministers in the prime minister. The exclusion 
of Kotak from the cabinet, for instance, was Denktaş’s decision, not Konuk’s. It was also 
Denktaş who outlined the targets of the new government.486 Furthermore, he maintained 
                                                        
482 “Konuk İstifa Nedenlerini Olay’a Açıkladı [Konuk revealed the reasons behind his resignation to Olay].” 
Olay, 24.4.1978.  
483 Ibid. 
484 Samioğlu interviewed by author.  
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to be a player in the executive, particularly by sending his famous personal notes written 
on small paper scraps (pusula) to the ministers concerned about the petitions of citizens, 
and from time to time he continued presiding over cabinet meetings.487 Second constrain, 
(though Konuk did not refer to it) was imposed by Ankara. In a former Turkish 
ambassador’s words “the number two in the Turkish embassy used to attend all cabinet 
meetings, act like a second prime minister and later in the day report to the ambassador” 
(İnal Batu cited in İnanç 2007: 100). In other words, the post of prime minister was highly 
symbolic and in practice the BEY administration was firmly in place even after 1974. 
The process following the resignation of Konuk also showed that even ostensibly 
omnipotent Denktaş did not have a free hand in picking the prime minister. He was in an 
uneasy situation in the sense that he had to balance not only the demands of different 
groups within the party but Ankara as well. It was not a secret that Konuk’s successor 
Osman Örek was neither Denktaş’s nor the party’s pick but rather imposed by Ankara.488  
İrsen Küçük, by now the strongest man in the party, had to settle for the secretary 
generalship of the party for the moment.489 However, he was not deterred. Emboldened by 
its victory, the Nicosia clique he led, which was now referred to as the junta, toppled Örek 
within less than seven months, this time triggering a larger crisis. In other words, Konuk’s 
wishes for his successor did not come true and Örek went through a similar ordeal490, and 
his stint came to an abrupt end when seven of his cabinet members tendered their 
resignations.491 He quit few days later when his attempt to secure support to form a new 
government failed. The foremost cause of his resignation, in his words, was “lack of 
discipline, disharmony and conflicts within the party”.492 He also highlighted that “some of 
his fellow party members forced him as the head of the government to take decisions that 
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would violate the constitution” and that “they most of the time pushed the public interest 
aside and acted for political expedience”.493  
The causes of Örek’s resignation were not so different from the ones expressed by Konuk 
earlier. Yet, his statements about the functioning of the party were even more striking and 
bolder. In an interview he gave to the Turkish daily Hürriyet, he revealed the conflict 
between the government and parliamentary party; particularistic demands; and how this 
conflict made the country ungovernable:494  
The conflict fundamentally derives from the meanings we attribute to the state, 
government and constitutional principles. This disease emerged in the very first 
meeting of the Federated Assembly where we had a two-thirds majority [sic]. The 
majority of the fellow parliamentary party members had views regarding the 
position of the speaker of the parliament and government that would bring about a 
"parliamentary dictatorship".495  
Another fundamental difference: We, as the government, are bound by the 
government program, budget and annual plan. In the program, we have said that we 
were going to cut spending and increase revenue.  
Today, the tax burden is on the civil servants and workers employed in the public 
sector. There has been a tax bill in the parliament for years. No one even talks about 
it … To give an example, we wanted to update the price of hunting licenses, which 
had not been changed since 1936. After great difficulty, we passed it in the 
parliament. Imagine a citizen, who pays 10 thousand liras to buy a hunting rifle. 
When we ask this fellow to pay 100 liras for annual license, all hell breaks loose. Is 
that normal?   
When asked about the disagreements within the cabinet, the former prime minister 
answered as follows: 
The basic problem is this: Imagine a government, which the society expects to solve 
urgent problems with bills and decisions based on principles. And you, as the 
council of ministers, are made to deal with such issues as giving civil servant X a pay 
rise, transferring civil servant Y from one place to another, and raising the salary of 
a watchman in village Z by 50 lira.  
Even more striking than these statements is what Örek revealed about the level of 
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494 Ziya Akçapar: “Kıbrıs’ta Gizli Savaş [Secret war in Cyprus].” Hürriyet (Reprinted in Kurtuluş, 15.12.1978).  
495 Elsewhere Örek said that the parliamentary party had the tendency to act as a “government above 
government”. Particularly, they wanted to have a say on the government bills, and appointments to the high 
level posts in the bureaucracy (Halkın Sesi, 7.12.1978).   
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corruption within the UBP, when the interviewer reminded him that even some party 
members call the government “the government of smugglers”. Among other things, he 
conceded that he turned a blind eye to the smuggling activities of the fellow deputies’ 
relatives, in the name of preserving the party’s unity:     
Let's talk straight. Has smuggling started with my government? … Strange but true; 
do you know who is accusing the government most about smuggling? One stands up, 
and goes like "smugglers are passing through the Ledra Palace checkpoint. Is the 
government sleeping?" You look into it, and find out that who is smuggling is the 
father-in-law of this fellow deputy. He did everything to cover it up. We say the 
party, we say the [national] cause and bite our lip. He keeps shouting. Another 
fellow deputy shouts. You look into it and see that he is in collaboration with 
another smuggler.  
Örek’s resignation as prime minister, party leader, and party member triggered a domino 
effect. Erol Kazım, Feridun Adahan, Tansel Fikri, Orhan Zihni and Hüseyin Curcioğlu 
followed him.496 When Mustafa Hacıahmetoğlu resigned due to different reasons, the UBP 
lost its majority in the parliament.497 At this point, Denktaş interfered, and made the so-
called Türk-Sen deputies return to the party by using his influence on the Türk-Sen 
president, Necati Taşkın.498 After this, Orhan Zihni and Hacıahmetoğlu also returned and 
Tansel Fikri gave support while staying independent.       
But why did not Denktaş use his clout before things got out of hand? First, it would be a 
mistake to see this only as a vicious intra-party power struggle. If we are to reach a more 
complete understanding, these developments should be put into the broader context of 
Cyprus problem, and Denktaş’s desire to remain at the helm should be factored in. No 
matter what he said, Denktaş’s actions in this period demonstrated that he did not espouse 
the form of government and, in the course of the 1970s, what we see is “presidential 
primacy” in the executive branch. Indeed, all Denktaş needed was a lightning rod to deflect 
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criticisms in domestic politics. An independent and strong prime minister, who could go 
beyond that would be a threat to his power. So the presence of an intra-party opposition 
was an effective means to keep the prime minister’s power in check, and hence it was in 
Denktaş’s favour; of course, so long as this competition did not lead to the UBP losing its 
majority in the parliament.  
Indeed, at the time there was a wide consensus in the political circles that Konuk’s 
resignation was the result of “collusion between the father and son Denktaş”.499 Some 
believe that Denktaş undermined him, when he came to perceive him as a threat to his 
monopoly of handling the relations with Ankara as well as the Cyprus negotiations.500 The 
developments in the run up to Konuk’s toppling corroborate this account. Few months 
before Konuk’s resignation, Ecevit501 who was known to have disagreements with Denktaş 
over the strategy to solve the Cyprus conflict, not only upgraded the status of his Turkish 
Cypriot counterpart, Konuk, vis-{-vis Denktaş by inviting him to Ankara502, but also 
welcomed the involvement, and contribution of the opposition in the negotiation process. 
Ahmet Tolgay, who participated in this trip as a member of the Turkish Cypriot delegation 
suggests that the rising prestige of Konuk was not welcomed on the island (cited in Besim 
2011: 121). “I faced with jealousies and tricks of politics for the first time after this Ankara 
visit,” he recounted decades later (ibid.).   
After Örek’s resignation, and Denktaş’s refusal to give the premiership to İrsen Küçük503, 
the junta did not feel the need to hide the fact that “they were looking for a weak prime 
minister”.504 They found what they were looking for in Mustafa Çağatay (henceforth 
Çağatay). This was a curious choice because few months before, Çağatay also resigned as 
the minister of health because of “the disorganization within the parliamentary party” only 
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to return a week later after assurances of his fellow deputies.505 Under Çağatay, the 
influence of the parliamentary party, to whom he owed his premiership, grew. The 
influential deputies started to attend cabinet meetings “to make sure that the group held 
the reigns”.506 In other words, “the parliamentary dictatorship,” Örek had pointed out 
earlier was finally established. 
The party administration was under the junta’s control. İrsen Küçük was still the secretary 
general and the central committee was largely made up of the junta members including 
Raif Denktaş, Enver Emin and Recep Ali Gürler.507 Even more importantly they took the 
complete control of the grassroots organizations. By the 1980 party conference, they 
placed their loyalists into the delegate lists, which would vote in the primary elections the 
following year. The number of delegates was again highly inflated. If the figures were to be 
believed, the UBP had 35 thousand members in Nicosia alone, where the total number of 
registered voters stood at 37 thousand; and 24,500 members in Famagusta where there 
were 26 thousand registered voters.508       
After the establishment of the first Çağatay government, the party seemed to be stabilized 
for a while. This did not last long, however.  
5.2 Split Within the Junta and Raif Denktaş’s Anti-Clientelistic Intra-Party 
Opposition  
By late 1980, intra-party affairs started to take a new turn, when for the first time, Raif 
Denktaş, a representative of the powerful junta started publicly complaining about, and 
exposing the party’s clientelistic structure and policies. This section will outline the process, 
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which started as intra-party, anti-clientelistic, renewal movement and culminated with Raif 
Denktaş’s resignation from the party after his defeat in the primaries ahead of the 1981 
parliamentary election. Essentially, what Raif Denktaş said was not so different from what 
other dissidents had said before. What made Raif Denktaş different was (a) his decision to 
stay and fight, and (b) his surname. His failure to transform the party therefore can also be 
seen as a major watershed in what would become the de-Denktashization of the UBP and a 
harbinger of more instability in the years to come.       
The first sign of the approaching storm came in April 1980 when Raif Denktaş in a 
parliamentary speech described the UBP’s four years in government as a failure to 
Çağatay’s chagrin, who replied Raif Denktaş by reminding him of his duties to the party and 
saying he “should learn intra-party discipline”.509 The performance of the party in the 
municipal elections held in June, did not help Çağatay either. Particularly, Kyrenian 
members of the cabinet (Gürçağ, Çaydamlı and Çağatay himself) were held responsible for 
the electoral defeat in Kyrenia.510 In November, the pressure on Çağatay piled further up 
when he received two consecutive memoranda from six dissident Famagusta deputies511 
led by Eroğlu who made his debut as a rising party star, followed by a boycott of the 
parliament.512  
On the face of it, this was “a call for dynamism,” and an attempt “to warn the government 
about important issues in accordance with parliamentary regime and intra-party 
democracy”.513 According to Kotak, a former UBP deputy from Famagusta and a journalist, 
however, this was all about grabbing a cabinet seat, which would be of immense help to get 
re-elected in the upcoming elections: Famagustians were demanding three ministries on 
the ground that Famagusta was underrepresented with only one seat (Ali Atun) while 
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despite its small size Kyrenia was having three.514 Either way, intra-party relations seemed 
to be far from being harmonious.   
This crisis was quickly pushed off the agenda when a scandal broke out involving 
Cypfruvex, the SEE responsible for management of the exports of the citrus produces, by 
far the most important cash crop. According to the report submitted to the government and 
undersigned by the minister of finance as well as the top bureaucrats from various 
ministries, the company was “virtually bankrupt” and there was a discrepancy of USD 21 
million in its books.515 This was a huge figure for the cash-strapped government as it 
represented slightly more than half of all export earnings in 1979. Soon, it was revealed by 
the ministry of finance that the loss of hard currency was much higher than this as there 
were also some private companies, which did not bring the country the hard currency 
obtained from exports.516 At a time when, international trade and foreign currency 
transactions were supposedly subject to strict government control, this affair was yet 
another sign showing the weakness of the government to make and enforce laws vis-{-vis 
not only the private sector but also its own appointees at the SEEs.517       
Though the Cypfruvex scandal led to the pushing aside of the Famagustians’ revolt518, the 
tension within the party did not ease because contrary to the mood within the 
parliamentary group, Raif Denktaş was against a cover-up. In his newspaper, where he 
wrote with the pseudonym, Ülkü Cem, he held the government responsible for the 
bankruptcy and called for its resignation.519 Subsequently, he voted along with the 
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hard currency earnings that have not been brought to the country].” Halkın Sesi, 13.12.1980.  
517 For a critical analysis see two articles by Dr Fazıl Küçük: “Daha Neyi Bekliyorlar [What are they waiting 
for]?” and “Suç Kimde [Whose fault is it]?” published in Halkın Sesi on 2.12.1980 and 11.12.1980 respectively.   
518 It was quickly swept under the carpet thanks to the efforts of Denktaş (“Denktaş’ın Çabası Bunalımı 
Yumuşattı [Denktaş’s efforts have eased the crisis].” Halkın Sesi, 17.11.1980).  
519 Ülkü Cem: “Hükümete [To the government].” Zaman (Reprinted in Kurtuluş, 7.11.1980); see also the 
minutes of his speech at the parliament (“Raif Denktaş UBP’yi Sarstı [Raif Denktaş shook the UBP].” Olay, 
24.11.1980, pp. 13-4).  
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opposition in favour of a motion to open a general debate in the parliament on the 
agricultural policy of the government.520 The motion was defeated by a slim margin: 17-16. 
However, Raif Denktaş’s offensive against the government did not subside but rather 
intensified; now he was targeting the party as a whole. Though his resignation was 
speculated521, he was determined to stay and fight.522 Accordingly, few weeks later, with a 
letter addressed to Çağatay, he announced the setting up of the revolutionary Kemalist 
opposition group within the UBP. He expressed the views and aims of the group with 
various press conferences, press releases and paid ads.  
When these statements are studied, they give the impression that Raif Denktaş was 
basically trying to form what Shefter calls a “constituency for universalism” or a 
“constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” within the party against the already entrenched 
“constituency for patronage”. To quote Shefter, these are “the groups that oppose the 
patronage system, that insist that public benefits and burdens be allocated according to a 
set of general, universalistic rules and procedures, and that seek to defend the autonomy of 
the bureaucracy from politicians who seek to intervene before it on a case-by case basis” 
(1994: 28). In this respect, Raif Denktaş’s movement was probably the last chance to 
reinvent the UBP as a program-oriented party. To show this, below, I will highlight few 
excerpts from the group’s statements, where the analysis of the UBP’s stint in government 
is made.  
To start with, according to the group, the government was “spiritless,” “directionless,” 
“visionless” and “inept”; “there was no difference between having this government and no 
government at all”. It was basically not doing anything other than “addressing 
particularistic demands”; it was just “muddling through”. In the group’s view, the 
government was incapable of setting up a state mechanism that would solve problems on 
time and on spot in a universalistic manner. As a result, citizens were forced to look for 
                                                        
520 “Cypfruvex’deki Suistimaller ve Tarım Politikası ile İlgili TKP’nin Genel Görüşme Önerisine, Raif Denktaş 
Muhalefetle Birlikte Olumlu Oy Verdi [Raif Denktaş voted together with the opposition in favor of the TKP 
motion to hold a general debate about the abuses in Cypfruvex and the agricultural policy].” Halkın Sesi, 
5.12.1980; Olay, 8.12.1980, p. 20.  
521 “Raif Denktaş UBP’den İstifa Ettiğini Yalanladı [Raif Denktaş denied the allegations that he resigned from 
the UBP].” Bozkurt, 21.11.1980.  
522 “Raif Denktaş: Kesinlikle İstifa Etmem ... ‘Hükümet Kaybolan Yılları Geri Getiremedi’ [Raif Denktaş: I’m 
definitely not going to resign ... ‘The government fails to make up for lost years’].” Halkın Sesi, 30.12.1980. For 
an overall analysis of the developments within the UBP until the late January see Olay, 26.1.1981.  
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particularistic remedies, which in turn led to the taking root of a perception in the public 
mind that there was an absolute need to find a patron if one is to obtain his rights. In a 
similar vein, referring to the widespread unemployment problem, they said, “solving the 
problems of individuals but not addressing the collective causes of them is neither talent 
nor politics”.523   
In an op-ed published in Halkın Sesi, Raif Denktaş describes the relationship between the 
business circles, high-level bureaucracy and government as follows:   
Bureaucracy has been contaminated by bourgeoisie while bribery and favoritism 
have been institutionalized. Those who have come to power with the votes of 
villagers and workers have completely lost their contact with this base and have 
become conflated with the corrupt high-level bureaucracy. The contact with the 
base has been reduced to providing benefits to or solving problems of those who 
can bring votes. In other words, the UBP, which has come to power with the votes of 
artisans and laborers, in practice have become the government of corrupt 
bureaucracy-bourgeoisie due to its choices of cabinet members.524         
This catastrophic state of affairs was the result of the candidate selection in the 1976 
primaries, according to the group: “The UBP may come to power by nominating whoever 
that can bring votes. However, a group, who come together on the basis of this philosophy, 
as the experience has showed, does not deliver”.525 As the party was not in a position to ask 
for votes in the upcoming elections based on their performance in the government, the only 
way out for the party would be to come up with cadres that would put the UBP’s program 
into practice. Accordingly, the first target of the group was announced as “coming up with a 
coherent and reliable list of candidates, and wiping off the useless and parasitic names” in 
the primary elections. Çağatay was warned not to allow the members of his cabinet to 
exploit their positions as ministers to retain their seats. To secure this, a technocratic 
government was proposed to conduct daily affairs until the election.526 Not surprisingly, 
this was not put into practice, and as it was revealed in a later statement, “the exhausted 
                                                        
523 UBP Kemalist Devrimci Muhalefet Grubu Duyuru No. 1 [The UBP Kemalist Revolutionary Opposition 
Group Announcement No. 1]. Halkın Sesi, 21.1.1981. 
524 Raif Denktaş: “Niçin Kemalist Devrim [Why Kemalist revolution]?” Op-Ed, Halkın Sesi, 19.1.1981.  
525 “Raif Denktaş’ın Yeni Açıklaması [Raif Denktaş’s new statement].” Halkın Sesi, 10.2.1981.  
526 Cited in “Raif Denktaş Neler Söyledi [What did Raif Denktaş say]?” Halkın Sesi, 26.4.1981.  
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party administration” started “using public sources to hunt voters and party delegates as it 
did in 1976”.527   
No wonder these statements attracted the wrath of the party administration. For the first 
time in the party history, a disciplinary action was initiated. Although, this led to Raif 
Denktaş’s resignation from the party, he was quickly convinced to stay by Emin, another 
extremely influential backbencher, and the disciplinary action was shelved. Apparently, 
Emin promised him to work together in the primary elections to eliminate those they held 
responsible for the dismal performance of the party.528 Accordingly, before the Nicosia 
primary, where there were 55 candidates for 18 spots in the party ticket, Raif Denktaş, 
İrsen Küçük and Emin secretly agreed on 18 names of whom 15 were neophytes.529 In 
other words, four ministers (Atakol, Atun, Gürler and Tahsin) from the serving cabinet and 
Şemsi Kazım, a veteran deputy, were all excluded with a view to “injecting new blood to the 
party”.  
This was a rather curious pact. It is true that İrsen Küçük, Emin and Raif Denktaş, the 
famous junta, had worked together for the most of the previous five years. However, İrsen 
Küçük and to a lesser extent Emin were the embodiment of everything Raif Denktaş had 
challenged with his Kemalist group in the previous months. It was them who represented 
the “constituency for patronage” within the party. This became obvious once again in the 
run up to the primaries.      
When the primary season came, İrsen Küçük was clearly the strongest man in the party.530 
His strength largely derived from two factors. Firstly, his role as the secretary general of 
the party put him into an extremely advantageous position in the selection of party 
delegates who would vote in the primaries. This power was used extensively in the branch 
                                                        
527 UBP Kemalist Devrimci Muhalefet Grubu Duyuru No. 1 [The UBP Kemalist Revolutionary Opposition 
Group’s Announcement No. 1]. Halkın Sesi, 21.1.1981. 
528 See for instance “Atakol ve Atun Liste Dışı Bırakılmak İsteniyor [There are efforts to exclude Atakol and 
Atun from the party ticket].” Kurtuluş, 20.3.1981; “Perde Aralığından [Through the curtain].” Kurtuluş, 
24.4.1981.    
529 See Raif Denktaş’s statements cited in Olay, 11.5.1981.   
530 According to Turkish daily Cumhuriyet, for instance, İrsen Küçük could easily take the control of the party 
should Denktaş remain neutral, see Olay, 5.1.1981, p. 7 (originally published in Cumhuriyet, 31.12.1980). For 
İrsen Küçük’s strength in the party in the eve of the primaries see Olay, 23.3.1981, p. 17.  
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conferences in the run up to the 1980 party conference.531 Considering the fact that over 
two thousand and four hundred delegates eventually voted in the primary elections, and 
that each delegate represented 25 members, the number of delegates was obviously 
inflated532, and no one could manipulate the number of delegates better than the secretary 
general.533 As it would be revealed later, in the run up to the primaries, İrsen Küçük had 
signed up 200 bogus delegates534, and in an arbitrary manner, replaced many existing 
delegates with his supporters.535    
Secondly, as the minister of agriculture, he was in control of the biggest source of 
patronage; a position he had secured allegedly “by blackmailing Denktaş”536 in 1976 and 
managed to keep at the expense of dividing the party. Indeed, it was this position, which 
brought him the secretary generalship in the wake of the crisis, which culminated with the 
resignation of Konuk. There were reports in the press that in certain villages, agricultural 
credit was distributed to the party delegates; tractors were given at giveaway prices; 
banquets were thrown at the expense of the Coop Bank.537 “Hundreds of farm animals from 
the state farms (Devlet Üretme Çiftlikleri) were given away to the delegates”.538 In Tatlısu 
                                                        
531 “UBP Kurultayı: Cunta Partiye El Koydu [The UBP Congress: The junta seized control of the party].” Olay, 
10.3.1980, p. 18-9; for a specific example showing how the junta exercised power in the branch conferences 
see “Güzelyurt’ta ‘Gelmezseniz Mal Verilmeyecek’ Denerek Göçmenler Zorla UBP Kongresine Götürüldü [The 
displaced in Güzelyurt were told ‘if you do not come, you will not be given property’ and forced to attend the 
UBP Congress].” Kurtuluş, 27.2.1980.   
532 Reportedly, in some villages the number of delegates was equal to the number of inhabitants (Olay, 
23.3.1981, p. 20); see also Olay, 27.4.1981, p. 7.  
533 For more on the role of delegates in the UBP primaries see for instance Olay, 23.3.1981, pp. 16-17 and 
İsmet Kotak: “Bu ülkeden partizanlık kaldırılmalıdır, partiler değil [In this country clientelism should be 
abolished, not the parties].” Olay, 23.3.1981.  
534 See also Raif Denktaş’s statements on the “bogus delegates” signed up in the villages of Gönyeli, Gaziköy 
and Değirmenlik, in Olay, 4.5.1981, p. 5.  
535 Olay, 27.4.1981, p. 7.  
536 “I joined the UBP to become the minister of agriculture. If I don’t become the minister of agriculture I’ll go 
to the TKP,” he said, when he was offered the ministry of education (See Ahmet Y. Atamsoy: “Beş Yıllık 
Deneyimden Sonra UBP’ye Güven Son Bulmuştur [After experiencing five years of UBP government, trust in 
the UBP has collapsed].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 22.5.1981).  
537 “Kooperatif Merkez Bankası UBP’lilerin Vurgun Kaynağı Haline Getirildi [Cooperative Central Bank has 
been turned into a soruce of loot for UBP members].” Kurtuluş, 6.3.1981; see also Gözlemci: “Kapan Kapana 
[Finders Keepers].” Kurtuluş, 27.3.1981; “Marifetli Tarım Bakanı İyi Traktörleri Hurda Diyerek Taraftarlarına 
Dağıtıyor [The ‘talented’ minister of agriculture is distributing perfectly good tractors to his supporters by 
classifying them as scrap].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 9.4.1981; “İrsen Küçük Devlete Ait Araçları UBP’lilere 
Dağıtıyor [İrsen Küçük is distributing vehicles that belong to the state to the UBP members].” Yenidüzen, 
6.3.1981; see also “Koop-Sen de Greve Gidiyor [Koop-Sen is going to strike too].” Halkın Sesi, 30.4.1981; 
“Kooperatif Merkez Bankası UBP’nin Çiftliği midir [Is the Cooperative Central Bank the UBP’s private candy 
store]?” Kurtuluş, 21.8.1981.   
538 “UBP Delegelerinin Değil Toplu Kalkınmanın Gereği Vurgulandı [The economic development of all – not 
the UBP delegates- is required].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 7.5.1981. 
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village, for instance, 13 party delegates were given credits from the fund for the 
rehabilitation of displaced (Göçmen Rehabilitasyon Fonu).539 According to Olay, “the 
ministry was filled with personnel up to the corridors”.540 Even the resources provided by 
the UN were channelled towards clientelistic activities.541  
Certainly, the ministry of agriculture was not the sole source of patronage. Other ministries 
played an important role in the distribution of jobs and favors as well. In spite of the 
warnings issued by the Court of Audit, for instance, sons and daughters of the UBP 
delegates were employed in the public sector542 with the consent of the ministry of finance. 
Another method, which would come to play an important role in the elections to come was 
introduced in this period. This was granting of the so called Z and T car plate permits to the 
delegates and the party’s backers by the ministry of interior, which were exclusively given 
to rent-a-car and taxi owners to import cars with substantially reduced customs duties.543  
As in the 1976 primaries, there was a cutthroat competition between the candidates. When 
the showdown came and the results were announced, there was a tremor within the party: 
Raif Denktaş, who ran on an anti-clientelistic platform544 was out while everybody he 
fought against was in. He resigned, blaming İrsen Küçük and Emin of betrayal. “In the name 
of topping the list and sending puppets to the parliament, they [İrsen Küçük and Emin] 
made concession to corruptedness in districts, [and resorted] to magic delegate tricks, and 
                                                        
539 “UBP’nin Ön Seçiminde Sadece G. Mağusa’da 10 Milyon Lira Dağıtıldı [In Famagusta alone, 10 million TL 
distributed during the UBP’s primaries].” Olay, 1.6.1981, p. 11.  
540 “Başsavcılık-Sayıştay Başkanına Aldıran Yok [Nobody heeds the Attorney General and the chairman of the 
Court of Audit].” Olay, 5.1.1981, p. 11; Nazif Borman, his successor at the ministry of agriculture confirms that 
he found hundreds of people illegally employed in the ministry when he took over (interviewed by author).  
541 The TKP leader, Alpay Durduran’s statement (Olay, 2.2.1981, pp. 14-15).  
542 Relevant reports of the Court of Audit are cited in Mehmet Altınay: “Denetim [Auditing].” Kurtuluş, 
20.3.1981; “UBP İktidarı Seçim Uğruna Devleti Batırıyor [For the sake of election, the UBP government is 
driving the state to bankruptcy].” Kurtuluş, 27.3.1981; see also “UBP’nin Ön Seçiminde Sadece G. Mağusa’da 
10 Milyon Lira Dağıtıldı [In Famagusta alone, 10 million TL distributed during the UBP’s primaries].” Olay, 
1.6.1981, p. 11; see also Raif Denktaş: “Bir ‘Gazel’ Daha [Another ‘fairy tale’].” Olay, 21.6.1982, p. 40; 
parliamentary speech of İsmet Kotak (DHP, Famagusta) cited in Olay, 23.2.1981, p. 15.  
543 “T ve Z Plakalı Araba Yöntemiyle Milyonluk Vurgunlar Devam Ediyor [Millions continue to be looted 
through granting of the T and Z car plate permits].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 9.4.1981; see also İsmet Kotak: 
“Sorun Hükümet Sorunudur [The problem is the government].” Olay, 1.6.1981.  
544 Once, he addressed the delegates as follows: “Don't forget that those who offer you the state’s resources or 
banquets on their personal account to get elected, may try to compensate their expenses (and much more on 
top of that) out of the public sources, once they get elected” (Raif Denktaş cited in Olay 27.4.1981, p. 8).   
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in doing so tainted the primaries,” he said.545 More importantly, he announced that he was 
going to set up a new party.  
What was really wondered was Denktaş’s reaction to all this. Would he support his son’s 
new party? According to one account, Raif Denktaş’s Kemalist movement was indeed 
orchestrated by Denktaş behind the scenes.546 He had realized that party would not be able 
to win the election unless it changed course and nominated new faces. Furthermore, İrsen 
Küçük would soon become too strong to contain. In other words, this was a repetition of 
the 1976 election, and the Kemalist group was just a copy of the Reformist group. It is true 
that Denktaş did not publicly support his son’s manoeuvres, and even continued touring 
villages with Çağatay and other ministers. It is equally true however that he, for the first 
time, publicly complained about the corruption at the SEEs.547 Furthermore, from what Raif 
Denktaş at one point disclosed, it is understood that he let Denktaş know before 
challenging Çağatay, and his father did not try to stop him either.548 For those who know 
him well, this was not surprising. This was one of the tactics Denktaş frequently employed. 
That is to say, not taking sides openly in a power struggle so that he could continue to work 
together with whoever prevails at the end. After all, this was his position vis-{-vis the 
Reformists in 1976 too.   
There are some press reports supporting this argument. In an article entitled “Denktaş lost 
thrice,” Selim Selçuk argued that Denktaş actively campaigned in the primaries without 
much success.549 According to Olay, when İrsen Küçük’s clique found out that their names 
were not on the lists distributed by Denktaş, they reciprocated and eliminated Raif 
Denktaş.550 Whether these allegations are true or not remains to be a moot point. However, 
                                                        
545 “Oğul Denktaş Yeni Partiyi Kurmaktan Vazgeçti [Denktaş junior abandoned the idea of setting up a new 
party].” Halkın Sesi, 28.4.1981. 
546 See İsmet Kotak: “Tekerleme ile İktidara Yeniden Adaylık Koyan Parti [The party which wants to come to 
power again by regurgitating the same things].” Olay, 26.1.1981.  
547 “Denktaş BRT’de Yaptığı Konuşmada Narenciye İhracatında Suistimali Kabul Etti [Denktaş admitted the 
abuse in the citrus fruit exports in his speech on BRT].” Olay, 10.11.1980, pp. 11-13; Cumhuriyet, 31.12.1980 
(Reprinted in Olay, 5.1.1981, p. 7); also see Çeşitleme: “Geçmişi Unutanlar [Those who forgot the past].” Söz, 
24.6.1981.  
548 See Raif Denktaş’s statements cited in Olay, 26.1.1981, p. 11.  
549 According to Selim Selçuk, Denktaş campaigned for his favorite candidates in the primaries by summoning 
the heads of village and neighborhood organizations, and by circulating the list of his favored candidates’ 
names (“Denktaş Üç Kere Mağlup [Denktaş defeated thrice].” Söz, 22.4.1981); See also “Partilerde Çalkantı 
Sürüyor [Parties still in turmoil].” Olay, 11.5.1981, p. 6.  
550 Olay, 27.4.1981, pp. 7-8.   
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it is a fact that Denktaş held particularly İrsen Küçük responsible for his son’s exclusion as 
well as the erosion of the party’s support in the 1981 elections. To this I will turn in Section 
5.3. It is also worth mentioning in this juncture that in this whole process, one clear winner 
stood out. This was Eroğlu, who came in first in the Famagusta district, garnering 180 votes 
more than his nearest contender. Such was his influence on the delegates that some 
delegates were seen to hang placards on trees, which read “God first, then Eroğlu” (önce 
Allah, sonra Eroğlu).551 He was said to be in league with İrsen Küçük and Emin. However, 
probably because he was away from the main battlefield, Nicosia, it was İrsen Küçük and 
Emin who attracted the wrath of Denktaş, and Eroğlu managed to escape the whole process 
unscathed. In a similar vein, the details regarding the intra-party struggle cannot be fully 
corroborated. However, it can be argued in certainty that there was a bitter feud within the 
party, which had nothing to do with the program or ideology of the party. This was strictly 
a personal power struggle.  
5.3 Denktaş’s Reclaiming of the Party  
Against this backdrop, after pondering for almost a week, Denktaş announced his 
candidacy from the UBP. He said “the candidates promised me not to undermine each other 
in the campaign and work selflessly for the party”552; “I decided to run for the UBP based 
on the word of honour they [the UBP candidates] gave me”.553 His move effectively killed 
Raif Denktaş’s plans to set up a new party. As he put it in the press conference where he 
announced this decision, those “who were involved in the setting up of the party withdrew 
after the president’s decision to reclaim the UBP”.554  
Once again, Denktaş was in the driving seat: He took the reigns of the party555 or to put it in 
his own words, he “seized the party’s administration,” and announced that he would be 
                                                        
551 “Koltuk Kavgası UBP’deki Çöküntüyü Hızlandırdı [Power struggle has expedited the collapse of the UBP].” 
Yenidüzen, 24.4.1981. 
552 “Rauf Denktaş UBP’nin Liderliğini Üstlendi [Rauf Denktaş has assumed the leadership of the UBP].” Halkın 
Sesi, 26.4.1981.  
553 “Denktaş: UBP İçin Hedef En Az 30 Mebus Olmalı [Denktaş: The target for the UBP must be minimum 30 
deputies].” Halkın Sesi, 29.4.1981.  
554 “Oğul Denktaş Yeni Partiyi Kurmaktan Vazgeçti [Denktaş junior abandoned the idea of setting up a new 
party].” Halkın Sesi, 28.4.1981.  
555 Editorial: “Alçaklara Kar Yağıyor [There will be a price to pay].” Söz, 29.4.1981.  
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personally conducting the election campaign along with Çağatay556; practically the 
secretary general’s authorities were suspended.557 This was interpreted as his reaction to 
İrsen Küçük, whom he held responsible for eliminating his son. Though they resented 
Denktaş’s fait accompli, and though Emin even resigned at some point558, eventually, İrsen 
Küçük and Emin stepped back and pledged their loyalty to Denktaş.559 A truce seemed to 
be made. However, a settling of scores was seen inevitable after the elections.560   
“Nobody should take it for granted that the current ministers will retain their positions in 
the new cabinet,” Denktaş declared.561 This single line, which he frequently used in the 
campaign trail is of significance as it shows (a) he was aware that the dismal performance 
of the party in government jeopardized his chance of winning and wanted to distance 
himself from the party; (b) who really was at the helm: He was even quoted saying “none of 
the current ministers will take part in the government after the election”562, which also 
supports the argument that Denktaş was the one behind the botched attempt by the 
Kemalist movement to reform the party.  
Eventually, after a highly contested election, Denktaş won the presidency by a whisker in 
the first round with 51.77 percent of the votes –down from 76.6 percent he had garnered in 
1976. This was a huge blow to his legitimacy not only at the domestic level but also 
internationally. The sharp decline in his votes led the Greek Cypriot press to conclude that, 
this was an indication that he lost the confidence of Turkish Cypriots, and it was the 
                                                        
556 “Devlet Başkanı Denktaş Şefliğini İlan Etti [President Denktaş has declared his chieftainship].” Yenidüzen, 
1.5.1981; see also İsmet Kotak: “Ekonomiyi Perişan Eden UBP Bugün Kendi de Perişandır [The UBP, which 
has ruined the economy, is itself ruined too].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 7.5.1981; Fuat Veziroğlu: “Parti 
Darbesi [Coup within the party].” Kurtuluş, 8.5.1981; “Kan Davası [Blood feud].” Birlik, 18.12.1993.   
557 See for instance “Devlet Başkanı Denktaş Şefliğini İlan Etti [President Denktaş has declared his 
chieftainship” and Editorial: “Denktaş Kabinesi: On Denktaş [Denktaş’s cabinet: Ten Denktashes].” Yenidüzen, 
1.5.1981; see also Editorial: “Alçaklara Kar Yağıyor [There will be a price to pay].” Söz, 29.4.1981. 
558 “E. Emin’in İstifasının Kabul Edilip Edilmediği Henüz Açıklanmadı [Whether Emin’s resignation has been 
accepted or not, has not yet been disclosed].” Halkın Sesi, 3.5.1981.   
559 “Enver Emin’in Açıklaması [Emin’s statement].” Halkın Sesi, 7.5.1981; see also “İrsen Küçük’le Birlikte 
Denktaş’a Başkaldıran Enver Emin Tövbekar Oldu [Emin who along with İrsen Küçük had earlier revolted 
against Denktaş has repented].” Yenidüzen, 8.1.1981.  
560 Refik Erduran: “Kampanyanın Mihveri: Denktaş [The axis of the campaign: Denktaş].” Milliyet, 24.6.1981.   
561 “Denktaş Mühürde Israr Ediyor [Denktaş presses for the electorate not to split their votes].” Halkın Sesi, 
5.5.1981; also cited in Kerim Ozanbaşı: “Bakan Olmaya Layık Görünmeyen UBP Adayları [The UBP candidates 
who were not seen to be deserving a ministerial portfolio].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 11.6.1981.  
562 Olay, 25.5.1981, p. 7.  
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Turkish settlers’ votes, which kept him in power.563 It is difficult to verify this statement 
because there is no public opinion or exit poll available showing the preferences of the 
settlers in this election. The most extensive research on the voting behavior of the settlers 
is Hatay’s study (2005), where he compares voting patterns of settlers and native Cypriots 
living in certain villages in the parliamentary elections. What I have found out when I 
applied Hatay’s method to the presidential election reveals that the Greek Cypriot press’ 
conclusion was an exaggerated statement. Having said that, it would not be wrong to say 
that Denktaş was relatively more popular among the settler voters, which according to 
Hatay’s account made up about sixteen to twenty two percent of the electorate (see Hatay 
2005: 21-2)564, and that the settlers’ support helped him to avoid a run-off.565   
The UBP’s defeat in the parliamentary election was even more humiliating. It lost its 
majority in the parliament, and won only 18 seats –12 less compared to 1976. Still, given 
its dismal performance in government, and splintering, this was a success. The overall 
macroeconomic performance was miserable. In 1980, GNP grew less than one percent, 
while it shrank 7.5 percent in 1981.566 The public sector employees, biggest social group, 
were squeezed. Because of its failure to collect direct taxes, the government relied on 
indirect taxes (Hakkı Atun cited in Kasımoğlu 1980: 23 and 46), which skewed income 
distribution to the detriment of the salaried. They saw their real income decline during this 
period due to rampant inflation –something unprecedented before the adoption of Turkish 
lira. According to one account, the purchasing power of the salaried in 1980 was a 
staggering 80 percent lower when compared to the 1974 figures.567 Moreover, as the 
                                                        
563 Philelefhteros and Eleftherotypia cited in “Rumlar ve KTFD Seçimleri [Greek Cypriots and the TFSC 
Elections].” Olay, 13.7.1981, p. 10.   
564 Based on 2003 figures.  
565 Hatay identifies “26 ‘settler villages’ exclusively inhabited by the ‘settlers’,” and “53 villages inhabited 
exclusively (up to 90 percent) by ‘native Turkish Cypriots’” (which together represented 21 percent of the 
electorate in 1981) based on the place of birth identified in the electoral roll, and compare their voting 
patterns in the parliamentary elections. I used his methodology to compare their voting patterns in the 
presidential election of 1981. I found out that in the settler villages, Denktaş garnered 60.27 percent of the 
votes, while his support fell to 51.36 percent in the native villages. Two points should be borne in mind 
regarding this method: (a) Hatay’s study does not say anything about the voting patterns of urban voters, and 
(b) “The place of birth” details of the ID cards given to at least some of the settlers had been admittedly 
tampered with by the Turkish Cypriot authorities (Kotak interviewed by author).   
566 State Planning Organization: Economic and Social Indicators, available at http://www.devplan.org/Frame-
eng.html  (accessed on 16.5.2013).   
567 The calculation was made by the KTAMS, the union of public servants (“KTAMS Başkanı Süreç Acı Gerçeği 
Ortaya Koydu: Maaşlar %80 Düştü [The KTAMS chairman Süreç revealed the bitter truth: Salaries fell by 
80%].” Kurtuluş, 5.12.1980).    
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resettlement and land issue could not be resolved, rents skyrocketed.568 This was because 
the Greek Cypriot immovable properties could not be sold and bought. Therefore, the 
prices of very limited amount of Turkish Cypriot land, especially in the Nicosia district 
went drastically up further depressing the disposable incomes of the working class. The 
government was not capable of meeting the public expenditures with local revenues and 
had to go regularly to Ankara cap in hand.  
Furthermore, corruption allegations were widespread, yet impunity was the norm. Even in 
the Turkish press, this was highlighted. One of the articles published on this issue was 
entitled “Cyprus has become the smugglers’ paradise,” for instance.569 The following 
excerpt from the article of a Turkish columnist -based in Cyprus- captures the politico-
economic state of the Turkish Cypriot community at this point very well:   
[After 1974, Denktaş] found himself presiding over a community, which was almost 
ungovernable. 
The authorities of the Federated State simultaneously possess and lack authority to 
rule the region. From the outset, our bureaucrats have limited their options by 
introducing red tape, and putting the economy, which by its nature needed to rely 
on free market mechanism to thrive, into a quagmire of semi-statism.    
In a setting, turned into a paradise for smuggling and theft, while a handful of 
profiteers have been sprouting in a mind-boggling manner, those with low-income 
increasingly fell victim to inflation and suffered. The party in power, on the other 
hand, could not free itself from the role of defender and protector of undeserved 
wealth, and because of its internal conflicts failed in the economic field.570  
Given this catastrophic outlook in the domestic front, it was Ankara’s intervention, which 
avoided an even heavier defeat for the UBP. As the Turkish ambassador of the time İnal 
Batu revealed later, the opposition in this period “was excluded”: “[i]n the elections all 
institutions openly sided with the incumbent government and Denktaş, and in this way the 
                                                        
568 The ITEM was passed in August 1977. However, it was not implemented for a while as Denktaş shelved it 
on the grounds of its incompatibility with international law (see “Denktaş Vaad Dağıtıp Mühür İstiyor 
[Denktaş is distributing promises left right and center, and asking for votes].” Yenidüzen, 8.5.1981; see also 
Hasan Erçakıca: “Dilin Kemiği Yok [Talk is cheap].” Yenidüzen, 29.1.1981.  
569 Ziya Akçapar: “Kıbrıs Kaçakçıların Cenneti Oldu [Cyprus has become the smugglers’ paradise].” Hürriyet, 
19.12.1980. A similar comment was made by another columnist in Hürriyet, Hasan Pulur on 21.12.1980. Both 
of them were cited in “TKP Şemsi Kazım’ı Protesto Etti [The TKP protested Şemsi Kazım].” Halkın Sesi, 
26.12.1980. See also “Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Nasıl Görüyor [How does the Cumhuriyet newspaper see]?” Olay, 
5.1.1981, p. 7 (originally published in Cumhuriyet, 31.12. 1980); “Kıbrıs’ta Bir KİT [A state economic 
enterprise in Cyprus].” Olay, 22.6.1981, p. 17 (originally published in Hürriyet).  
570 Refik Erduran: “Denktaş’ın Dramı [Denktaş’s tragedy].” Milliyet (Reprinted in Olay, 20.7.1981).  
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left opposition was countered” (cited in İnanç 2007: 99). The implementation of this 
exclusion strategy can be seen at different levels.  
First, it should be borne in mind that at the time there was a military junta in power in 
Ankara, which crushed the Turkish left and was ready to do the same thing in Cyprus. The 
junta summoned all party leaders and secretary-generals to Ankara in early April in the eve 
of the June 28 elections. When the invitation was made public, rumour mill started turning. 
The rumours were spread by the UBP and revolved around three points: (1) Ankara was 
against the opposition; (2) the elections would be postponed; (3) the constitution would be 
amended to introduce a presidential system.571 On their arrival back in Cyprus, the 
opposition leaders denied the allegations.572 However, later it was revealed that among 
other things, they were reminded by the generals that the Turkish army’s mandate to 
protect the “Turkish nation’s interests” extended to the island, and they were told that the 
current political situation on the island resembled the one prevailing in Turkey before the 
coup d’état, implying that they could suspend democracy in northern Cyprus too.573 It was 
not a coincidence that the Turkish daily Hürriyet on the day the Turkish Cypriot party 
leaders arrived in Ankara574, declared whoever put up his candidacy against Denktaş 
would indeed serve the Greeks and Armenians.575 The Turkish media continued their 
disinformation campaign against the opposition throughout the election campaign.576 As if 
this was not enough, Dr Küçük and Halkın Sesi switched sides and launched an attack 
against the TKP few days before the election.   
As part of this effort, top-level Turkish officials visited the island one after another. Zeyyat 
Baykara, the deputy prime minister and the chairman of the Cyprus Coordination 
                                                        
571 See the TKP’s party assembly report (Olay, 21.6.1982); see also “Üst Düzeyde Türkiye Ziyareti [High level 
visit to Turkey].” Olay, 30.3.1981, pp. 19-20. 
572 “Ankara Kişi veya Parti Empoze Etmedi [Ankara did not impose a person or a party].” Olay, 13.4.1981, p. 5.   
573 Naci Talat, secretary general of the CTP, cited in Olay, 23.8.1982, p. 6.  
574 See Olay, 13.4.1981, p. 6.   
575 The piece, which was published on 4.4.1981, was entitled “Makarios’un Ruhu ve Denktaş [Makarios’ 
spectre and Denktaş].” It was reprinted in the UBP’s mouthpiece Birlik too. Needless to say it attracted strong 
criticism from the Turkish Cypriot opposition (see Yenidüzen, 10.4.1981; see also Olay, 13.4.1981, p. 6 and 
34).  
576 See Refik Erduran: “Denktaş’ın Dramı [Denktaş’s tragedy]” and Ali Sirmen: “Kıbrıs, Denktaş ve Çok Seslilik 
[Cyprus, Denktaş and Pluralism]” both reprinted in Olay, 20.7.1981, pp. 11-12; see also “Ormandan Geliyorum 
[I am coming from the jungle].” Alpay Durduran singles out Günaydın and Hürriyet’s stories as particularly 
damaging for his party (interviewed by Ayer Y. Delideniz, Olay, 6.7.1981, p. 19). 
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Committee, for instance, spent a week in Cyprus.577 In a similar vein, Nurettin Ersin, the 
chief of the armed forces, and a member of the ruling junta visited the island in the eve of 
the elections and stayed until two days before the polls.578 The Turkish involvement was 
not limited to these high-level visits. To give an example, an official from the Turkish 
ministry of finance did not mind showing up with Hakkı Atun, the minister of finance, 
attracting the criticism of the opposition.579  
There were many others actively involved particularly in the villages and neighbourhoods 
resided by the Turkish settlers. In an article entitled “I’m coming from the jungle,” Kotak, 
who was on the field as the secretary general of the DHP, talks at length about this issue. 
According to Kotak voters were intimidated and forced to vote for either the UBP or the 
Turkish Unity Party (Türk Birliği Partisi, TBP), a party established by the settlers.580 Armed 
groups surrounded villages populated mainly by the settlers such as Kaplıca, Ardahan, 
Kalecik, Ziyamet, Gelincik, Derince, Dipkarpaz, and Güvercinlik. 581  The settler 
neighbourhoods of Famagusta became “out of bounds to not only the political party 
representatives but even to the residents” in the last 48 hours before the polling day, Kotak 
added. 582 Furthermore, on the day of election, “the voters were not allowed to go out; they 
were picked up from their houses and driven to the polling stations and then back to their 
houses”.583  
Crucially, the expenditures made by Yardım Heyeti went drastically up in the election 
month and 200 million lira, out of 600 million transferred between March and June, 
                                                        
577 “Baykara Temaslarını Tamamlayarak Ankara’ya Döndü [Baykara completed his meetings and returned to 
Ankara].” Olay, 27.4.1981, p. 13.  
578 See Olay, 22.6.1981, p. 19 and 27.6.1981, p. 21; “Koalisyon Dönemine Giriliyor [Entering the era of 
coalitions].” Yankı (Turkey) (Reprinted in Olay, 20.7.1981, pp. 10-11); see also the TKP’s party assembly 
report (Olay, 21.6.1982). It is interesting to note that the opposition was blamed for not attending the 
reception given on the occasion of the general’s visit. It turned out later that nobody from the opposition was 
invited! (See the statements of Nejat Konuk, the DHP leader, cited in Akay Cemal, “KTFD’de Bugün 83 Bin 
Seçmen Oy Kullanıyor [83 thousand voters casting their votes today in the TFSC].” Milliyet, 28.6.1981; Refik 
Erduran: “Denktaş’ın Dramı [Denktaş’s tragedy].” Milliyet (Reprinted in Olay, 20.7.1981).  
579 “T.C. Maliye Müşaviri Sadullah Aygün Hakkı Atun ile Seçim Gezisi Yapıyor [Sadullah Aygün, an advisor 
from the Turkish ministry of finance canvassing for votes with Hakkı Atun].” Demokratik Halk Gazetesi, 
22.5.1981.  
580 İsmet Kotak: “Ormandan Geliyorum [I’m coming from the jungle].” Olay, 6.7.1981, p. 9 and 22; see also his 
statements as the secretary general of the DHP in Olay, 6.7.1981, p. 21.    
581 Ibid.; Olay, Editorial. 6,7,1981, p. 4.  
582 “DHP Genel Sekreteri İsmet Kotak’ın Açıklaması [The DHP secretary general Kotak’s statement].” Olay, 
6.7.1981, p. 21.  
583 Ibid.  
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remained unaccounted, which was according to the sources unidentified by Kurtuluş, went 
to the salaries of the temporary personnel illegally employed in the period concerned.584 
The details about public employment in the election periods will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Suffice it here to note that the fact that the number of temporary personnel 
employed in this particular case was in the vicinity of 3500, lends credibility to this 
allegation.   
In short, Ankara did everything to bolster the UBP’s chances of success before the elections.  
When this fell short of securing a UBP majority in the parliament, this time, it blocked the 
forming of a coalition by the three opposition parties, TKP, CTP and DHP, which among 
themselves had 21 seats and agreed on forming a coalition. The pretext was the CTP’s anti-
NATO stance.585 When Çağatay as the leader of the biggest party failed to form the 
government, Denktaş did not give the mandate to the leader of the second biggest party, 
TKP. Rather, the UBP formed a minority government, and upon Ankara’s “request,” the 
DHP leadership accepted not to support a motion of censure for a certain period of time. 
When, the minority government was eventually brought down, the DHP, under duress, 
switched sides and took part in an UBP-led coalition. 
As a TKP deputy put it at the time, after “the 28 June 1981 election democracy has been 
seriously wounded;” of course this did not mean “that there was a fully functioning liberal 
democracy before 28 June. While they used to try to conceal the restrictions on liberties 
before, today they are exposed”.586 This is to say, obviously similar to the post World War II 
regimes in Italy and Greece, a democrazia bloccata to use the Italian term or a “guided 
democracy,” in Mouzelis words, was prevailing in the northern part of Cyprus in this period. 
In the Greek case, “the throne and the victorious anti-communist army played the 
dominant political role –setting, in a clearly unconstitutional manner, strict limits to what 
was and what was not allowed to happen on the level of parliamentary politics” (Mouzelis 
cited in Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002: 3). In Tsoukalas’ words this was “the deeply 
                                                        
584 Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance cited in “Seçim Ayında Yardımlar Dört Kat Arttı [Financial assistance 
quadrapled in the election month].” Kurtuluş, 7.8.1981; the TKP’s party assembly report (Olay, 21.6.1982); 
Alpay Durduran interviewed by author. 
585 Özker Özgür cited in Erten Kasımoğlu: “Villa Fırtına’da Söylenenler [What was said at Villa Fırtına [the 
Turkish ambassador’s summer residence]].” Olay, 17.5.1982.  
586 Hasan Özbaflı cited in Erten Kasımoğlu: “Sınırlı Demokrasimizin Sırtına Vurulan Her Hançerin Adı ‘Arzu’ 
veya ‘Rica’ Oluyor [Every stab to the back of our imperfect democracy comes under the cloak of an ‘entreaty’ 
or ‘intercession’].” Olay, 28.12.1981.   
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original phenomenon of an authoritarian regime… built under the auspices of a 
democratically organized parliamentary state” (cited in Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002: 3). 
In a similar vein in both cases, the Cold War considerations played an important role in 
justifying the crippling of democracy. The threat of a communist takeover was used as a 
pretext to exclude from power the parties they labeled “anti-system”. There was a slight 
difference in the Turkish Cypriot case, though. The communist witch-hunt seen in these 
countries was coupled with a Rumcu (pro-Greek Cypriot) one.  
As a result, the community had been condemned to the UBP-dominated governments for 
years. According to Della Porta, due to the lack of alternation in power in Italy, “the party 
system lost its legitimacy among the general public; the state became identified with the 
government; and the political elite's sense of responsibility and accountability declined or 
vanished” (2006: 188). As it will be shown in the rest of the study, the consequences of 
democrazia bloccata was not different in this case too. I will turn to the specific adverse 
effects of the lack of alternation in power in the politico-economic development in Chapter 
Six.   
At the intra-party level, living up to his reputation as a grandmaster of political chess, 
Denktaş eliminated the junta gradually. First, as mentioned earlier, he pacified İrsen Küçük 
in the election campaign as much as possible. There were even rumours that the Denktaş 
family was mobilized to avoid İrsen Küçük’s election, albeit to no avail.587 After the election, 
İrsen Küçük’s resignation was speculated two times in three weeks clearly showing that 
the battle was not over.588 As a further indication of the tension, İrsen Küçük did not attend 
the reception held in the presidential palace after the swearing in ceremony. 589 
Furthermore, he was excluded from the committee, which would negotiate the conditions 
of a possible coalition with the DHP, although he still held the number two position in the 
party hierarchy.590 Given the party’s weak showing in the election, and with only 18 seats 
in the parliament, however, Denktaş was not in a position to eliminate him altogether. 
                                                        
587 “UBP Adayları Şimdi de Birbirlerini Yemeye Başladı [And now the UBP candidates have started  to 
cannibalize each other].” Yenidüzen, 19.6.1981; see also “Denktaş İrsen’e Karşı [Denktaş against İrsen].” 
Kurtuluş, 3.7.1981; “Denktaş Üzgün [Denktaş is sad].” Kurtuluş, 3.7.1981, p. 4.  
588 “İrsen Küçük UBP’den İstifa Ettiği Söylentilerini Yalanladı [İrsen Küçük denied the rumours that he had 
resigned from the UBP].” Bozkurt, 7.7.1981; “İrsen Küçük’ün İstifa Ettiği Haberi Yayıldı [İrsen Küçük’s 
resignation has been rumored].” Bozkurt, 28.7.1981.  
589 Olay, 20.7.1981, p. 16.  
590 Olay, 27.7.1981, pp. 7-8.  
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Therefore, he kept him in the cabinet of the minority government but gave him a less 
important portfolio: ministry of health, social affairs and labor.  
In the coalition government, which was formed after the minority government had been 
brought down, İrsen Küçük was reinstated as the minister of agriculture.591 But this did not 
mean that the two rivals buried their hatchets. It only showed how high İrsen Küçük’s 
bargaining power was. His hand was strengthened by the fact that the new government 
had a majority of only one seat. But this came at a cost. Denktaş, this time, managed to 
weaken him by depriving him of the second leg of his power base: his position in the party. 
He was replaced by Hakkı Atun as the secretary general of the party in 1982.592    
What made İrsen Küçük completely expendable for Denktaş was the proclamation of the 
TRNC in 1983. This unilateral declaration of independence was an undisguised challenge to 
the international community and a major watershed in the inter-communal affairs, and 
therefore it is taken up most of the time in this context in the literature. Domestic 
repercussions however, are largely overlooked. Looking from the perspective of Denktaş, 
the advantages of the declaration are not limited to the foreign policy domain. It provided 
Denktaş with a pretext to address challenges against his power at the domestic front too. 
By coming up with the idea of drafting a new constitution with a new constituent assembly, 
Denktaş indeed killed not two but four birds with one stone.  
Dodd suggests Denktaş “did not advance proposals for a presidential type of constitution, 
to which he was always sympathetic” as “[h]e could not be seen to be gaining something for 
the presidency out of the declaration” (1993: 130). Though not completely wrong, this is 
only half of the truth. That he did not push for the presidential system may be true but as 
Soysal argued at the time, the amendments required by the declaration could have been 
easily done by the current parliament.593 It would not be difficult to convince the 
opposition, which had been arm-twisted to vote unanimously in favour of the declaration, 
to support these cosmetic changes to reach a two-thirds majority required for amendment. 
                                                        
591 This was a four way coalition: UBP, DHP, TBP and Konuk as an independent.  
592 “I was asked by Çağatay and Denktaş to stay out of the cabinet and assume the number two position in the 
party as they thought İrsen Küçük had been neglecting his responsibility as the secretary general,” Atun 
recounted in our interview. “Until 1985, Denktaş used to be close to the party, and he used to intervene from 
time to time,” he added (interviewed by author).   
593 Mümtaz Soysal: “Ada İnsanları [The island people].” Kıbrıs Postası, 19.12.1983 (Originally published in 
Milliyet). 
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However, this was not the real intention. In fact, the whole fuss/farce about the new 
constitution and constituent assembly served one purpose: to secure the political survival 
of Denktaş. The article 79 (2) of the 1975 constitution limited the president’s time in office 
to two consecutive five-year terms, and opposition would never vote for its abolition. If this 
parliament would not, then, one that would do had to come! Hence, a constituent assembly 
was called. In the TKP leader Bozkurt’s words, “this was a coup d’etat”.594 Though, the TKP 
took the case to the constitutional court, the constitutional court upheld the constituent 
assembly. Obviously, the decision was made under duress.595  
Contrary to what Dodd suggests, therefore, it is safe to say that Denktaş gained a lot out of 
the declaration596, and his gain was not limited to this obvious benefit. Soon it turned out 
that he intended a broader shake up of domestic politics. In this context, we can talk about 
at least three more “gains” that he obtained with this move.  
First, by setting up a new constituent assembly, he parachuted 30 new deputies –of whom 
10 were directly appointed by the president597, and in doing so tilted the balance in favour 
of himself both in the UBP and parliament.598 He was no longer dependent on the wafer-
thin majority provided by an unruly coalition. Furthermore, he got rid of Çağatay with 
whom his relations had turned sour lately.599 He asked Çağatay in a meeting of the 
Coordination Council to tender his cabinet’s resignation to give way to the establishment of 
a neutral transition government.600 In other words, he sent his third victim to the 
graveyard of prime ministers. Finally, he appointed İrsen Küçük’s archrival Konuk as the 
prime minister of the transition government, and in doing so made sure that İrsen Küçük 
did not take part in the cabinet. Being deprived of his power bases, first the secretary 
                                                        
594  İsmail Bozkurt interviewed by Mete Tümerkan. (http://www.haberkibris.com/n.php?n=8dbd6f06-
2011_12_07) accessed on 20.7.2012.  
595 “If only you knew how we made that decision,” confided one of the judges later to Bozkurt (ibid.).  
596 İlter Türkmen, who was the Turkish minister of foreign affairs at the time, goes as far as saying “one of the 
aims of the establishment of TRNC was to maintain Denktaş’s presidency,” a quarter of a century later (İlter 
Türkmen: “Tarih Aydınlanıyor [History uncovered].” Hürriyet, 26.7.2008).  
597 Most of the other organizations, which were given a quota, were traditional allies of Denktaş such as Türk-
Sen (3 members), three veteran associations (5 members), Chamber of Commerce (1 member), Chamber of 
Industry (1 member), and Farmers Union (1 member). For the complete list see for instance Kıbrıs Postası, 
3.12.1983.   
598 See for instance “Kurucu Üyeler And İçiyor [Constituent members to swear in].” Kıbrıs Postası, 6.12.1983. 
599 According to Çağatay’s undersecretary Samioğlu, they had been at odds (Samioğlu interviewed by author); 
Borman, who served in the same cabinet with Çagatay, also confirms that Çağatay repeatedly complained that 
Denktaş had been constantly undermining him (Borman interviewed by author). 
600 Aydın Samioğlu and İsmet Kotak interviewed by author. 
176 
 
generalship and now the ministry of agriculture, İrsen Küçük’s clout in the party entered a 
phase of rapid decline, which culminated with his resignation from the UBP few months 
later.    
5.4 Fall of the Junta and the Unlikely Rise of Eroğlu – Revenge is a dish best 
served cold! 
Denktaş was not the only one who wanted to see Çağatay’s back. The Nicosia clique was 
also eager to get one of its own elected as the party chairman. The opportunity they had 
been looking for arose when Çağatay resigned not only from the premiership but also from 
the leadership of the UBP.601   
When the party chairmanship became vacant, one candidate stood out as the favourite. 
This was Eroğlu, the chief of the Famagusta branch, who had an extremely strong base in 
his constituency. When the junta had made its first move to replace Çağatay a year earlier, 
at the 1982 party conference, their candidate was Eroğlu. This was just to test the water. 
What they wondered was the reaction of Ankara. The reaction was negative: “They 
summoned us to the embassy. They told us that the TMFA wanted Çağatay to continue. We 
did not accept. Then they told us that the Joint Chief of Staff wanted him. We asked for time 
to evaluate the situation. Eroğlu succumbed and withdrew his candidacy,” recounts 
Emin.602 Hakkı Atun, the secretary general of the party, who had announced his candidacy, 
was also vetoed by Ankara.603 As a result, in the first multi-candidate contest held in 1982, 
only a relatively weak figure, Ramiz Manyera, the former president of the KTTO was 
allowed to run as a candidate against Çağatay.604 He was not a strong contender because he 
was at odds with the junta. With the Nicosia clique’s active support, Çağatay defeated 
                                                        
601 “Çağatay UBP Genel Başkanlığından da Çekildi [Çağatay withdrew from the chairmanship of the UBP].” 
Bozkurt, 1.12.1983.  
602 Enver Emin interviewed by author; see also “Derviş Eroğlu: Anavatandan Gelen Telkinler Işığında 
Adaylığımı Erteleme Kararı Aldık [Eroğlu: Based on the advice from the motherland, we decided to postpone 
my candidacy].” Yenidüzen, 2.11.1982. 
603 “UBP Kurultayı Arifesinde Etkili Çevreler Yine Devrede [The influential circles in action again in the run up 
to the UBP congress].” Yenidüzen, 19.10.1982; “Etkili Çevreler Baskın Çıktı Eroğlu ve Atun UBP Genel 
Başkanlığına Aday Olmaktan Vazgeçirildi [The influential circles prevailed: Eroğlu and Atun dissuaded from 
running for the chairmanship of the UBP].” Yenidüzen, 26.10.1982.  
604 “Manyera: Bana Bir Telkin Yapılmadı. Adaylığımın Anavatan Tarafından Tasvip Edildiği Anlaşılıyor 
[Manyera: I have not been told anything. Apparently, my candidacy has been approved by the motherland].” 
Yenidüzen, 2.11.1982. 
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Manyera easily by garnering 222 of the 303 votes cast.605 Basically, Ankara told the clique 
not to change horses in the middle of the stream. That it was Ankara calling the shots over 
who would form the government, had been seen in 1981. Now, it was clearly revealed that 
even who would run the UBP was up to Ankara.   
Indeed, as in 1982, in the 1983 party conference too, Eroğlu was proposed as a stopgap 
solution. It was clear that Denktaş would never accept the chairmanship of the clique 
strongman İrsen Küçük. The clique, on the other hand, would never let Denktaş impose 
them someone against their will once again. Eroğlu was considered to be the right 
candidate because he was perceived as someone “unambitious,” who could be dealt with 
later, once Denktaş’s hegemony was broken. This perception, to a certain extent, derived 
from his resignation as the education minister although he was encouraged to stay by the 
clique.606 The same reasons made him acceptable to Denktaş too, who had always been in 
favour of working with a “weak” primer minister607 (see also Egemen 2006: 244-5).   
Eventually, he ran unopposed and became the first UBP chairman, who was elected by the 
party before being appointed by Denktaş as the prime minister.608 He had to wait for 
another 18 months before he took over the premiership because the transition period 
lasted a year longer than it had been originally envisaged.609 It is also important to note 
that the clique recaptured the secretary generalship in the 1983 party conference. 
Although İrsen Küçük’s name was “widely rumoured” for this position610, he did not run 
and Emin became the new secretary general.611   
In the mean time, having drawn a lesson from the 1981 election, which almost cost him the 
presidency, in 1985 presidential election, Denktaş ran for the first time as an independent, 
“above-parties” candidate and easily won with 70 per cent of the votes. He dissociated the 
                                                        
605 “Raundu Çağatay Kazandı [The round won by Çağatay].” Olay, 8.11.1982, pp. 6-7.   
606 Emin interviewed by author.  
607 Mustafa Erbilen interviewed by author.  
608 “Eroğlu UBP Genel Başkanı [Eroğlu, the UBP’s chairman].” Bozkurt, 18.12.1983. 
609 According to Nejat Konuk, his government was scheduled to stay in office until May 1984 (“Hükümet 
Takvimi Mayıs 1984’e Göre Ayarlandı [The government’s schedule set until May 1984].” Kıbrıs Postası, 
25.12.1983.  
610 “UBP Parti Meclisi Bugün Yetkili Organları Belirleyecek [The UBP party assembly to determine the 
executive board members today].” Bozkurt, 21.12.1983.  
611 “UBP Genel Sekreteri Yeniden Emin [Emin elected as the secretary general of the UBP].” Bozkurt, 
23.12.1983.  
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presidential and parliamentary elections from each other by setting different dates. In his 
words, “from the past experience it was seen that having both elections on the same day 
created problems; candidates were shown very close to certain parties and against others. 
The presidential election will be held earlier to allow the candidates to campaign their 
programs freely”.612 This did not prevent the UBP from throwing its full support behind 
Denktaş.  
Here, a parenthesis should be opened. The close relationship between the UBP and Denktaş 
is taken for granted most of the time. In practice, however, given the rivalry outlined here, 
it would not be wrong to say that this was not the case. The decision to support Denktaş in 
this particular presidential election was a “strategic” one made after long deliberations. 
“We have asked two questions to ourselves,” Emin recounted in our interview; “first ‘what 
do we have to gain from fielding a candidate against Denktaş?’ and second ‘in the campaign 
trail, do we want him cursing us or praising us?’ My view was that we would not gain 
anything from nominating someone against Denktaş. At the end my view prevailed”.613 The 
main proponent of the contending view, İrsen Küçük, who wanted to be the presidential 
candidate of the UBP against Denktaş614, resigned in June 1984615, and set up his own party.  
This meant a reshuffling of the cards within the UBP. İrsen Küçük’s resignation was a 
critical blow to the Nicosia wing, which had controlled the party since its establishment. 
Yet, this blow could have been less effective, if it was not followed by the elimination of 
other heavyweights like Emin and Olgun Paşalar in the run up to the 1990 election. After 
allegations about his business dealings, Emin decided to retire from politics on the grounds 
of family matters.616 Paşalar, who had joined the clique in the 1981 elections and became 
the successor of Emin as the secretary general found himself “vetoed” by the candidate 
selection committee of the party, where he was a member!617 This was widely interpreted 
as a plot orchestrated by Denktaş to punish those whom he held responsible for the 
exclusion of Raif Denktaş from the party back in 1981. The rage against the clique was so 
                                                        
612 Denktaş cited in “KKTC Cumhurbaşkanı Denktaş Resmen Açıkladı: Seçimlere Bağımsız Katılacağım 
[Denktaş: I will run as an independent].” Kıbrıs Postası, 22.12.1983.  
613 Emin interviewed by author.  
614 Eroğlu cited in Nur Batur: “Kıbrıs Girdabı [The Cyprus Whirlpool] (4).” Milliyet, 4.3.1993.  
615 “UBP Güçlü Bir Kanadını Yitirdi [The UBP lost a stong wing].” Halkın Sesi, 1.6.1984.  
616 “Politik Yaşamını Noktalıyor [He is finishing his political career].” Birlik, 16.3.1990.   
617 “Olgun Paşalar ve 7 Milletvekili Liste Dışı Kaldı [Paşalar and 7 other deputies out of the party ticket].” 
Kıbrıs, 24.3.1990.  
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fierce that Emin was even asked by the Denktaş family not to attend the funeral of Raif 
Denktaş when he passed away in a tragic accident.618 What Denktaş did not realize then, 
however, was that by cutting all the aces of the Nicosia wing out, he was indeed elevating 
Eroğlu to a position where he would become invincible. He was obviously underestimating 
the talents of his new prime minister.  
Given the circumstances preparing his ascendance to the party leadership outlined above, 
it would not be wrong to say his fortune served Eroğlu well. However, he has to be given 
credit for being ready when the luck struck. Eroğlu, who had not been in the inner circle of 
Denktaş administration before 1974, has joined the party in its establishment period. He 
played a major role in the setting up of the Famagusta branch and helped turning it into a 
UBP stronghold. Coming from a modest background, he has always been a leader with a 
common touch. His talent to recall names619, and “being a dealer of hope” -someone 
excelled in pandering and overpromising620- proved to be of immense help in cultivating 
close ties with the rank and file party members and sympathizers. Along with these 
personal characteristics, his popularity –as a medical doctor and the president of the most 
popular football club in Famagusta helped him to come in on top of the party list621 in the 
first election622, and this, helped him to become the minister of education in the first 
cabinet. Although his term in office did not last long623, he began gaining ground in the 
party by joining forces with the Nicosia clique – a move, which turned out to be what 
eventually elevated him to the leadership of the party.  
Unlike his rival Denktaş, who had proven himself a capable politician and a charismatic 
leader long before the party’s establishment, it should be noted that Eroğlu’s success has 
depended entirely on his mastery of intra-party politicking. He showed that he knew what 
exactly he was supposed to do if he was to retain his leadership: controlling the party 
delegates. He is known to be constantly in touch with the local party chiefs; “he is always 
                                                        
618 Emin interviewed by author.  
619 A talent, which served the former American president Bill Clinton well in his successful political career 
(Cicero and Carville 2012).   
620 A personal feature Napoleon considered vital in a leader (Cited in Cicero and Carville 2012). 
621 The electoral system allows voting for individual candidates within the party list (preference votes) as 
well as splitting the votes across different parties. For more on the electoral system and elections see Warner 
(1993: 193-217).   
622 Indeed, except for 1985, when he came in second, he has always come in first.  
623 He resigned before completing his first year in office. 
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on the phone, checking on what’s going on even in the remotest villages,” I was told by one 
of my interviewees. When I asked the former UBP ministers, deputies and other party 
operatives I interviewed, what made Eroğlu so strong, the answer I received was 
unanimous: “he had secured an absolute control over the party delegates by distributing 
favours”.624 When I elaborated on this in the research process, two crucial steps he had 
made, stood out.   
First, in as early as his second year in office, he issued a circular regarding the procedure of 
employment in the public sector, which made appointments and promotions subject to his 
approval.625 In the words of Nazif Borman who worked under Eroğlu in various cabinets:  
Here the intention was to send a message that it was the prime minister who had 
the authority. In practice, he would not veto the candidates recommended by the 
ministers as long as the person to be employed was close to the party. Final decision 
was always made after relevant local party chief was consulted and the candidate’s 
affiliation with the party was confirmed. The real problem used to arise when 
contending candidates were all affiliated with the UBP.626  
Second, he attached the Coop Bank directly to the prime minister’s office.627 The bank has 
been the main institution, which organized rural life by offering credits and agricultural 
inputs to producers.628 Furthermore, as the bank commanded vast resources, controlling 
the bank meant control over credits for other sectors too. In other words, the bank was not 
only a shortcut to the delegates in the villages but also had huge influence over other 
business interests.   
Relying on these two key sources of patronage, Eroğlu replaced those chiefs of the sections 
whose loyalty he could not count upon, with people whom he could trust to use their votes 
to sustain his leadership. He strengthened the lower level party chiefs vis-{-vis the chiefs at 
the branch level629 and in doing so broadened his base. In this way, the role of patron 
became accessible to anyone, as it was no longer necessary to have a social or economic 
status to act as a patron or a mediator (see Piattoni 2001b: 203). Affinity to the party and 
                                                        
624 Serdar Denktaş; Hasan Hasipoğlu; Erdinç Gürçağ; Mustafa Erbilen; Enver Emin; Hasan Taçoy.  
625 KKTC Başbakanlığı, Genelge No.: 1, Sayı: BB/276/76/8, 8.1.1987 [The TRNC Prime Minister’s Office, 
Circular No.1, Issue: BB/276/76/8, 8.1.1987].  
626 Borman interviewed by author.  
627 Ibid.  
628 Ibid.  
629 Serdar Denktaş and an anonymous interviewee interviewed by author.  
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access to a pool of votes was enough. In a way, this was the final stage of what Tarrow calls 
the transition from the “clientelismo of the notable” to “clientelismo of the bureaucracy” 
(1967: 340-1). In short, with these shrewd moves, Eroğlu developed the political machine 
to perfection, which had been established earlier by the junta. 
As pointed out in the previous sections, de-Denktashization of the party organization did 
not start with Eroğlu. However, it can be said that it gained momentum in this period. 
Denktaş’s famous notes were no longer heeded. In Denktaş’s words, Eroğlu “turned against 
me. He did not want me to interfere and said ‘the era of acting with Denktaş’s personal 
instructions written on small paper scraps (pusulalar) came to an end’”.630 Under Eroğlu, 
another important step in the direction of institutionalizing the prime minister’s office was 
taken and a new office building was built. Until then, the prime ministers had to share the 
same building with the president, which was located in the yard of the presidential palace.     
By 1990, the power struggle between Denktaş and Eroğlu did not yet reach a level that 
would avoid cooperation in the campaign trail. Though he did not run on a UBP ticket, 
Denktaş resigned and pushed the presidential election forward631, with a view to 
bolstering the UBP’s chances of success, and actively campaigned for the UBP in the 1990 
election632.   
The 1990 parliamentary election was quite different from the previous ones as it was a two 
party race. This was so because three main opposition parties, the TKP, CTP and YDP, 
decided to join forces and formed the Democratic Struggle Party (Demokratik Mücadele 
Partisi, DMP) to fight the elections.633 The reason behind this unlikely partnership was the 
electoral system introduced by the UBP in the eve of the election, which would favour the 
biggest party (see Warner 1993: 200 and Dodd 1993: 148-152). The DMP’s electoral 
                                                        
630 Interviewed by author. 
631 See İsmet Kotak: “Yangından Mal Kaçırır Gibi Seçim [Snap election].” Kıbrıs Postası, 15.3.1990; and İsmet 
Kotak: “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi [The presidential election].” Kıbrıs Postası, 24.3.1990; Serdar Denktaş 
interviewed by author.  
632 See his statements about the Group of 9 made in the press conference held on 9.7.1992 (The copy of the 
transcript of the press conference from the personal archive of Hakkı Atun).   
633 “Muhalefetin Tarihi Kararı [The opposition’s historical decision].” Kıbrıs Postası, 4.3.1990.  
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pledge was limited to changing the electoral law and renewing the election within three 
months.634  
In its first election under the leadership of Eroğlu back in 1985, the UBP had won 24 of 50 
seats. But this success was thanks to the eight percent threshold introduced after the 
declaration of the TRNC because the party garnered only 36.7 percent of the votes -5.8 
percentage points below the 1981 result. After two coalition experiences, first with the TKP 
and then with the YDP, which lasted 13 and 20 months respectively, the UBP formed a 
single party government by transferring deputies from the YDP. Apparently, Eroğlu did not 
want to go back to a coalition government after the election, and disregarding the protests 
of the opposition, he pushed the new electoral law through. The opposition’s reaction was 
strong: “The harbinger of fascism,” was the headline of daily Kıbrıs Postası.635 The tension 
was high.  
This polarization led to the conducting of probably the most tainted election campaign in 
the Turkish Cypriot history. The opposition’s allegations were numerous (see Warner 
1993: 200-1), and as the report of the parliamentary committee of enquiry, which was set 
up later to look into the electoral offences committed during the 1990 elections showed, 
they were largely true. Though, the report produced is not comprehensive -only two and a 
half pages- and at times vague in wording, its findings clearly showed that the elections 
were neither free nor fair. In the report, inter alia, it was stated that the public employees 
were paid an extra salary one week before the election, without even completing the legal 
procedure; that the local and Turkish media repeatedly violated the electoral law 
influencing the results; that even on the day of election (which was a Sunday), the ministry 
of interior was opened to grant citizenship to the foreigners (read as Turkish citizens) so 
that they could vote for the UBP; that Turkish officials toured the villages and influenced 
voters. The report also concluded that appointments and promotions in the public sector, 
as well as granting of the T car plate permits and citizenship, and allocation of land should 
                                                        
634 See Mithat Sirmen: “KKTC’de Seçim Sancısı [Election pangs in the TRNC].” Kıbrıs Postası, 5.3.1990 
(Originally published in Güneş (İstanbul)).  
635 See “UBP Seçim Yasa Tasarısını Bugün Meclise Sunuyor: KKTC’de Demokrasi Hançerlendi [The UBP to 
submit the draft electoral law to the parliament today: A blow to democracy in the TRNC].” Kıbrıs Postası, 
9.1.1990; “Faşizmin Ayak Sesleri [The harbinger of fascism].” Kıbrıs Postası, 10.1.1990; “Avanta Yasası Kabul 
Edildi [The elecotral spoils law approved].” Kıbrıs Postası, 17.2.1990.  
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be stopped in the run up to the elections if more democratic and sound elections would be 
held in the future.636 
In the financing of the election campaigns, the public sources had always been reinforced 
by private funds provided by businessmen close to the party. “In the eve of the elections 
businessmen were ‘taxed’ in line with the extent of their business dealings with the state: If 
they were recently given a lucrative public contract or a preferential loan, for instance, the 
amount of ‘tax’ went up”.637 In this particular case, the famous businessman Asil Nadir 
played an exceptional role (see Altan 2003: 22; Egemen 2006: 250-1). “In the 1990 election, 
more than distribution of public jobs and the bonus salary, it was the cash provided by Asil 
Nadir, which tipped the balance in favour of the UBP. Money carried in suitcases was given 
to the ministers who distributed them via the party sections,” recalls a former high-level 
bureaucrat638; and adds that he was personally involved in buying votes in his 
neighbourhood: “We summoned the family leaders and paid them on a per vote basis”. 
When I asked him about the details of the campaigning process in the 1980s and 1990s 
when he was active in the party, he told me the following:  
When the election period comes, first, we hold a meeting at the party 
neighbourhood section. We have the list of voters registered in the neighbourhood 
in front of us. We know the UBP loyalists; they don’t need to be bribed. So we cross 
them out. We also know the opposition loyalists; there is nothing to be done about 
them as well. So, we focus on independents. If the family has a grown up kid who 
needs a job, we offer a job. If they need land, we offer land. You name it… Even such 
things like a permit to drill a well can be offered in exchange of votes. … To support 
the party sections at the village level, we used public funds allocated for supporting 
the local football clubs or for the maintenance of the mosques.  
5.5 The Emergence of the Rift between Denktaş and Eroğlu 
In the 1990 elections, the party and Denktaş acted in harmony. Yet, given Denktaş’s 
tendency to hold the reigns of the party and Eroğlu’s determination to protect his turf, a 
clash between the two leaders was inevitable. The first major disagreement arose in the 
run up to the by-election scheduled for October 1991 to fill the seats in the parliament, 
                                                        
636 For the full report see KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [Minutes of the TRNC Parliament], 
10.10.1997, pp. 195-8.   
637 Borman interviewed by author.  
638 Anonymous interviewee; see also the statements of Şinasi Başaran, a journalist who used to work at Asil 
Nadir’s Kıbrıs at the time (“Eroğlu’na İki Bavul Parayı Ben Götürdüm [I took the two suitcases of money to 
Eroğlu].” Havadis, 19.10.2012).  
184 
 
which became vacant when the opposition decided to boycott the parliament.639 The 
boycott started when the TKP and CTP deputies had refused to swear in after the 1990 
election to protest the undemocratic electoral system and Turkish meddling in the 
elections (see also Dodd 1993: 151).640 In Denktaş’s opinion, the UBP should not field 
candidates in the upcoming by-election as a parliament without opposition would put him 
and the TRNC in an awkward position in the eyes of the international community.641 Eroğlu 
decided otherwise642, and by winning eleven of the twelve seats at stake, the UBP came to 
control 45 of the 50 seats.      
In the meantime, some deputies including Denktaş’s younger son Serdar Denktaş who had 
made a strong debut in politics with the 1990 election by coming first in Nicosia list, 
started intra-party opposition against Eroğlu. Indeed, the first clash between Serdar 
Denktaş and Eroğlu came, when Serdar Denktaş put his nomination for secretary 
generalship. Eroğlu responded by abolishing the position saying, “only communist parties 
have secretary generals”.643 Serdar Denktaş responded by organizing an opposition 
movement within the party:  
I used to go to my father and tell him about our group. After listening to me, ‘how 
many deputies do you have in the group?’ he used to ask. He gave me the nod when I 
told him we had reached eight.  
Upon Denktaş’s green light the so-called Group of 9 gave a memorandum to the party 
leader Eroğlu, and resigned from their posts in the party organization in protest in May 
1992. After 1976 and 1981, now for the third time a group within the party was coming 
forward with an agenda to reform the UBP; looking from a different perspective, however, 
this can be seen just another attempt by Denktaş to retake the control of the party he had 
established. The memorandum is a succinct summary of the transformation that the 
Turkish Cypriot community has gone through in the post-1974 era. Of particular 
importance is what the rebel deputies said about the public administration:  
                                                        
639 “Kaçıncı Raunt [Which round].” Milliyet, 17.4.1995.  
640 A parliamentary investigation committee concluded that the opposition parties were basically right (see 
the Report of the Parliamentary Investigation Committee, which was set up to investigate the electoral 
offences committed in the 1990 presidential and parliamentary elections). The committee was established on 
1.1.1994 and completed the investigation on 4.6.1997.  
641 “UBP Kaynıyor [The UBP in chaos].” Kıbrıs Postası, 5.6.1991; see also his statements dated 9.7.1992.   
642 “Eroğlu’ndan Denktaş’a Yanıt: UBP’nin Seçime Girmesiyle Meclisin Yüzü Kararmaz [From Eroğlu to 
Denktaş: The UBP’s participation in the elections will not bring shame on the parliament].” Vatan, 23.8.1991.  
643 Serdar Denktaş interviewed by author.  
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… public service personnel, particularly the high level bureaucrats are being held 
under pressure by a narrow, monopolist cadre of the party and government; those 
who are trying to protect the rights of the state and the public are being excluded; 
the civil servants are tried to be modelled as yes men. Merit, experience and 
objective evaluation are pushed aside … A circle of fear is built upon the citizens … 
Citizens do not benefit from the resources of the state based on legal criteria. Rather, 
a narrow cadre who holds the political power is arbitrarily monopolizing the 
distribution of these resources.644  
Different from the previous rounds, where he acted by pulling the strings behind the 
scenes, this time Denktaş publicly embraced the intra-party opposition movement645, and 
took active part in the anti-Eroğlu campaign.646 Eroğlu showed that he could play as tough 
as Denktaş by starting disciplinary probe against the rebel deputies, and suspending all 
nine’s membership; something his predecessors could not dare.647 Eventually, when, the 
rebels resigned from the party upon the suspension decision648 to set up the Democratic 
Party, and brought away a considerable chunk of the members of grassroots organizations 
with them, particularly in Nicosia and Kyrenia, Eroğlu shrewdly filled all vacant posts with 
his loyalists without election.649 This is to say, though the party was weakened in general, 
Eroğlu’s hold on the party was strengthened after the splintering.  
This came in handy particularly when Eroğlu lost the premiership after the 1993 election. 
It is important to note that Denktaş did his best to defeat Eroğlu in the polls. To force 
Eroğlu to call early elections, he resigned as the negotiator in the Cyprus talks blaming 
Eroğlu and the UBP of undermining him by making anti-federation statements that cannot 
be reconciled with his negotiating position.650 He even explicitly called on Ankara to bring 
Eroğlu into line by using its financial influence, to no avail: “Turkey holds the biggest 
                                                        
644 The copy of the memorandum from the personal archive of Hakkı Atun. The memorandum was dated 
4.5.1992. See also “Kriz Dorukta [Crisis peaked].” Kıbrıs, 5.5.1992 and “Ve ipler koptu [And the ties are 
severed].” Kıbrıs, 6.5.1992.    
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longer with the UBP said ‘an early election will definitely be called’].” Kıbrıs, 11.7.1992.  
646 To make Ankara exert pressure on Eroğlu, he even resigned as the negotiator blaming Eroğlu and the UBP 
of undermining him by making anti-federation statements that cannot be reconciled with his negotiating 
position (“Denktaş: Federasyona İnanmayan Bir Hükümetin Görüşmecisi Olmam [I cannot be the negotiator 
of a government, which does not believe in federation].” Halkın Sesi, 7.7.1993; see also Sami Kohen: “Sonuç 
Çözümü Nasıl Etkiler [How will the result affect the solution]?” Milliyet, 10.11.1993). 
647 “Altı Ay UBP’den Uzak Kalacaklar [They will stay away from the UBP for six months].” Kıbrıs, 7.7.1992.  
648 “Ve Dokuzlar İstifa Etti [And the group of nine have resigned].” Kıbrıs, 10.7.1992.  
649 Anonymous interviewee.   
650 “Denktaş: Federasyona İnanmayan Bir Hükümetin Görüşmecisi Olmam [I cannot be the negotiator of a 
government, which does not believe in federation].” Halkın Sesi, 7.7.1993; see also Sami Kohen: “Sonuç 
Çözümü Nasıl Etkiler [How will the result affect the solution]?” Milliyet, 10.11.1993.  
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sanction in its hands. It cuts money and says ‘pal, you cannot do that’.”651 Yet, he could not 
secure the support of Ankara and eventually, the UBP came in first in the election held in 
December 1993. From Denktaş’s statements it is understood that the DYP wing of the 
ruling coalition in Ankara, and particularly Orhan Kilercioğlu, the state minister 
responsible for Cyprus affairs protected Eroğlu.652 However, Denktaş refused to give the 
mandate to form the government to Eroğlu, and after blaming him of bribing the voters, 
expressed his hope that “the intra-party movement against Eroğlu … succeeds and makes 
his job easier”.653 So strong was Denktaş’s hostility against Eroğlu that the process brought 
about the Cypriot version of compromesso storico –historic compromise: The DP-CTP 
coalition.  
Having fallen from power, Eroğlu found himself in a struggle for his political survival. Emin, 
whom he earlier had called back from retirement and appointed as the deputy chairman to 
pull the party together654, turned against him and tried to force him to resign. Indeed, he 
announced that he would resign655 only to change his mind a day later “upon the pressure 
from the party base”.656 This led to Emin’s nomination for the party chairmanship in the 
upcoming party conference in October 1994. Though Eroğlu easily won the election657, the 
UBP suffered yet another blow, when defeated Emin resigned from the party to set up a 
new one. To encourage the party organization to vote out Eroğlu, Denktaş repeatedly 
stated that he was not going to give the mandate to form the government to Eroğlu. The 
message was clear: only obstacle between the UBP and government is its chairman. 
Specifically, just before the UBP conference, he said should the DP-CTP coalition fall, he was 
not going to ask Eroğlu to form the government, “as in his eight years in office as the prime 
minister, he misused power, and ordered committing of [electoral] offences, which 
required imprisonment”.658 Accordingly, when the coalition eventually resigned few 
                                                        
651 Özcan Ercan: "Kıbrıs Dosyası [The Cyprus dossier] (3)." Milliyet, 8.10.1993. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Akay Cemal: “Eroğlu’na Görev Yok [No mandate to Eroğlu].” Milliyet, 14.12.1993.  
654 Emin interviewed by author.  
655 “Eroğlu İstifa Ediyor [Eroğlu is going to resign].” Kıbrıs, 7.4.1994.  
656 “Eroğlu Tabanın Baskısı Üzerine İstifa Etmekten Vazgeçti [Upon the base’s pressure Eroğlu decided not to 
resign].” Kıbrıs, 9.4.1994.  
657 Eroğlu received 521 of the 757 votes cast (“UBP, ‘Eroğlu’ dedi [The UBP said ‘Eroğlu’].” Kıbrıs, 17.10.1994).  
658 “Denktaş: ‘Sayın Eroğlu, ekmek su ister gibi başbakanlık istememeli’ [Denktaş: ‘Mr Eroğlu should not ask 
for the premiership as if he were asking for bread or water’].” Kıbrıs, 3.9.1994.  
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months later, he asked a UBP deputy, Paşalar to form the government.659 He said in doing 
so, he intended “to help to reunite the base, which has been divided needlessly”.660 “I used 
my constitutional authority to reconcile the base,” he added. When he was asked what he 
thought about allegations that he appointed Paşalar “to further divide the UBP,” he put the 
blame for division on Eroğlu once again:  
The DP’s birth has been attributed to me for known reasons. But nobody is saying 
that if 9 deputies had not been needlessly expelled from the party with a vengeful 
dictatorial decision, the base would not have been divided. The one who took that 
decision and kicked them out is to be blamed.      
The DP leadership stated that Denktaş’s decision to give the mandate to Paşalar was “a step 
on the way to reunifying the right,” and expressed its willingness to take part in a UBP-DP 
coalition under Paşalar’s premiership.661 However, the UBP’s party assembly unanimously 
decided to return the mandate next day.662 Denktaş blamed Eroğlu and UBP of squandering 
an historic opportunity. What is more, he seemed to be surprised by the unanimity of the 
decision, and said, more than six deputies who had pledged their support for Paşalar 
“obviously went back on their pledges,”663 admitting that he was in league with certain UBP 
deputies to depose Eroğlu.  
The feud took a different turn in the 1995 presidential election, when Eroğlu ran as the first 
UBP candidate to contest against Denktaş and managed to force a run-off by garnering 24.1 
percent of the votes. Remarkably, there was a perception that this time, at least in the first 
round, Denktaş was not actively supported by Ankara.664 When he was asked about this in 
a press conference, Denktaş said, certain politicians from Turkey, particularly Orhan 
Kilercioğlu, now only a DYP backbencher, had undermined him.665 Yet, he managed to win 
the second round easily by getting 62 percent of the votes.    
                                                        
659 “Görev Paşalar’ın [Mandate given to Paşalar].” Kıbrıs, 16.3.1995.  
660 “Amaç Sağı Birleştirmek [The aim is to unite the right].”  Kıbrıs, 16.3.1995.  
661 “Görev Paşalar’ın [Mandate given to Paşalar].” Kıbrıs, 16.3.1995. 
662 “UBP’den Ret [Refusal from the UBP].” Kıbrıs, 17.3.1995. 
663 “Denktaş: Çare Buluruz [Denktaş: We will find a solution].” Kıbrıs, 17.3.1995. 
664 This was the conclusion derived by a journalist from the fact that Denktaş could not win in the first round 
(see “Denktaş: ‘MAP destek için benden 3 milyar istedi [Denktaş: ‘MAP asked for 3 billion in exchange for 
support’].” Kıbrıs, 18.4.1996). 
665 Ibid.  
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After the presidential election, Denktaş maintained his anti-Eroğlu stance, and gave the 
mandate to form the government, once again to the DP leader Atun. Accordingly, the 
second DP-CTP coalition was formed, which would last less than six months. This was 
followed by the third DP-CTP coalition, which resigned a little more than six months later. 
The collapse of three DP-CTP governments in only 30 months is remarkable and the 
reasons behind this merits further attention.  
How can we explain the failure of historic compromise? Why did Denktaş eventually back 
down and hand the premiership to Eroğlu666, whom he detested so much? The 1994 
Turkish economic crisis is the obvious answer. As a result of this crisis, in Celasun’s words, 
“in the first quarter of 1994, the Turkish Lira (TL) was devalued more than 50 percent 
against the USD, the [Turkish] Central Bank lost half of its reserves, interest rates 
skyrocketed, and the inflation rate reached three digit levels” (1998, 2). Given the 
dependence of the Turkish Cypriot economy on the Turkish one, it is not difficult to 
conclude that the same effects were felt in the island too. As in Turkey, the crisis also led to 
a small-scale banking crisis.667 More significantly, a sharp decline in the Turkish financial 
assistance can be observed in the 1994-5 period. While the amount of money transferred 
from Ankara stood at USD 82.6 million in 1993, it fell to USD 50.6 million in 1994, and then 
to USD 44.3 million in 1995.668 In the absence of Ankara’s support, the government failed to 
pay the salaries on time in May669, June670, and July 1996671. The shortage of money 
inevitably turned into a social turmoil, and this led to the resignation of the government.   
No matter how plausible this explanation is, it only partly accounts for the failure of the DP-
CTP coalition. A deeper analysis reveals that the reason behind this crisis was not purely 
economic. The fact that the Turkish economy was going through a rough patch at the time 
cannot be denied. Yet, the real reason behind the Turkish government’s parsimony was the 
CTP’s participation in the government, and not its own economic woes. It is not hard to see 
                                                        
666 “Yeşil Işık [Green Light].” Kıbrıs, 2.7.1996.  
667 “Akdeniz Garanti ve Everest Devlet Kontrolünde [Akdeniz Garanti and Everest Bank under state control].” 
Kıbrıs, 2.5.1994.  
668 TC Yardım Heyeti (2004: 25).  See also the table in Annex.  
669 “Maaş Yok [No salary].” Kıbrıs, 3.5.1996; “Coşar: ‘Maaşlar Türkiye’den Bulunuyor [Coşar: Salaries got from 
Turkey].” Kıbrıs, 11.5.1996.  
670 “Memur Çekleri Dağıtıldı, Para Bugün [The civil servant paychecks distributed; cash today].” Kıbrıs, 
4.6.1996.  
671 “Maaşlar Bugün veya Yarın [Salaries will be paid today or tomorrow].” Kıbrıs, 2.7.1996.  
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that the CTP’s stance towards the solution of the Cyprus problem, civilianization of the 
police department or its willingness to place the relations between Turkey and the TRNC to 
a state-to-state basis did not win it many friends in Ankara. Serdar Denktaş also confirms 
that Ankara never approved their coalition with the CTP.672 To say the least, this was the 
perception in the nationalist circles673, which was also shared by the CTP.674 The more than 
doubling of Turkish aid to USD 91.9 million in 1996675 after the forming of the UBP-DP 
government shows that this perception was right. Indeed, the Turkish premier Erbakan did 
not hide that he preferred a right-wing government.676 He played an active role in the 
formation of the UBP-DP coalition by bringing the two parties’ leaders together in a hotel 
room when he visited Cyprus.677    
It is important to note that the Turkish establishment did not air its discontent about the 
involvement of the CTP in government by only playing the financial assistance card. There 
was a parallel campaign, which culminated with the explosion of a bomb in the Nicosia 
branch of the CTP on May Day.678 The CTP called upon the solidarity and support of 
international actors by releasing a public statement entitled “Escalation of Terrorist 
Activities in Northern Cyprus” via its London Solidarity Association.679 The following 
excerpt from this release does not only reflect the situation on the ground very well but 
also sheds light on the role of the Turkish “deep state” in Cyprus before the existence of this 
organization began to be discussed in the Turkish public opinion. I will briefly touch upon 
this in the next chapter.  
                                                        
672 Interviewed by author.  
673 See for insance Eşref Çetinel: “İktidar Hakkı Ankara’dan Para Sağlayanındır [The right to govern belongs to 
the one who secures money from Ankara].” Halkın Sesi, 9.3.1996; see also İsmet Kotak: “‘Anavatan-
Yavruvatan’ İlişkisi İstemediklerinden Halkı Mahkum Ediyorlar [People suffer because they do not want to 
have an infant-mother type of relationship with Turkey].” Halkın Sesi, 25.3.1996; Artun Çağa’s interview with 
Serdar Denktaş, Kıbrıs, 3.5.1996; Eşref Çetinel: “Bu Hükümetle Bu Memleket Kurtulmaz [This government 
cannot rescue this country].” Halkın Sesi, 30.3.1996.  
674 See Talat’s statements (“UBP-DP Uzun Ömürlü Olmaz [The UBP-DP will not last long].” Kıbrıs, 21.8.1996) 
and Soyer’s statements cited in Dilek Çetereisi: “Soyer Rekor Kıramadı [Soyer could not break the record].” 
Kıbrıs, 27.8.1996.   
675 TC Yardım Heyeti (2004: 25).  
676 See Eroğlu cited in “Erbakan’dan İç Politikamıza Müdahale [Erbakan meddling in our domestic politics].” 
Yenidüzen, 24.7.1996.   
677 After calling for the formation of a broad-based coalition, Erbakan said, “motherland is strong and rich. It 
can provide the resources required for the economic development of the northern Cyprus”. Later, he met with 
Serdar and Eroğlu, in Talat’s words “to broker a coalition between the DP and UBP” (see “Geniş Tabanlı 
Hükümet Çağrısı [Call for a broad-based coalition]” Kıbrıs, 21.7.1996); see also Ülker Fahri: “Şeffaf Müdahale 
[Transparent intervention].” Yenidüzen, 26.7.1996.    
678 “CTP’ye Bomba [The CTP building bombed].” Kıbrıs, 3.5.1996. 
679 For the full public statement see Kıbrıs, 28.5.1996.  
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Secret distribution of unsigned pamphlets, posting anonymous letters of threat to 
individuals, chauvinistic propaganda by newly revitalized members of old 
underground organizations680, warmongering by generals, importation of groups of 
reactionaries, ultranationalists and religious fanatics, vandalism of island’s cultural 
heritage and planting of explosives at private houses and cars, offices, night clubs, 
banks and political centers have been the norm of terrorist activities in northern 
Cyprus over the past two years. 
In spite of the fact that these terrorist activities are on constant increase no one has 
yet assumed responsibility, no suspect has yet been identified and no arrest has 
been made. There is no plan of action and no measure has been taken either to deter 
or search for those responsible.  
The democratic forces in northern Cyprus are seriously concerned because it is hard 
to believe that terrorism can run loose and undetected under the nose of the 
prevailing martial rule at the rate of one ‘security personnel’ for every four civilians
     …  
All the indications are that what is being witnessed today is just the tip of an iceberg 
of much wider campaign by the reactionaries, ultranationalists and fundamentalists 
in Turkey and in Cyprus to silence the opposition and pave the way to the solution 
leading to territorial integration of northern Cyprus to Turkey and extinction of a 
Turkish Cypriot community on the island.  
Not surprisingly, the CTP’s statement attracted the reaction of the nationalist circles681, and 
probably hastened the dissolution of the coalition. Yet, it did not deter further attacks. The 
explosion of a bomb at the DP headquarters right after the release of the statement, the 
assassination of Kutlu Adalı682, a pro-federation journalist, and the border incidents that 
led to the killing of two Greek Cypriot demonstrators in the following two months proved 
the concerns raised in the statement right.  
The fact that the formal negotiations for the UBP-DP coalition lasted more than two 
months683, and that the talks collapsed more than once, in a way, show that the UBP-DP 
                                                        
680 The group called itself Libertarian Turkish Brigade (Özgürlükçü Türk Tugayı), see Halkın Sesi, 17.4.1996.  
681 The UBP leader, for instance, identified it as “scandalous” (“Eroğlu: ‘Koalisyonu Tartışırız’ [We can discuss 
a coalition].” Kıbrıs, 28.5.1996); see also “CTP’nin Türkiye’ye Yönelik Beyanları Kabul Edilemez [The CTP’s 
statements regarding Turkey are unacceptable].” Kıbrıs, 29.5.1996; “Kotak: ‘CTP Örgütleri KKTC’yi Arkadan 
Vurdu’ [The CTP subsidiaries backstabbed the TRNC],” and “MAP: ‘DP-CTP Görüşmeleri Halka Saygısızlık’ 
[The DP-CTP meetings are disrespect to people].” Kıbrıs, 29.5.1996; “Etkin’den CTP’ye Sert Eleştiri: 
‘Hükümette İşiniz Ne [Harsh criticism against the CTP from Etkin: ‘what are you doing in the government]?’” 
Kıbrıs, 1.6.1996. 
682 “Siyasi Cinayet [Political murder].” Kıbrıs, 7.7.1996; a day later, the Turkish Revenge Brigade claimed 
responsibility for the assassination (“T.İ.T. Üstlendi [T.İ.T. claimed].” Kıbrıs, 8.7.1996).    
683 The DP party assembly authorized their leader to start coalition negotiations with the UBP in the early 
hours of June 11th (see “DP-UBP Gündemde [DP-CTP on agenda].” Kıbrıs, 11.6.1996). The DP-CTP coalition 
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coalition was an arranged -or to be more precise, a shotgun- marriage, at least looking from 
the DP side. 
As a commentator put it, the whole process can be interpreted as a preparation for a post-
Denktaş era; “certain circles in Turkey” were trying to initiate a rapprochement between 
the two right wing parties with a view to creating “a new leader,” and this new leader was 
obviously Eroğlu.684 The fact that Denktaş had a heart attack in early March and stayed out 
of office for almost two months certainly gives credit to this kind of comments.685 Still, no 
matter how much sense this made for those in Ankara, this was not something that Denktaş 
could easily stomach. Yet, on the face of growing pressure, he had no option but to yield.      
Only looking from this broader perspective, one can understand Denktaş’s green light to 
the formation of an Eroğlu-led government after all he has done to get rid of him. “The 
party has embraced its leader. His party refused the reasons I had raised before. People 
have also forgotten. Being stubborn does not make sense,” Denktaş said, before adding that 
he did not see any reason for not giving the mandate to Eroğlu.686 Having said that, this did 
not mean that Denktaş accepted the defeat and settled for a peaceful cohabitation with 
Eroğlu. It would turn out that this was just a tactical retreat. When a more favourable 
government came to power in Ankara, he struck back. This and its implications, I will 
discuss in Chapter Six.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
formally came to an end on July 4th (“DP-CTP Bitti [DP-CTP over].” Kıbrıs, 5.7.1996), and the DP and UBP 
reached an agreement to form a coalition government on August 14th (“UBP-DP Nihayet Tamam [UBP-DP 
finally OK].” Kıbrıs, 15.8.1996).    
684 Başaran Düzgün: “Denktaş Sonrası Dönem [The post-Denktaş period].” Yenidüzen, 29.5.1996. 
685 Ses for instance “Denktaş’ın Durumu İyi [Denktaş’s condition is good].” Kıbrıs, 4 March 1996. 
686 “Yeşil Işık [Green Light].” Kıbrıs, 2.7.1996. 
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Chapter 6: The Left’s Perfect Storm: A Politico-Economic Analysis of 
the End of the Monopoly of Nationalism in Turkish Cypriot Politics  
This concluding chapter focuses on the transformation process, which has culminated with 
the Turkish Cypriot community’s approval of the UN’s reunification plan in April 2004. It 
aims to explain how, against all odds, politico-economic dynamics, which have sustained 
the pro-taksim consensus until the early 2000s, have drastically changed, and turned the 
EU into a strong overarching element to mobilize masses, prompting the sudden end of the 
half a century old monopoly of Turkish nationalism in Turkish Cypriot politics.  
Only few years ago, such a thing was inconceivable. As Diez suggests, when the EU 
membership came to agenda in the 1990s, it was portrayed “as an existential threat to the 
Turkish-Cypriot community’s identity,” and used as a pretext to deepen integration with 
Turkey (2002: 146). The electorate did not seem to be bothered by this. To the contrary, in 
the 2000 presidential election, the combined votes of the two nationalist rivals, Denktaş 
and Eroğlu reached almost 74 percent. However, despite the alarmist discourse of the 
nationalist establishment, instead of solidification of the Turkish identity, paradoxically, 
what we see in the period to come was the rise of a more inclusive vision of a political 
community envisaging coexistence with the long-mistrusted “other”. Cypriotism was on the 
rise at an unlikely time and in an unprecedented manner.  
In what follows, I analyze the politico-economic dynamics underlying this paradoxical 
transformation process. At the center of this turnaround lies the drying up of the financial 
resources under the government’s disposal, at a time when the need for fresh funds tended 
to go up by the day. Particularly, the appeal of the clientelistic system began to decline 
when two consecutive economic crises struck a blow on the finances of the government 
and severely curbed its distributive capacity. The Annan plan with its prospect of 
immediate membership to the EU was introduced when the social unrest triggered by the 
economic crises was at its peak. After Ankara’s blocking of their coming to power in 1981, 
the two vanguards of federal settlement to the Cyprus problem and Cypriotism, the TKP 
and CTP had been effectively pushed to the sidelines, though as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, both took part in short-lived coalitions as junior partners. Now, with the 
increasingly impoverishing effects of the crises on the masses, and the EU membership 
around the corner, the left was resuscitated back to life, and particularly the CTP assumed 
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the leadership of the pro-reunification movement. For the first time, the pro-reunification 
opposition was able to offer a tangible alternative political project to replace the defunct 
politico-economic structure.  
These developments were taken up in the literature by Lacher and Kaymak (2005), and 
Kızılyürek (2002 and 2005), who analyzed the identity transformation within the Turkish 
Cypriot community in a broader historical context. This chapter complements these studies 
by elaborating on the politico-economic dynamics preparing this transformation in the 
1990s and early 2000s. The emphasis is on the “catalyst effect” of the EU; the banking 
crisis; and infighting within the nationalist camp whose roots were taken up in the 
previous chapter. What is completely new here is, particularly, the analysis of the latent 
role of the schism within the nationalist camp in this process. I argue that what really 
escalated the banking crisis into a full-scale social turmoil was Denktaş’s attempt to 
politicize and instrumentalize it during and aftermath of the 2000 presidential election 
campaign to eliminate his archrival Eroğlu once and for all, and his rival’s determination 
not to yield. Without this self-inflicted wound the banking and subsequent financial crisis 
could have been weathered without much damage on the integrity of the post-1974 
establishment. Indeed, this schism was not new, and as briefly touched upon in the 
previous chapter, the negative effects of a similar -albeit slightly smaller- combination of 
banking and currency crises were aggravated by political manipulation in the mid-1990s, 
without causing the fraction of the anti-establishment backlash experienced in the early 
2000s. Yet, of course one should remember that at that time, the prospect of EU 
membership was not imminent enough to make it a real game-changer.   
Before focusing on the details of the dissolution process in the last section of this chapter, 
in the first three sections, I will show the macro-economic and social consequences of some 
two decades of clientelism under the UBP with a view to demonstrating the fragility of the 
economy, and the damage inflicted on the social fabric at large. I also show (a) that the 
public sector was indeed even more over-bloated than it has often been assumed, and (b) 
that this huge public sector was the result of what Lyrintzis calls “bureaucratic clientelism,” 
a distinct form of clientelism.  
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6.1 Delayed Catalysis: The Agonies of the Old Regime  
In the last few years following the RoC’s accession to the EU, Brussels has often been 
criticized for admitting a divided Cyprus and leaving the Turkish Cypriots outside in the 
cold. Yet, those looking for a culprit should look elsewhere. After all, the intention of the EU 
when it had declared the RoC a candidate was to induce the Turkish Cypriot side to be 
more conciliatory in the inter-communal negotiations, and in that it certainly succeeded -
though the wisdom of this approach at some point had been seriously questioned 
(Larrabee 1998; Dodd 1999; Jakobsson-Hatay 2001; Diez 2002; Yeşilada and Sözen 2002). 
The problem was, to the dismay of the proponents of this change, the expected “catalyst 
effect” kicked in too late. By the time the pro-reunification camp took over the cockpit, the 
crucial deadlines were already missed687 due to, what David Hannay called  “kamikaze 
approach” of the Turkish diplomacy (2005: 143).   
Against this backdrop, if we are to understand the turnaround, first we need to put the EU 
dimension into its historical context, and explain the initial failure of the expected “catalyst 
effect”. To start with the ruling nationalist elite, it should be noted that the EU membership 
had never been an incentive for a settlement for them.688 Quite the opposite, it had been 
dismissed as a “carrot” aiming to deceive the Turkish Cypriot people in order to separate 
them from their “motherland” (Denktaş cited in Kızılyürek 2003: 300). It was nothing but 
enosis in disguise or “through the backdoor”689 (Cem 2001: 180; see also Diez 2002), and 
hence should be avoided at all costs.690 From their perspective, the Cyprus problem was 
solved back in 1974 anyway691, and “any settlement short of the legalization of the status 
quo” was not desirable (Lacher and Kaymak 2005: 153; see also Hannay 2005). Ankara’s 
position was not different either. When the EU leaders declared, in Corfu in 1994, that the 
next phase of enlargement of the Union would include the RoC, the then Turkish foreign 
minister Murat Karayalçın expressed Turkey’s misgivings by saying “in such an undesirable 
                                                        
687 The RoC was formally admitted to the EU –long before the referendum- after signing the Treaty of 
Accession on 16 April 2003 when Denktaş was still at the helm.  
688 “Denktaş: Türkiyesiz Avrupalı Olamayız [We cannot become European without Turkey].” Kıbrıs, 5.4.1995.  
689 Denktaş used this expression in his election campaign in 1995 (“Baraji Geçtim [I cleared the threshold].” 
Kıbrıs, 13.4.1995).  
690 See also the DP leader and prime minister Hakkı Atun’s statements cited in “Aman Türkiye Duymasın 
[Don’t let Turkey hear that]!” Nokta Kıbrıs, 8.5.1994, p.10.  
691 See for instance the statement of Ecevit cited in Fikret Bila: “Ecevit’ten AB’ye Uyarı [Warning to the EU 
from Ecevit].” Milliyet, 23.7.2000.  
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eventuality, Turkey will be left with no option but to take steps towards achieving a similar 
integration with the TRNC” (cited in Kramer 2000: 177). Accordingly, Turkey and the TRNC 
signed an agreement establishing Association Council in 1997, “with the objective of 
achieving integration between the two countries in the economic and financial fields as 
well as achieving partial integration in matters of security, defense and foreign affairs”.692  
The decision of the EU Luxembourg Summit to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate 
states, and the Greek Cypriot administration’s plan to deploy Russian-made S 300 missiles 
in the island worsened the already strained relations between the two sides (Yeşilada and 
Sözen 2002: 269). Consequently, the tone of Turkey’s reaction to the progress of relations 
between the EU and the RoC became even harsher after the formal opening of accession 
negotiations in March 1998. İsmail Cem, the then Turkish foreign minister had urged the 
EU “to evaluate its future steps very carefully before it is too late and before the Greek 
Cypriot administration paves the way towards another war on the island” (cited in Kramer 
2000: 178). In August 1998, Denktaş, backed by the Turkish government, took advantage 
of the situation to further his taksim agenda and came up with preconditions for the 
resumption of inter-communal negotiations, including the Greek Cypriot side’s recognition 
of the TRNC and negotiating settlement on the basis of confederation.    
When we look at the initial impact of the prospect of EU membership on the electorate, we 
see that it was equally negative. The December 1998 parliamentary election brought a 
landslide victory for the nationalist parties, whose overall share of the vote reached its 
historical peak with approximately 68 percent. Denktaş welcomed the result as “a victory 
for the national cause,” and said that the success of the majority, who had always been loyal 
to Turkey and determined to maintain the TRNC, was an unmistakable message to the 
world. He attributed the decline of the CTP’s support to its stance towards the “national 
cause” and dismissed its leader Talat’s earlier statement “Turkey is not my motherland,” as 
ridiculous.693 A few months later, the electorate reaffirmed its support for the nationalist 
leaders in the presidential election. By 2000, the expected “catalyst effect” of EU 
                                                        
692http://www.mfa.gov.tr/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-
government-of-the-turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus-on-the.en.mfa (accessed on 18.3.2013).  
693 TAK’s news bulletin dated 7.12.1998  
http://www.emu.edu.tr/~tak/news/19981207.htm (accessed on 19.3.2013); see also Sertaç Görgüner: 
“Görev Eroğlu’nun [The mandate given to Eroğlu].” Kıbrıs, 9.12.1998. 
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membership in promoting a more flexible stance was obviously lacking at both elite and 
mass level.  
If it seems unsurprising that the elites remained committed to secessionism, it is more 
difficult to explain the indifference at the level of society at large. To account for this 
unresponsiveness, the attention should be turned, once again, to the clientelistic linkage 
mechanism established between voters and elites. By the early 2000s, looking from the 
perspective of the nationalist politicians, the clientelistic system seemed to be still, to quote 
Uğur, “resolute enough to survive under-performance in economic terms” (2003: 64). This 
was true so long as Ankara continued pumping money into the system. In fact, the Turkish 
Cypriot economy was nothing but a house of cards. Overall public finances were in a 
shambles after decades of misallocation of resources making the system extremely 
susceptible to external shocks; something those politicians failed to see at the time and 
would learn the hard way.  
In what follows, I elaborate on the accumulated effects of clientelism on the economy and 
society to lay the ground for explaining why the whole establishment went into such a big 
crisis when Ankara turned off the tap. To start with, I take the Italian case as a benchmark, 
and very briefly look at the effects of the decades long DC dominance on the socio-
economic development of this country to give a general idea about the connection between 
political clientelism on the one hand, and economic underperformance and corruption on 
the other. What render this comparison possible is three fundamental similarities between 
the DC and UBP: their conservatism; non-programmatic, clientelistic nature; and dominant 
role as the government party for a long time.  
In the literature, general assumption is that political clientelism is damaging for economic 
growth (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Stokes 2007; Müller 2007: 263; for a critical 
assessment see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007(b)). Yet, Kitschelt and Wilkinson point out 
that these assumptions “are based on little empirical evidence” (2007b: 329). Having said 
that, they concede that, “on average, the prevalence of clientelism may foster more 
satisfaction of rent-seeking interests, worse governance, and weaker economic 
performance than polities with mostly programmatic competition” (ibid.: 333-4). What 
prevents them from talking about a stronger relationship between political clientelism and 
its negative consequences is their assumption that democratic competition for political 
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office restrains the extent of clientelism, bad governance and corruption (ibid.). If this is so, 
then in polities where such competition is seriously distorted as in the cases of north 
Cyprus and the Cold War era Italy due to absence of alternation in power, such restraints 
were obviously not in force, and one may conclude without much hesitation that political 
clientelism prompted high level of corruption and poor economic performance. In this 
regard, as the literature shows, the Italian case is particularly telling.  
It is also important to note that thanks to the independence of judiciary in Italy, at least 
some of the worst offenders were exposed and held accountable (Müller 2007: 267). A case 
in point was the tangentopoli scandal. This is to say, the Italian case may give us a rough 
idea about what has been swept under the carpet in the Turkish Cypriot case where the 
subordination of the judiciary to the political establishment did not allow such catharsis. 
Besides, as it has been studied much more extensively in general, the findings of this vast 
literature can be extrapolated to the Turkish Cypriot case, a virgin territory, to support 
anecdotal evidence.  
To start with, to understand why clientelism leads to relatively slow economic growth one 
may look, inter alia, at the organizational nature of clientelistic political parties. Tarrow 
identifies the DC as “part conservative party of business, part anticommunist bastion, part 
confessional party, part party of defence of the 'little man', and, most basically, the Italian 
version of the postwar phenomenon of the 'catch-all people's party’” (1979: 170). Replace 
the expressions “confessional” with “nationalist”, and the “Italian” with “Turkish Cypriot,” 
and the description applies perfectly well to the UBP (for the “catchall” character of the DC 
see also for instance Allum and Allum 2008: 343). It was exactly because of this nature that 
similar to the DC’s, the UBP’s extraordinary success in the election time has never been 
matched by its performance in governing. The presence of representatives of different 
interest groups within the party made it vulnerable to conflicting demands from different 
sources. In other words, the very factors that gave the party a big advantage when running 
an election campaign, paralyzed the party when it came to governing. To quote Tarrow 
once again, the DC’s  
major defects lay in the policy area, where it developed an inability to make hard 
choices and dispersed resources, rather than concentrating their impact on chosen 
policy targets. … Public intervention took the form of subsidies to industry, a large 
nationalised sector and generous public assistance to a variety of social groups. 
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What never developed was the capacity for concerted public activity to increase 
demand, to create or redirect employment, or to come to grips with the structural 
problems of an economy divided into modern and traditional sectors —in other 
words, economic planning (1979: 170 and 174).  
Add this, another feature that the two cases had in common, and the picture becomes 
clearer. That is lack of alternation in power. In Pasquino’s words:  
Always present, and in a dominant role, in all the various national governmental 
coalitions, often leading exclusively DC cabinets (monocolori), the party and its 
leaders were able to strengthen and consolidate their ties with the bureaucracy, the 
public managers, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Southern Development Agency), the 
banking system. Unfettered by any control, DC hegemony over these sectors was 
taken for granted by the "controlled" as well as by the party (1979: 95).  
Under such circumstances, the state had come to be “perceived primarily as a vehicle for 
the pursuit of personal, party, and factional interests, leading to a blurring of the line 
between public and private and between legitimate and illegitimate forms of power and 
influence” (Chubb 2004: 465). In a political system, where the citizens’ basic rights were 
transformed into “privileges” or “favors,” by party bosses, “not just businessmen and 
politicians, but almost all citizens became complicit in some form of clientelism or 
corruption as a necessary lubricant to unblock an otherwise unresponsive bureaucracy” 
(ibid.) leading to the emergence of “mass socialization in the practices of illegality” 
(Signorelli cited in Chubb 2004: 465-6).  
Though it is almost impossible to illustrate it in a decisive way, one may clearly sense the 
same perception and conditions outlined above in the Turkish Cypriot community too. As 
far as political corruption, and illegitimate forms of power and influence is concerned, 
though there is not much scholarly research at hand, plenty of anecdotal evidence is 
available as mentioned in the previous chapters, which could probably put it almost at par 
with southern Italy. To give just few examples from the more recent past, “today, whoever 
you ask in the TRNC who is not associated with the governing party…complains about 
corruption, clientelism and favoritism,” the Turkish weekly Nokta’s reporter observes in 
1992. “The clearest manifestation of this situation is the case of Ömer Demir, a UBP deputy, 
who had been caught smuggling heroin via the VIP lounge at the airport,” Atun, the then 
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speaker of the parliament, points out.694 Demir was acquitted after the only witness of the 
case escaped from police custody in a rather dubious way leading to allegations that he was 
part of a much bigger and influential clandestine network.  
The involvement of politicians in criminal cases aside695 – or probably in conjunction with 
that- by the late 1990s, the TRNC made a reputation as a safe-haven for “casino and money 
laundering operations”696 (see Gunter 1998: 133). Apparently, the Turkish “deep state,” the 
Turkish equivalent of Gladio, was in the middle of all of this. It is known that this 
organization was involved in many illicit activities in Turkey and abroad, including 
“political assassinations, drug trafficking, and political corruption at the highest levels” 
(ibid.: 119). According to Fikri Sağlar, the former Minister of Culture (Turkey) and the 
member of the parliamentary enquiry committee established to investigate the Susurluk 
scandal, which revealed “the relationship between the Turkish state and its intelligence 
community on the one hand, and organized international crime on the other,” (ibid.: 120)- 
northern part of Cyprus was one of the hotbeds of the deep state’s operations.697   
Remarkably, the bomb attacks against opposition politicians698, the bombing of the houses 
of two prime-ministers, Eroğlu and Talat in 2001 and 2004 respectively, and the 
assassination of a dissident journalist699, which all went unaccounted for, are also 
attributed to the Turkish deep state, which had a long track record of politically motivated 
assassinations and provocations in Turkey and elsewhere (For the Turkish deep state see 
Söyler 2012; Polat 2011 and Gunter 1998). Given the interpenetration of crime and politics, 
                                                        
694  Kadri Gürsel: “Kıbrıs’ta Çözümsüzlüğe İsyan [Revolt against non-settlement in Cyprus].” Nokta, 
22.11.1992, p. 14.  
695 See also for instance Özker Özgür: “Öne Fırlatılmış [Hurled forward].” Yenidüzen, 5.4.1990. 
696 See also “Turkey and Corruption: Rotten Eggs Unbroken.” The Economist, 1.11.2001.    
697 Fikri Sağlar cited in Mehmet Altan: “Korsan Ada [Pirate island].” Sabah, 15.5.2004.     
698 For a detailed account of bombing attacks in the 1989-1993 period see Sevgül Uludağ: “Bombalı Yaşam 
[Life with bombs].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 20.3.1994, pp. 12-15; see also “Hasan Erçakıca’ya Atılan Dinamit 
Kontrgerilla Eylemine Benzetildi: Demokrasiye Gölge Düştü [The dynamite thrown to Hasan Erçakıca’s house 
likened to counter-guerilla operation: democracy overshadowed].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 29.5.1994; for a more recent 
tally see Mert Özdağ: “Ve KKTC polisi yakalar(maz) [And the TRNC police (don’t) catch]?” Yenidüzen, 
22.6.2012.  
699 Later, the assassinated journalist Kutlu Adalı’s wife sued Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights, 
where Turkey was found guilty (see for instance Ayşe Karabat: “Visit reminds of dark files army was allegedly 
involved in.” Today’s Zaman, 5.9.2008.  
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no wonder that the TRNC came to be compared with Sicily in the mid-1990s700 - which is 
yet another similarity with the Italian case (For the Italian case, see for instance Sassoon 
1995).  
When we look at the role of the Turkish Cypriot state in the economy, we see that again 
similarities with the Italian case are manifold i.e. generous subsidies, pensions and public 
assistance to a variety of social groups, and a large public sector. The way the state, which 
came to be conflated with the UBP, had manipulated the resources under its disposal, 
resulted in a stagnant economy. The export revenues generated in 2002, for instance, was 
not much different from the amount in 1980, and averaged slightly above USD 50 million in 
the period concerned. Few sectors, like manufacturing which had some potential for 
growth fell victim to the regime’s secessionist policies; the sector was hit by the European 
Court of Justice’s ruling on the Anastasiou case (1994), which effectively excluded the 
Turkish Cypriot products from the EU market. According to the figures released by the 
Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industry, employment figures in the sector had slipped from 
13 thousand in 1994 to 9 thousand in 1999 and continued to decline ever since.701 
Reluctance of the Turkish government to open its market to the Turkish Cypriot products 
further undermined the manufacturing sector.702  
The end of the so-called luggage tourism703 after liberalization of Turkish economy, which 
had been a major source of revenue until then, created another shock on the economy. 
Indeed, in the mid-1980s as part of a new economic strategy to overcome this bottleneck, 
“tourism was declared the leading sector of the economy, with the lion’s share of resources 
– largely in the form of incentive credits from Turkey – being earmarked for assistance to 
tourism development” (Scott 2000: 60). Yet, the strategy’s success was limited (ibid.), 
basically because the soft loans provided via the newly established development bank was 
used to enrich cronies; “all 16 businessmen who benefited from the scheme happened to be 
                                                        
700 Cited in Sevgül Uludağ: “O Şimdi Bodyguard [He is a bodyguard now].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 5.6.1994, p. 12. See 
also Turhan Dağcı: “Sicilya’dan Beter Olduk [We became worse than Sicily].” Vatan, 11.12.1993. According to 
Bülent Şemiler, “the cost of non-settlement in Cyprus will be Sicilianization of the part of island under our 
control, and social collapse” (“Siyasi Çözüm [Political Settlement]...” Nokta Kıbrıs, 27.3.1994, p. 15).    
701 “İşyerlerine Kilit [Businesses closing].” Kıbrıs, 17.4.2001. 
702 İŞAD, various press releases.  
703  “Shopping trips of only one or two days’ duration, staying in cheap and often unregistered 
accommodation, to take advantage of price and custom tariff differentials by buying large quantities of retail 
goods on commission for resale in Turkey” (Scott 2000: 60).  
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pro-UBP, and included the chiefs of Nicosia, Kyrenia and Morphou branches of the party as 
well as some party assembly members”.704 The tourism facilities run by the Cyprus Turkish 
Tourism Enterprises, on the other hand, were turned into loss-making basket cases where 
the government officials as well as members of military and civilian bureaucracy indulged 
themselves thanks to discounts up to 100 percent, in accommodation, food and drinks, and 
even telephone calls.705  
In the absence of any large-scale productive economic activity, and especially after the 
bankruptcy of Nadir’s Polly Peck which, at some point became the second biggest employer 
after the state (Egemen 2006: 205), the amount of money required to buy legitimacy for 
the regime gradually spun out of control. Essentially, the entire economic system came to 
rely on funds from Ankara, which was pumped into the rest of the economy via 
government spending. This amounted to a staggering USD 3.07 billion706 in the thirty years 
to 2004.707 As the future flow of Turkish financial assistance was taken for granted, there 
was no urge to establish a sustainable economic structure. Moreover, growing economic 
dependence on Turkey was not seen as a handicap but as the tightening of relations with 
the “motherland”. As a result of this mentality, increasingly bigger portions of Turkish 
financial transfers disappeared into a “black hole” of public expenditures in the form of 
generous salaries, pensions and subsidies.708 Between 1983 and 2000, transfer payments 
and current public expenditures grew annually by 8 percent and 6.2 percent respectively 
while the GDP grew only by 3.8 percent (Yılmaz 2002: 40). By 2000, when the total 
employment figure was less than 80 thousand, the treasury was issuing monthly 55 
thousand paychecks.709 The weight of salaries in this amount is discussed in the next 
section. As far as pensions were concerned, it can be said that the social security system 
                                                        
704 See Özcan Ercan: "Kıbrıs Dosyası [The Cyprus dossier] (2)." Milliyet, 7.10.1993; see also Sevgül Uludağ: 
“Turizm Teşvikleri Mikroskop Altında [Incentives to tourism under scrutiny].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 29.5.1994; 
“Yağma [Pillage] (1).” Yenidüzen, 7.4.1990, and “Yağma [Pillage] (3).” Yenidüzen, 10.4.1990.    
705 “Turizm İşletmeleri Nasıl Zarara Sokuldu [How the State Tourism Enterprises have been rendered loss-
making].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 24.4.1990, pp. 18-9.  
706 For a breakdown of the figure see Annex.  
707 According to the World Bank report, on a per capita basis, the northern part of Cyprus, received USD 1,348 
as aid in 2003 compared to the average of USD 337 for small country aid recipients (2006a: 22). It should be 
noted that the aid figures used by the World Bank report are considerably lower than the figures revealed in 
the Turkish Board of Financial Assistance (Yardım Heyeti) report, which leads one to think that the real per 
capita aid figures can be even higher.     
708 İŞAD various press releases; “Commentary.” The Financial Weekly, 12-18 March 2004.  
709  “Memurda Maaş Endişesi [Civil servants concerned about salaries].” Kıbrıs, 31.7.2000.   
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was so lax that, in 2001, 62 percent of some 11 thousand pensioners were between the 
ages of 35-60.710 As if this was not costly enough, with a new legislation introduced in the 
eve of the 1990 elections, the pensions began to be calculated based on the gross and not 
net salaries, which amounted to planting a ticking time bomb under the budget.711  
The result of this profligacy was the growth of dependence on Turkish funds. While the 
amount transferred from Ankara was around USD 38 million in 1989, it almost sextupled 
to USD 226 million in 2000.712 Clearly, more than an independent state, the TRNC looked 
like a spoiled teenager on allowance or to borrow Chubb’s term, which she used to depict 
the Italian south, the northern part of Cyprus was an area assistita; “dependent for survival 
on various forms of assistance from the” center (1982: 256). Looking from the perspective 
of Ankara, given the lack of any sign of economic development beyond increasing number 
of luxury cars cruising around despite hundreds of millions of dollars transferred each year, 
no wonder that the Turkish Cypriot politicians came to be classified into two groups as 
“thieves and traitors,”713 where needless to say, traitors denoted the members of pro-
reunification opposition, and thieves, the UBP.  
When we look at the business elite, we see that by and large, they were, as Sotiropoulos 
said of the South European capitalist classes, “accustomed to depend on the state for their 
enrichment and for the reproduction of their power position in society. They relied on 
preferential state loans, contracts and other outlays to sustain their share of their market” 
(2004: 408). Furthermore, the purchasing power created by the clientelist system was 
used to consume goods and services they provided. Therefore, having thrived in this order, 
the loyalty of the majority of the business community to the ruling political elite was 
unshakeable. The chambers of commerce and industry represented this group.   
In the meantime however, a different kind of business elite was in the making. Unlike their 
conservative counterparts, these sought to position themselves away from the 
establishment. This new, more progressive group of businesspeople was organized under 
                                                        
710 Hüseyin Özgürgün (UBP, Nicosia) cited in “Meclis ‘Ekonomik Bunalımı’ Görüştü [The parliament discussed 
the economic crisis].” Kıbrıs, 28.4.2001.  
711 “Emeklilik Denen Kıyak [Unfair entitlements called a pension].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 10.4.1994, p. 5.   
712 For the Turkish financial assistance figures see Annex. 
713 See for instance Zülfü Livaneli: “Sonunda Akıl Galip Geliyor [Finally wisdom is winning out].” Vatan 
(İstanbul), 14.2.2004.  
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the TRNC Businessmen Association (KKTC İşadamları Derneği, İŞAD) and took a stance 
against the clientelist policies pursued by the governments, and in 1995, went as far as 
writing a letter to the Turkish prime minister Çiller calling on her to cut the financial 
assistance to the island (cited in Altan 2003: 52-3). The main argument of this letter was 
that the Turkish funds were either channeled directly to consumption or unfairly allocated 
to the Turkish businesspeople through Turkish cadres in the island, denying the local 
business community any chance for development.714 The İŞAD also pointed out the ever-
increasing size of the public sector as the main cause of the marginalization of the private 
sector (ibid.). Before further elaborating on the size of the public sector, it should be 
underlined that the İŞAD’s position on the strategy to solve the Cyprus problem was also 
fundamentally different from the other economic interest groups.715 To give a solid 
example, much to the chagrin of the nationalists716, the İŞAD was the first organization that 
embraced the confidence building measures proposed by the UN in the early 1990s.717  
6.2. The Public Sector: How bloated is it?  
That the public sector in the northern part of Cyprus is oversized is not a secret. As early as 
in 1975, in a minister’s words “the public payroll tended to swell constantly”718, and even 
in 1976, there were media reports expressing the “determination” of the government not 
to hire new personnel in the face of rising personnel expenditures.719 Yet, as the newly 
emerging private sector was not able to keep up with the demand for jobs, the government 
carried on taking the easiest way to address the growing unemployment problem by 
offering jobs in the public sector. In 1977, for instance, only 190 of the 2126 people placed 
in a job were employed in the private sector.720 It didn’t get any better in 1978, (217 of 
                                                        
714 See also “Kıbrıs Türk İnşaat Firmaları İhaleleri Boykot Ediyor [The Turkish Cypriot construction 
companies to boycott the public works tenders].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 20.3.1994, p. 44; for a more specific case see 
“Ali Yıldız’a Tanınan Ayrıcalıklardan Yerli Müteahhitler Rahatsız [Local contractors uneasy about the 
priveleges granted to Ali Yıldız].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 10.4.1994, p. 26.  
715 According to the chamber of industry, the only solution of the economic problems was integration with 
Turkey (see “Tek Çözüm TC ile Entegrasyon [The only way out is integration with Turkey].” Kıbrıs, 7.5.1994). 
716 See for instance Harid Fedai: “Bir Açık Oturum ki [Such a panel discussion].” Kıbrıs, 11.5.1994. 
717 “KKTC İşadamları Derneği Başkanı Kutlay Erk KKTC Özel Sektörünün Başarılı Olacağına İnanıyor [The 
TRNC Businessmen Association chairman Erk believes the TRNC private sector will be successful].” Nokta 
Kıbrıs, 6.3.1994, p. 38.  
718 Osman Örek cited in Abdulkadir Tansu: “Kadrolarda Şişkinlik ve Gereksiz Atamalar [Bloatedness in civil 
service and unnecessary appointments].” Halkın Sesi, 26.12.1975.  
719 “1976 Yılında Kesinlikle Yeni Memur Alınmayacak [In 1976 definitely no new civil servant will be 
employed].” Zaman, 21.4.1976.  
720 Devlet Planlama Örgütü (1978: 73).  
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3434) or in 1979 (123 of 1697).721 To quote Raif Denktaş, “the only alternative to a job in 
the public service is working as retailer of smugglers,” in this period.722 
Having said that, finding out how bloated the public sector exactly is, takes some digging up. 
For a long time, the only source of information about the employment figures, was the State 
Planning Organization’s (Devlet Planlama Örgütü, DPÖ) annual publications entitled the 
Economic and Social Indicators. Based on these statistics researchers, such as the authors 
of the so-called World Bank report (2006b: 14), and Noë and Watson (2005: 3), among 
others, concluded that the “public sector’s” share had been declining over time, and that at 
the time of writing, it had provided around 20 percent of total employment. This is not 
accurate for two reasons. First, apparently, the researchers were misled by the terminology 
used by the DPÖ. The problem is that data classified under “public services” do not reflect 
the total number of people employed in the public sector. Rather it is a narrow definition of 
it. Consequently, the public services figures presented under Sectoral Distribution of 
Working Population do not include, for instance, the public sector employees working in 
the public banks, who are classified under “financial institutions,” or the Turkish Cypriot 
Electricity Authority employees, who are classified under “electricity and water,” while 
covering the employees of clinics, and schools run by the private sector.  
Second problem is a more fundamental one, and derives from the method used. For a long 
time (1977-2005), the DPÖ estimated employment figures based on “value added”. Then, in 
an effort to adapt to the EU methods723, the organization abandoned this, and started 
conducting annual household labor force surveys (HLFS), which are considered much more 
reliable than the previous method.724 For only two years (2004 and 2005), the figures 
calculated using both methods are available, and this renders comparison possible.  
 
 
 
                                                        
721 Devlet Planlama Örgütü (1979: 97) and (1980: 102).  
722 Raif Denktaş’s parliamentary speech cited in Olay, 5.5.1980, p.9.  
723 Devlet Planlama Örgütü (2009: 1).  
724 Director of the Statistics Department: Personal communication, Nicosia, March 2010.  
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Table 1: Total employment figures 
 Value 
Added 
HLFS Discrepancy 
2004 104873 86914 17959 
2005 109090 85583 23507 
Source: Prepared by author based on State Planning Organization, Follow Up and Coordination Department: 
2007 Economic and Social Indicators, pp. 36-8.  
As shown in Table 1, there is a considerable discrepancy in the two sets of figures. When 
the results of HLFS (2006) are checked against the 2006 census results (91815 and 92088 
respectively), it is seen that the accuracy of HLFS are confirmed, which, by implication 
makes all pre-2004 figures about total employment completely unreliable -except for the 
years 1996 and 2006 when censuses were held. This is to say, only reliable employment 
statistics at hand belong to the post-2004 period, and they show that the real size of public 
sector fell below 30 percent only in 2010 and averaged around 31 percent.      
Table 2: HLFS basic indicators 
 
Total Labor 
Force 
Total 
Employment 
(T.E) 
Public 
Sector 
Employment 
(P.S.E) 
P.S.E./T.E. 
(%) 
2004 96592 86914 27900 32,1 
2005 93248 85583 28903 33,8 
2006 101366 91815 29106 31,7 
2007 99149 89787 28289 31,5 
2008 101104 91223 27893 30,6 
2009 104490 91550 27627 30,2 
2010 106117 93498 27244 29,1 
2011 107514 97103 29695 30,6 
Source: Prepared by author based on HLFS results, 2004-2011 (Hane Halkı İşgücü Anketi Sonuçları 
[Household Labor Force Surveys] see www.devplan.org).    
The problem is that HLFS figures are limited to eight sets of data covering the period 
between 2004 and 2011, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, this 
table makes a good analytical tool because (a) although it represents the period when the 
UBP was no longer in power, it reflects the overall result of bureaucratic clientelism 
practiced by this party in the preceding three decades, and (b) it provides a benchmark for 
comparison.  
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In the absence of published data, I turned to interviews with officials from the DPÖ, and the 
personnel department. As a result, I have gathered various unpublished data on the public 
sector employment. Of particular importance is a dataset, which shows a detailed 
breakdown of public sector employees including, public administration (comprising 
permanent staff, temporary staff, and workers); institutions and SEE’s; and municipalities, 
as well as pensioners on yearly basis covering the period 1990-2008. According to my 
informant725, the DPÖ had formed this table by gathering data from the ministry of finance 
(based on the number of paychecks issued per month), and by calling the institutions, SEE’s, 
and municipalities one by one. Although there are some discrepancies with the HLFS 
figures, the difference is negligible.   
To render a sound assessment possible, the total employment figures were also needed, 
which were not available except for the years 1996 and 2006. Based on these two figures I 
calculated the annual average growth rate from 1996 to 2006 (2.98%), and assuming that 
the total employment figures are not volatile, I applied the same rate to the period 1990-
1995. In the last column in Table 3, I further refined the figures by excluding the non-
citizens employed in TRNC based on my estimation.726 
Table 3: Public employment as a percentage of selected indicators 
 
Total 
Employment 
(T.E.) 
‘TRNC’ 
Citizens 
Employed 
(T.C.E) 
Public 
Employment 
(P.E.) 
P. E. / T.E. 
(%) 
P.E. / T.C.E 
(%) 
1990 57580 42860 18619 32,3 43,4 
1991 59295 43871 18178 30,7 41,4 
1992 61061 44907 19067 31,2 42,5 
1993 62879 45966 20002 31,8 43,5 
1994 64751 47051 20444 31,6 43,5 
1995 66680 48161 19543 29,3 40,6 
1996 68667 49298 19761 28,8 40,1 
1997 70712 50461 20515 29,0 40,7 
1998 72818 51652 20870 28,7 40,4 
1999 74987 52864 21287 28,4 40,3 
2000 77220 54104 21437 27,8 39,6 
2001 79520 55373 21607 27,2 39,0 
                                                        
725 Personal Communication, December 2009.  
726 Following the same method, I estimated the number of TRNC citizens in employment (1990-2006), based 
on the official data from 1998 and 2006 to complete the data set.  
207 
 
2002 81888 56673 22104 27,0 39,0 
2003 84327 58002 24079 28,6 41,5 
2004 86838 59363 23879 27,5 40,2 
2005 89425 60756 25223 28,2 41,5 
2006 92088 62181 25964 28,2 41,8 
Source: Prepared by author based on unpublished data from the SPO (for the public employment figures 
1990-2006); Results of the Household Income Distribution Survey 1998 (for the number of ‘TRNC’ citizens 
employed for 1998); Results of the Census 2006 (for the total employment figure in 2006 and the number of 
‘TRNC’ citizens employed in 2006); Census of Population Social and Economic Characteristics of Population, 
December 15, 1996 (for the total employment figure in 1996). 
As seen in Table 3, contrary to what other studies claimed before, there is only a very 
gradual decline in the proportion of public sector employment. However, it continues to 
expand in absolute terms adding up to the burden on the budget. When we introduce the 
pensioners to the equation both the burden on the budget, and this group’s political clout 
become more obvious.  
Table 4: Pensioners and public sector employees as a percentage of registered voters 
 
Public 
Sector 
(P.S.) 
P.S. 
Pension
ers 
Total Voters 
Total/ 
Voters 
(%) 
1990 18619 7585 26204 101306 25,9 
1991 18178 7889 26067 106301 24,5 
1993 20002 8545 28547 108820 26,2 
1995 19543 9825 29368 113340 25,9 
1998 20870 10806 31676 119019 26,6 
2000 21437 11341 32778 126675 25,9 
2003 24079 11817 35896 140832 25,5 
2004 23879 11930 35809 143639 24,9 
2005 25223 12120 37343 147249 25,4 
Source: Prepared by author based on data from the State Planning Organization (unpublished document); 
High Electoral Council.  
Table 4 shows that over time, consistently every one out of four voters is either a public 
sector employee or used to be one. At any rate, they are on the payroll of the state and their 
welfare is closely associated with the treasury’s finances. When we factor in their 
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dependents as well, their influence grows even bigger, and makes this group probably the 
strongest interest group in Turkish Cypriot community.  
The figures presented so far show how big the public sector is but a comparison may be 
useful to show how costly sustaining this was, even in South European standards. As it can 
be seen in the Table 5, as measured by the average share of wages and salaries in total 
public expenditure, the Turkish Cypriots have by far the costliest public sector.  
Table 5: Average share of wages and salaries in total public expenditure in Southern, 
Western and Northern Europe in 1981–90 and 1991–95 (As percentage of the state 
budget) 
 1981-90 1991-95 
Greece 24,8 21,1 
Italy 11,7 11,7 
Portugal 22 28,5 
Spain 21,6 14,9 
South European 
average 
20 19,1 
West European 
average 
12,6 11,7 
North European 
Average 
9,6 8,3 
TRNC 38,9 40,2 
Source: Prepared by author on the basis of Sotiropoulos (2004:414, Table 2). The TRNC figures from the DPÖ.  
6.3 Bureaucratic Clientelism 
Although such a big public sector is a symptom of clientelism, its presence per se does not 
necessarily mean that these jobs were distributed politically. What really makes the 
difference is the way the new personnel were recruited to the public sector. In this context, 
the method of employment can be used as an indicator to gauge to what extent the 
enormous size of the public sector can be attributed to what Lyrintzis calls “bureaucratic 
clientelism”. This is, in essence, what Mavrogordatos (1997) did for Greece. Before coming 
to this, however, the concept of bureaucratic clientelism, which fits into the Turkish Cypriot 
case very well, has to be identified. In Lyrintzis’ words: 
 Bureaucratic clientelism is a distinct form of clientelism and consists of systematic 
 infiltration of the state machine by the party devotees and the allocation of favors 
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 through it. It is characterized by an organised expansion of existing posts and 
 departments in the public sector and the addition of new ones in an attempt to 
 secure power and maintain a party’s electoral base.  … In a system such as this the 
 public bureaucracy is orientated less towards the effective performance of public 
 service than towards provision of parasitic jobs for the political clientele of the 
 ruling sectors, in exchange for their political support (1984: 103).   
In his study on Greece, Mavrogordatos identified “meritocracy, implying a system whereby 
appointments and career patterns are determined on the basis of merit alone, according to 
universalistic and objective criteria,” as the opposite of clientelism (1997: 4). Then he 
compared the number of employments made through party channels (clientelistic), and 
general competition (meritocratic). In what follows, I will apply the same method on the 
Turkish Cypriot case.  
To start with, in the Turkish Cypriot context, on paper, appointment to permanent posts in 
the public sector requires a certain procedure, which is conducted by the Public Service 
Commission. This involves passing a central proficiency examination on the constitution 
and the civil service law, as well as other specific examinations that may be required by the 
particular post concerned. However, this procedure applies only to the public 
administration in its narrowest sense. For instance, teachers, police officers, employees of 
the municipalities, SEEs, and other autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions are not 
subject to this procedure.  
Beside this, there are three other methods leading to a job in the public sector: (1) Hiring 
personnel on temporary basis. Although this method also stipulates a call for applications 
in the official gazette and competitive entrance examination, the process is not through the 
Civil Service Commission.727 Rather it is at the discretion of the minister concerned.728  (2) 
Hiring in the status of the so-called 03 permanent worker, which does not require any 
exam. Although it was originally envisaged for personnel with no university degree, there 
have been instances when university degree holders were hired, among other things, as 
road construction workers.729 (3) Hiring on contractual basis.  
 
                                                        
727 Kamu Hizmeti Yasası, 7/1979, Kısım 1, Madde 6 (2) [Public Service Law, 7/1979, Section 1, Article 6 (2)].  
728 Provided that the personnel department, and the ministry of finance give their approval.  
729 Anonymous interviewee.  
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Table 6: Public sector employees recruited through the Public Service Commission 
 
Permanent 
Civil Service 
Employees 
Total 
Number of 
Public 
Employees 
Permanent/Total 
(%) 
1990 4014 18619 21,6 
1995 4244 19543 21,7 
2000 4526 21437 21,1 
2005 4728 25223 18,7 
Prepared by author based on unpublished DPÖ data (Total Public Employment); unpublished data from the 
Personnel Department (Permanent Civil Service Employees). 
Table 6 shows that only some 20 percent of the public sector employees have gone through 
the nominally meritocratic procedure before taking their job in the public sector. In other 
words, provided that this procedure of employment was followed strictly, it could be 
argued that 80 percent of the placements were susceptible to political abuse, to say the 
least. My interviews with the employees of the Personnel Department confirmed that this 
nominally meritocratic system was also far from being immune to political meddling. “As 
far as the legal framework is concerned we are probably better than any country in terms 
of meritocracy; the problem is in the enforcement,” a senior civil servant at the Personnel 
Department told me.730 Regarding the examinations of the Civil Service Commission, 
general perception is that most of the time they were token examinations, where in oral 
exams, questions asked did not go further than “who is your father?” In the written 
examinations, questions were often leaked to the clients in advance. Overall common belief 
is, as one of Navaro-Yashin’s informants put it “[t]here is no such thing as merit in the civil 
service. … No one is brought to a position in the civil service because he has merits. He is 
promoted because he has torpil731, through relations between partners and friends [es-dost 
iliskisi]” (2006: 284).  
Even though the Civil Service Commission’s involvement does not ensure meritocracy in 
the process, apparently the pre-requisite of qualifying in the central proficiency exam has 
been acting as a deterrent for utilization of this method in a large-scale. Furthermore, the 
fact that the Commission’s members are appointed by the president, and not by the 
government, had posed another obstacle for the UBP, especially since the emergence of the 
                                                        
730 Personal Communication, April 2010.  
731 In this context torpil means a patron.  
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schism between Denktaş and Eroğlu. Consequently, as seen in Table 6, the absolute number 
grew very gradually, although more than half of the positions have been vacant.732  
Given these constraints, it turns out that most favoured two methods of employment in the 
public sector have been appointment in temporary and 03 permanent worker positions. 
Although it does require some form of examination, absence of any central exam 
requirement for appointments in the temporary positions, obviously, renders bypassing 
the examination process altogether possible. This is in effect the first leg of a process, 
which is known as titularisation – something common in the rest of Southern Europe too. It 
“involves hiring personnel to meet temporary shortages in the public sector and then 
granting to these personnel the status of civil servant or the functional equivalent (i.e. 
permanent job contracts)” (Sotiropoulos 2004: 411). As it is shown below, although it is 
clearly against the law, it has been widely used by the UBP machine to employ clients 
without any competition particularly in the run up to elections. To give two specific 
examples: referring to the laxity of the doling out of government jobs in the run up to the 
2003 parliament elections, one of my informants at the personnel department said, “I could 
even have had my late grandmother employed”.733 Regarding the election a decade earlier, 
“such was the panic in the party that there were cases where we have employed the same 
person via three different party sections,” conceded a party operative.734  
Beyond its relative simplicity, this method has another advantage for the patron: “people 
hired under such circumstances can have a concrete interest in the government being re-
elected, since they may have reasons to fear that a new government will terminate their 
employment” (Hylland 2004: 41). This precarious status makes them more likely to honour 
their part of the clientelistic transaction and vote for the patron, on the one hand, and to 
work actively in the campaign process, on the other. As it does not provide a permanent 
position, it can be terminated at the discretion of the patron. Therefore, at any rate the 
transaction does not come to an end, and the client’s dependence on the party continues – 
unless transferred to a permanent post or she quits the job herself. This was successfully 
exploited by the UBP in the 1993 election. When Denktaş protested that the UBP was 
doling out jobs in the run up to the polling day, the party responded by promising to 
                                                        
732 For 2005, the number of vacant positions stood at 4552 (Personnel Department). 
733 Personal Communication, December 2008.  
734 Anonymous interviewee.  
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transfer all temporary staff to permanent positions after the election, and managed to 
mobilize them against the DP, by saying Denktaş is against this.735 Ironically, the very same 
method was employed in the eve of the 1995 presidential election to give a boost to 
Denktaş’s campaign: The DP-controlled ministry of finance had sent a circular to the 
ministries to start the process for elevating the temporary personnel to permanent 
positions though the issue was shelved after the election.736  
As far as the political abuse of temporary employment in the public sector is concerned, 
there are two concrete cases where the UBP was caught red-handed, and one where its 
misconduct was certified by a parliamentary enquiry committee. These three cases provide 
solid evidence supporting the anecdotal ones, and therefore clearly show that the size of 
the public sector was due to bureaucratic clientelism. These are the general elections of 
1990, 1993 and 2003. In the latter two elections, the UBP was voted out of government 
making enquiries on the irregularities during the election periods possible. As for the first 
one, the report produced seven years later when the UBP was in opposition, verifies 
allegations about irregularities regarding the employment, appointment, promotion, and 
transfer of the public employees during the campaign period.737 Additionally, it confirms 
that the government’s decision to pay in effect a bonus salary to the public sector 
employees by switching the date of payment738 (see also Warner 1993: 213-4) was 
illegal.739      
Regarding the 1993 and 2003 cases, evidence available is even more solid. In the case of 
1993 elections, the council of ministers authorized the minister of finance and economy, or 
the director of this ministry along with the director of the personnel department to employ 
temporary staff to “various ministries, and directorates” just few days before the 
election.740 In Denktaş’s words, jobs were distributed “like candies”.741 Both the director of 
court of audit, and the attorney general declared the placements made according to this 
                                                        
735 See “Geçicilerin Tümü de Kadrolanacak [All temporary staff will be given permanent positions].” Birlik, 
1.12.1993, and “Denktaş Geçicilerin Kadrolanmasına da Karşı [Denktaş is also against the elevation of 
temporary staff to permanent positions].” Birlik, 2.12.1993.  
736 “Geçiciler Kadrolanıyor [Temporary staff to be elevated to permanent positions].” Kıbrıs, 8.3.1995.  
737 See the paragraph 5 of the suggestions section of the report.  
738 “Esenlik Paketi [Welfare package].” Kıbrıs, 30.04.1990.  
739 See the paragraph 5 of the findings section of the report.  
740 Karar Numarası: E–1520 –93 (8 December 1993): Muhtelif Dairelere Geçici Statüde Gündelikçi Olarak 
Istihdam Yapılması [Temporary employment as casual labor to various departments].  
741 Denktaş’s Letter to the Editor, Birlik, 10.11.1994.  
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governmental decree unlawful742 right after the election, and ironically the decree, and the 
consequent employments were annulled by the outgoing council of ministers with a new 
decree few days after the election!743 According to the minister of economy and finance, 
employing temporary staff was something, which had been practiced since 1979, and 
practising it more during the election campaign was “normal”.744 In an attempt to justify 
what they did in 1993, an unidentified former minister, was indeed confessing the party’s 
earlier misconduct: He said that the UBP had employed around 4 thousand new personnel 
before the 1981 elections; 2 thousand before the 1985 elections, and another 1800 before 
the 1990 elections.745 Considering that in 2005, the average number of votes required to 
win a seat in the parliament was 2190 when 119 thousand voters turned out to vote746, and 
that one job brings most of the time the votes of a whole family, it can be safely said that 
this practice provided the UBP with a huge advantage in the elections.         
The governmental decree annulling the job placements did not stop the attorney general 
from starting an investigation regarding the irregularities in the election period. Upon 
completion of the investigation, he concluded that there were serious violations of the 
electoral law, and asked the parliament via the prime minister747 to lift the legislative 
immunities of all the cabinet ministers concerned (ten in total), along with another UBP 
deputy to render their trial possible. Accordingly, an enquiry committee was established in 
the parliament. Although, the committee report stated that “the facts and findings” 
presented in the attorney general’s dossier involved “serious allegations,” it concluded that 
they were not serious enough to make the lifting of the legislative immunities 
imperative.748 It is important to note that in the “facts,” section of the report, it was clearly 
stated that based on the governmental decree concerned, “1175 people had been given 
                                                        
742 “Geçici İstihdam Yasal Değil [Temporary employment is not legal].” Kıbrıs, 14.12.1993; “Geçici İstihdam 
Kargaşaya Dönüştü [Temporary employment turned into chaos].” Kıbrıs, 15.12.1993; “Geçiciler Durduruldu 
[Temporary employees dismissed].” Kıbrıs, 18.12.2003. 
743 Karar Numarası: E – 1572 – 93 (16 December 1993): Muhtelif Dairelere Geçici Statüde Gündelikçi Olarak 
Istihdam Yapılması Hakkındaki E – 1520 – 93 Sayı ve 8.12.1993 tarihli kararın iptali [The annulment of the 
decree regarding the temporary employment as casual labor to various departments]; “1200 Genç Kapı Dışarı 
[1200 youths shown the door].” Yenidüzen:  18.12.1993; “Geçiciler Durduruldu [Temporary staff dismissed].” 
Kıbrıs, 18.12.1993. 
744 “Coşar: Amaç İstihdamdı [The intention was employment].” Birlik, 18.12.1993.  
745 Cited in “Eski Bakanlar Sanık Sandalyesinde [Former ministers in the defendant box].” Nokta Kıbrıs, 
10.4.1994, p. 19.  
746 Naci Taşeli: “Seçimler Diye Diye [Talking about the elections].” Yenidüzen, April 2009.  
747 For the letter to the Prime Minister dated 9 March 1994 see KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 
[Minutes of the TRNC Parliament] 12.8.1994, pp.27-8.  
748 See KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [Minutes of the TRNC Parliamenti]. 12.8.1994, p.21.  
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istihdam belgesi749,” and that some of these “documents had been distributed by the UBP 
members, including ministers, deputies, and candidates.”750 When I asked Serdar Denktaş 
why the DP did not vote in favour of lifting of the immunities of the offenders in the 
committee, he told me that the dominant view within the party was against starting a 
political blood feud in the eve of the upcoming presidential election.751 Once again, political 
expediency trumped principle although supposedly the DP’s raison d’etre was eradicating 
such practices.   
In a similar vein, in the eve of the 2003 election, it turned out that the UBP government 
placed 1660 people in the temporary positions. The incoming council of ministers annulled 
the employment of these people, on the ground that they had been admitted to “the public 
service unlawfully”.752 Probably, as a consequence of the earlier impunity or in the absence 
of political will, this time the attorney general did not bother to start an investigation.  
Though unlike these three cases, no formal probe was conducted into the matter, the 1981 
elections should also be mentioned in this context because of the extent of abuse. 
According to the opposition members of the parliament, over three thousand people were 
given jobs in the public sector without following the legal procedure despite the protests of 
the court of audit.753 Years later, the UBP’s mouthpiece Birlik admitted that this was true. It 
was said that Denktaş had made the minister of finance hire 3 thousand new personnel in 
the run up to the 1981 elections, following the same procedure the UBP followed in 
1993.754   
As discussed earlier, although there is a perception about the widespread use of 
bureaucratic clientelism in the public mind, its exposure as clear as the cases elaborated 
above would be impossible without the party in power being voted out of government. This 
                                                        
749 A document stating that the holder was employed in the public sector on a temporary basis. The typed 
document was signed by the directors of the ministry of economy and finance, and personnel department. 
Only the name section was left blank to be filled out later by hand. For a copy of the document see Yenidüzen, 
13.12.1993, p. 5.      
750 Ibid.: 18.  
751 Interviewed by author.  
752 “Seçimlik İstihdamlara Son Veriliyor [Jobs annulled of those employed in return for their votes].” Kıbrıs, 
30.1.2004.  
753 See for instance the parliamentary speech of Ergün Vehbi (CTP, Nicosia) cited in Olay, 25.1.1982, p.25; 
İsmet Kotak’s (DHP, Famagusta) parliamentary speech cited in Olay, 22.2.1982, p. 18. 
754 “Denktaş’a Mübah UBP’ye ise Günah [Permissable for Denktaş but sinful for the UBP].” Birlik, 18.12.1993. 
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does not necessarily mean that there is no other evidence, however. Although it does not 
show the immediate relationship between the job and vote as clearly as the instances in 
these three cases, another occasion revealing the extent of this practice is the situations 
where these temporary posts were turned en masse into permanent ones by means of 
legislation passed in the parliament; in other words, the second leg of the titularisation 
process. Indeed, though the precarious status of the temporary staff is a tramp card for the 
party to retain them as clients and hence desirable from the perspective of the patron, 
holding them in this status indefinitely is not possible, as the group’s sheer size makes it a 
too big pressure group to be ignored. There are three cases where the government 
eventually bowed to these demands: 1984, 1997, and 2000.   
The law elevating the temporary personnel to permanent positions (Geçici Personelin 
Kadrolanması Yasası, 22/1984) dated 1984, appointed in total 3475 temporary employees 
to permanent posts both as civil servants, and workers.755 This, to a certain extent, also 
verifies the allegations regarding the 1981 elections mentioned above.756 A similar draft 
bill to appoint 1105 temporary employees (who were employed between 1985 and 1996) 
to permanent posts was tabled in 1997757, but it did not come into force as the 
constitutional court overturned it upon Denktaş’s referral. The verdict of the court contains 
numerous details about bureaucratic clientelism, and hence merits further elaboration. The 
court concluded that the draft bill was a clear infringement of the constitution (Article 8), 
as it violated the equal opportunity principle, by excluding the rest of the citizens not 
holding office (as temporary staff) from the opportunity to be admitted to the civil service, 
even though they may have had better qualifications than the temporary office-holders.758  
Two of the five judges who opposed this verdict, justified their position by stating that the 
draft bill was an “interim solution,” which was accepted by both the parliamentary 
opposition, and the trade unions.759 Among other things, they argued that the law per se 
did not violate the constitution but rather fixed an earlier violation, which had been 
                                                        
755 Geçici Personelin Kadrolanması (Özel Kurallar) Yasası [The law (special rules) elevating the temporary 
personnel to permanent positions], No. 22/84, see pages 13 and 16.  
756 In the verdict of the Constitutional Court regarding a similar legislation, it is said that temporary 
employment had been made since 1981  (A/M Numara: 2/1997, D. No: 3/97, p. 17).  
757 A/M Numara: 2/1997, D. No: 3/97, p. 4. 
758 Ibid.: 15.  
759 Ibid.: 17. 
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committed by employing these people in the first place.760 They argued that contrary to the 
Article 6 (2) of the relevant law - which says the employment is completely temporary, and 
could not last more than one budgetary period - both the ones who employed the 
temporary staff, and those who had been employed temporarily themselves had never 
intended to keep these positions temporarily.761 But rather, both sides concerned saw this 
as a first step to the public sector, which would eventually, somehow be turned into 
permanent positions.762 It is interesting to note that there was no reference made to the 
earlier law (22/1984), although they explicitly expressed their concern regarding the 
prospect that this legislation could form a loophole/precedent, which could be abused by 
the party in power in the future, especially in the election periods.763 
What 97/3 tried and failed to do was later achieved by the legislation dated 2000 
(19/2000), which eventually elevated 1166 temporary employees to permanent positions.   
6.4 The Collapse 
 For a long time, despite complaints from different segments of the society, what this 
illusory welfare state had been offering concretely was perceived to be outweighing the 
abstract and uncertain economic gains of prospective EU membership. Yet, as Roniger 
suggests, intrinsically clientelistic relations are limited in scope and extent, and are subject 
to the dynamics of political economy. Hence, inter alia “a decline in the supply of resources 
… may in the short term contribute to the fragility of clientelistic commitments and over 
the long term may shatter the salience of clientelism and patronage” (1994: 11; see also 
Chubb 1982: 5). In a similar vein, Piattoni points out that “when the economic and political 
costs of clientelism become unbearable, mobilization against it may be sudden and 
dramatic” (2001b: 199). This was exactly what happened when the Turkish government 
decided to make the Eroğlu government foot the bill for the banking crisis, which broke out 
in 1999, and imposed an austerity program to cut budgetary deficits as a pre-condition for 
further financial support.  
                                                        
760 Ibid.: 19.  
761 Ibid.: 19-20.  
762 Ibid.: 20.  
763 Ibid.: 19.  
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Lacher and Kaymak highlight “the Turkish financial crisis of 2001 as a cathartic element … 
which reduced the ability of the incumbent elites to contain discontent and the envisioning 
of political alternatives through the traditional instruments of patronage and clientelism” 
(2005: 150). They attribute this reduced ability to Ankara’s diminishing willingness to pay 
the bills due to its own economic woes (ibid. 157). This argument needs to be refined. 
Firstly, in curbing the distributive capacity of the government, the 1999 banking crisis was 
more important than the 2001 crisis, as it substantially increased the amount of transfer 
payments in the budget due to compensation payments for the depositors of the liquidated 
banks. Secondly, and more importantly, though it is true that the Turkish government 
showed less willingness to foot the bill, this was not due to its economic woes. Rather, it 
was a deliberate policy to force Eroğlu to step down in an effort to side with Denktaş.  
Ironically, therefore, one of the factors that played a decisive role in bringing the collapse of 
the politico-economic structure that had sustained the taksim project was a personal 
power struggle between the two leaders of the nationalist camp. Particularly, the Turkish 
government’s active involvement in this feud proved counterproductive. By making the 
flow of financial assistance subject to implementation of a rather unpopular economic 
austerity program, Ankara seriously weakened Eroğlu, but fell short of effecting his 
resignation. Eroğlu’s resistance perpetuated the crisis to the extent that not only his 
government’s, but the legitimacy of the post-1974 regime as a whole came under scrutiny. 
It is important to highlight that this is not to say that this power struggle alone led to the 
collapse of the regime. There was a “historical juncture” at this point; a rare alignment of 
the stars where external and internal factors were all favorable for a change. This is to say, 
without the EU membership around the corner, most probably the regime would have 
survived this power struggle and financial crisis as it did in the 1990s. But in a similar vein, 
in the absence of this power struggle/financial crisis and its consequences on the living 
standards of the ordinary Turkish Cypriots, the EU membership would probably not 
become a game-changer. In what follows, I will elaborate on this process.  
The root of the crisis can be traced back to November 1999, when a banking crisis hit. The 
amount deposited in the failing banks was USD 163 million in 58 thousand different 
accounts, which corresponded to almost 18 percent of all bank deposits in the banking 
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system.764 More than 30 thousand individuals were affected.765 Still, the disruptive 
repercussions of the crisis were not clear at the beginning. After all, all deposits were 
insured by the government; therefore, depositors stood to be compensated. A deal between 
the government and depositors was struck as early as in March 2000, which envisaged the 
payment of compensations in 18 equal monthly installments.766 It was naturally assumed 
that the operation would be financed by Ankara, as always.   
Until the kick-off of the presidential election campaign in April 2000, everything seemed to 
be under control. However, when Denktaş turned the campaign into an opportunity to 
settle his old score with Eroğlu, things took a different turn. From the beginning, it was 
clear that Ankara’s favorite would be Denktaş. Allegedly, Turkey’s minister of state 
responsible for Cyprus affairs, Şükrü Sina Gürel (henceforth Gürel) even asked Eroğlu not 
to run, albeit to no avail.767 Having failed to dissuade him from running, Denktaş predicated 
his election campaign on portraying Eroğlu as the sole culprit for the banking crisis. As 
usual, Denktaş’s campaign did not only target the Turkish Cypriot electorate; it also 
addressed the public opinion in Turkey. In the mass circulation Turkish daily Hürriyet, for 
instance, he blamed Eroğlu for wasting Turkey’s precious money for his political 
expedience:  
In the last four days, I have visited 35 villages. There is an outcry in every village. 
The economy has sunk. When I talk about these issues, they [the government] tell 
me not to interfere. The president is being excluded. And now they are running 
against me at the election. Whose money are they using for this? They are trying to 
collect votes by distributing millions of dollars coming from Turkey to their 
partisans [and] exerting pressure.768 They are trying to deceive desperate people.769 
                                                        
764 The amount reached to USD 244 million and 89 thousand accounts by 2003 after failing of some other 
banks (TC Yardım Heyeti 2004: 3 and 30-1).  
765 “KKTC İsyan Havasında [TRNC in the rebellion mood].” Radikal, 25.7.2000. 
766 “Aylık Miktar 160’dan 200 Sterlin’e Çıkarıldı [The monthly amount increased from 160 to 200 British 
pounds].” Avrupa, 6.1.2001. 
767 Reportedly, this was refused by Eroğlu in an unpleasant manner, sowing the first seeds of the tension 
between Turkish government and Eroğlu’s UBP (Muharrem Sarıkaya: “Bakan Gürel’den Eroğlu’na: Benim 
Tabanım da 65 Milyon [From the minister Gürel to Eroğlu: My base is 65 million].” Hürriyet, 30.7.2000). 
768  This was not the first time that Denktaş accused Eroğlu of vote buying. He made similar statements after 
the parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1998 (see for instance “Denktaş: Milli Dava Kazandı [Denktaş: The 
national cause has won]” Kıbrıs, 7.12.1998). For more on vote buying in north Cyprus see Hylland 2004.  
769 “Denktaş’ın Sorusu, Tamam mı devam mı [Denktaş’s question: should I stay or should I go]?” Hürriyet, 
28.3.2000. 
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Despite Denktaş’s strong negative campaign, in the first round of the election, Eroğlu 
gained a significant share of the vote with 30 percent, six percentage points more than he 
had received in the first round in 1995, and once again forced Denktaş for a run-off. 
However, the run-off eventually would not be held as increasing pressure from Turkey led 
Eroğlu to surrender and withdraw his candidacy.770 Yet, for Denktaş, this was not enough. 
Immediately after he has sworn in, he aired his discontent about Eroğlu once again, stating 
that it was no longer possible for him to work in harmony with Eroğlu, and explicitly 
calling for his and the foreign minister Ertuğruloğlu’s resignation.771 Eroğlu retorted that 
nobody but his party congress could oust him, thus further escalating the tension.772   
In the meantime, the coincidence of Eroğlu’s withdrawal from the presidential race and the 
release of USD 100 million in loan by Ankara773 was evaluated as a clear indication that 
Ankara would involve itself in this power struggle by playing the financial assistance card 
to bring Eroğlu into line. Later, the Turkish government maintained this policy by tying the 
release of desperately needed funds to the implementation of an economic austerity 
package, which would substantially reduce the incomes of public sector employees and 
pensioners, the main clientele of the UBP. The Turkish government was quite convinced 
that their money was not used properly and squandered by the Eroğlu government, and 
was determined to put the financial burden of the crisis on the government’s shoulders.774 
In fact, as Ecevit and Gürel made it clear, it was not a big deal for Turkey to bail the Turkish 
Cypriots out of this crisis; however, the Turkish Cypriots had to clean up their act first.775   
The government was between a rock and a hard place. Not only the opposition parties and 
trade unions –usual suspects- but this time the business community too was opposed to 
the proposed package. The trade unions and the opposition criticized the package for 
depriving employees of their acquired rights, while the business community argued that 
                                                        
770 Reportedly, Eroğlu implied that Ankara made him withdraw (Hakan Gülseven: “KKTC’de Kötü Koku [Foul 
smell in the TRNC].” Radikal, 22.4.2000; Sedat Sertoğlu: “Kıbrıs’ta Tehlikeli Tezgah [Dangerious plot in 
Cyprus].” Sabah, 27.7.2000).  
771 “KKTC Denktaş’a Teslim [The TRNC entrusted to Denktaş].” Radikal, 21.4.2000.  
772 Ibid.  
773 Erdal Güven: “KKTC’nin Seçimi [The TRNC’s choice].” Radikal, 21.4.2000; “Tercih de Plan da Belliydi [Both 
preference and plan were known in advance].” Radikal, 22.4.2000.  
774 See for instance Güneri Civaoğlu: “Kıbrıs’ta Bugün [Today in Cyprus].” Milliyet, 1.8.2000.   
775 Uğur Ergan and Metehan Demir: “İşte Kıbrıs Raporu [Here is the Cyprus report].” Hürriyet, 27.7.2000; 
Kıbrıs, 29.7.2000; Fikret Bila: “Ecevit: KKTC Disipline Olmalı [The TRNC needs to be brought under 
discipline].” Milliyet, 28.7.2000.  
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the package was incomplete. According to the İŞAD, the sole aim of the package was to cut 
public expenditures rather than giving a boost to the economy. This would curb demand 
and push the economy further into depression rather than fixing it. İŞAD urged the 
government to complement it with measures that would promote the private sector in 
order to secure growth.776    
Having failed to implement the austerity measures on time due to massive opposition, in 
July 2000, the government paid the salaries of public sector employees with great 
difficulties and with a week’s delay.777 Even more importantly, the government also 
announced that it would stop paying the bank depositors’ compensations of which three 
installments had so far been paid, due to lack of financial resources. To paraphrase a 
metaphor from Warren Buffet, when the tide of Turkish handouts had gone out it became 
evident that the government was swimming naked.778   
As if this was not enough trouble, the commander of the Security Forces (Güvenlik 
Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, GKK), Ali Nihat Özeyranlı, a Turkish brigadier general, opened a 
second front against the Eroğlu government. The issue was the junior coalition partner 
TKP’s demand to transfer the control of the police department from military to civilian 
authority as it was stated in the coalition protocol. Tension between the TKP leader and 
deputy prime minister Akıncı, and Özeyranlı peaked when the latter, during an opening 
ceremony, stated that the special conditions on the island made it impossible to civilianize 
the police department. Akıncı left the ceremony in protest.779 The next day, the general 
made a statement that criticized Akıncı in a humiliating manner and accused him of 
treason. 780  He also demanded that Eroğlu sack the directors of BRT, the public 
broadcasting corporation and TAK, the public news agency, as these two institutions 
                                                        
776 “İŞAD İkinci Ekonomik Paketi Değerlendirdi [İŞAD evaluated the second economic package].” Kıbrıs, 
26.7.2000. 
777 “Maaşlar Nihayet Ödendi [Salaries finally paid].” Kıbrıs, 8.7.2000.  
778 For the original metaphor, “It's only when the tide goes out that you can see who's swimming naked,” see 
“Danger Time for America” The Economist, 14.1.2006. 
779 “Polis Genel Müdürlüğü Binası Törenle Açıldı [The General Directorate of Police Department opened with 
a ceremony].”Avrupa, 1.7.2000.  
780 See “Turkish Cyprus: Not a Baby.” The Economist, 20.7.2000.  
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“censored his statements”. He also called on parliament to start an investigation against 
Eroğlu, should he not sack them.781  
Tension escalated further when Şener Levent, the editor of the Avrupa newspaper, was 
arrested, along with three other journalists, on charges of espionage.782 Avrupa, one of the 
champions of Cypriot identity, had been a staunch critic of the regime and heavily criticized 
Ankara’s proposed economic austerity package and the Turkish commander’s meddling in 
the internal affairs of north Cyprus before the arrests.783 The general’s statements and 
detentions of the journalists sparked strong public criticism. In the Economist’s words, “a 
score of liberal political parties, trade unions and non-governmental organisations in 
northern Cyprus have formed a ‘platform against oppression,’ denounced the arrests and 
demanded the immediate replacement of General Ozeyranli”.784 Cengiz Çandar’s words 
cited in the same article would later turn out to be a prescient warning to the Turkish 
establishment which went unheeded: “If things continue like this, Cyprus, which was lost 
neither on the battleground nor at the negotiating table, will be lost because of the 
domestic situation in northern Cyprus.”785 
It was this perfect storm, which prepared the ground for the marginalized opposition to 
reconnect with the electorate. With a view to translating the community’s accumulated 
anger and frustration into political action, the opposition parties, trade unions, and other 
civil society organizations called on the public to demonstrate against the “imposition of 
the economic package of destruction” and “the intervention of the military in civilian life,” 
and to protest “the imprisonment of journalists on false charges”. At the same time, the 
organizers expressed their support for a peaceful settlement for the Cyprus problem, 
attributing the recent woes to the perpetuation of the conflict.786 In short, this was a rally 
against the status quo, which was defined as an all-encompassing social, cultural, political, 
and economic establishment. The rally proved to be a huge success and subsequently its 
organizers came together to form a platform under the name “This Country is Ours;” a clear 
                                                        
781 “Ne Komutan [What a commander]!” Avrupa, 2.7.2000. 
782 The evidence presented against the journalists was so flimsy that few days later the court freed them, 
pending trial (The Economist, 20.7.2000).  
783 “In a front-page story, the newspaper told the general: ‘Look, you are not the one to decide who is a traitor 
and who is a patriot. Before you were in Cyprus, we were here. When you leave, we will still be here.’ (ibid.) 
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid.  
786 Avrupa, 15,16,17,18, July 2000.  
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message to Ankara. The platform was to constitute the backbone of the opposition 
movement that would challenge the regime in the months to come. It would prove 
instrumental in mobilizing what Kızılyürek calls “post-nationalist Cypriot patriotism,” as a 
broad-based people’s movement (2003: 298-9). 
Less than a week after the opposition’s rally, the bank depositors held a demonstration to 
protest the government, which had ceased to pay the monthly compensation installments. 
The demonstration culminated in the storming of the parliament by angry demonstrators. 
The police used tear gas and sound bombs to disperse the furious crowd, and arrested 
around sixty demonstrators.787 Referring to the police brutality, Şener Levent wrote that 
this was much worse than the reaction of the British commandoes against the Turkish 
Cypriot protesters during the 27-28 January 1958 demonstrations against the British 
colonial administration.788    
In the face of overwhelming pressure, Eroğlu desperately sought to mend fences with the 
Turkish government. However, his requests for an appointment were repeatedly turned 
down by Ecevit.789 This was an ironic situation for a prime minister who had come to 
power with promises of more money from Turkey. Referring to these promises, the editor 
of the influential daily Kıbrıs, Başaran Düzgün, wrote an article entitled “Begging for 
Appointment,” where in a sarcastic way he said let alone money, Eroğlu was not able to get 
an appointment from Ankara.790 Ecevit was firm. At some point, he even proposed 
switching to the presidential system as a way out of the crisis.791 Another idea, which was 
floated in the Turkish media, was forming a technocratic government.792    
In the meantime, after consultations in Ankara, Denktaş decided to withdraw from the 
ongoing inter-communal negotiations in November 2000 on the grounds that “the 
negotiations were a waste of time” (Kızılyürek 2005: 269). His intention was to achieve his 
long-desired goal of integration with Turkey by derailing the negotiation process that could 
                                                        
787 “Büyük Tutuklama [Many arrested].” Kıbrıs, 25.7.2000.  
788 “Kuzular ve Şahinler [Lambs and hawks].” Avrupa, 25.7.2000.  
789 Erdal Güven: “Nereye Kadar [Until where]?” Radikal, 28.7.2000.  
790 29.7.2000. See also “Ankara Eroğlu’na Randevu Vermedi [Ankara did not give Eroğlu an appointment].” 
Avrupa, 31.7.2000. 
791 “Bülent Ecevit KKTC için Başkanlık Sistemi Önerdi [Ecevit proposed presidential system for the TRNC].” 
Kıbrıs, 29.7.2000.  
792 See Başaran Düzgün, “Ötenazi mi Demokrasi mi [Is it euthanasia or democracy]?” Kıbrıs, 31.7.2000.  
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have resulted in reunification and EU membership (ibid.). To this end, in early 2001, the 
Turkish council of ministers took some measures envisaging integration between Turkey 
and the TRNC in diverse domains. When the Turkish daily Sabah announced the measures 
with an article, entitled “Cyprus, the 82nd Province,”793 the Turkish Cypriot public opinion 
was angered once again. Though it turned out that the measures were less dramatic than 
the sensational headline suggested, the decision was not welcomed on the island.794 
According to the CTP leader Talat this plan would lead to the “annihilation of the Turkish 
Cypriots”.795 He withdrew the CTP’s representative from the Association Council, stating, 
“the CTP would not be a partner in this sin [and] that they would never accept its 
results”.796   
The Eroğlu government, however, had no other option but to give in to Ankara’s pressure. 
By signing the “Economic and Financial Cooperation Protocol” with the Turkish 
government after months of foot-dragging, the government agreed to implement the 
proposed austerity program on 12 January 2001797, and secured USD 350 million, which 
enabled it, inter alia, to resume the compensation payments of bank depositors. The 
strongest opposition to the protocol came from the influential trade union of primary 
school teachers, KTÖS. KTÖS gave an advertisement to local newspapers addressing 
Ankara798 on the day a Turkish official came to the island. “We neither want your money, 
nor your package, nor your civil servants,” the ad declared (Güven 2003: 73-4).  
In the face of growing dissidence, the regime did not sit on its hands. It responded by 
employing its battle-tested tactics, nationalistic arousal with a pinch of terror, to clamp 
down on social unrest. As in 1996, the pro-reunification junior coalition partner was kicked 
out of the government, and a grand coalition between the UBP and DP was formed. Akıncı’s 
                                                        
793 Avrupa, 1.3.2001.   
794 The idea of integration was not popular among the Turkish Cypriots. According to a poll, when asked 
about the best solution to the Cyprus problem, only 11.5 percent in 1997, 8.2 percent in December 1999 and 
7.7 percent in August 2000, of the respondents said they were in favour of integration with Turkey 
(Yenidüzen, 1.4.2002).  
795 “KKTC ‘Kurtarılacak’ [The TRNC will be ‘rescued’].” Radikal, 5.1.2001.  
796 “CTP Ortaklık Konseyi’nden Temsilcisini Geri Çekti [The CTP withdrew its representative from the 
Association Council].” Avrupa, 5.1.2001.  
797 TC Yardım Heyeti (2004: 1). 
798 Kıbrıs refused to run it. Only Yenidüzen and independent Avrupa agreed to run it. 
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stance towards Ankara “cost him his job as deputy prime minister in the Turkish-Cypriot 
government”.799 To quote the Economist once again,  
A newspaper critical of Mr Denktash, Avrupa, has been hit by a bomb. Mr Denktash 
has accused advocates of a Greek-Turkish dialogue of being ‘spies on the payroll of 
foreign diplomats’ -and has recently said he has evidence to prove it. A group called 
the National Action Movement [sic], which goes around villages reminding residents 
of atrocities committed by Greek-Cypriots before 1974 and heaps praise on ‘our 
saviours from the Motherland’, is said to have been conceived by Mr Denktash and 
his mentors in Turkey.800  
In the meantime, another economic shock struck when the Turkish government decided to 
drop exchange rate controls and allow the Turkish lira to float in February 2001. To quote 
James Arnold of BBC, this was the worst financial crisis to hit Turkey since World War II. As 
a result, Turkish citizens “have seen the dollar value of their savings and incomes halve, 
while their financial obligations - usually set in hard currency – ballooned” in the following 
year. 801 Needless to say, Turkish Cypriots, who use the Turkish lira as legal tender, were in 
the same sinking boat. The society as a whole was impoverished. Yet, the two groups’ 
situation is of particular importance as what held the rest of the economy on its feet was 
the consumption of these groups. These were the public sector employees and pensioners, 
whose incomes eroded considerably as a result of the implementation of the austerity 
measures: in 2001 and 2002, in average real terms, salaries and pensions were 30 percent 
less than their 2000 level.802 One might look at the financial assistance figures and say 
Ankara indeed increased the amount of money transferred in the period concerned. This is 
true. However, it should be borne in mind that the bulk of these transfers went to the 
compensation payments of bank depositors 803 , and this severely curtailed the 
government’s distributive capacity. 
This was a serious blow for a regime, which grew increasingly dependent on political 
clientelism. The first poll results after the introduction of the Annan Plan confirmed this: 
83.5 percent of the military and police personnel; 78 percent of the teachers; 77 percent of 
other public sector employees; and 65 percent of workers said that they would vote in 
                                                        
799 “Divided Cyprus: The danger of over-doggedness.” The Economist, 19.7.2001. 
800 Ibid.  
801 James Arnold: “Analysis: Turkey’s year of crisis.” 21.2.2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1833730.stm (accessed 15.3.2012).  
802 TC Yardım Heyeti (2004: 32-3). 
803 Ibid. 
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favor of the plan, should a referendum be held.804 Obviously, the public sector employees 
were not willing to unilaterally fulfill their side of the clientelistic deal in the absence of 
rewards from the government side.   
Certainly, the transformative process that was set in motion with these events cannot be 
grasped in economic terms alone. As Yücel argues, the series of developments outlined 
above were the manifestation of an “economic-political-social chaos” that posed an 
“existential threat” to the community (2003: 37). This chaos clearly demonstrated that 
“neither democracy, nor a sustainable economy, nor a state in a real sense could be 
formed,” despite thirty years that had elapsed since the division of the island (Kızılyürek 
2005: 388-9). As The Economist commented in the wake of the dispute between the 
Turkish general and the government, the claim that “the Turkish north Cyprus is an 
independent state and recognized as such” began to ring hollow.805 The taksim project had 
failed to realize most of its promises and was virtually bankrupt. As Lacher and Kaymak 
suggest: 
the TRNC is a ‘failing state’; its legitimacy has eroded as more and more Turkish 
Cypriots question whether this state actually reflects their political will … it is not 
just an increasing dissatisfaction with the failure to gain external recognition, but 
wide-ranging skepticism as to the quality of the TRNC’s internal sovereignty that 
prevails (2005: 155). 
Crucially, this bankruptcy or “state failure” coincided with the rise of a new tide. Now, a 
“solution based on a common state” also meant automatic EU membership. This was an 
important element in mobilizing mass-support among people (Kızılyürek 2005: 389). For 
the first time, a concrete political project had emerged that could challenge the monopoly 
of Turkish nationalism. Particularly, common people came to perceive the EU as a panacea 
for various economic ills of the establishment.806 Just as significantly, the same perception 
was gaining ground in the ranks of the business community as well. The EU membership 
represented an opportunity for normalization in economy that would allow the private 
sector to thrive without being held hostage by the UBP. This was indeed one of the 
                                                        
804 The public opinion poll was conducted by KADEM, which is considered as one of the most reliable 
pollsters (“İşte Referandum [Here’s the referendum].” Kıbrıs, 6.1.2003).  
805 “Turkish Cyprus: Not a Baby”. 
806 For instance see the poll published in Yenidüzen (Muharrem Faiz: “Kıbrıslı Türkler Ne Düşünüyor [What 
do Turkish Cypriots think]?” Yenidüzen, 1.4.2002).  
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novelties of this movement. Especially, the election of a liberal-minded, pro-EU 
businessman, Ali Erel, as chairman of the KTTO gave a significant boost to the pro-
reunification camp (Bahceli 2004). With this move, the chamber, which had been hitherto 
one of the bulwarks of the taksim policies, reinvented itself as the champion of “solution 
and EU membership”. Only few years earlier it was issuing statements against not only 
official but also unofficial contacts with the Greek Cypriot side.807 Erel’s chairmanship can 
be seen as the defeat of the conservative business elite by the liberal ones, which had 
organized earlier under İŞAD. The pro-solution stance of İŞAD, which was fiercely attacked 
by the chamber few years ago, now came to dominate the chamber.  
Soon, six other business associations, including the hoteliers, bankers, and building 
contractors, joined the pro-reunification movement, launching a public relations campaign 
to urge both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials not to miss the chance to reach a 
settlement before the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit.  
By joining forces with the parties on the left, and trade unions, which had established “This 
Country is Ours Platform” earlier, the KTTO helped broadening the social base of the 
movement. The new umbrella organization established in August 2002 was named 
“Common Vision”. The Common Vision, which was comprised of 91 professional 
associations and civil society organizations, became the spearhead of the “Solution and EU” 
movement, bringing together, according to some accounts, up to 60 thousand Turkish 
Cypriots -almost one third of the population- in mass demonstrations (Bahceli 2004). In 
June 2002 local elections, this liberal-left wing coalition showed that it could translate its 
influence on the streets into electoral success when the CTP won the mayoralties in three 
big towns, Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia by garnering some 34 percent of votes with its 
election campaign based on the slogan: “Open the door to solution and EU membership”. 
The chamber’s support in Nicosia was so remarkable that it led some to comment that the 
CTP candidate, Kutlay Erk, a former chairman of the İŞAD, was in fact the candidate of the 
KTTO (An 2004:  149-51).    
                                                        
807 See for instance “Ticaret Odası Görüşmelere Karşı [The chamber of commerce is against the negotiations].” 
Ortam, 16.12.1998.  
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This is to say, when the Annan Plan was introduced in November 2002, there was already 
an unprecedented momentum behind the reunification movement. This was revealed by 
the initial polls conducted right after the introduction of the Annan Plan in December. 
Almost two thirds of the respondents were ready to approve the first version of the plan, 
indicating that the following period, which culminated with the referendum, was by no 
means an uphill struggle for the proponents of reunification and EU membership.808   
Certainly, this is not to deny the effect of the pro-EU Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government’s new Cyprus policy in the process. However, 
considering the fact that the AKP came to power in November 2002, it would not be wrong 
to suggest that the AKP’s stance gave a boost to the dynamics that were already at work 
rather than initiating them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
808 “İşte Referandum [Here is the referendum].” Kıbrıs, 6.1.2003.  
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Conclusions 
How can we explain the Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the UN’s reunification plan in 2004, 
given the fact that they had kept pro-partition leaders in power for almost half a century? 
This study aimed to answer this question within the analytical framework offered by the 
political clientelism literature. Basically, I argued that the yes vote, which represented a 
sharp departure from the taksim policy of the nationalist ruling elite, was triggered by a 
crisis of the clientelistic system, which had been the main source of legitimacy of the post-
1974 order. 
What do we know about the role and nature of clientelism in Turkish Cypriot politics? Not 
much. The review of the relevant literature showed that though the presence of patronage 
politics in the northern part of Cyprus has been referred to in passing in many works, a 
comprehensive study, which analyzes the causes of its birth and charts the development of 
these practices in detail with a historical approach, has yet to be done. Therefore, to fill this 
gap, overall the study mainly dealt with the emergence, development and crisis of political 
clientelism in the Turkish Cypriot political life in conjunction with its effects on the Cyprus 
problem and politico-economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
Against this backdrop, the study started with a chapter on political clientelism, which 
outlines the theoretical framework of the dissertation. After identifying what it is, and 
elaborating on the differences between the traditional and modern forms of patronage, I 
overviewed the culturalist, developmentalist and institutionalist approaches, which try to 
account for the emergence of political clientelism in different contexts.  
Which of these theories does offer the best framework to understand the case of north 
Cyprus? Was political clientelism in the post-1974 period a consequence of the pre-existing 
patron-client ties as the culturalist and developmentalist approaches presuppose? Did it 
emerge after the independence of the island in 1960? Or was it a post-1974 phenomenon? 
To answer these questions, in the first chapter of the empirical part, the possible roots of 
political clientelism have been investigated with an historical approach, which extended to 
the beginning of the British period. Here, I showed that the prevalence of political 
clientelism in the post-1974 period could not be attributed to pre-existing patron-client 
ties because (a) the pattern of land-ownership i.e. majority of the farmers were peasant-
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proprietors, was not conducive to the formation of lasting patron-client relations; (b) the 
British solved the problem of peasant indebtedness and hence blocked the possible rise of 
money-lenders as a patron group; (c) particularly after the abolition of the legislative 
assembly in 1931, we cannot talk about electoral politics, and (d) in the Republic period 
there was an authoritarian, military rule where there was no room for political competition 
and therefore mass clientelism.   
If political clientelism was not inherited from the pre-democratic past, then how can we 
explain its emergence in the post-1974 period? In Chapter Three, following, to a large 
extent, the institutionalist approach, I demonstrated that the emergence of clientelistic 
politics was basically the consequence of a deliberate strategy adopted by the ruling 
nationalist elite to outmobilize the opposition in the first multi-party elections. I argued 
that the programmatic difference between contending political blocs i.e. polarization in the 
political arena, played an important role in prompting the nationalist elite to opt for a 
clientelistic mobilization strategy. This is to say, to create an image of mass support behind 
the taksim idea, which was at the time opposed not only by the local opposition but also by 
the mainstream political actors in Ankara, the nationalist leadership adopted a clientelistic 
strategy in the establishment process of their political party, the UBP. The absence of a 
constituency for bureaucratic autonomy, which could have blocked the adoption of this 
strategy; abundance of public resources under their disposal; and the wider socio 
economic context made the conditions for the adoption of this strategy more favourable.  
What were the basic characteristics of the UBP at the time of its establishment? In other 
words, what does make the UBP a clientelistic party? In Chapter Four, I tried to answer this 
question by analyzing its program, social composition, constitution and organization. I 
showed that what brought the founders together was not program or ideology but rather 
clientelistic linkages by illustrating the lack of cohesion in its program, and irreconcilable 
conflicts of interest in its cadres, who, given their social backgrounds did not make natural 
allies. The leadership’s puzzling decision to organize itself in the mass party format is also 
worth mentioning here. This was an odd choice because as an internally mobilized party, 
they did not need mass membership to finance the party’s activities. This decision largely 
stemmed from the leadership’s desire (a) to outdo the HP, which had adopted a similar 
model and reached over three thousand members in a short time; (b) to show that a big 
majority espoused its taksim policy, and (c) to renew the cadres around Denktaş. This was 
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a critical choice because by removing the discretion of party leaders on the selection of 
candidates, this model had detrimental effects on the existing cadre’s prospects of 
maintaining their position, and paved the way for the ascendance of a different breed of 
politicians, the new guard, who would before long capture the party administration –
something, which was discussed in detail in Chapter Five. In the last section of Chapter 
Four, I also illustrated how the UBP machine used public resources first to recruit members 
and then to mobilize voters in the run up to the first multi-party election. 
How can we explain inertia in government and chaos within the UBP, two things, which 
have characterized the post-1974 politico-economic order? To what extent did the 
institutional choices made in the UBP’s and TFSC’s establishment process affect the 
functioning of the UBP in particular, and politico-economic development of the Turkish 
Cypriot society in general? I tried to answer these broad questions in the Chapters Five and 
Six. The first section of Chapter Five was devoted to the roots of the political turmoil, which 
would paralyze the country and the UBP in the decades to come. Here, particularly, I tried 
to answer two questions: How can we explain the chaos within the UBP, which brought the 
party to the brink of a complete disintegration in only few years? What was the role of 
Denktaş in all this? I showed that basically the chaos within the party was due to two 
parallel power struggles: one between the president, and the prime minister, who was also 
the UBP leader; and another between the old guard and the new guard. So, inertia of 
government was only a side effect of the power struggle for the control of the party. 
Institutional factors, like the electoral system and form of government also aggravated the 
situation. To be more precise, the open list electoral system led to the personalization of 
politics, intensified intra-party competition for getting re-elected and hence promoted 
disunity. The semi-presidential character of the government, on the other hand, strained 
the relations between the president and prime minister. While eventually one of these 
parallel power struggles came to an end after the election of Eroğlu to party chairmanship 
in 1983, which signified the victory of the new guard, this did not stabilize the country 
because the tension between the president and the UBP leader got even more intensified.    
At the inter-party level, not surprisingly, this turmoil proved to be extremely costly for the 
UBP. Despite all the patronage power it mobilized and the nationalistic propaganda it 
spread, the party lost its majority in the parliament as early as in 1981. Yet, it remained in 
power as the junta in Turkey dictated so. This move exposed the role of Ankara. Obviously, 
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it was setting strict limits to what was and what was not allowed to happen in the northern 
part of Cyprus. In other words, just like in post World War II Italy and Greece, here too, a 
“guided democracy” was prevailing. In this respect, it is important to note that highlighting 
the important role of political clientelism in maintaining the pro-taksim policies does not 
mean that this is the sole problem in an otherwise democratic, autonomous state with free 
and fair elections. The Turkish Cypriot democracy is flawed in many respects; the biggest 
of them being the tutelage of Ankara, which can be seen as an integral element of the 
system as its roots can be traced back to the mid-1950s, as shown in Chapter Two. 
Overall, in Chapter Five, I also aimed to show how it turned out that no matter how useful it 
was in mobilizing masses in election times, when it came to governing, and particularly 
delivering public goods, the system proved extremely inept in a way constantly sowing the 
seeds of its own destruction. This had something to do with the nature of machine parties. 
In the absence of a binding ideology and a too broad base that makes interest aggregation 
almost impossible, the UBP governments have never managed to go beyond kicking the can 
down the road. It should be also added that by exposing the lack of discipline within the 
party, an indirect indicator showing that a party is held together by clientelistic linkages, I 
tried to highlight that the UBP has been a machine party.    
What did eventually bring about the crisis that led to the collapse of the regime? What did 
make the regime, paradoxically, so resilient yet at the same time so fragile? Chapter Six was 
devoted to the analysis of the dynamics, which have maintained and then undermined 
machine politics. I argued that the prospect of EU membership was part of the answer for 
the first question. But if this was the case, then another question had to be answered: Why 
did the kicking in of the much-expected catalyst effect of the prospective EU membership in 
shifting the Turkish Cypriot position in the inter-communal negotiations take so long? The 
answer had two dimensions: (a) at the ruling elite level the EU did not have much appeal 
anyway. Indeed, the EU’s approach even backfired and gave Denktaş a pretext to be even 
less cooperative; (b) at the mass level, on the other hand, the tangible benefits offered by 
the regime or simply patronage politics, obviously outweighed the abstract and uncertain 
benefits of the possible EU membership.  
Yet, it should be borne in mind that the survival of patronage politics cannot be taken for 
granted indefinitely because it is subject to changes in the politico-economic dynamics, and 
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certainly some dynamics were constantly undermining it. What made the system so fragile 
were the accumulated ills of decades of patronage politics on the economy and society. I 
touched upon this in the first section of Chapter Six, where I made a comparison with the 
DC and Italian case, which share something in common with the Turkish Cypriot case: 
political clientelism and guided democracy. This is to say, in a clientelistic system where 
the opposition is declared unfit to come to power and alternation of power is effectively 
blocked, the system loses its sole mechanism to correct itself. The most obvious side effects 
of this deadly combination, in both cases, were an inefficient and over-bloated public sector, 
widespread corruption and overall failure in delivering public goods. 
To elaborate on this, in the rest of Chapter Six, I showed (a) that the public sector was even 
more bloated than it has been widely assumed, and (b) that this was the consequence of 
bureaucratic clientelism. In the absence of any large-scale productive sector that could act 
as a locomotive for the rest of the economy, the cost of sustaining the system gradually 
grew, and at some point in the mid-1990s spun out of control. The result was an “assisted 
society,” which made the whole politico-economic structure not only susceptible to 
economic crisis but also, as soon it would turn out, to the political meddling of the sponsor 
of this clientelistic system: Ankara. 
Given these weaknesses, as also pointed out by Chubb (1982: 211-6), it can be argued that 
the long term resilience of clientelistic systems can be accounted for in the context of a 
collective action problem. This is to say, no matter how bad the situation is for the society 
as a whole, individuals do not have much incentive to try to change the system until 
something major changes the calculus in their minds and makes collective action possible. 
In the case of Naples, for instance, it was the cholera outbreak of 1973, which provided the 
essential stimulus to bring an end to the DC rule in the local government (ibid.: 249). In the 
Turkish Cypriot case, the stimulus for change was a mixture of factors: a banking crisis, 
whose effects were worsened (a) by the involvement of Ankara in the power struggle 
between nationalist leaders, and (b) by a financial crisis. It was the coincidence of this 
multiple crisis with the immediate prospect of the EU membership, a perfect storm, I 
argued, which brought about the nationalists’ sudden fall from grace and “yes” in the 
referendum.  
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Is there anything peculiar about the Turkish Cypriot political clientelism? What are the 
specific features of the Turkish Cypriot case compared to the other cases? The peculiarity 
of the Turkish Cypriot case stems from the Cyprus conflict, which to a large extent has 
conditioned the way the system has been operating since its inception. Take the two of the 
favorite patronage resources, for instance. Distributing the Greek Cypriot properties to the 
voters, and granting TRNC citizenship en masse to the Turkish citizens in the run up to the 
elections seem to be peculiar to this case, which in the absence of the Cyprus conflict would 
not be possible. By distributing these “resources,” the UBP did not only tighten its grip on 
power but also undermined the prospects of reunification of the island –the party’s raison 
d’etre. Furthermore, its image as the sole guardian of the status quo and the Turkish 
interests in the island in the eyes of the establishment in Ankara has turned the UBP into a 
gatekeeper, which effectively monopolized the distribution of jobs and other favours. This 
meant the total exclusion of the pro-reunification opposition parties; something that we 
cannot see in the cases of Italy or southern Cyprus for instance. In the case of the Cold War 
era Italy, for example, when it came to the distribution of public jobs, thanks to “the so-
called lottizzazione [carve-up]” (Morlino et al. 2000:76), “candidates for public 
appointments were chosen on the basis of the strength of their party” (Edwards 2005: 227), 
where even the Italian Communist Party was not left out (Morlino et al. 2000: 77). The 
same applies to the Greek Cypriot case too (Faustmann 2010).   
Does the crisis outlined in this dissertation mean that the era of political clientelism in the 
Turkish Cypriot political life has come to an end once and for all? Or will there be a revival? 
Alas, it is not possible to talk about the demise of political clientelism in Turkish Cypriot 
politics. Recent developments show that the crisis of political clientelism, which brought 
about the end of the hegemony of the UBP, was a temporary one. A revival already came, 
and indeed, it did strikingly. The UBP had made a comeback in the 2009 parliamentary 
election by garnering 44 percent of the votes –its third best performance in a general 
election after 1976 and 1990! Furthermore, in the presidential election in 2010, its 
chairman Eroğlu who came back from retirement has easily won the presidency.  
Did being five years away from government change the UBP? No. The UBP’s latest stint in 
power was not so different from the previous ones. Indeed, what we have observed in the 
few years following Eroğlu’s ascendance to presidency was like watching the remake of an 
old movie: A succession crisis, a power struggle between the president and the prime 
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minister –or to put it another way, between former and current leaders of the UBP- and 
eventually splintering.  
When he got elected to the presidency, like Denktaş, Eroğlu stepped down from the 
leadership of the party as the constitution dictated. With a twist of fate, this gave the old 
master of patronage and the architect of the UBP machine, İrsen Küçük the chance to make 
a comeback and grab the party leadership as well as the premiership. Yet, as it was the case 
with Denktaş, Eroğlu was not willing to give up his hegemony over the party. As his 
predecessor did, no wonder, he also faced with resistance from the new chairman. This 
new round of intra-party conflict of power led to turmoil within the party, and inertia in 
government. And once again, the Turkish government picked a side in this struggle and 
threw its full weight behind Küçük. Emboldened by Ankara’s support, Küçük used the full 
patronage power of the state to retain his chairmanship in the 2012 party congress against 
Ahmet Kaşif, who was the favored candidate of Eroğlu. Yet, he failed to garner enough 
votes to win in the first round. Only after months of controversy and a court order, Küçük 
accepted a run-off, which he won by a whisker: 708 to 701. As of the time of writing, 
another split have occurred within the UBP. Eight dissident deputies resigned from the 
UBP with the endorsement of Eroğlu, ironically, to join an earlier splinter movement, which 
came into being after an intra-party revolt against Eroğlu back in 1992: the DP. 
Subsequently, they forced Küçük to resign as prime minister by voting in favour of a 
motion of no confidence. The ensuing early election, which was held on 28 July 2013 led to 
the formation of a CTP-DP government against the will of Ankara -as if history is repeating 
itself.  
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Annex  
Table 7: The Turkish financial assistance as percentage of the budget expenditures. 
Year 
Budget Expenditure 
(USD) 
Turkish Aid 
(USD) BE/TA (%) 
1977 65,170,329.7 18,259,231 28.0 
1978 58,345,528.5 23,158,745 39.7 
1979 65,054,347.8 19,288,386 29.6 
1980 56,047,936.1 27,224,576 48.6 
1981 63,892,035.4 31,321,535 49.0 
1982 59,158,730.2 37,164,285 62.8 
1983 70,207,937.9 44,867,325 63.9 
1984 73,391,399.0 52,862,207 72.0 
1985 86,671,777.4 38,051,352 43.9 
1986 103,243,480.8 48,340,879 46.8 
1987 121,621,903.7 44,066,301 36.2 
1988 105,979,043.6 35,657,293 33.6 
1989 120,187,191.5 38,353,117 31.9 
1990 200,363,882.1 58,648,787 29.3 
1991 212,174,575.6 76,422,671 36.0 
1992 198,560,652.5 93,529,092 47.1 
1993 225,468,367.2 82,623,645 36.6 
1994 209,270,687.3 50,628,985 24.2 
1995 293,320,522.5 44,262,629 15.1 
1996 296,779,987.9 91,921,534 31.0 
1997 323,841,392.8 199,385,809 61.6 
1998 403,647,258.4 184,081,346 45.6 
1999 455,094,061.6 162,361,566 35.7 
2000 530,378,838.1 226,852,576 42.8 
2001 418,220,888.7 209,590,904 50.1 
2002 531,813,423.7 282,007,478 53.0 
2003 691,441,329.8 356,760,133 51.6 
2004 883,601,641.6 379,544,828 43.0 
Source: Prepared by author based on financial assistance figures (TC Yardım Heyeti 2004: 25); budget 
expenditure figures (State Planning Organization: Economic and Social Indicators, available at 
http://www.devplan.org/Frame-eng.html  (accessed on 16.5.2013). The average exchange rate figures to 
convert the budget expenditure figures, which were available in current TL prices to USD (ibid.).  
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